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Defendant's Attorney: Shannon B. Wiesedeppe

Description:

Houston, Texas - Divorce lawyer represented Appellant with a failing to pay child support and medical support charge.

The lengthy proceedings underlying this appeal began in April 2004, when
the Office of the Attorney General filed an original petition in a suit affecting the
parent-child relationship (SAPCR) on behalf of appellee Doneisha Cheree Davis.1
The trial court signed an agreed order finding that Francis was the father of a minor
child with Davis. The order appointed the parties as joint managing conservators,
with Davis having the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary residence.
The order required Francis to pay child and medical support to Davis. The order also
required Francis to pay retroactive child support, and it withheld his income for
support.
Over the next decade, the court entered several modification and enforcement
orders due to Francis’s nonpayment. In April 2008, the court found Francis in
contempt for not paying child and medical support. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 157.001(b) (authorizing court to enforce any provision of temporary or final order
1 Davis did not file a brief on appeal. Moreover, the record on appeal consists only of
a clerk’s record.
3
by contempt). The court committed Francis to the county jail for 180 days, but
suspended commitment and placed him on community supervision for 120 months
or until he paid the child support arrearage. See id. § 157.211 (authorizing court to
suspend commitment and place respondent on community supervision). In 2011, the
court revoked Francis’s community supervision for violations of its terms. See id.
§§ 157.214, 157.215(a), 157.216. The court released Francis from commitment in
March 2012.
In September 2014, the court signed a non-agreed child support review order.
Francis, represented by counsel, filed a petition to modify the support order in 2016.
2
He argued that the prior order was “not based on a mediated or collaborative law
settlement agreement.” He also argued that the parties’ circumstances had materially
and substantially changed since the prior order, such that the retroactive and ongoing
support payments should be decreased.
In 2018, the Attorney General filed a motion for enforcement of child and
medical support, asserting that Francis was more than $22,000 behind on payments.
The Attorney General asked the court to hold Francis in contempt and enter
judgment on the arrears. A copy of the motion for enforcement and notice of the
hearing on it was served on Francis by personal service. See id. § 157.062(c). The
2 The record on appeal does not indicate whether the trial court ruled on Francis’s
petition to modify the support order.
4
court signed an order directing Francis to appear and to show cause. See id.
§ 157.061(a) (requiring court to set hearing on motion for enforcement requesting
contempt and to order respondent to personally appear and respond to motion).
Acting pro se, Francis filed an answer with a general denial. He also alleged that the
judgment was void, and that it violated his constitutional and statutory rights.3
Francis also filed a document entitled “Demand to Vacate [and] Demand of
Proof of Authority/Jurisdiction to Deprive Property without Due Process [and]
Demand Judicial Review.” In this document, he claimed that several of his
constitutional rights were violated.
The court ultimately reset the enforcement hearing for March 28, 2019.
Following the hearing before the associate judge, the court signed a commitment
order enforcing child and medical support. The court found that Francis was more
than $26,000 behind in child and medical support. The court held him in contempt
and ordered him committed to the county jail for 180 days.
On April 1, 2019, Francis sought a de novo rehearing of the trial court’s March
28, 2019 enforcement order. See id. § 201.015(a)–(c) (authorizing party to request
de novo hearing before referring court and requiring request to “specify the issues
3 Francis’s answer does not specify the judgment or order that he contends was void.
The Attorney General’s motion for enforcement referenced the trial court’s
September 3, 2014 amended child support review order.
5
that will be presented to the referring court”). The record on appeal does not include
an order on Francis’s request for de novo rehearing. However, the trial court’s docket
sheet indicates that the court held a hearing on April 24, 2019, with both parties and
the Attorney General’s Office present. See id. § 201.015(f). The docket sheet states,
Respondent has failed to follow the requirement set out in Tex. Fam.
Code § 201.015(b) in that he has failed to “specify the issues that will
be presented to the referring court,” as the issues listed on his request
for de novo hearing are inapplicable to the evidence received and
rendition rendered by the IV-D associate judge. Respondent’s argument
effectively is that he is exempted from the laws of the State, but that his
constitutional rights are being infringed. Request for rehearing denied.
On May 3, 2019, Francis filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing
the “final judgment” of April 24, 2019. This appeal followed.
Analysis
I. Contempt Order
Francis challenges the trial court’s enforcement order, which found him in
contempt of court and committed him to jail for 180 days. We dismiss this challenge
for lack of jurisdiction.
It is well settled that “[d]ecisions in contempt proceedings cannot be reviewed
on direct appeal because contempt orders are not appealable, even when appealed
along with a judgment that is appealable, as here.” Cline v. Cline, 557 S.W.3d 810,
812 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Cadle Co. v. Lobingier,
50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)); see Metzger v.
6
Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 54–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied);
In re J.D.G., No. 01-19-00476-CV, 2020 WL 3393538, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (per curiam). “A contempt judgment is
reviewable only via a petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is
confined) or a petition for writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved).” Cline,
557 S.W.3d at 812; Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 55; In re J.D.G., 2020 WL 3393538, at
*2.
Because Francis brought his contempt-based complaints to this Court on
direct appeal rather than by original proceeding, we dismiss that portion of his appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. See Cline, 557 S.W.3d at 812; Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 55.
II. Challenge to the Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
Francis lists the following issue on appeal: “Whether the District Court
correctly determined that [Francis] failed to [state] triable issues of fact regarding
[Davis’s] Child Support Order with the Child Support Enforcement Agency.”
This argument could be a reference to the trial court’s April 24 docket entry
denying Francis’s motion for de novo rehearing. If so, Francis has waived this
argument by failing to identify any record support or legal authority explaining why
the court’s reasoning was erroneous. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellate
briefs to “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record” on appeal). Nor does Francis
7
cite the record on appeal to support his factual assertions. See TEX.R. APP. P. 38.1(g)
(“The statement [of facts in a brief on appeal] must be supported by record
references.”). “A brief that does not contain citations to appropriate authorities and
to the record for a given issue waives that issue.” Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d
521, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (citing Abdelnour v.
Mid Nat’l Holdings, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.), and San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).
Instead, Francis appears to argue that the trial court never had jurisdiction to
hear the child-support case against him in the first place. Whether a trial court has
subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t
of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A court must
have subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy to render a binding judgment.
Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010) (citing CSR Ltd. v. Link,
925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996)); see Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is never
presumed and cannot be waived.”).
Francis has not demonstrated any jurisdictional defect. The only case that
Francis cites regarding jurisdiction is Mason v. Bradley. See generally 789 F. Supp.
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273 (N.D. Ill. 1992). That Illinois case considered Illinois’s Title IV-D4
child support
program, not Texas’s program. Id. at 274–75. Moreover, the child’s mother sued
Illinois’s Title IV-D agency officials after she requested the agency’s help in
obtaining child support and the agency was unsuccessful. Id. at 274. The court
determined that the mother lacked standing to sue the state agency officials because
Title IV-D did not create a private right of action allowing her to sue the agency. Id.
at 277. Mason has no relevance to this case, as neither Francis nor Davis has sued
the Texas agency officials.
Francis also grounds his argument in a single sentence from the Attorney
General’s original SAPCR petition which stated, “No Court has continuing
jurisdiction of this suit or of the child the subject of this suit.” But that sentence
simply informed the court that, at the time of that filing, no court had yet obtained
“continuing jurisdiction of this suit or of the child the subject of this suit.” See TEX.
FAM. CODE § 102.008(b)(1)(A) (requiring such notification).
4 Proceedings relating to establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support
obligations are often called “Title IV-D cases.” Title IV-D refers to subchapter IV,
Part D of the federal Social Security Act, which “creates a child-supportenforcement program” for participating states, including Texas, to administer the
plan. See Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. C.W.H., 531 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tex.
2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654, and TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.034). The Texas
Legislature has designated the Office of Attorney General as Texas’s Title IV-D
agency. See id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 231.001, 231.0011(a)).
9
By contrast, the trial court acquired “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
the matters provided for by this title [concerning SAPCRs] in connection with a child
on the rendition of a final order,” and it retains jurisdiction over the parties and
matters. See id. §§ 155.001(a), 155.002. The court could exercise its jurisdiction to
modify and enforce orders, including orders of conservatorship and child support.
See id. § 155.002. Therefore, the Family Code authorized jurisdiction over the
SAPCR and subsequent modification and enforcement proceedings.
We overrule Francis’s jurisdictional issue.
III. Constitutional Issues
Francis also argues that his constitutional rights—which he generally defines
to include due process, involuntary servitude, separation of powers, and alienation
of children—were violated, and that he did not waive those rights.
As stated above, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellate
briefs to support factual assertions with record references and to “contain a clear and
concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities
and to the record” on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g), (i). “[A] brief that does not
contain citations to appropriate authorities and to the record for a given issue waives
that issue.” Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at 545.
Francis does not cite the record on appeal to support his constitutional claims.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g). And although he cited some case law, he does not apply
10
the legal principles from those cases to the facts of his case.
5 See TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(i). Consequently, his briefing of his constitutional issues does not meet the
minimum required to present an issue for appellate review. Because Francis did not
adequately brief his constitutional issues, he has waived error. See Guimaraes, 562
S.W.3d at 545.
We overrule Francis’s constitutional issues.
IV. Remaining Issues
Francis makes several other arguments throughout his brief, including
arguments that any agreement for him to pay child support to the Attorney General
was invalid. He also makes arguments regarding fraud, duress, and material mistake
of fact. However, Francis did not cite the record on appeal or any legal authority to
support these arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g), (i); Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at
545. Accordingly, his briefing of these issues does not meet the minimum
requirements for appellate review of the issue. We conclude that he has waived his
remaining issues.
5 Nor do the cases appear to support his general arguments. For example, Francis
quotes two United States Supreme Court opinions, but neither case includes the
language Francis attributes to them. See generally Clearfield Tr. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943); Fed. Hous. Admin., Region No. 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
His remaining cases are inapposite and do not support his contentions that Texas’s
child support system violates the separation of powers doctrine; that Texas child
support orders are not court orders; or that the child support order was void as a
fraud upon the district court.
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We overrule Francis’s remaining issues.

Outcome: We dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portions of the appeal challenging the
contempt order. We affirm in all other aspects.

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