Date: 05-20-2022

Case Style:

Jesse James Fitness, LLC, et al. v. Flossie Stiles, Individually

Case Number: 02-19-00417-CV

Judge:

Bonnie Sudderth

Before Sudderth; Gabriel and Ker

Court:

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

On appeal from The 362nd District Court Denton County, Texas

Plaintiff's Attorney:

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Defendant's Attorney: Mark Grosso
Katherine K. Elrich

Description:

Fort Worth, Texas - Business Law lawyer represented Appellants with a suing A for damages arising from a business deal gone bad.

After filing their notice of appeal of the trial court’s entry of default judgment
against them, Appellants Jesse James Fitness, LLC; Outlaw Bootcamp Franchise,
LLC; Outlaw Boot Camp, a Texas Limited Liability Company; Jesse J. Leyva,
Individually; Outlaw Fitcamp Franchise, LLC; Outlaw Fitcamp, LLC; and Outlaw
Life, LLC, filed a “Motion for Jurisdictional Determination.” Appellants assert that
they filed their notice of appeal out of an abundance of caution and argue that we lack
jurisdiction because the default judgment is not a final and appealable order due to its
failure to address Appellants’ counterclaims. We agree with Appellants and
accordingly dismiss this appeal.
Appellee Flossie Stiles sued Appellants for damages arising from a business
deal gone bad. On July 23, 2019, the trial court struck the Appellants’ answers for
their continued failure to comply with discovery orders.1 One hour after the
sanctions order was filemarked by the district clerk, Appellants Jesse James Fitness,
LLC and Jesse J. Leyva filed an “Original Counter-Petition, Rule 194 Request for
Disclosure, and Rule 193.7 Notice.” A week later, on July 30, 2019, Appellee filed a
motion to strike the counterpetition. There is no order in the record granting or
denying that motion.
1We express no opinion today as to the substance of the trial court’s sanctions
order.
3
On August 26, 2019, on Appellee’s motion, the trial court signed a “Final
Default Judgment” against Appellants. The judgment awarded Appellees over
$450,000 in economic and exemplary damages for fraud and fraudulent conduct,
provided that “all necessary writs shall issue as necessary following the finality of this
Judgment,” provided that Appellee “shall be able to abstract this Final Judgment,”
and stated “All writs of execution and processes for the enforcement of this Judgment
may issue as necessary.” Finally, it contains a Mother Hubbard clause, “All other
relief not expressly granted herein is denied,” and states “This is a Final Judgment.” It
does not, however, address the counterpetition filed by Appellants Jesse James Fitness
and Jesse Leyva.
With regard to judgments in cases such as this, in which a conventional trial
was not held, there is no presumption of finality. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d
191, 199 (Tex. 2001). Consequently, this judgment is final for purposes of appeal “if
and only if either it actually disposes of all claims or parties then before the court,
regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment
as to all claims and all parties.” Id. at 192–93 (emphasis added). Including the word
“final” in the title or elsewhere in the order, awarding costs, or stating that the order
or judgment is appealable is not necessarily language of sufficient clarity to make it
final for purposes of appeal. Id.
Here the “Final Default Judgment” does not meet the requirements of Lehmann
because it neither disposes of the counterclaims nor includes clear language that it
4
intended for the judgment to do so. Id. at 203–04 (noting that a Mother Hubbard
clause—“all other relief not expressly granted herein is denied”—is ambiguous as to
the court’s intention and overruling precedent approving of Mother Hubbard clause
to indicate finality, but also noting that “[a] statement like, ‘This judgment finally
disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable’, would leave no doubt about
the court’s intention.”); see also In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 825, 827 (Tex. 2018)
(orig. proceeding) (holding order was final for purposes of appeal when it stated,
“This judgment is final, disposes of all claims and all parties, and is appealable”) (emphasis
added); In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 829–31
(Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (holding default judgment was interlocutory despite
Mother Hubbard clause).
Because we hold that the “Final Default Judgment” is not final for purposes of
appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ appeal. See In re Roxsane R., 249
S.W.3d 764, 774–75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, orig. proceeding) (“Texas
appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final orders or judgments unless a statute
permits an interlocutory appeal.”); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014
(listing orders from which interlocutory appeals may be taken). . See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

Outcome: We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

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Defendant's Experts:

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