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Date: 02-11-2021
Case Style:
Paul Edward Hicks v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 02-19-00434-CR
Judge:
Court: Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph W. Spence
Victoria A. Ford Oblon
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
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Description:
Fort Worth, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Paul Edward Hicks with a Criminal Trespass charge.
Marshall House was mowing the grass on private property located next to a
convenience store. Hicks approached House, and the two began arguing about trash
Hicks had seen on the grass. House repeatedly told Hicks that he was trespassing;
Hicks asserted that he was on the convenience store’s property. The two fought, and
House called the police. Hicks was charged with criminal trespass. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 30.05(a). At trial, Hicks testified that he thought he was on the
convenience store’s property and admitted that he would not leave the property after
House told Hicks he was on private property and asked Hicks to leave. A jury found
Hicks guilty of criminal trespass, and the trial court assessed his punishment at thirty
days’ confinement. See id. §§ 12.22, 30.05(d)(1).
On appeal, Hicks contends that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte
charge the jury on mistake of fact, which had been raised by the evidence at trial. See
id. § 8.02. Hicks concedes that he did not request the submission of this defensive
3
issue but argues that the absence of the instruction was egregiously harmful, entitling
him to a new trial.
II. SUBMISSION OF UNREQUESTED DEFENSIVE ISSUE
An omission from the jury charge that draws no objection or inclusion request
is not reversible error unless any harm arising from the omission is egregious. See
Gibson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (op. on reh’g). Before
determining if Hicks was egregiously harmed, however, we are required to first ask
whether it was error for the trial court to fail to sua sponte instruct the jury on the
defensive issue. See Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Unless a particular statute places a sua sponte duty on the trial court to give such an
instruction, the trial court generally need not do so because an unrequested defensive
issue is not “the law applicable to the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14;
see Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 518–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Oursbourn v. State,
259 S.W.3d 159, 179–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). If a defensive issue is not statutorily
required to be given sua sponte, a defendant must either object to its omission or
affirmatively request its submission; a failure to do either procedurally defaults any
alleged error on appeal. When presented with procedural default surrounding the
omission of a nonmandatory defensive issue, we do not engage in an egregious-harm
review. See Vega, 394 S.W.3d at 519; Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 61–62 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
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Hicks does not assert that a rule or statute required the sua sponte submission
of mistake of fact. Indeed, mistake of fact is a traditional defense that must be
brought to the trial court’s attention to preserve the issue for our review. See Posey,
966 S.W.2d at 59–60, 62; Bridwell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 401, 406–07 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1988), aff’d on other grounds, 804 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The trial court,
therefore, did not err by failing to sua sponte give the unrequested defensive
instruction. See Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Hester
v. State, No. 02-18-00448-CR, 2020 WL 479286, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Jan. 30, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Gandy v. State,
222 S.W.3d 525, 531–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). Hicks’s
assertion of egregious error was not preserved for our review. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 36.14; Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 382–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(citing Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 62); Hester, 2020 WL 479286, at *6. We overrule his sole
appellate issue.
Outcome: Hicks failed to object to the absence of a mistake-of-fact instruction in the jury
charge or request its inclusion. Accordingly, mistake of fact was not the law
applicable to the case, and the trial court was not required to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defensive issue. Thus, Hicks procedurally defaulted his egregious-harm allegation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: