Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 02-12-2021
Case Style:
Santiago Vasquez v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 03-19-00564-CR
Judge: Thomas J. Baker
Court: TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
Plaintiff's Attorney: Mr. Justin Bradford Smith
The Honorable Stacey M. Soule
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Austin, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Santiago Vasquez with a Murder charge.
Vasquez was charged with killing his neighbor Seth, whom he had lived next door
to for years. During the trial, the State and Vasquez called multiple witnesses.
One of the State’s witnesses was Vasquez’s next-door neighbor. In her testimony,
the neighbor explained that before the incident in question, she saw Vasquez in his front yard
sitting on a stool, sharpening a knife, and monitoring his water sprinkler. Further, the neighbor
stated that she saw Vasquez about two hours later and shortly before the incident, that he was
2
still sharpening the knife while sitting on the stool, and that she had never seen Vasquez sharpen
a knife outside before.
The State also called Tammy Wolfe who was an eyewitness. In her testimony,
Wolfe explained that she was remodeling a home in a cul-de-sac that faced Vasquez’s and Seth’s
homes. While taking a break in front of the house, Wolfe saw Seth near his mailbox holding
what appeared to be mail in his hands and turning to walk back toward his house and also saw
Vasquez using a cane to walk from his garage through his yard toward Seth.1
When Vasquez
reached Seth in front of Seth’s property, he appeared to be angry based on his tone and on how
he was moving his hand, and Wolfe could hear him yelling at Seth while Seth “just st[ood]
there.” After yelling at Seth, Vasquez hit Seth with his cane, which caused Seth to lose his
balance and move backwards. Vasquez then moved forward to hit Seth with the cane again and
caused Seth to fall to the ground near a sidewalk in front of Seth’s home. When describing this
exchange, Wolfe explained that Seth stayed in front of his house during the whole incident,
never moved toward Vasquez, and did not act aggressively. Further, Wolfe testified that
Vasquez shot Seth multiple times while Seth was getting up and that Seth fell to the ground,
causing the papers in his hand to scatter. Wolfe testified that after shooting Seth, Vasquez
looked around before returning to his property and making a phone call. Wolfe also explained
that she had a clear and unobstructed view of the incident, and photographs were admitted
showing her view of the houses from the front yard of the home that she was helping remodel.
During the trial, some law-enforcement officers testified that Vasquez was outside
on his cell phone when they arrived and that a search of Vasquez revealed that he had on his
1 Wolfe did not know and had not met either Seth or Vasquez, but she described Seth as
an African American man and Vasquez as a white man. Wolfe also identified Vasquez in the
trial court as the white man whom she saw on the day of the offense.
3
person a revolver, a small caliber handgun, a fully loaded magazine for the handgun, “a speed
loader for the revolver,” and a hunting knife with a blade that was more than six inches long.
One officer explained that there were no handguns or other weapons found near Seth’s body and
that Vasquez stated that his hand had been injured during the confrontation. Another officer
testified that Seth’s body was in front of his house and that Vasquez’s wrist was swollen.
Another officer explained that the police had previously responded to the area after Seth called
911 to report that Vasquez broke his window with a rock and was playing music too loudly. At
trial, the medical examiner testified that Seth had been shot two times in the chest and abdomen,
that he died from those wounds, and that he had recent bruises and blunt force injuries on his left
forearm, left hand, and right hand.
In his case in chief, Vasquez elected to testify and stated that he was retired but
had been in the army for nearly thirty years and was previously employed as a security officer, a
reserve police officer, and a jailer. Regarding the day of the offense, Vasquez testified that he
was outside watering his lawn and that he was sharpening the knife so that he could use it at an
upcoming barbecue. Next, Vasquez testified that Seth approached him, started an unpleasant
conversation with him, and then made multiple movements towards him, and he explained that
he raised his cane up to stop Seth from advancing. Further, Vasquez related that Seth yanked the
cane out of his hand and then hit him with the cane two or three times. Additionally, Vasquez
stated that he held his hand up to protect himself and that the cane struck his hand. Vasquez also
testified that he was afraid for his life, that he carried so many weapons to protect himself from
Seth due to Seth’s previous threats, that one of his guns fell out of his pocket during the struggle
with Seth, that Seth tried to grab it, that he picked up the weapon before Seth could grab it, and
that he shot Seth two times in self-defense. Moreover, Vasquez testified that he yelled for help,
4
called his lawyer right after the shooting, and was on the phone with his lawyer when the police
arrived. Following Vasquez’s testimony, his attorney testified that Vasquez had previously hired
him to sue Seth for harassment, called him right after the offense, had a large bruise on his left
forearm after he was arrested, and stated that he put his hands up to protect himself when Seth hit
him with his own cane.
At trial, the State and Vasquez called the following expert witnesses: Dr.
John Fabian and Dr. Maureen Burrows. In his testimony, Dr. Fabian explained that Vasquez
had a history of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from his prior military service. Further,
Dr. Fabian related that Vasquez was paranoid, suspicious, hypervigilant, and aggressive.
Additionally, Dr. Fabian testified that Vasquez had PTSD at the time of the offense and that
his mental deficits and disorders made him “perceive[] a need to defend himself” and view
Seth as a threat.
In her testimony, Dr. Burrows stated that Vasquez had been diagnosed with PTSD
before the incident. Additionally, Dr. Burrows explained that Vasquez was “easily upset by
perceived slights or insults,” that he holds “grudges,” that anger and aggression “play a marked
role in his day-to-day functioning,” that he has difficulty controlling his anger, that he expresses
his anger by making threats to assault others, that he has “a history of aggression and hostility
and poor anger control,” and that he has gotten into fights with others in the past. Dr. Burrows
also related that Vasquez stated that the origin of the conflict was that Seth spit on Vasquez’s
mailbox earlier in the day and on other occasions and that Vasquez admitted that he was angry
at Seth for spitting on the mailbox and was “tired of it.” Moreover, Dr. Burrows explained that
Vasquez’s description of the events changed over time with each new version alleging that Seth
5
was more aggressive than in the version before and that he “manipulated” and embellished his
description of the incident “to justify his actions” and make him seem less culpable.
After considering the evidence presented at trial, the jury convicted Vasquez of
murder, implicitly rejecting his self-defense claim.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Vasquez asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his
“conviction because a rational jury could not reject his claim of self-defense.” On the contrary,
Vasquez contends that the evidence established that he “acted reasonably in shooting Seth to
protect himself from Seth’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force” and that his
“defensive action was immediately necessary to protect himself against” Seth who was bigger
than him. More specifically, Vasquez urges that there was a “history of bad blood” between
Seth and him, that the two engaged in a hostile conversation before the shooting, and that Seth
made an aggressive movement towards him. Further, Vasquez contends that his injuries were
“consistent with a defensive effort—warding off a blow from Seth—as well as his version of
events.” Moreover, Vasquez urges that Wolfe’s eyewitness testimony “must be taken with a
grain of salt” because of how far away she was from where the incident occurred and because
she did not fully explain how he and Seth ended up in front of Seth’s house. Additionally,
Vasquez highlights the portions of Dr. Fabian’s testimony stating that Vasquez suffered from
PTSD and that Vasquez perceived a threat and reacted in self-defense based on his circumstances
and life experiences.
Under the Penal Code, a person commits murder if he “intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of an individual.” Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(1). The Penal Code also
6
specifies that “[i]t is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under”
chapter nine. Id. § 9.02. One justification listed in that chapter is self-defense, which provides
that “a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor
reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use
or attempted use of unlawful force.” Id. § 9.31(a). “The use of force against another is not
justified . . . in response to verbal provocation alone” or “if the actor provoked the other’s use
or attempted use of unlawful force, unless . . . the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly
communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely abandon the
encounter” and unless “the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against
the actor.” Id. § 9.31(b)(1), (4).
Moreover, the use of deadly force is only justified in the circumstances set out
by the Penal Code. Id. § 9.31(d). Of significance to this case, “[a] person is justified in using
deadly force against another . . . if the actor would be justified in using force against the other” as
set out above and “when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is
immediately necessary . . . to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of
unlawful deadly force.” Id. § 9.32(a). “A person has the right to defend himself from apparent
danger to the same extent as he would if the danger were real.” Dugar v. State, 464 S.W.3d 811,
818 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491,
493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Accordingly, “under certain circumstances, a person may use deadly
force against another, even if the other was not actually using or attempting to use unlawful
deadly force.” Id. “The reasonableness of a person’s belief that force is immediately necessary
is viewed from the person’s standpoint at the time that he acted.” Id. “[A] ‘reasonable belief’ is
one that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person.” See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368,
7
385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Rodriguez v. State, No. 13-16-00396-CR, 2018 WL
2252882, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (explaining that “self-defense supported by a paranoid delusion is not a recognized
defense in Texas”).
“Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if a rational jury could
find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stahmann v. State,
602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979)). In making this determination, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and consider all of the admitted evidence, regardless of whether it was properly
admitted.” Id. “The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony
of the witnesses.” Id. “Juries can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence so long as each
inference is supported by the evidence produced at trial,” id., and are “free to apply common
sense, knowledge, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing reasonable
inferences from the evidence,” Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that
the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.” Merritt v.
State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Appellate courts must “determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable
based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Furthermore, appellate courts presume that conflicting inferences were resolved in favor of the
conviction and “defer to that determination.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). Courts also must bear in mind that “direct and circumstantial evidence are treated
8
equally” and that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing
the guilt of an actor” and “can be sufficient” on its own “to establish guilt.” Kiffe v. State,
361 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). The evidence is legally
insufficient if “the record contains no evidence, or merely a ‘modicum’ of evidence, probative of
an element of the offense” or if “the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt.” Id.
at 107 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320).
“The defendant has the initial burden of production and must bring forth some
evidence to support” his claim of self-defense. See Dearborn v. State, 420 S.W.3d 366, 372
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “Once the evidence is produced, the State
bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense.” Id. “This burden does not require the
production of additional evidence rebutting self-defense; it requires the State to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “When the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty, there is an
implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory.” Id. “Because the State bears the
burden of persuasion to disprove a” claim of self-defense “by establishing its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, we review . . . sufficiency challenges to the . . . rejection of such a defense
under” the legal-sufficiency standard. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); cf. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (providing that “legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court
should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a
criminal offense”).
When addressing a claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
rejection of a self-defense claim, appellate courts “examine all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
9
reasonable doubt (1) the essential elements of the alleged offenses, and (2) against appellant on
the self-defense issue.” Dearborn, 420 S.W.3d at 372. The trier of fact “is the sole judge of
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 372-73.
Accordingly, “[t]he trier of fact is free to accept or reject defensive evidence on the issue of selfdefense,” and appellate courts “presume the trier of fact resolved any conflicting inferences and
issues of credibility in favor of the judgment.” Id. at 373. “Moreover, when there is evidence,
if believed, to support a claim of self-defense, but other evidence, if believed, to support a
conviction, an appellate court will not weigh in on this fact-specific determination as this is
a function of” the trier of fact. See McFadden v. State, 541 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d).
As set out above, Vasquez did testify that Seth was the instigator, that he was
acting in self-defense, that he believed that his life was in danger, and that he sustained injuries
while acting in self-defense, and evidence was presented demonstrating that he had an injury to
at least one of his arms and had been diagnosed with and was suffering from PTSD. However,
the jury also heard other evidence pertaining to Vasquez’s guilt. Wolfe testified that she had a
clear view of the incident and saw Vasquez approach Seth while he was carrying what appeared
to be mail in his hands and was walking from near the mailbox towards his house, and the jury
could have reasonably inferred that Vasquez approached Seth while he was checking his
mailbox. Further, Wolfe stated that she observed Vasquez yelling at Seth and then hitting Seth
multiple times with his cane before shooting Seth several times. Moreover, Wolfe testified that
Seth “just st[ood] there,” did not advance or take any aggressive action, and never left the area in
front of his property. Consistent with Wolfe’s description, the medical examiner testified that
10
Seth had fresh bruises on his arms and hands in addition to the two gunshot wounds that resulted
in his death.
The jury was charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Moreover, when
resolving these conflicts, the jury was aided by the testimony from Dr. Burrows indicating
that Vasquez had purposely changed his story regarding the offense to make Seth seem
more aggressive and to make himself seem less culpable. Similarly, the jury was aided by the
testimony from Dr. Burrows indicating that Vasquez had a history of past aggressive actions,
holds grudges for perceived slights, and was angry at Seth on the day in question because Seth
allegedly previously spit on his mailbox. Moreover, when assessing Vasquez’s intent, the jury
could rely on the evidence establishing that Vasquez approached Seth while Seth was either on
or in front of his property and that Vasquez was seen sharpening a hunting knife over an
extended period of time before approaching Seth with that same weapon in his waistband and
while also carrying two guns in his pocket as well as extra ammunition. Furthermore, given
Wolfe’s testimony, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Vasquez’s injuries were either of
his own making when he used his cane to attack Seth or were caused by something other than
Seth hitting him with a cane.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could
have reasonably concluded that Vasquez intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Seth by
shooting Seth and that Vasquez did not reasonably believe that the use of deadly force was
necessary to protect himself from Seth’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force and,
therefore, rejected the self-defense claim. See Hill v. State, 99 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d); see also Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (explaining that jury is free to accept or reject any or all evidence from either party); Heng
11
v. State, No. 01-04-00450-CR, 2006 WL 66461, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 12,
2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that evidence was
sufficient to support rejection of self-defense claim where evidence showed that defendant
armed himself, that victim had no weapon, and that defendant shot victim multiple times).
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of
Vasquez’s self-defense claim and to support his conviction.
For these reasons, we overrule Vasquez’s issue on appeal.
Outcome: Having overruled Vasquez’s issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
of conviction.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: