Date: 10-02-2020

Case Style:

Case Number: 05-18-00640-CR

Judge: Leslie Osborne

Court: Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

Plaintiff's Attorney: Laura Anne Coats
John Creuzot

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: Dallas, TX - Criminal Defense Attorney, Capital Murder

Jeffrey Brandon Youngblood and Ryan Towle had been friends and smoked
marijuana together since they were fourteen years old. Youngblood was a graduate
of Berkner High School where Towle, Jones, Eric Gray, Elijahwon King,
LaJonathan Fulton, and Rob-Darius Clay also attended. According to Towle, it was
a “pretty well-known fact” that Youngblood sold marijuana, and among the Berkner
H.S. crowd he was known as the go-to guy for “weed.”
At some point, Youngblood stopped working and began selling marijuana
full-time and, according to Towle, he was bringing in hundreds of dollars a day.
However, Youngblood had shared with his closest friends that he had been robbed
of marijuana and money in January 2014.
On the night of April 1, 2014, Youngblood was at the house where he lived
with his parents in Richardson, Texas. That evening, Youngblood texted Towle who
agreed to come over and bring money he owed Youngblood for marijuana. At
around 10:00 p.m., Towle arrived at Youngblood’s home in a white Lexus where he
found Youngblood sitting in his car in the driveway smoking marijuana and joined
him.
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Meanwhile, also at around 10:00 p.m., Jones, Gray, King, and Fulton got
together that night to “go hit a lick”2
because Jones’s rent was due and he needed
money. First, Gray drove to a house in Richardson where some people they knew
lived. Jones and Fulton got out of the car but returned shortly afterward because
someone was home. They did not have a gun at that point. When the four men
discussed their desire for some weed, Youngblood was mentioned because he had
sold Gray, King, and Fulton weed in the past. They drove by Youngblood’s home
and saw him sitting in his car smoking marijuana. Then, they drove back to the
apartment complex where Jones lived. While Gray, King, and Fulton waited in the
car, Jones went into his apartment and got a shotgun. According to Gray, the shotgun
was intended to be used as a “scare tactic.”
Youngblood and Towle had been smoking marijuana and listening to music
in Youngblood’s car for about an hour, when four men approached Youngblood’s
car saying “give me your shit.” Three of the men wore bandanas over their faces
and one man wore a hoodie. The three men with bandanas were later identified as
Jones, Gray, and King, and the man wearing the hoodie was identified as Fulton.
Towle saw that one of the men had his hand in his shirt like he was “toting a gun”
and understood that they were being robbed, so he grabbed the jar of marijuana and
got out of the vehicle. Towle also saw that one of the men wearing a bandana, who
2
Testimony at trial shows that the phrase to “hit a lick” means to rob someone.
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was later determined to be Jones, had a shotgun pointed at Youngblood’s torso.
Youngblood was not compliant and put his hand up to indicate the men should “chill
out.” According to Towle, Jones was irritated that Youngblood was not complying
and pushed the shotgun past Youngblood’s raised arm. At that point, there was a
scuffle during which Youngblood was trying to push the barrel of the shotgun out of
his face. As Towle was fleeing, he turned to see if anyone was chasing him and saw
Jones shoot at Youngblood. However, Towle thought the shot missed Youngblood,
who had appeared to push the gun away toward the front of his car at the time of the
shotgun’s discharge. As Towle ran home, he heard sirens in the distance and, by the
time he arrived home, the police were already at his house.
Around 11:00 p.m., Youngblood’s mother was awakened by yelling outside.
When she went outside, she found Youngblood in the front seat of his car and
unresponsive. She also saw an unfamiliar white car. She returned to the house and
screamed for her husband to call 9-1-1. By that point, some of her neighbors had
come over, and one neighbor said he had heard a gunshot. Youngblood died from a
shotgun wound to his chest.
The four men returned to Jones’s apartment. They decided to clean the
shotgun and bury it. Gray suggested they bury it in “the maze.”3
After the shooting,
Jones, Gray, King, and Fulton parted ways, although they still kept in contact.
3
Testimony at trial described “the maze” as a “dirt hill” or a “little creek” located in Garland, Texas,
near where Gray and King lived at the time.
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Detective Jules Farmer investigated the case. However, fingerprints and DNA
evidence collected at the scene, witness interviews, and a public plea for help did
not result in any leads as to who had committed the murder. As a result, the case
“stalled after a while.”
Rob-Darius Clay was in jail when he heard of Youngblood’s death. Clay had
attended junior high school with Youngblood’s younger sister. Later in 2014, after
he was released from jail, Clay eventually got his own apartment. Clay worked with
Jones and, at some point, Jones moved in with him. During one of their
conversations, Jones told Clay about killing Youngblood. Jones stated he had
needed money to pay his rent and Gray, Fulton, and King were helping him out.
They decided to rob Youngblood because they believed he had a lot of money, so
Gray drove them to Youngblood’s house where they found him in his car. Jones
said that he pointed the shotgun he had brought with him at Youngblood who
“wrestled with it” when the trigger went off and, after they returned to Jones’s house,
they cleaned the shotgun and buried it in the “maze.”
In March 2016, Jones visited Fulton and Thelemonaay Thompson, who had
recently given birth to Fulton’s baby. At some point, Fulton left to go to the store.
During Fulton’s absence, Jones was looking through Facebook and became upset
because people on the internet were questioning who was responsible for
Youngblood’s murder. In response to questions from Thompson, Jones hesitantly
told her about the murder but instructed her not to tell anyone. Jones told Thompson
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he was looking for extra money, he met up with some people, and they went to “hit
a lick on a dude he knew.” He did not tell Thompson that Fulton was one of the
people with him. Jones described an incident where they tried to go into a window
of a house. Also, Jones told her they found Youngblood parked in his driveway and
he pointed the shotgun towards Youngblood demanding all of his money and drugs.
He stated that Youngblood did not comply with his demand and they tussled,
resulting in Youngblood’s getting shot. Jones told Thompson that he had buried the
shotgun. After Fulton returned, Thompson mentioned what Jones had told her and
Fulton responded “Don’t worry about it, he trippin’.” Thompson did not report the
matter until Jones was “secure” in jail.
Approximately two-and-a-half years after Youngblood was murdered, Clay
began having anxiety attacks. At some point, Clay told his supervisor about the
murder, and she contacted the police. When the police spoke with Clay, he told
Detective Farmer that Jones had admitted to killing Youngblood. Clay provided
detailed information that the detectives were able to corroborate.
Within the week, Detective Farmer was able to interview Jones, who had been
arrested on a traffic warrant. Detective Farmer read Jones the Miranda warnings4
and, after indicating he understood them, Jones waived those rights and agreed to
speak with the police. During his interview, Jones provided four different versions
4
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436 (1966).
–7–
of the event. Ultimately, Jones stated that there were four people involved in the
robbery, Youngblood did not cooperate, and he shot Youngblood with a shotgun that
he had stolen during a previous “lick.” He also stated that he bleached the shotgun
and then buried it in a creek bed. A few days later, Jones showed the police where
the shotgun was buried, but no gun was recovered. During a subsequent interview,
Jones mentioned Fulton’s being “dumb” that night, calling out people’s names and
walking around with a gun in plain view. Jones’s comments sounded similar to a tip
Detective Farmer had received regarding an attempted burglary that occurred just
before and close to the location of Youngblood’s murder.
Jones was indicted for the offense of capital murder. Before trial, Jones filed
a motion to suppress his statement, contending that his statement was involuntary
and coerced. On February 19, 2018, a hearing was held on Jones’s motion to
suppress and the trial judge orally denied the motion. However, no written findings
of fact and conclusions of law were entered into the trial court’s record. Before the
jury trial commenced, the trial court also held a hearing on the admissibility of any
reference to the attempted burglary that occurred before Youngblood’s murder on
the basis of Texas Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b). In response, the State
argued that it was evidence of intent to kill because the men did not have the shotgun
for the attempted burglary, but Jones obtained it before going to rob Youngblood.
The trial judge overruled Jones’s objection. The jury found Jones guilty of the lesser
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included offense of felony murder and assessed his punishment at eighty-four years
of imprisonment.
Jones appealed the final judgment. Because there were no written findings of
fact and conclusions of law relating to the voluntariness of Jones’s statement and the
trial judge who presided over the February 19, 2018 hearing on the motion to
suppress was no longer on the bench, this Court abated the appeal for a de novo
hearing on Jones’s motion to suppress. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22
§ 6. As a result, the new trial judge conducted a do novo suppression hearing on
June 21, 2019, and signed written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In issue one, Jones argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress his statement. He claims that his statement to the police was involuntary
and he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel when he stated, “I
don’t want to answer that question without a lawyer,” in response to a question about
who was with him during the offense. Further, Jones maintains that he made no
affirmative statement indicating he was willing to continue the police interview
“despite his repeated statements that he was unwilling to answer any questions about
the identity of his accomplices without a lawyer.” The State responds that Jones did
not make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel because Jones did not express
that he was unwilling to continue speaking with Detective Farmer and it was
–9–
reasonable for Detective Farmer to understand Jones’s statement as an unwillingness
to name his codefendants rather than an assertion of his right to counsel.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court
applies a bifurcated standard of review. See Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 457–
58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000). An appellate court gives almost total deference to the trial court’s
determination of historical facts but conducts a de novo review of the trial court’s
application of the law to those facts. See Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458; Carmouche,
10 S.W.3d at 327. As the sole trier of fact during a suppression hearing, a trial court
may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. See Wilson, 311
S.W.3d at 458; State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An
appellate court examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. See Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). A trial court will abuse its discretion only if it refuses to suppress
evidence that is obtained in violation of the law and that is inadmissible under Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. See Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458.
Where the trial court has made express findings of fact, an appellate court
views the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings and determines
whether the evidence supports the fact findings. See State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d
1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim.
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App. 2010). An appellate court then proceeds to a de novo determination of the legal
significance of the facts and will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any
theory of law applicable to the case. See Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 8; Valtierra, 310
S.W.3d at 447.
B. Applicable Law
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant’s statement
may be used against him only “if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily
made without compulsion or persuasion.” CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21. The
determination of whether a statement is voluntary is based on an examination of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d
235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991).
A statement may be deemed “involuntary” under three different theories:
(1) failure to comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 § 6;
(2) failure to comply with the dictates of Miranda as codified and expanded in article
38.22 §§ 2 and 3; or (3) failure to comply with due process because the statement
was not freely given as a result of coercion, improper influences, or incompetency.
See Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Wolfe v. State,
917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A statement may be deemed
involuntary under one, two, or all three of these theories. See Oursbourn, 259
S.W.3d at 169.
–11–
Once a suspect invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel during
questioning, interrogation must cease until counsel has been provided or the suspect
reinitiates a dialogue. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); State v.
Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The right to counsel is
invoked when a person indicates that he desires to speak to an attorney or to have an
attorney present during questioning. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995).
Whether a particular mention of a lawyer constitutes a clear invocation
depends upon the contents of the statement itself and the totality of the surrounding
circumstances. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. The test is objective: the suspect “must
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request
for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–9; Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 79 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012); Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. While there are no “magical words”
required to invoke an accused’s right to counsel, at a minimum, a suspect must
“express a definite desire to speak to someone, and that person be an attorney.”
Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 352.
However, not every mention of a lawyer constitutes an invocation of the right
to counsel; an ambiguous or equivocal statement does not require officers to halt an
interrogation or even seek clarification. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. Texas courts
have uniformly held that conditional statements in which a suspect indicates that he
–12–
“might” want an attorney, as well as generalized questions asked by a suspect
seeking to clarify his rights, are typically not considered an unambiguous expression
invoking the right to counsel.5
Nevertheless, a conditional statement is not necessarily “equivocal,
ambiguous, or otherwise unclear.” Id. at 893; see also Trejo v. State, 594 S.W.3d
790, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). When a suspect makes
a clear, but limited, invocation of the right to counsel, the police must honor the
limits that are thereby placed upon the interrogation, but they may question their
suspect outside the presence of counsel to the extent that his clearly expressed
limitations permit. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 893; see also Trejo, 594 S.W.3d at 797.
5
E.g. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (concluding “I should have an
attorney,” was not a request or an express statement that the suspect wanted an attorney); Dinkins, 894
S.W.2d at 352 (suspect’s question concerning what an attorney would tell him to do under the circumstances
did not rise to an invocation of the right to counsel); Robinson v. State, 851 S.W.2d 216, 223–24 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (suspect’s question asking, “Do I need to talk to a lawyer before I sign?” was equivocal
and did not invoke the right to counsel); Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
(suspect’s question to officers regarding “whether they thought the presence of an attorney was necessary”
did not invoke right to counsel); accord Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (holding “Maybe
I should talk to a lawyer,” was not a request for an attorney); see also Mbugua v. State, 312 S.W.3d 657,
665 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (suspect’s question asking, “Can I wait until my
lawyer gets here[?]” did not clearly state a firm, unambiguous, and unqualified condition that any further
questioning must be conducted only with his attorney present); Reed v. State, 227 S.W.3d 111, 113, 116
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (suspect’s question asking, “I can get a lawyer if I want
one, right?” was not an unequivocal request for counsel); Gutierrez v. State, 150 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (suspect’s question asking, “Can I have [a lawyer] present now?”
was ambiguous and did not clearly invoke the right to counsel); Loredo v. State, 130 S.W.3d 275, 284–85
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (suspect’s question asking, “Can I ask for a lawyer
now?” was not an unambiguous invocation of right to counsel); Halbrook v. State, 31 S.W.3d 301, 302
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d) (suspect’s question asking, “Do I get an opportunity to have my
attorney present?” did not constitute clear and unambiguous invocation of counsel); Flores v. State, 30
S.W.3d 29, 33–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d) (suspect’s question asking, “Will you allow
me to speak to my attorney before?” was neither clear nor unequivocal about his desire to speak to an
attorney); Cooper v. State, 961 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d)
(suspect’s question asking, “Where is my lawyer? Where is he?” was not an unequivocal assertion of the
right to counsel).
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C. Application of the Law to the Facts
Jones does not specify any findings of fact that he contends are not supported
by the record. Specifically, the trial court found that Jones was given the warnings
required by Miranda and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he
waived his right to remain silent, he did not request an attorney to be present or that
he be permitted to speak with an attorney before making his statement, he did not
request to terminate the interview at any time or assert his right to remain silent, no
force was used or promises made in order to persuade him to make his statement, it
was reasonable for the detectives conducting the interview not to interpret Jones’s
statement about an attorney as a clear unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel
or a request to terminate the interview, and Jones immediately picked up with his
explanation of the events that night without any hesitancy or reluctance after stating
he would not name his accomplices so there was no clear indication that he intended
to terminate the interview by that statement. After reviewing the record under the
applicable standard for review, we conclude that the evidence supports the trial
court’s factual rendition. See Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 8 (trial court given almost
total deference in determining facts and where trial court has made express findings
of fact appellate court views evidence in light most favorable to those findings and
upholds them as long as supported by record); Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447 (same).
Jones contends that the trial court’s conclusions of law are incorrect. In
particular, he challenges the following conclusions of law:
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The Court [concludes] that [Jones’s] statement [] was voluntarily made
and admissible at trial.
The Court [concludes] that [Jones’s] statement “I can’t answer that
without a lawyer,” was not a clear, unequivocal invocation of his right
to counsel.
The Court [concludes] that based on the statement itself and the totality
of the circumstances [Jones] did not invoke his right to counsel or ask
to terminate the interview.
Jones’s statement that he did not want to answer questions about his
accomplices without an attorney did not indicate he wanted to speak to an attorney,
have an attorney present during questioning, or halt the interrogation. Jones focuses
on the absence of an affirmative statement indicating a willingness to continue
despite his repeated requests not to answer questions about the identity of his
accomplices without a lawyer. However, an ambiguous or equivocal statement does
not require officers to halt an interrogation or even seek clarification. See Gobert,
275 S.W.3d at 892.
Further, we also note that Jones’s statement with respect to an attorney was
conditioned as it referred only to the naming of his accomplices. The record shows
that, toward the beginning of the interview, the detective asked the following
question, “You said they were going to go out and hit some more licks.” To which
Jones responded, “Yeah.” Then, the detective asked “Who were they [his
accomplices]?” Jones twice responded to the effect that he could not answer the
question about his accomplices without a lawyer and the detective replied “Ok.”
After that, the detective resumed his questions and did not ask Jones for the names
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of his accomplices until after Jones had acknowledged that he saw his friends at the
police station, expressed concern that they were pinning the offense on him, and
there was discussion about one of them bringing a gun to the robbery of Youngblood.
At that point, the detective inquired as to who might have brought the gun and Jones
stated, “You know who he is.” Then, during the remaining portion of his interview,
Jones volunteered the names of his accomplices and, toward the end of the interview,
the detective stated that he wanted to ensure the accuracy of the persons involved,
and Jones again provided their names.
We conclude the trial court did not err when it concluded that Jones’s
statement was voluntarily made and that Jones did not clearly and unequivocally
invoke his right to counsel. Further, to the extent that his statement “I can’t answer
that [who was with him] without a lawyer” can be construed as a conditional request
for a lawyer, Detective Farmer obeyed that condition.
The trial court did not err when it denied Jones’s motion to suppress his
statement. Issue one is decided against Jones.
III. EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE EVIDENCE
In issues two and three, Jones argues the trial court erred when it overruled
his objection to the admission of extraneous offense evidence because it was not
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relevant under Rule 401 and it was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.6
With
respect his Rule 401 objection as to relevance, Jones argues that there was no issue
of identity, motive, intent, plan, knowledge, or lack of mistake or accident at trial so
the State had no need for the evidence of the extraneous attempted burglary that
occurred prior to Youngblood’s murder. He claims that the evidence was not
relevant to prove any “fact of consequence” in the case. As to his Rule 403
objection, Jones contends that the probative value of the extraneous offense evidence
was unfairly prejudicial because it served only to show his propensity to commit
crime or character conformity. The State responds that the extraneous attempted
burglary, which was committed without a shotgun, was contextual and supported
that, when Jones agreed to rob Youngblood, he was willing to commit murder
because he got a shotgun just before that robbery. Neither Jones nor the State
addresses whether the alleged error was harmful error.
A. Harm Analysis
Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that any
error, other than constitutional error, that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected when the error
had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. King v. State,
6
Although Jones also objected pursuant to Rule 404(b) at trial, he does not argue that point on appeal.
See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) (evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts inadmissible if offered to prove
character of person to show action in conformity therewith, but evidence may be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake, or accident, or to rebut defensive
theory).
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953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The erroneous admission of an
extraneous offense is non-constitutional error. Johnson v. State, 84 S.W.3d 726, 729
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d)
B. Application of the Law to the Facts
Even assuming the admission of the extraneous offense was error, it was not
harmful error. Jones was indicted for the offense of capital murder. The State sought
to introduce evidence of an extraneous offense, i.e., the attempted burglary that
occurred just prior to Youngblood’s murder. Before trial, Jones objected to the
extraneous offense evidence based on Rules 401, 403, and 404(b). The State argued
this uncharged, extraneous attempted burglary was key to their case because it
demonstrated Jones’s specific intent to kill in the charged offense. Specifically, the
State maintained that the attempted burglary was committed without a shotgun,
which showed that the robbery of Youngblood with the shotgun was different. The
trial court overruled Jones’s objection.
At trial, the defense did not deny that Jones caused the death of Youngblood
during the course of committing a robbery. Instead, Jones claimed that the offense
was felony murder, not capital murder, because he did not intentionally kill
Youngblood. Specifically, in his opening statement, Jones’s counsel stated:
And I will tell you this, that at the end of these proceedings, []Jones will
be held accountable. It’s important that we hold him accountable for
what he did and what the law says he did. We don’t put everybody in
prison for life without parole just because we can or just because we
like it. We reserve that for a very special, specific purpose. Remember
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what we talked about yesterday in voir dire. What’s the difference
between felony murder and capital murder? It’s intent. Period. And
that’s what we’re going to talk about the next couple of days.
. . . .
When you have heard everything and seen all the evidence and heard
from all the witnesses, I expect that you are going to know exactly why
we’re asking what we’re asking for. Not guilty of capital murder and
find him guilty on a lesser included. And that’s what we’re going to
ask you to do. Thank you.
Similarly, during his closing argument, Jones’s counsel argued:
Like I told you yesterday morning when we started this case, when we
look at the evidence, it’s clear; this isn’t a capital murder, it’s a felony
murder. This isn’t a situation where there was any intent involved. It
was an accident that happened in the middle of a felony. . . . What it
means is it’s just a situation where [Jones] didn’t intend for a death to
occur.
. . . .
It was a situation where he shouldn’t have been out there robbing.
Absolutely he deserves to pay for what he did, but there was no reason
for him to shoot [Youngblood], until they started fighting over the
[shot]gun, and that’s what everybody told you.
In contrast, the State argued during its closing argument, the evidence of the
prior attempted burglary was proof of intent for the offense of capital murder:
Because the defendant had tried committing a lick earlier in the night
without a weapon. He tried breaking into a house to make some money
that way, right? And that’s what this was all about; he needed to make
some cash.
So first they go without a gun to try to break into someone’s house. But
someone is home, they can’t get away with it. They don’t get any
money, right? So they have to go try again. And this time Quincy Jones
is going to make sure that he gets the cash he needs.
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So this time they’re going to take a loaded shotgun with them because
they’re not walking away with nothing this time.
Further, the record shows that the trial court’s jury charge instructed the jury
that it was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones had committed the
extraneous offense before it could consider that offense for any purpose. The trial
court also instructed that, even then, the jury could consider the extraneous offense
only in determining the intent, knowledge, design, scheme, or system of the
defendant, if any, in connection with the offense on trial and for no other purpose.
The jury found Jones guilty of the lesser included offense of felony murder,
not the charged offense of capital murder. The purpose of the extraneous offense
evidence was to show Jones’s specific intent to kill in support of the offense of
capital murder. Because the jury did not find Jones guilty of capital murder, we
cannot say that the extraneous offense evidence had a substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, assuming, without deciding, the trial
court erred when it overruled Jones’s objection to the extraneous offense evidence,
we cannot say that the alleged error was harmful error.
Jones’s second and third issues on appeal are decided against him.

Outcome: The trial court did not err when it denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Also,
even if the trial court erred when it overruled Jones’s objection to the admission of the extraneous offense evidence, that alleged error was not harmful error.

The trial court’s final judgment is affirmed.

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