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Date: 12-29-2020
Case Style:
Aaron Kaufman v. Amerihealth Laboratory, LLC
Case Number: 05-20-00504-CV
Judge: John G. Browning
Court: Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Defendant's Attorney:
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Description:
Dallas, TX - Contract attorney represented Aaron Kaufman with a Contract dispute.
AmeriHealth is a clinical laboratory capable of performing complex testing,
including but not limited to qualitative drug screens, genetic testing, and blood and
molecular testing. AmeriHealth entered into a consulting agreement with Final Inch,
LLC in which Final Inch agreed to provide consulting services regarding technology,
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automation, and technical management. To carry out the services, Final Inch gained
access to AmeriHealth’s confidential and proprietary information. According to
AmeriHealth’s original petition, Kaufman is the CEO of Final Inch and “has
continually been Final Inch’s point person for performance of the Agreement, as
well as Final Inch’s signatory on the Agreement.” Both Final Inch and Kaufman are
Florida residents.
On November 1, 2019, AmeriHealth filed suit alleging tortious interference
against Kaufman and breach of contract against Kaufman and Final Inch. It further
sought a temporary restraining order, requested a hearing on a temporary injunction,
and requested leave to conduct expedited discovery.
The court held a hearing the same day. It is undisputed the beginning of the
hearing was not transcribed. However, at the subsequent special appearance hearing,
AmeriHealth reminded the trial court of Kaufman’s actions during the TRO hearing.
AmeriHealth emphasized that Kaufman’s counsel appeared without limiting his
appearance and actively made arguments on Kaufman’s behalf, which included
arguing he was not a signatory to the consulting agreement. AmeriHealth reminded
the court that the parties retired to the jury room, at the court’s suggestion, to work
out the expedited discovery requests. After their discussions, they proceeded on the
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record.1
The second half of the hearing in our appellate record is titled, “Rule 11
Agreement Proceeding.”
At the beginning of that hearing, the trial court asked, “Y’all have an
agreement regarding discovery?” AmeriHealth’s attorney answered, “We do. After
- - discovery and extending the TRO.” AmeriHealth further stated that the court had
already signed and entered a TRO setting the TI hearing and that “[t]he parties have
agreed to extend the TRO until the completion of a TI hearing.” AmeriHealth’s
attorney then read into the record the parties’ agreement regarding certain discovery
issues and their agreement to mediate the case before the TI hearing. Counsel noted,
“[W]e are requesting that - - once I confirm this agreement with [Kaufman’s
attorney], that the Court order us to comply with our Rule 11 agreement that we’ve
announced on the record.” He continued, “Did I get our entire agreement or did I
miss something?” Kaufman’s attorney added one additional discovery request and
stated, “But everything else that he said is agreed.” The court signed the temporary
restraining order, which included some modifications based on Kaufman’s
arguments, on November 1, 2019.
Kaufman filed his special appearance on November 8, 2019, alleging Texas
did not have general or specific jurisdiction over him. He acknowledged he was the
1 During the special appearance hearing, Kaufman’s counsel did not dispute these recitation of events
because she was not the attorney at that time. She simply acknowledged “there is no transcript before this
Court as to what occurred at the beginning of the hearing. Mr. Dial’s a good lawyer, he’s at Greenberg
Traurig. And he thought it wasn’t waived because every single thing he did thereafter said ‘subject to’ - -
every written record we have, ‘subject to and without waiving’ the special appearance.”
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CEO of Final Inch. He lived in Florida and met with AmeriHealth representatives
in Florida several times before entering into the consulting agreement. He denied
ever traveling to Texas and asserted that all contract negotiations occurred in Florida.
He alleged he did not individually sign the contract, and all of the services Final Inch
performed under the contract occurred in Florida. He denied owning any real
property in Texas and claimed he visited the State a few times to see relatives and to
conduct one business meeting on behalf of a company unrelated to the facts of the
present case. He likewise argued AmeriHealth failed to explain how his alleged use
of AmeriHealth’s information related to Texas.
The trial court signed a temporary injunction on November 22, 2019.
Subsequently, AmeriHealth filed its first amended petition alleging alter ego and
piercing the corporate veil because “Final Inch, LLC is organized and operated as a
conduit of Aaron Kaufman.” The trial court held a hearing on the special appearance
on April 6, 2020. AmeriHealth argued that based on Kaufman’s previous actions,
he had generally appeared. Counsel presented five different actions by Kaufman’s
attorney that he believed supported the general appearance: (1) announcing he was
appearing on behalf of Kaufman at the TRO hearing without limiting his appearance
to a special appearance; (2) actively participating in the TRO hearing on behalf of
Kaufman; (3) asking for expedited discovery and obtaining such relief; (4) asking
the trial court to order all parties to comply with the agreed discovery order; and (5)
asking the trial court to extend the TRO. Counsel spent little time elaborating on the
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alter ego theory, and the court did not have questions on that theory challenging
jurisdiction.
Kaufman’s attorney argued his participation in discovery did not waive his
special appearance. The trial court asked, “What authority do you have regarding
the effect of the TRO with attorney participation and the Rule 11? . . . I think that’s
the operative facts, you know.” Counsel could not definitively answer and requested
to supplement, which the court agreed because “that’s what I want to see now.”
The parties filed supplemental letter briefs. Kaufman argued that participating
in the TRO hearing and agreeing to an extension did not waive his special
appearance. Further, he contended he did not ask the trial court to order all parties
to comply with the rule 11 agreement; rather, AmeriHealth misconstrued the
proceedings. AmeriHealth filed its letter reurging its five theories presented during
the hearing and distinguishing case law relied on by Kaufman.
After considering “the pleadings on file, arguments of counsel, and the actions
taken by Aaron Kaufman prior to this hearing,” the trial court signed an order
denying Kaufman’s special appearance “based on all of the reasons advanced” by
AmeriHealth. Kaufman requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the
trial court did not enter any. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of
law. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 805–06 (Tex.
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2002). The trial court’s decision to grant or deny a special appearance is subject to
de novo review on appeal, but if a factual dispute exists, an appellate court is called
upon to review the trial court’s resolution of the factual dispute as well. Id. at 806;
see also BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex.
2002). If the trial court does not issue findings of fact, as in this case, a reviewing
court should presume the trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its
judgment. Am. Type Culture, 83 S.W.3d at 806. Further, because the trial court did
not specify under what ground it was exercising its authority to deny the special
appearance, we may affirm the judgment under any applicable legal theory. Point
Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987); see also Baxter
& Assocs., L.L.C., v. D&D Elevators, Inc., No. 05-16-00330-CV, 2017 WL 604043,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In the absence of
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment of the trial court must be
affirmed if it can be upheld on any available legal theory that finds support in the
evidence.”).
Waiver of Special Appearance
In the trial court and on appeal, AmeriHealth argued Kaufman entered a
general appearance thereby waiving his special appearance complaint. Because
these issues must be resolved before considering the merits of the special
appearance, we address them first.
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A special appearance permits a nonresident defendant to object to personal
jurisdiction in a Texas court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. However, a nonresident
defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas if the defendant enters a
general appearance. Boyd v. Kobierowski, 283 S.W.3d 19, 21 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2009, no pet.). A general appearance entered before a special appearance
waives the special appearance. Exito Elec. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex.
2004). In Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1998), the supreme
court provided guidance as to what constitutes a general appearance: a party (1)
invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the court’s jurisdiction,
(2) recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative
relief from the court. “The test for a general appearance is whether a party requests
affirmative relief inconsistent with an assertion that the trial court lacks personal
jurisdiction.” Brady v. Kane, No. 05-18-01105-CV, 2020 WL 2029245, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We begin by considering whether Kaufman generally appeared by
participating in the TRO hearing. Both parties cite case law supporting their
position; therefore, we address each as it relates to the facts of this case.
Kaufman argues that making legal arguments at the TRO hearing did not
waive his special appearance because appearing in an ancillary matter prior to the
main suit does not constitute a general appearance in the main suit. See Alliantgroup,
L.P. v. Feingold, No. H-09-0479, 2009 WL 1109093, *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24,
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2009); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 200–01 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no
pet.); Valsangiacomo v. Americana Juice Imp., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 201, n.3 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Turner v. Turner, No. 14-98-00510-CV, 1999
WL 33659, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 1999, no pet.) (not
designated for publication); Perkola v. Koelling & Assocs., Inc., 601 S.W.2d 110,
111–12 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).
In Perkola, a case from our Court, we considered the denial of a plea of
privilege and whether Perkola waived his plea of privilege by appearing at a
temporary injunction hearing without having been served with process.
2
Perkola,
601 S.W.2d at 111. In that case, we recognized that a party waives a plea of privilege
“if he invokes the power of the court in a manner which negatives a continuing intent
to insist upon the plea.” Id. Without analysis, we held Perkola “did not waive his
plea by contesting the interlocutory temporary injunction. Perkola’s appearance at
this hearing on an ancillary matter was not an appearance in the main case.” Id. at
112.
Kaufman argues Perkola is “instructive” because like Perkola, he appeared
and contested the temporary restraining order, which was nothing more than
participation in an ancillary matter. A closer review of the case, however, does not
support Kaufman’s characterization of our holding.
2 Perkola is not a special appearance case and does not discuss rule 120a.
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Importantly, unlike Kaufman, Perkola filed his plea of privilege first before
taking any other action. Id. at 111 (noting order of pleadings filed). Here, Kaufman
did not file his special appearance until after the trial court signed the TRO. Further,
Kaufman’s focus on Perkola “contesting” the temporary injunction as the lynchpin
to our holding is misplaced and an overly broad reading of the case. The opinion is
silent as to any actions that Perkola took, other than appearing, to contest the plea
of privilege. Id. at 111 (both sides framing argument as whether waiver occurred
based on voluntary appearance at temporary injunction hearing). We did not
conclude, as Kaufman suggests, that a party who “appeared and contested” an
ancillary matter prior to the main suit did not generally appear in the main case.
Rather, Perkola contested the ancillary proceeding by appearing. Thus, Perkola is
consistent with the general principle that simply appearing for an ancillary
proceeding, such as a TRO hearing, is not a general appearance under rule 120a.
See, e.g., Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (“[P]arty who is a silent figurehead in the courtroom,
observing the proceeding without participating” has not generally appeared.);
Bradford v. Bradford, 971 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.)
(same). However, those are not the facts before us.
Rather, Kaufman voluntarily appeared through counsel at the TRO hearing,
succeeded in modifying the TRO based on counsel’s arguments, and argued he was
not a signatory to the consulting agreement thereby challenging AmeriHealth’s
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breach of contract claim. By stepping outside the role of observer or silent
figurehead and participating in the hearing, counsel’s actions were inconsistent with
the assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Kaufman. See, e.g., Beistel
v. Allen, No. 01-06-00246-CV, 2007 WL 1559840, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“While Texas courts have held that a party who
merely observes a proceeding without participating does not make a general
appearance, Beistel’s counsel participated when she objected to the admission of
Allen’s spreadsheet.”). Instead, counsel not only actively participated in the hearing
but also sought and received affirmative relief from the trial court. See DawsonAustin, 968 S.W.2d at 322.
We are likewise unpersuaded by the other cases Kaufman relies on.
Valsangiacomo cited Perkola, in part, for the proposition that appearing and
participating in an injunction hearing did not constitute a general appearance in an
ancillary matter. Valsangiacomo, 35 S.W.3d at 204 n.3. However, in that case
“counsel for [defendant] appeared at and participated in the temporary injunction
subject to the special appearance.” Id. (emphasis added). Further, the opinion is
silent as to the extent of counsel’s participation in the hearing.
In Turner, the defendant appeared at a TRO hearing prior to filing a special
appearance. Turner, 1999 WL 33659, at *1–2. Counsel explained the defendant’s
position and presented argument in opposition to the TRO. Id. at *3. On appeal, the
court recognized counsel was more than a “mere bystander at the hearing,” but
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because the TRO hearing was an ancillary matter, it concluded the defendant did not
generally appear. Id. Significantly, unlike counsel in Turner, Kaufman’s attorney
sought and obtained affirmative relief from the trial court because of his participation
in the TRO hearing. See, e.g., Silbaugh v. Ramirez, 126 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (noting a party must not seek affirmative relief on
any question other than that of the trial court’s jurisdiction before the disposition of
the special appearance). Further, this case has no precedential value. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 47.7(b) (“Opinions and memorandum opinions designated “do not publish”
under these rules by the courts of appeals prior to January 1, 2003 have no
precedential value.”); see also Babiy v. Kelley, No. 05-17-01122-CV, 2019 WL
1198392, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Lastly, Kaufman relies on a federal district court case, which is not binding
authority. Alliantgroup, L.P., 2009 WL 1109093, *5–6; see also Roe v. Ladymon,
318 S.W.3d 502, 510 n.5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (noting binding
authority on appellate courts). Regardless, the defendant in that case raised the lack
of personal jurisdiction in his first responsive pleading before filing a special
appearance, and the opinion does not indicate defense counsel’s level of
participation in the pre-special appearance hearings. Alliantgroup, L.P., 2009 WL
1109093, *5–6.
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The missing piece from each of these cases is the extent of counsel’s
participation in the hearing and counselseeking and receiving affirmative relief from
the trial court. The Austin Court of Appeals has recognized this distinction.
In Schoendienst v. Haug, 399 S.W.3d 313, 314 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no
pet.), the court considered whether Haug violated Schoendienst’s due process rights
by taking a default judgment without prior notice after she appeared in the action.
Although the case did not involve a special appearance, the Austin court conducted
a thorough analysis of 120a cases to determine whether Haug generally appeared
through her actions thereby recognizing the trial court’s jurisdiction to decide
broader questions in the case. Id. at 317. The court concluded that by agreeing
without qualification to a temporary injunction, she subjected herself to a court order
that restricted her personal freedom and ability to deal with her property and finances
in anticipation of a trial on the merits. Id. at 320–21. The court acknowledged what
had been suggested by some courts to be “a categorical rule that appearing in matters
‘ancillary and prior to the main suit,’ including agreeing to temporary injunctive
relief, does not constitute a general appearance that waives a special appearance.”
Id. at 321 n.8 (discussing two cases relying on Turner and Perkola). As we
explained above and the Austin court likewise concluded “a close examination of
the authorities cited to support that proposition reveals it to be an overbroad
oversimplification.” Id.
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Kaufman has not challenged the facts from the beginning of the TRO hearing
that were not recorded. In fact, during the special appearance hearing,
AmeriHealth’s counsel reminded the trial court of the procedural background
without any challenge from Kaufman:
[Y]our Honor, respectfully, while there wasn’t a record of the first part
of your hearing, I think the Court recalls what Mr. Dial did, appearing,
making argument, the TRO speaks for itself, more importantly, there is
a record of the second part of your hearing.
THE COURT: Yeah.
Accordingly, Kaufman’s conduct during the beginning of the TRO hearing,
considered in the context of the present record, amounted to a general appearance.
The reporter’s record of the second half of the TRO hearing further supports
the conclusion Kaufman generally appeared by seeking affirmative relief from the
trial court. Kaufman, however, argues he did not generally appear by requesting
expedited, pre-injunction discovery, and by agreeing to the rule 11 agreement
because he did not invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
We agree engaging in discovery is not enough in and of itself to waive a
special appearance. See Brady, 2020 WL 2029245, at *6. We likewise recognize
that under some circumstances, a rule 11 agreement will not constitute a general
appearance. See Crystalix Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. Vitro Laser Grp. USA, Inc., 127 S.W.3d
425, 428 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (concluding rule 11 agreements
did not constitute a general appearance but “declin[ed] to establish a bright-line rule
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affecting all rule 11 agreements” and instead “look[ed] to the facts of the case before
us”).
In Crystalix, we concluded two rule 11 agreements, one extending a TRO and
another agreeing not to interfere or seize certain property, did not amount to a general
appearance because the agreements neither changed the status of any action with the
trial court nor requested or invoked any action from the trial court. Id. at 428. Here,
despite Kaufman’s arguments to the contrary, he agreed to the terms read into the
record by AmeriHealth, but more importantly, he agreed to “everything else that
[AmeriHealth] said,” which included the trial court ordering compliance with the
rule 11 agreement. By suggesting a contrary conclusion because AmeriHealth’s
attorney read the agreement into the record, Kaufman underplays his own actions
during the hearing. AmeriHealth repeatedly said, “the parties have agreed,” and “we
have agreed” as terms were read into the record. Kaufman never objected or
attempted to clarify that he did not agree with the recitations. Further, Kaufman’s
attorney made one clarification and said, “But everything else he said is agreed.”
Thus, Kaufman agreed to the trial court confirming the rule 11 agreement and
ordering the parties to comply with it. As such, he invoked action from the trial
court inconsistent with the assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him.
See Dawson-Austin, 968 S.W.2d at 322 (seeking affirmative relief from trial court
will constitute a general appearance). But see Exchequer Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stratum,
Dev., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (no general
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appearance when “no evidence on our record showing appellee requested any
affirmative relief from the trial court”).
In reaching this conclusion, we reject Kaufman’s contention that language in
the temporary injunction order indicates AmeriHealth and the trial court understood
he had not generally appeared.3
By the time the trial court signed the order, Kaufman
had already generally appeared. Any attempt to belatedly preserve his special
appearance by inserting language into the temporary injunction order did not
eliminate or cure the effects of his prior actions during the TRO hearing, which were
inconsistent with the assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. See,
e.g., Beistel, 2007 WL 1559840, at *3 (counsel’s participation in hearing was
inconsistent with special appearance and attempt to preserve special appearance did
not cure effect of actions at previous hearing). Moreover, inserting such language,
which is routinely included in pleadings filed after a special appearance, did nothing
more than acknowledge the pending special appearance.
Given Kaufman’s actions, considered in the context of the present record, we
conclude Kaufman generally appeared. As such, his general appearance waived his
3 The order stated, in part, “The parties have agreed to the terms of this Order of Temporary
Injunction as evidenced by their approval and of the approval of their attorneys below, without waiver of
Defendant Aaron Kaufman’s Special Appearance.” In a footnote, the court elaborated,
Defendants expressly condition the submission of this Agreed Temporary Injunction on
the condition that neither the filing nor the Court’s entry of this Agreed Temporary
Injunction waives Aaron Kaufman’s Special Appearance. Plaintiff agrees not to use the
parties’ agreement of the entry of the Agreed Temporary Injunction as evidence of waiver
of Aaron Kaufman’s Special Appearance or to argue that either constitutes a waiver of
Aaron Kaufman’s Special Appearance.
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personal jurisdiction complaint, and we need not address whether Kaufman negated
personal jurisdiction based on AmeriHealth’s alter ego theory. See Crystalix, 127
S.W.3d at 427 (“An appearance that does not comply with rule 120a is a general
appearance and waives the party’s personal jurisdiction complaint.”); see also
Whorton, 742 S.W.2d at 278 (affirming denial of special appearance under any
applicable legal theory when trial court does not specify under what ground it
exercised authority); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
We overrule Kaufman’s arguments challenging the trial court’s denial of his
special appearance.
Outcome: We affirm the trial court’s order denying Kaufman’s special appearance.
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