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Date: 10-18-2021
Case Style:
LOUIS EVANGELISTA, SR., AKA Luigi Evangelist v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Case Number: 19-3825
Judge: Cheryl Ann Krause
Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Plaintiff's Attorney: United States Attorney’s Office
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
New York, NY - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with various offenses, including tax evasion charges. He now fights removal proceedings
Historically, § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) permitted
lawful permanent residents facing deportation to apply for a discretionary waiver of
removal if they could show that (a) they had a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years and (b) they had not been convicted of an aggravated felony for which
they served a term of at least five years’ imprisonment.1
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).
In 1996, however, Congress revisited § 212(c) twice in quick succession.
First, in April 1996, it passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), which disqualified from § 212(c) relief any noncitizen who “is deportable
by reason of having committed” an aggravated felony, regardless of sentence. Pub L. No.
104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277. Then, in September 1996, it passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which repealed
§ 212(c) altogether, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597 (1996). But
this repeal did not go into effect immediately, leaving § 212(c)—as amended by
1 Although by its terms § 212(c) applied only to exclusion, the BIA and federal
courts also applied it to deportation proceedings. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295
(2001).
3
AEDPA—in place from April 1996 to April 1997. See IIRIRA § 309, 110 Stat. 3009-
625.
Louis Evangelista, an Italian citizen who has resided in the United States since
being admitted as a legal permanent resident in 1961, fell into that gap. In 1995,
Evangelista was charged with various offenses, including tax evasion in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7201, an aggravated felony. At that time, a conviction for this offense would not
automatically disqualify him for a § 212(c) waiver so long as he was sentenced to less
than five years’ imprisonment. Following his indictment, Evangelista and the
Government engaged in plea negotiations, and Evangelista, reasonably relying on the
availability of § 212(c) relief, declined to enter a guilty plea and instead proceeded with a
jury trial, resulting in a guilty verdict in February 1996. Evangelista was sentenced to 51
months’ imprisonment in October 1996, by which time AEDPA had taken effect,
disqualifying him for § 212(c) relief based on his conviction for an aggravated felony,
regardless of the sentence imposed.
Against this backdrop, when the Government sought to remove Evangelista three
years later, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluded that he was ineligible for § 212(c)
relief because he was convicted of aggravated felony after AEDPA’s effective date.
Evangelista pursued § 212(c) relief in numerous challenges to his order of removal over
the next several years, and DHS appeared to accede by granting him a series of deferrals
through 2017. In 2018, however, DHS renewed its efforts to remove him, prompting
Evangelista filed a motion to reopen in which he urged the BIA to reconsider its position
that he was ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver. The BIA agreed that Evangelista would have
4
been eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief at the time he elected to go to trial in February
1996 and that his case was “very sympathetic,” but it nonetheless declined to exercise its
sua sponte authority to reopen on the ground that, because his formal judgment of
conviction was entered after AEDPA’s effective date, he was statutorily ineligible for
relief. This petition for review followed.
II. Discussion2
Evangelista challenges the BIA’s premise that AEDPA renders him ineligible for
relief under § 212(c) and argues that it would be impermissibly retroactive to subject him
to a statute that went into effect only after he had declined to enter a plea and the jury had
returned its verdict, i.e., after his opportunity to change his plea became irrevocable.
3
In
analyzing whether a civil law applies retroactively, we first ask “whether Congress has
expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 280 (1994). If so, our inquiry ends. See Matthews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161
2 The BIA’s decision to reopen a “case in which it has rendered a decision,” is
discretionary. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We retain jurisdiction, however, to determine if “the
BIA relie[d] on an incorrect legal premise” and, if so, to “remand to the BIA so that it may
exercise its sua sponte authority under the correct legal framework.” Sang Goo Park, 846
F.3d at 651 (citing Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011)). We exercise
plenary review over questions of law, Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 561 (3d Cir. 2002),
even as we recognize that “ultimately it is up to the BIA to decide whether it will exercise
its discretion to reopen.” Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160.
3 While the INA’s time- and number-bars might ordinarily foreclose a subsequent
motion like Evangelista’s, Evangelista identified substantial grounds for equitable tolling
and the Government, having expressly conceded that argument agreeing that the BIA
equitably tolled the time- and number-bars below, is bound by its waiver. See Barna v. Bd.
of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2017).
5
F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1998). If not, then we “must determine whether the new statute
would have retroactive effect.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
The first step has been accomplished for us. In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court
held that Congress did not expressly provide for AEDPA’s changes to § 212(c) to be
retroactive.4 See 533 U.S. at 320; see also Atkinson v. Att’y Gen., 479 F.3d 222, 227 (3d
Cir. 2007) (describing St. Cyr’s analysis at Landgraf step one). We thus ask if AEDPA’s
changes to § 212(c) have a “retroactive effect;” that is, if they “attach[] new legal
consequences to events completed before [their] enactment.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). Here, the new
consequence is clear: AEDPA makes Evangelista ineligible for § 212(c) relief when he
would not have been otherwise. Our task, then, is to determine the past event to which
AEDPA attached this new consequence, applying the “commonsense, functional
judgment” demanded by the Supreme Court. Id. at 321.
The Government contends that the relevant event was Evangelista’s formal
judgment of conviction upon sentencing, which occurred six months after AEDPA was
4 St. Cyr involved the retroactive application of both AEDPA and IIRIRA to a
noncitizen who had pleaded guilty before the enactment of those statutes. While the Court
expressly referenced only IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c) in discussing Landgraf step one, it
necessarily reached the same result as to AEDPA’s restrictions on § 212(c) to conclude
that both statutes were impermissibly retroactive as applied to the noncitizen in that case.
533 U.S. at 320. Accord Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018); see also
In re Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 259 (BIA Feb. 28, 2014) (“A guiding principle
underlying St. Cyr is that Congress did not express a clear intention that the AEDPA and
IIRIRA amendments relating to section 212(c) would operate in a manner that would have
a ‘retroactive effect.’”).
6
enacted and so would be subject to AEDPA’s dictates without any need to consider
retroactivity. It reaches this conclusion in three steps, observing that: (1) § 440(d) of
AEDPA disqualified from § 212(c) relief noncitizens who were “deportable by reason of
having committed” an aggravated felony, 110 Stat. at 1277; (2) a noncitizen is
“deportable” once he is “convicted of an aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1996), and
(3) under IIRIRA’s definition of “conviction,” which is expressly retroactive, see Perez,
294 F.3d at 561, a noncitizen is “convicted” when the trial court enters a formal judgment
of conviction, including the sentence.5
But while we agree that AEDPA made eligibility for § 212(c) relief turn on
conviction for an aggravated felony,
6
it also attached new legal consequences to
5
IIRIRA defines “conviction” for immigration purposes as either “a formal
judgment of the alien entered by a court,” or, in the absence of such a judgment, when “a
judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty” and “the
judge has ordered some form of punishment.” IIRIRA § 322(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-628
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)).
6 This interpretation finds support in the decisions of our sister circuits regarding
analogous provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA where the phrase “removable [or deportable]
by reason of having committed” has been interpreted by reference to the underlying statute.
Compare Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “the
meaning of the term ‘deportable’” in Section 309(c)(4)(G) “must be derived from the
underlying statute[],” which “makes aliens ‘deportable only when they have been
‘convicted’” of a covered offense (emphasis in original)), and Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29,
38 (1st Cir. 1997) (interpreting the phrase “deportable by reason of having committed”
under § 440(a) of AEDPA by reference to § 241(a)(2)(C), which renders an alien
deportable if “convicted” of a firearms offense) with Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting the term “deportable” under § 1229b(b)(2) by
reference to § 1182(a)(2)(C), which “does not require a conviction, but only a ‘reason to
believe’ that the alien is or has been involved in drug trafficking.” (quoting Lopez-Molina
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004))), and Fernandez-Bernal v. Att’y Gen.,
257 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the phrase “removable by reason of
7
Evangelista’s decision to accept a plea deal or go to trial. “[T]he availability of
discretionary relief plays a central role in many aliens’ decisions regarding whether to
accept a plea agreement.” Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 494-95 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322-23). Indeed, such immigration consequences implicate
sufficiently “weighty reliance interests” that the Constitution guarantees defendants the
right to be advised of those consequences in criminal proceedings. Francisco-Lopez v.
Att’y Gen., 970 F.3d 431, 439 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
364 (2010)). Accordingly, where a defendant has had the option of accepting a plea
bargain, both we and the Supreme Court have looked to the time of that decision to
determine if a law has an impermissible retroactive effect.
In St. Cyr, for example, the Supreme Court held that AEDPA and IIRIRA attached
new consequences to the decision to accept a plea bargain because “[p]rior to AEDPA
and IIRIRA,” aliens who took plea deals “had a significant likelihood of receiving
§ 212(c) relief,” whereas pleading guilty after AEDPA and IIRIRA meant “facing certain
deportation.” 533 U.S. at 325. The Court emphasized that “a great number of [aliens]
agreed to plead guilty” in reliance on “settled practice, the advice of counsel, and perhaps
even assurances in open court that the entry of the plea would not foreclose § 212(c)
relief,” id. at 323, and thus “the elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by
IIRIRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect,” id. at 325.
having committed” under § 1252(a)(2)(C) by looking to the underlying statute,
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which renders an alien removable for “having been convicted of [a
covered offense] or having admitting to committing it or acts constituting it”).
8
Building on St. Cyr, we held in Ponnapula that AEDPA and IIRIRA attached new
consequences not only to an alien’s decision to accept a plea, but also to an alien’s
decision to turn down a misdemeanor plea deal because, at the time, “even if he were
convicted of a felony after trial he would still be eligible for [§ 212(c) relief].” 373 F.3d
at 497 (quotation omitted). We stressed that “the reliance interest of an alien who accepts
a plea agreement arises at the time the choice is made to accept the agreement.” Id. at
494.
The Government suggests that Evangelista must show actual reliance on the
availability of § 212(c) relief when he chose to go to trial. But “[t]he Supreme Court has
never required actual reliance” to establish a retroactive effect. Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at
493; see also Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 273 (2012) (“[T]he presumption against
retroactive application of statutes does not require a showing of detrimental reliance[.]”).
Rather, as we explained in Atkinson, reliance “is an element to consider in determining
whether the enactment of a new law has created a ‘new disability’” or attached new legal
consequences to a past event. 479 F.3d at 229; see also id. at 227-29. And in any event,
as in Ponnopula, Evangelista’s reliance on the availability of § 212(c) relief is supported
by the record. In his sworn affidavit, Evangelista explained that if he had known that
“new laws could foreclose the traditional process for obtaining a [§ 212(c)] waiver . . .
everything would have been different. [He] could have pleaded guilty and started to pay
off my debts . . . I could have negotiated a plea agreement that didn’t require pleading
guilty to the singular charge . . . that supported the deportation proceedings.” J.A. 27.
9
With this in mind, we find this case virtually indistinguishable from Ponnapula:
Like the alien there, Evangelista had plea discussions with the Government before
AEDPA took effect and opted to reject a plea and try the case before a jury. At that time,
regardless of whether his guilt was determined by plea or by trial, Evangelista could
reasonably expect he would remain eligible for § 212(c) relief whenever he was
sentenced, so long as he was sentenced to less than five years’ imprisonment. Only after
the jury returned its verdict and his choice not to enter a plea became irrevocable did
AEDPA attach to that choice a new legal consequence: ineligibility for § 212(c) relief.
Had that been the state of the law earlier, a noncitizen in Evangelista’s position may well
have made a different choice or even negotiated different plea terms, as Evangelista
attested he would have done. Even the Government concedes that “pleading guilty
before [April] [19]96 would have changed [Evangelista’s] situation” and preserved his
eligibility because “he would have been covered by St. Cyr.” Oral Arg. at 30:10-30:16.
In short, no less than in Ponnapula, AEDPA had a retroactive effect on Evangelista’s
decision to decline a plea and proceed to trial.7
See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 484 (“It is
7 Our holding in Atkinson is not to the contrary. There we concluded that IIRIRA
could not be applied retroactively even to “aliens who . . . had not been offered plea deals
and who had been convicted of aggravated felonies following jury trial at a time when that
conviction would not have rendered them ineligible for section 212(c) relief.” 479 F.3d at
229-30 (emphasis added). For that group of aliens, we explained, the “important ‘event’”
to which IIRIRA attached new legal consequences was “the conviction” because—in
contrast to the situation addressed in Ponnopula, as well as the one before us today—
retroactive application of the statute would render those aliens ineligible for relief
“regardless of whether [their] conviction[s] resulted from trial or plea.” Id. at
230. Likewise, our holding in Perez that IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c) applied to a
noncitizen who was tried before IIRIRA went into effect but sentenced after, see 294 F.3d
10
hard to imagine that [petitioner] would not have accepted the misdemeanor plea offer if
he had known about the risk of being ineligible for § 212(c) relief.”). We conclude that
AEDPA “operates retroactively” in this circumstance and cannot, consistent with the
“commonsense, functional judgment” we are called upon to exercise, be applied to
Evangelista. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (quotations omitted); see also Ponnapula, 373 F.3d
at 483.
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the BIA’s ruling that Evangelista was
statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief rested on an incorrect legal premise.
Accordingly, we will grant Evangelista’s petition for review and remand to the BIA to exercise its suasponte authority under the correct legal framework. See Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 651
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: