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Date: 08-08-2021
Case Style:
United States of America v. JEREMY WARREN
Case Number: 20-10213
Judge: Susan Pia Graber
Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Plaintiff's Attorney: McGregor W. Scott, United States Attorney; Camil A.
Skipper, Appellate Chief; Alexandre M. Dempsey, Assistant
United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
San Francisco, California - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a child charge.
In a one-count superseding information, the government
charged Defendant Jeremy Warren with “VIOLATION:
18 U.S.C. § 1594(C) - CONSPIRACY TO ENGAGE IN SEX
TRAFFICKING OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF
18 U.S.C. § 1591(A)(1), (B)(2).” Defendant pleaded guilty
and the district court sentenced him to 206 months’
imprisonment. He timely appeals. Defendant challenges
neither the conviction nor the sentence but argues only that
the judgment and commitment order must be amended to
remove references to the underlying substantive offense,
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). We disagree and,
therefore, affirm.
1
1 The parties dispute whether we review de novo or for plain error, as
Defendant did not seek a change in the judgment at the district court.
United States v. Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.
2009). We need not resolve that dispute because the result would be the
same under either standard.
4 UNITED STATES V. WARREN
In 2013, Defendant discussed with Alyssa Tegan Brulez
the prostitution of a minor through the use of a website called
Redbook. Defendant knew that the minor was in fact under
the age of 18. He also knew that Brulez had encouraged the
minor to engage in prostitution and that the purpose of the
scheme was to make money for Defendant. There is no
evidence that the minor actually engaged in a commercial sex
act as a result of the conspiracy.
In 2015, the government indicted Defendant on three
counts. Two of the counts charged sex trafficking of a child
by force, threats of force, or coercion; the other count charged
Defendant and co-defendant Brulez with conspiracy to
engage in sex trafficking of a child. Thereafter Defendant
entered into an agreement with the government under which
he would plead guilty to a single count of conspiracy to
engage in sex trafficking of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1594(c). In turn, the government agreed to dismiss the
remaining counts against Defendant.
Accordingly, the superseding information charged
Defendant with a single count of conspiracy to engage in sex
trafficking of a child “in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 1594(c) and 1591(a)(1), (b)(2).” Title
18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) punishes a person who conspires with
another to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Section 1591 pertains to
sex trafficking. Subsection 1591(a)(1) applies to a person
who “recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains,
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits” sex trafficking
by any means. Subsection 1591(b)(2) describes the
punishment for sex trafficking that is not effected by means
of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion and that does not
involve a child victim under the age of 14.
UNITED STATES V. WARREN 5
Defendant pleaded guilty to the single count contained in
the superseding information. The government stated that
Defendant and another person had agreed “to engage in sex
trafficking of a child in violation of Title 18 United States
Code Sections 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2).” At one point, the
prosecutor explained that Defendant “will plead guilty to the
single count in the super[s]eding information which charges
a violation of Title 18 United States Code Section 159[4](c),
conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a child in violation
of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2).” As agreed, the
government moved to dismiss the remaining counts. The
court accepted the guilty plea and adjudged Defendant guilty
of the charged offense.
The court later sentenced Defendant to 206 months’
imprisonment, dismissed the remaining counts, and entered
the following judgment:
On appeal, Defendant asserts that the judgment must be
“corrected” because it shows that he was convicted of having
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). That is, he asserts
that the judgment states that he was found guilty of both the
conspiracy and the underlying crime that formed the
substantive object of the conspiracy. That is an incorrect
reading of the judgment.
The judgment clearly provides that Defendant pleaded
guilty to a single count, “Count 1 of the Superseding
6 UNITED STATES V. WARREN
Information”; that Defendant is “adjudicated guilty of this
offense” in the singular (emphasis added); that “[a]ll
remaining Counts are dismissed”; and that the nature of the
offense of conviction is “Conspiracy to Engage in Sex
Trafficking of a Child (Class A Felony)”—again describing
the nature of “the offense” in the singular. The inclusion of
statutory references to both the conspiracy statute and the
sections describing the object of the conspiracy does not
transform the judgment into one that describes a conviction
of the substantive crime. The judgment, in sum, cannot
properly be read to suggest that Defendant was convicted of
more than one crime, nor can it properly be read to suggest
that Defendant stands convicted of the crime that was the
object of the conspiracy.2
It is axiomatic that, to be found guilty of a federal
conspiracy, one must agree with at least one other person to
commit a substantive federal offense. United States v.
Indelicato, 800 F.2d 1482, 1483 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
Thus, although the judgment is not required to pinpoint the
statute defining the substantive offense that is the object of
the conspiracy, neither is it error for the judgment to include
such a reference. See, e.g., United States v. Pariseau,
685 F.3d 1129, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 846
and 841 where the defendant was convicted of one count of
2 Defendant argues that, because of the wording of the judgment, the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) erroneously concluded that he has a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which makes him ineligible for certain benefits
and privileges. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvii) (inmates ineligible if convicted of “[a]ny offense
under Chapter 77, relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons,
except for sections 1593 through 1596”). He now has the opportunity to
present to the BOP this opinion, which construes the judgment to reflect
that Defendant committed a single offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c).
UNITED STATES V. WARREN 7
attempted possession with intent to distribute more than
500 grams of methamphetamine); United States v. MartinezMartinez, 156 F.3d 936, 938 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371 and 659 where the defendant pleaded guilty to a onecount indictment charging conspiracy to steal goods in
foreign commerce)
Outcome: AFFIRMED
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: