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Date: 04-01-2022
Case Style:
Case Number: 2019-CA-1058-MR
Judge: McNeill
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Plaintiff's Attorney: John A. Bahe, Jr., David Mushlin, Patrick Markey Ryan C. Vantrease
Defendant's Attorney: Carol S. Petitt and Adam Fuller
Description: Louisville, Kentucky personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiffs, who sued Defendants on
malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
On December 22, 2007, three armed suspects (two
males and one female) entered the home of Abbey
Schmitt. The three suspects demanded money and
assaulted Schmitt and her boyfriend, Robert Hayes.
Schmitt reported to responding officers that the female
suspect was African-American, “20-24 years of age,
5’7”, 130 pounds, thin build, and with a short black
afro.” Marlowe’s Brief at 7. Schmitt also reported that
one of the male suspects referred to the female suspect as
“Nikki.” Marlowe was assigned to investigate the
robbery.
University of Louisville’s campus police
investigated a similar robbery near Schmitt’s home.
Campus police presented a photo-pack to the victim of
the similar robbery, and she identified Vaughn Carter as
one of the male suspects. Carter was arrested, and
Marlowe interviewed Carter. Upon questioning, Carter
apparently acknowledged knowing a woman that went by
the nickname of “Nikki.” According to Marlowe, Carter
identified Tiffany Washington as “Nikki” and reported
that she worked at the University of Louisville’s campus
library.
Marlowe subsequently compiled a photo-pack
containing Washington’s photo. Marlowe utilized
Washington’s driver’s license photograph and placed it in
a photo-pack with five other female mug-shot
photographs. The driver’s license photograph used in the
photo-pack depicted Washington as having straight
shoulder-length hair. Also, Washington’s driver’s
license photograph had a light blue background while the
other mug shot photographs had a dark colored
background.
Washington was arrested and remained incarcerated
for approximately five days until she posted bail. The
grand jury declined to indict Washington after hearing
alibi evidence that Washington was in Henderson,
Kentucky, on the day of the crime.
The circuit court did not address whether Marlowe
possessed probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant for
Washington in its summary judgment. Considering the
factual complexity and the current posture of this case,
we reverse upon this issue and remand for the circuit
court to determine whether Marlowe possessed probable
cause to obtain an arrest warrant for Washington and if
so, whether Marlowe acted in good faith and was entitled
to qualified official immunity.
On remand, the trial court again considered Marlowe’s motion for
summary judgment in light of the Court’s holding in Marlowe I. Ultimately, the
court denied Marlowe summary judgment as to Washington’s claims. The case
was tried in the fall of 2019 during which Marlowe moved for a directed verdict,
which was granted in part and denied in part. A Jefferson Circuit Court jury
ultimately found in favor of Washington on the counts of malicious prosecution
and abuse of process.
The jury awarded her a total of $2,250,000.00 in damages,
including $250,000.00 in punitive damages. Marlowe now appeals to this Court as
a matter of right. She primarily argues that the trial court erred in denying her
motion for summary judgment and in denying her motion for a directed verdict.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR1 56.03. The Kentucky Supreme Court further explained this summary
judgment standard in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.:
While it has been recognized that summary judgment is
designed to expedite the disposition of cases and avoid
unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of material
fact are raised, . . . this Court has also repeatedly
admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. The
record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all
doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a
trial court may believe the party opposing the motion
may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary
judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial
judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue
of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is
not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we
have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of
trial if they have issues to try.
Outcome: Reversed
See: Jerome Render, et al. v. Crystal Marlowe
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: