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Date: 02-07-2021
Case Style:
Myles Danard Alexander-Woods v. State of Indiana
Case Number: 20A-CR-01233
Judge: Elizabeth F. Tavitas
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
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Description:
Indianapolis, IN - Criminal defense attorney represented Myles Danard Alexander-Woods’ with moving to suppress the seized evidence on the bases that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to search and arrest him; and his arrest and the vehicle search were unreasonable and violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[4] On October 10, 2019, while Deputy Brent Horton (“Deputy Horton”) of the
Rush County Sheriff’s Department was on routine patrol, Deputy Horton
initiated a traffic stop of a speeding vehicle with an Oklahoma license plate.
Without his canine partner, Deputy Horton approached the vehicle on the
passenger side. Deputy Horton observed the driver, later identified as
Alexander-Woods, making “abnormal[ly]” excessive, “furtive movements”
within the vehicle. Tr. Vol. III pp. 222, 223. Alexander-Woods was
accompanied by his wife, India Alexander-Woods (“India”).
1
The vehicle was
a rental car.2
[5] Deputy Horton detected a strong odor of marijuana in the vehicle and observed
one package of Swisher Sweets cigarillos in the center console and another
package on India’s floorboard. In Deputy Horton’s experience, cigarillos are
commonly used to smoke marijuana, with marijuana substituted for the original
1 Alexander-Woods resided in Michigan at the time of these events.
2 The vehicle was originally rented by Alexander-Woods’ brother.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 4 of 18
tobacco. Deputy Horton instructed Alexander-Woods and India to exit the
vehicle and advised the couple that Deputy Horton detected the odor of raw
marijuana coming from the vehicle. India exited the vehicle promptly;
however, Alexander-Woods “took a fair amount of time to exit the vehicle
which was a red-flag to [Deputy Horton].” Id. at 225-26. Alexander-Woods
advised that the couple smoked marijuana earlier that day. Deputy Horton
called for backup and commenced a vehicle search based on his detection of the
marijuana odor.
3
[6] The vehicle search revealed a baggie containing a plant-like material in the
center console of the vehicle. Deputy Horton believed the plant-like material to
be marijuana. Visibly protruding from beneath the driver’s seat, Deputy
Horton found a t-shirt that was wrapped around a crumpled napkin and a
handgun. The napkin contained a hard, brown, sand-like substance that
Deputy Horton suspected was heroin; the substance was later determined to be
fentanyl. Deputy Horton read the Miranda advisements to Alexander-Woods,
who agreed to speak with Deputy Horton. Alexander-Woods admitted that he
owned the gun and that the brown sand-like material was heroin.
[7] On October 11, 2019, the State charged Alexander-Woods with possession of a
narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; theft of a firearm, a Level 6 felony; carrying a
3 Deputy Horton’s canine partner did not participate in the vehicle search. See Tr. Vol. III p. 227 (Deputy
Horton’s testimony that “I’d already detected the odor of marijuana and searched based on that. My canine
was not needed.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 5 of 18
handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of
marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. In a separate information, the State alleged
that Alexander-Woods was an habitual offender.
[8] On January 3, 2020, Alexander-Woods filed a motion to suppress evidence,
wherein he asserted that: (1) “[t]he search and seizure was not based on
reasonable suspicion that [ ]Alexander-Woods [ ] was involved in criminal
activity”; (2) “[t]he search was not incident to arrest, because the search
preceded the arrest of [ ]Alexander-Woods[ ]”; and (3) “[c]onsidering the
totality of the circumstances, the arrest and search of [Alexander-Woods] was
unreasonable, and thus, violated Article l, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution . . . and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.” See Alexander-Woods’ Conf. App. p. 71. On January 9, 2020, the trial
court conducted a suppression hearing and, at the close of the evidence, found:
“. . . [T]here was reasonable [ ] suspicion for the stop and [ ] the odor of
marijuana, in itself, was Probable Cause for the search of the vehicle. [ ][T]he
Motion for Suppression of Evidence should be denied.” Tr. Vol. II p. 22.
[9] The trial court conducted Alexander-Woods’ jury trial on February 25 and 26,
2020.
4
During the State’s case-in-chief, Deputy Horton testified that: (1) he was
previously trained regarding “street level narcotics training [and]
4 To be precise, the underlying trial was Alexander-Woods’ second jury trial. The first jury trial, held from
January 14 to January 15, 2020, ended in a mistrial. On February 5, 2020, the State dismissed the theft of a
firearm count before the State retried Alexander-Woods on the remaining charges.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 6 of 18
identification[,]” tr. vol. III p. 220; and (2) he identified the odor of marijuana5
in the vehicle based on his training and experience. The defense objected to
Deputy Horton’s testimony “based on [the] prior Motion to Suppress” and
“ask[ed] the Court to note [the defense’s] continuing objection to any testimony
from the Deputy regarding the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 225. The trial
court overruled the objection. Thereafter, as the State introduced into evidence
the marijuana, handgun, fentanyl, and other items seized from the vehicle,
Alexander-Woods renewed his objection.
[10] On cross-examination of Deputy Horton, defense counsel challenged: (1) the
State’s ability to prove that Alexander-Woods knowingly possessed the fentanyl
and the handgun found in the vehicle; (2) the propriety of Deputy Horton’s
continued search after the discovery of the marijuana; (3) the particular
circumstances under which each item of contraband or evidence was discovered
during the search; (4) the nature, extent, and import of Deputy Horton’s
remarks to Alexander-Woods and India; and (5) the rationale for various steps
taken by Deputy Horton during his investigation.
6
The defense did not probe
into Deputy Horton’s qualifications to identify controlled substances and/or his
5 At trial, Deputy Horton did not specify that the detected odor was that of raw marijuana.
6 The defense elicited India’s and/or Alexander-Woods’ testimony that: (1) the vehicle involved in the
incident was a rental car; (2) India and Alexander-Woods lacked knowledge of the presence of the gun or the
fentanyl in the vehicle; (3) India had a Michigan-issued license to carry a handgun and would have had
lawful possession of any handgun in the couple’s possession; (4) Alexander-Woods only claimed ownership
of the handgun after Deputy Horton “threatened to lock [India] up” as well, tr. vol. IV p. 86; and (5)
Alexander-Woods did not identify the brown sand-like substance as heroin.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 7 of 18
ability to distinguish one controlled substance from another. See Tr. Vol. III pp.
246-47, Tr. Vol. IV p. 3 (Deputy Horton’s testimony and defense counsel’s
references, on cross-examination, regarding Deputy Horton’s detection of the
odor of marijuana).
[11] On February 26, 2020, the jury found Alexander-Woods guilty on all counts;
Alexander-Woods subsequently admitted he was an habitual offender. On
June 4, 2020, the trial court sentenced Alexander-Woods as follows and
ordered the counts to be served concurrently: (1) for possessing a narcotic drug,
ten years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), plus a six-year habitual
offender enhancement; (2) for carrying a handgun without a license, one year;
and (3) for possession of marijuana, sixty days. Alexander-Woods, thus,
received a sixteen-year aggregate sentence from which he now appeals.
Analysis
[12] Alexander-Woods alleges the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
fentanyl and the handgun evidence; he maintains that the admission of these
items violated his Fourth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Article
1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We review challenges to the
admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Fansler v.
State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). In those instances, we will reverse only
where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Id. “[W]hen an appellant’s challenge to such a ruling is
predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 8 of 18
seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider
that question de novo.” Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013).
[13] As noted above, Alexander-Woods argued below that:
3. The search and seizure was without lawful authority because:
a. The search and seizure was not based on reasonable
suspicion that the citizen (Alexander-Woods) was
involved in criminal activity.
b. The search was not incident to arrest, because the search
preceded the arrest of the citizen (Alexander-Woods).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the arrest
and search of the Defendant was unreasonable, and thus,
violated Article l, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995) and the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Alexander-Woods’ Conf. App. p. 71. On appeal, however, Alexander-Woods
challenges the vehicle search on a different basis. Alexander-Woods now
contends that Deputy Horton lacked probable cause to search because: (1) “the
smell of marijuana is no longer a sufficient basis to establish probable cause
because the smell is virtually indistinguishable from the smell of a legal plant
like hemp”; (2) “[w]ithout evidence that a police officer has been formally
trained and has experience in distinguishing the odor of legal hemp from the
odor of illegal marijuana, the incriminating nature of the source of an odor that
has commonly been associated with marijuana is no longer immediately
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 9 of 18
apparent to a police officer”; and (3) “Deputy Horton . . . did not testify that he
had the training and experience necessary to discern between legal hemp and
illegal marijuana.” Alexander-Woods’ Br. pp. 16-17.
[14] Alexander-Woods cannot now raise an argument that he did not raise to the
trial court. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Washington v. State, 808
N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004) (concluding that failure to raise an argument in the
trial court constituted waiver on appeal because “‘a trial court cannot be found
to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to
consider’”).
[15] As the State points out, Alexander-Woods may circumvent waiver by
establishing fundamental error. See Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind.
2010) (“Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental
error occurred.”). “The ‘fundamental error’ exception is extremely narrow and
applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles,
the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the
defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587
(Ind. 2006). “The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or
constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due
process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotation
omitted). Thus, we will consider whether the admission of the evidence at issue
constituted fundamental error under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 10 of 18
A. Fourth Amendment
[16] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a
warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens
possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Taylor v. State, 842
N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been “extended to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999
(Ind. 2016). “As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this
rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the
unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception.” Clark v.
State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013).
[17] Probable cause is “not a high bar,” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S.
320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014), and is cleared when the totality
of the circumstances establishes “a fair probability”—not proof or
a prima facie showing—of criminal activity, contraband, or
evidence of a crime, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238, 243
n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d
522, 528 (Ind. 2018).
Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581-82 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
“Probable cause to search exists where the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the officer making the search, based on reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Shorter v. State, 144
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 11 of 18
N.E.3d 829, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “[T]he determination is to
be based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which
reasonable and prudent persons act.” Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002). The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that the
“presence of odors” can establish probable cause to issue a search warrant,
provided that the following conditions are met: (1) the issuing judicial officer
“finds the affiant qualified to know the odor”; and (2) the odor “is one
sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance.” Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948).
[18] In Hawkins, this Court held that, when a trained and experienced police officer
detects the distinctive odor of a drug—such as raw or burnt marijuana—coming
from a vehicle, the officer has probable cause to search the vehicle. See Marcum
v. State, 843 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d
at 752); see also Shorter, 144 N.E.3d at 838-39 (finding that detection of burnt
synthetic drugs supplied probable cause for a search). Notably, however, in
each of those decisions, the defendant either failed to challenge law
enforcement’s qualifications to detect the odor, Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d at 752, or
the officer’s qualifications were sufficiently established, Marcum, 843 N.E.2d at
548; Shorter, 144 N.E.3d at 839.
[19] Hawkins is especially instructive. In Hawkins, a police officer lawfully stopped
Hawkins’ vehicle, detected the odor of burnt marijuana, and conducted a
warrantless search of the vehicle, which yielded a gun. Hawkins was charged
with a related offense and moved to suppress the gun for lack of probable cause.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 12 of 18
At the ensuing suppression hearing, Hawkins stipulated to the facts as provided
in the probable cause affidavit. The trial court subsequently granted Hawkins’
motion to suppress. In reversing on appeal, this Court held: “[W]hen a trained
and experienced police officer detects the strong and distinctive odor of burnt
marijuana coming from a vehicle, the officer has probable cause to search the
vehicle . . . . under both the Fourth Amendment of our federal constitution and
under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d
at 752 (emphasis added).
[20] Further, the panel noted: “Hawkins complains [ ] the record is silent concerning
the training and experience of the police officer. We certainly agree that an
accused may challenge the qualifications of the officer to determine the nature
of the detected odor. That opportunity was, however, foregone in this case.”
Id. Because Hawkins stipulated to the probable cause affidavit’s recitation of
the facts, which provided that, the officer identified the odor of burnt marijuana
based on the officer’s training and experience, the panel found “no issue was
raised [below] concerning the training and experience of the police officer, and
none can be raised now.” Id.
[21] Here, the record reveals that Alexander-Woods simply failed to seize his
opportunity below to challenge Deputy Horton’s training and experience
regarding the identification of controlled substances, including Deputy Horton’s
ability to distinguish between the odors of marijuana and hemp. Deputy
Hawkins testified that he was previously trained regarding “street level
narcotics training [and] identification[,]” tr. vol. III p. 220, and that he
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 13 of 18
identified the odor of marijuana in the vehicle based on his training and
experience. Alexander-Woods’ ensuing objection was based generally on the
motion to suppress, but failed to press Deputy Horton regarding the nature and
extent of his qualifications. As in Hawkins, Alexander-Woods seeks, on appeal,
to litigate issues that were not raised or properly preserved before the trial court.
See State’s Br. p. 14 (arguing that “[h]emp was never mentioned in the trial
court, and the trial court was never presented with any facts or argument about
the similarities or differences between the odors of hemp and marijuana”). This
is improper.
[22] “Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the
most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been
procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense
counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.”
Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014). Alexander-Woods’ failure to raise
the “hemp argument” below is fatal to his claim that the trial court
fundamentally erred in finding probable cause for the vehicle search under the
Fourth Amendment.
[23] Moreover, we find that facts and circumstances within Deputy Horton’s
knowledge support the trial court’s finding of probable cause for the vehicle
search. The record includes Deputy Horton’s testimony that, before the vehicle
search, Deputy Horton detected an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle;
observed in plain view cigarillos commonly used for smoking marijuana; and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 14 of 18
learned directly from Alexander-Woods that the couple smoked marijuana
earlier that day. See Tr. Vol. III p. 226.
[24] For the foregoing reasons, Alexander-Woods has not established that the trial
court, by its admission of evidence, committed an egregious and blatant error
that rendered a fair trial impossible or violated due process under the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, Alexander-Woods’ claim fails.
B. Indiana Constitution
[25] Next, we address whether the admission of the evidence at issue here
constituted fundamental error under the Indiana Constitution. Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
[26] Although Article 1, Section 11 contains language nearly identical to the Fourth
Amendment, Indiana courts interpret Article 1, Section 11
independently. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020). In cases
involving Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the State must show
that the challenged police action was reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014); see Austin v.
State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 15 of 18
10, 17 (Ind. 2010)) (“‘[W]e focus on the actions of the police officer,’ and
employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the
officer’s actions.”). “The totality of the circumstances requires consideration of
both the degree of intrusion into the subject’s ordinary activities and the basis
upon which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.” Litchfield v.
State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Ind. 2005). In Litchfield, our Indiana Supreme
Court summarized this evaluation as follows:
In sum, although we recognize there may well be other relevant
considerations under the circumstances, we have explained
reasonableness of a search or seizure as turning on a balance of:
1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation
has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search
or seizure imposes on the citizens’ ordinary activities, and 3) the
extent of law enforcement needs.
Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.
[27] We begin our analysis by examining the law-enforcement
officers’ “degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a
violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361. In
evaluating the officers’ degree of suspicion, we consider all “the
information available to them at the time” of the search or
seizure. Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18.
Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943. The record reveals that Deputy Horton: (1) lawfully
stopped Alexander-Woods’ speeding vehicle; (2) observed Alexander-Woods’
furtive movements inside the vehicle; (3) detected the odor of marijuana from
the vehicle; (4) saw potentially-incriminating cigarillos in plain view; and (5)
noted Alexander-Woods’ delay in exiting the vehicle as instructed. Deputy
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 16 of 18
Horton, thus, had a firm suspicion that there was illegal activity occurring in
Alexander-Woods’ vehicle as well as concern that Alexander-Woods was
operating the vehicle under the influence of drugs.
[28] Next, our consideration of the second factor, “the degree of intrusion the
method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizens’ ordinary activities”, is
guided by various principles. We first consider the degree of intrusion from the
defendant’s point of view; thus, a defendant’s consent to the search or seizure is
relevant to determining the degree of intrusion. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944.
Second, we consider the intrusion into both the citizen’s physical movements
and the citizen’s privacy. Id. In traffic stop cases, we focus on the degree of
intrusion into the defendant’s physical movements. Id. at 944-45. Third, we
consider the manner in which the officers conducted a search or seizure. See id.
at 945. Specifically, we continue to consider the totality of the circumstances
and look at “all of the attendant circumstances”—not a single aspect of the
search or seizure in isolation. Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196,
1202 (Ind. 2016)). Here, Alexander-Woods did not grant consent to the vehicle
search. Alexander-Woods does not suggest, and there is nothing in the record
to support a finding, that the actual vehicle search was conducted in an
extraordinary manner. We acknowledge, however, that Deputy Horton’s order
that Alexander-Woods and India should exit the vehicle as well as the interior
search of the vehicle imposed a moderate degree of intrusion into AlexanderWoods’ ordinary activities.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 17 of 18
[29] Regarding the third Litchfield factor, “the extent of law enforcement needs, our
Supreme Court has stated the following:
These law-enforcement needs exist not only when officers
conduct investigations of wrongdoing but also when they provide
emergency assistance or act to prevent some imminent harm.
In reviewing the extent of law-enforcement needs, we look to the
needs of the officers to act in a general way.
But we also look to the needs of the officers to act in the
particular way and at the particular time they did. In considering
the needs of law-enforcement officers in this more specific way,
however, we take a practical approach and do not require officers
to undertake duplicative tasks.
Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946-47 (internal citations omitted).
[30] Here, we find that the law enforcement need was elevated and, overall,
moderate. Deputy Horton was assigned to patrol the public highway and to
look out for public safety. After the lawful traffic stop, Alexander-Woods’
movements within the vehicle, his delay in exiting the vehicle, and his ability to
drive the vehicle away implicated officer safety and necessitated that officers
search the vehicle. Additionally, in the interest of ensuring the safety of
motorists, we find that conducting the search without a warrant was not
unreasonable. See Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind.
2019) (recognizing the “need to enforce traffic-safety laws”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-1233 | February 3, 2021 Page 18 of 18
[31] Based on our consideration and balancing of the Litchfield factors, we conclude
that the vehicle search was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. See Meek v. State, 950 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding,
under substantially similar facts, that the warrantless search of a lawfullystopped vehicle was “reasonable under [the] totality of the circumstances[,]”
based upon police detection of the odor of raw marijuana), trans. denied; see also
Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d at 752 (“[W]hen a trained and experienced police officer
detects the strong and distinctive odor of [ ] marijuana coming from a vehicle,
the officer has probable cause to search the vehicle . . . . under Article 1, Section
11 of the Indiana Constitution.”).
[32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the vehicle search did not run afoul of
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Alexander-Woods has,
therefore, not established that the trial court, by its admission of evidence,
committed an egregious and blatant error that rendered a fair trial impossible or
violated principles of due process under the Indiana Constitution. AlexanderWoods’ claim fails.
Outcome: The trial court did not fundamentally err in admitting the evidence found
during the search of Alexander-Woods’ vehicle. We affirm.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
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