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Date: 10-18-2021

Case Style:

United States of America v. JACK RUSSELL BRISTOL, a/k/a brisj44

Case Number: 21-2398

Judge: Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges PER CURIAM

Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Defendant's Attorney:


New York, NY - Criminal defense Lawyer Directory


Description:

New York, NY - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with federal sexual offenses concerning minors charges. He now seeks a reduction of sentence.



In 2019, Bristol was convicted of federal sexual offenses concerning minors. The
District Court imposed a 360-month sentence. Bristol appealed, but this Court granted
the Government’s motion to enforce the appellate-waiver provision included in Bristol’s
written plea agreement. See C.A. No. 19-3144.
Bristol filed the motion at issue here in March 2021, seeking compassionate
release from prison under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on conditions at FCI
Cumberland resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. See generally 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (providing that a sentence may be reduced if “extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”). After considering the Government’s
response, the District Court denied the motion.
The District Court determined that Bristol had not presented “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” for his release. Bristol’s medical records showed that he suffers
from hyperlipidemia, but he did not produce any evidence that hyperlipidemia is a
COVID-19 risk factor. Bristol also stated that he was a long-time user of chewing
1 Although we have entertained the Government’s motion, we remind the Government
that such a motion should typically be filed before the appellant’s opening brief is
3
tobacco, but the District Court noted that Bristol’s medical records reflected that he had
normal lung function, even after contracting and recovering from COVID-19 in January
2021. The District Court concluded that Bristol’s health conditions, even in conjunction
with his age (64), did not warrant his early release.
The District Court also determined that a reduction in sentence was not warranted
because Bristol would pose a danger to the community, and he did not merit release
under the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 11-12. The Court
explained that the nature of Bristol’s offense, and the fact that he had served only thirteen
percent of his sentence, weighed against his release. Bristol timely appealed the denial of
his motion.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
decision to deny a compassionate-release motion for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Andrews, --- F.4th ---, 2021 WL 3852617, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021). “[W]e will not
disturb the court’s determination unless we are left with ‘a definite and firm conviction
that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached’.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020)).
We agree with the Government that the District Court did not err in determining
that Bristol failed to present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release.
Bristol did not establish that he has any health conditions that make him particularly
due. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(b).
4
vulnerable to a risk of severe illness from COVID-19. And his age, while putting him at
a slightly increased risk, does not compel his release.
But even if Bristol had made the threshold showing that “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” supported his release, we also agree with the Government that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that compassionate release in
this case would be inconsistent with the Section 3553(a) factors. See United States v.
Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1102 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding no abuse of discretion where “the
district court found for the sake of argument that an extraordinary and compelling
circumstance existed . . . but that the § 3553(a) factors counseled against granting
compassionate release”).
The Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bristol failed to
demonstrate that he would not be a danger to the community. Id. at 13; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(C) (including protection of the public as a sentencing factor). As the
Government noted, “Bristol’s repeated depraved actions aimed at a particularly
vulnerable segment of the population, and his willingness to further those actions by
subjecting girls to in-person abuse, show he has no regard for public safety and presents a
clear danger to the community.” Dist. Ct. Mem., Dkt. #87 at 6.
And the District Court remarked that Bristol had served only thirteen percent of
his sentence at the time of his motion. That factor also weighs against Bristol’s release.
See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331 (“Because a defendant’s sentence reflects the sentencing
5
judge’s view of the § 3553(a) factors at the time of sentencing, the time remaining in that
sentence may . . . inform whether [compassionate] release would be consistent with those
factors.”)

Outcome: For these reasons, Bristol’s challenge to the District Court’s order does not present
a substantial question. We therefore grant the Government’s motion, and we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6

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