Date: 06-18-2022

Case Style:

Chester Bryan vs Governor Ron DeSantis

Case Number: 21-2575

Judge:

Thomas D. Winokur

Petition for All Writs—Original Jurisdiction

Court:

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA

On appeal from The

Plaintiff's Attorney: Ashley Moody, Attorney General,

Defendant's Attorney:

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Description:

Tallahassee, Florida - Criminal Defense lawyer represented Petitioner with seeing relief for the denial of an application for commutation of sentence.

Petitioner is serving a sentence for sexual battery by an adult
on a victim less than 12 years of age, a capital crime punishable by
life imprisonment under section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes
(1993). In 2016, Petitioner submitted a clemency application
requesting commutation of his sentence. The Office of Executive
Clemency informed Petitioner by letter that the Governor had
denied his request. The letter indicated that this denial was based
on the fact that the Governor had earlier denied “pending clemency
applications of all murderers and felony sex offenders.” Attached
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to the petition was a March 10, 2021, press release of the Florida
Commission on Offender Review, indicating that on that date the
Governor exercised his clemency powers to deny the pending
clemency applications of all individuals convicted of murder or
felony sex offenses. The letter stated that Petitioner may reapply
for clemency in five years. Petitioner asks the Court to “instruct
the Governor to scrap his ‘blanket policy’” of denying all clemency
applications of those convicted of murder or felony sex offenses.
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to some minimal due
process in the review of his clemency application and that the
process must not be wholly arbitrary or capricious. See Ohio Adult
Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Petitioner
argues that the letter from the Office of Executive Clemency is
evidence of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.
The Florida Constitution allows this Court to issue “writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and other writs
necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” Art. V,
§ 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). In applying this provision,
the rules of appellate procedure permit this court to issue “all writs
necessary to the complete exercise of the courts’ jurisdiction.” Fla.
R. App. P. 9.030(b)(3) (emphasis added). This “all writs” provision
does not provide Petitioner a proper avenue of relief in this
case. We stated the limits of our authority under this provision in
Williams v. State:
This “all writs” provision does not, however, constitute a
separate source of original or appellate jurisdiction.
Rather, it operates as an aid to the court in exercising its
“ultimate jurisdiction,” conferred elsewhere in the
constitution. These “constitutional writs” are ancillary in
that they are used to preserve the power of the court to
fully and effectively decide cases that have been, or will
be, presented on independent jurisdictional grounds.
102 So. 3d 669, 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); see also Cash v. Smith,
465 So. 2d 1294, 1295–96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (denying relief under
the “other writs” or “all writs” power because the petition was “not
sought to protect existing jurisdiction of the court”). Because
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Petitioner does not allege that his petition would preserve or
protect our jurisdiction in any way, he has not established any
right to relief.
Even if Petitioner had sought some other form of
extraordinary writ that would permit us to direct the Governor to
consider his clemency application further, we see no basis for
relief. Petitioner suggests that the Governor has a duty to consider
his application without resort to a policy that denies clemency
merely based on the type of crime committed, as this policy violates
“due process.” See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concluding,
according to five justices, that “some minimal procedural
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings”). We disagree. First,
“[t]he clemency process in Florida derives solely from the Florida
Constitution and [this Court has] recognized that the people of the
State of Florida have vested ‘sole, unrestricted, unlimited
discretion exclusively in the executive in exercising this act of
grace.’” Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 888 (Fla. 2013) (quoting
Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977)). As such, courts
“will not generally second-guess the executive’s determination that
clemency is not warranted.” Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 568
(Fla. 2012). Second, “no specific procedures are mandated in the
clemency process.” Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 25–26 (Fla.
2010). Regarding this second point, we note the observations of the
Northern District of California in Allen v. Hickman:
Clemency proceedings satisfy the Due Process Clause as
long as the State follows the procedures set out in State
law, the State does not arbitrarily deny the prisoner all
access to the clemency process, and the clemency decision
is not wholly arbitrary or capricious.
407 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1103–04 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Woodard,
523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)).
In this case, Petitioner does not allege that the Governor
violated any required procedures set forth in Florida law or refused
to consider any required criteria, or that he has been denied all
access to the clemency process. The Governor’s clemency decision
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was likewise not “wholly arbitrary or capricious” as it is not
irrational to deny clemency to murderers or felony sexual
offenders. Consideration of the offense of conviction is proper when
determining whether to exercise the “grace” of clemency.*

Outcome: As such, even if Petitioner had not improperly sought relief
under the “all writs” provision, we would not have seen a basis for
relief. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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