Date: 05-08-2022

Case Style:

Eberaia D. Fields v. State of Indian

Case Number: 21A-CR-02469

Judge: Derek Molter

Court:

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

On appeal from The Cass Superior Court

Plaintiff's Attorney: Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Kelly Loy
Assistant Section Chief of Criminal
Appeals

Ian McLean
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General

Defendant's Attorney:

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Description:

Indianapolis, IN - Criminal Defense lawyer represented defendant with a operating a vehicle while intoxicated charge.

In February 2018, the State commenced Cause Number 09D01-1802-F6-64
(“F6-64”). It charged Fields with operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a
Level 6 felony, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 3 of 10
Level 6 felony, and resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor.
Fields also received an HVSO enhancement. Then, in April 2021, the State
initiated Cause Number 09D01-2104-F6-79 (“F6-79”), charging Fields with
operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction within seven years
as a Level 6 felony and resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. Also, the
State alleged that Fields was an HVSO. For the purposes of disposition, the
trial court combined these two cases.
[4] At the combined plea and sentencing hearing, the court dismissed the operating
a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person charge from F6-64. Then, in
both F6-64 and F6-79, Fields pleaded guilty to the remaining charges. For F6-
64, the trial court sentenced Fields to two years for operating a vehicle while
intoxicated and one year for the resisting law enforcement conviction. It
enhanced the convictions by six years due to Fields’s HVSO status.
[5] Then, as to F6-79, the trial court sentenced Fields to two years for operating a
vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction within seven years and two
years for resisting law enforcement, which were also enhanced by six years due
to Fields being an HVSO. It also ordered the total sentence for F6-79 to run
concurrently to the total sentence for F6-64 so that the total period of
incarceration would be ten years. Fields now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 4 of 10
Discussion and Decision
I. Kosciusko County Sentence
[6] Fields first argues the trial court erred by not “offsetting” his concurrent HVSO
enhancements in F6-64 and F6-79 against his earlier HVSO sentence in a
Kosciusko Superior Court case under Cause Number 43D03-1510-F6-642 (“F6-
642”). Although the record here is not clear as to what the Kosciusko Superior
Court ordered in F6-642, it appears it may have directed that Fields’s HVSO
enhancement there must be served consecutively to his sentence in F6-64 once
that later sentence was imposed. Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 35–36; Tr. Vol. 2 at
36–40. But since F6-64 had not yet progressed to disposition, the Kosciusko
Superior Court could not order the sentences to run consecutively. See Reaves v.
State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. 1992) (stating that a trial court may not
withhold judgment, indefinitely postpone sentencing, or impose sentences that
begin in futuro). Regardless, that alleged error from an earlier, separate
sentencing is not before us in the appeal of this case.
1
Instead, Fields’s remedy
lies in the Kosciusko Superior Court.
1 The trial court lacked the authority to review the Kosciusko Superior Court’s alleged error. See State v.
Downey, 14 N.E.3d 812, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“The rule is quite well settled, that one court cannot
control the execution of the orders or process of any other court of equal jurisdiction.” (quotation marks
omitted)), trans. denied. Therefore, under Indiana Appellate Rules 5(A) and 9(A)(1), the issue is not before us
for our review.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 5 of 10
II. Abuse of Discretion2
[7] Trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing a
sentence for a felony offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.
2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The statement must
include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing
a particular sentence. Id. If the recitation includes a finding of aggravating or
mitigating factors, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating
and aggravating factors and explain why each factor has been determined to be
mitigating or aggravating. Id. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and [factors] before the court, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.
[8] A trial court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement which
omits mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced
for consideration. Id. at 490–91. Because the trial court no longer has any
2 We note that Fields seems to conflate two separate sentencing standards: whether the trial court abused its
discretion in identifying mitigating and aggravating factors and whether his sentence is inappropriate
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7. “As our Supreme Court has made clear, inappropriate sentence and
abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). Accordingly, “an inappropriate sentence analysis does not involve an argument that the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant.” Id. While Fields uses some language typical of an
inappropriate sentence claim, he has failed to develop his argument or provide citations to authorities. See
Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). As such, he has waived this claim for our review. See Shepherd v. Truex, 819
N.E.2d 457, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding appellant waived claim by failing to present cogent
argument).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 6 of 10
obligation to “weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors against each other
when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its
discretion in failing to “properly weigh such factors.” Id. at 491. Once the trial
court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not include the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it may then “impose any sentence
that is . . . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of
the State of Indiana.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d).
A. Mitigating Factors
[9] Fields argues the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him because
it failed to consider his efforts to rehabilitate, acceptance of responsibility and
remorse, and strong support system as mitigating factors.
[10] The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the trial
court’s discretion. Storey v. State, 875 N.E.2d 243, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. “The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s
arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor.” Id. Additionally, the
trial court is not required to attribute the same weight to proffered mitigating
factors as the defendant does. Id. Nonetheless, the trial court may not ignore
factors in the record that would mitigate an offense. Id. To fail to find
mitigating factors which are clearly supported by the record may imply the trial
court did not consider those factors. Id. To prevail upon appeal, the defendant
must establish a mitigating factor is both significant and clearly supported by
the record. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 7 of 10
[11] Fields, in one sentence, asserts that the trial court did not consider three
mitigating factors—his efforts to rehabilitate, acceptance of responsibility and
remorse, and strong support system. While he summarily states these factors
are supported by the record, he offers no further argument as to how they are
significant in light of the sentence the trial court imposed. Therefore, this
argument is waived under Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which requires
that contentions in an appellant’s brief be supported by developed reasoning
and citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on
appeal. See Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(concluding appellant waived claim by failing to present cogent argument).
[12] Regardless, Fields’s argument fails. First, the record demonstrates that Fields’s
family and social support were assessed as moderate—not high or strong. Tr. at
50; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 77. Next, it is not enough that Fields’s
efforts to rehabilitate and his acceptance of responsibility and remorse were
supported by the record at sentencing. Tr. 12, 38, 75–76. Instead, to prevail
upon appeal, the defendant must also establish that the mitigating evidence is
significant. Storey, 875 N.E.2d at 252. Fields has not done so here.
B. Aggravating Factors
[13] Fields also argues the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him
because the aggravating factors the trial court identified—Fields’s prior
convictions—were “inherently . . . included in the charges [pleaded] by [Fields]
and . . . should not have been levied against [him] as aggravating factors.”
Appellant’s Br. at 14. In raising this argument, Fields emphasizes that he
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 8 of 10
admitted to operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction within
seven years and being an HVSO. But he does not cite to any authority or offer
any detailed explanation to support this argument. Consequently, as with his
argument regarding mitigating factors, he has waived this argument under
Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See Shepherd, 819 N.E.2d at 483 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004).
[14] Waiver notwithstanding, we do not find Fields’s argument persuasive. “The
significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number
of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Maffett v. State, 113 N.E.3d
278, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). At sentencing, the trial court emphasized that
Fields has an extensive criminal history. Specifically, Fields has thirty-seven
misdemeanor convictions and six felony convictions—many of which are
alcohol-related or driving violations. Also, to the extent that Fields complains
his criminal history was used both to enhance the convictions at issue and as an
aggravating factor, that is not improper. In Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77, 80–
81 (Ind. 2008), our Supreme Court concluded that because trial courts no
longer “enhance” sentences under the advisory statutory scheme, using a
material element of a crime as an aggravating factor—here, a prior operating a
vehicle while intoxicated conviction—is “no longer an inappropriate double
enhancement.” Id. at 80.
[15] Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion in considering Fields’s criminal history as an aggravating factor.
Moreover, we note that we do not find Fields’s brief argument that the trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 21A-CR-2469 | May 6, 2022 Page 9 of 10
court “unreasonabl[y]” balanced the mitigators and aggravators persuasive.
Appellant’s Br. at 14. Because a trial court is no longer required to identify and
weigh mitigators and aggravators upon rendering a sentence and may, instead,
impose any sentence authorized by law after it enters its sentencing statement,
“the relative weight ascribed by the trial court to any” mitigators or aggravators
“is no longer subject to our review.” Salhab v. State, 153 N.E.3d 298, 304 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2020).
[16] In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Fields.
III. Sentencing Order
[17] As the State acknowledges, remand is necessary for a different reason.
Appellee’s Br. at 17. “[I]t is well-settled that a habitual offender finding does
not constitute a separate crime nor result in a separate sentence, but rather
results in a sentence enhancement imposed upon the conviction of a subsequent
felony.” Weekly v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1133, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(quotations marks omitted and alterations adopted), trans. denied. Here, the trial
court’s sentencing order mistakenly treats Fields’s HVSO enhancements in F6-
64 and F6-79 as separate sentences. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 110, 133;
Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 71, 93. We therefore reverse the portions of the
sentencing orders directing that Fields’s HVSO enhancements run as separate,
consecutive sentences to his underlying felony convictions and remand with
instructions to correct the order consistent with this opinion.

Outcome: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions

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