Date: 04-03-2023

Case Style:

Danny Lamont Chambers; Dontell Rayvon-Eddie Smith v. Ronald Sanders; City of Detroit, Michigan

Case Number: 22-1146

Judge: Gibbons

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Plaintiff's Attorney: Christopher P. Desmond, Johnson Law, P.L.C.

Defendant's Attorney: Christopher J. Raiti, Shneur Nathan Nathan & Kamionsky, L.L.P.

Description: Danny Lamont Chambers and Dontell Rayvon-Eddie Smith allege that Detective Ronald Sanders and his employer, the City of Detroit, violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial integrity by procuring the wrongful
conviction and incarceration of their father, Danny Burton. Even assuming that the plaintiffs
have identified a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause, their claim cannot
succeed because they have not alleged that defendants acted with a culpable state of mind,
directed toward them or their family unit. We affirm.

I.

In 1987, a Michigan state court jury convicted Danny Burton of first-degree murder and a
firearm charge. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The
complaint in this case alleges that the conviction primarily rested on witness testimony from
individuals who were present at the home where the shooting had allegedly occurred. In
December 2019, Burton was released from prison and his conviction was vacated on the
prosecutor’s motion, after key witnesses recanted and details of witness manipulation and
intimidation were revealed. Detective Ronald Sanders’s investigative tactics allegedly included
threats and physical violence against witnesses, including minors, to secure their testimony
against Burton. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result, Burton spent thirty-two years in prison.
In July 2020, Burton filed claims under §§ 1983 and 1988 against Sanders and the City of
Detroit for Brady violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence. The district
court granted the city’s motion to dismiss Burton’s claims, finding that Burton’s claims were
barred by the city’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy which occurred after Burton’s claims arose. Detective
Sanders did not move to dismiss and Burton’s claims against him were still pending in the
district court as of the time of this appeal.

Several months after the city was dismissed from Burton’s suit, Burton’s sons filed the
instant suit against Sanders and the city. His sons, Danny Lamont Chambers and Dontell
Rayvon-Eddie Smith, allege that the wrongful conviction and incarceration of their father
throughout their childhood and into adulthood violated their constitutional right to family
integrity. They do not assert that Sanders’s actions were directed at the family unit or intended
to break up the family; rather, they claim that their “rights were violated when defendants
violated Mr. Burton’s rights.” DE 1, Compl., Page ID 11.

The district court granted Sanders’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim against him,
finding no cognizable due process right for “interference with family integrity” when a party is
indirectly harmed by a constitutional tort against a family member. The district court further
granted the city’s motion to dismiss Chambers and Smith’s Monell claim because it relied on the
same theory of due-process parental interference that the court dismissed against Sanders. With
the federal claims dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Chambers and Smith’s state-law claims. Chambers and Smith timely appealed the district
court’s grant of the motions to dismiss.

II.

On appeal, Chambers and Smith reassert their argument that the substantive due process
right of familial association extends to cases where the state has wrongfully incarcerated a parent
for a significant period and argue that the district court erred in dismissing their federal claims
under Rule 12(b)(6).

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). For a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) “the defendant acted under color of state law;” and (2) “the defendant’s conduct
deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock,
592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). As the city and Sanders have not contested that Sanders was
acting “under color of state law” in course of his investigation, we focus our inquiry on the
second prong: whether the challenged conduct deprived Chambers and Smith of a federal right.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protections guard against
“governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property . . . regardless of the adequacy of the
procedures employed.” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 588 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pearson
v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir. 1992). It protects both constitutionally
enumerated rights, as well as rights “so rooted in the traditions of the people as to be ranked

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 4

fundamental” and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, or the interest in freedom from
government actions that “shock the conscience.” Id.; see also Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d
240, 249-50 (6th Cir. 2003). In recognizing unenumerated rights, the Supreme Court counsels
hesitation: “We must . . . exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the
policy preferences of” the judiciary. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(internal alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted). “To say the least, it’s a tough test.”
Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell, 42 F.4th 593, 601 (6th Cir. 2022).

The Due Process Clause has historically protected some rights that are grounded in
family integrity and autonomy. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”). However, this
longstanding liberty interest has traditionally applied to either state actions directed at the family
relationship, such as visitation or child custody, or state regulation of decisions within the ambit
of parental control, such as educational decisions, the choice of living arrangements, and the
choice to have children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-69 (2000) (custodial rights of
fit parents); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right of parents to make educational
decisions); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(right of extended family members to live together); Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to have children). The contours of these rights are guided by history
and tradition, and they are not absolute; “the family is not beyond regulation.” Moore, 431 U.S.
at 499.1

1Whatever the scope of the substantive rights that might be grouped under the heading of “family
integrity,” neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that such rights are shared equally by parent and child,
see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (“We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has
a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship.”). Our own precedent
has held only that children may assert reciprocal procedural due process protections in the context of child removal
proceedings. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child & Fam. Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 700 (6th Cir. 2013). We note

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 5

This circuit has not previously decided whether the right to family integrity is implicated
whenever the state deprives a child of routine interaction with a parent through wrongful
incarceration. Cf. Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 n.6 (6th Cir. 1991) (declining to
decide the issue of whether the children of a man wrongfully killed by state police could bring a
§ 1983 claim for deprivation of the parent-child relationship). We address the issue now and
hold that it is not.

III.

We may assume for purposes of this case that plaintiffs have identified a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Even so, it would not be violated here because
plaintiffs have not alleged that any state actor intruded on that right with the culpability required
to state a due process violation. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848. This
conclusion is supported by the majority of our sibling circuits and our own precedent.

A.

The Supreme Court has explained that “[h]istorically, the guarantee of due process has
been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (collecting cases). The “Due
Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it can properly be characterized as
arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Negligent behavior categorically fails to shock the
conscience, while conduct intended to injure is “most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking
level.” Id. at 849. Accordingly, the majority of circuits have recognized that “not every . . . act
that results in an interference with the rights of familial association is actionable.” Lowery v.
County of Riley, 522 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up and internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). As with every substantive violation of the Due Process Clause, the state
must have acted toward the plaintiff with a culpable state of mind. See id. (“The conduct or
also that, under the Supreme Court’s caselaw, the Due Process rights of parents—and hence any reciprocal rights of
children—may vary depending on a number of facts that are not alleged in the complaint, such as the parents’
marital and custodial status. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128130; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). We
decline to address the issue here.

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 6

statement must be directed at the familial relationship with knowledge that the statements or
conduct will adversely affect that relationship.”); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (1st
Cir. 1986) (“We decline, on this record, to make the leap ourselves from the realm of
governmental action directly aimed at the relationship between a parent and a young child to an
incidental deprivation of the relationship between appellants and their adult relative.”); Gorman
v. Rensselaer County, 910 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[A] claim under the Due Process Clause
for infringement of the right to familial associations requires the allegation that state action was
specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship.”); McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d
820, 827-28 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In the context of parental liberty interests . . . the Due Process
Clause only protects against deliberate violations of a parent’s fundamental rights—that is,
where the state action at issue was specifically aimed at interfering with protected aspects of the
parent-child relationship.”); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[F]inding a
constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the parent-child
relationship would stretch the concept of due process far beyond the guiding principles set forth
by the Supreme Court.”); Partridge v. City of Benton, 929 F.3d 562, 568 (8th Cir. 2019)
(“Pleading a plausible familial-relationship claim under § 1983 requires an allegation that the
state action was intentionally directed at the familial relationship . . . Partridge and Schweikle did
not allege in their complaint, or argue on appeal, that Ellison’s shooting was directed at their
relationship with Keagan. This forecloses their claims.”); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804-05
(4th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiffs, by contrast, seek to state a claim for violation of their own Due Process rights
without any showing of a culpable mental state directed toward them. Plaintiffs claim that
defendants violated their father’s constitutional rights through Brady violations, malicious
prosecution, and fabrication of evidence and that the City is liable to their father under Monell.
As to their own constitutional claims, they say simply that they have a “constitutional right to
have their family unit protected,” which was necessarily “violated when defendants violated Mr.
Burton’s rights, which caused Mr. Burton to be falsely convicted and imprisoned.” DE 1,
Compl., Page ID 11. But holding a government actor automatically responsible for incidental
harms flowing from his actions imposes strict liability—a result directly contrary to Daniels,
which clarifies that the Due Process Clause “serves to prevent governmental power from being

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 7

used for purposes of oppression.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that the “Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated” by an act “causing unintended loss of injury to life, liberty, or property,” even when
a government official acts negligently with respect to the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected
interests. Id. at 328. Nor can it be implicated when a government official unintentionally harms
those interests with no culpable state of mind directed toward them at all.

The only circuit to agree with the plaintiffs’ approach is the Ninth Circuit, which allows
children to claim violation of their right to family integrity against state actions which
incidentally impact their relationship with their parents. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d
1411, 1417-20 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199
F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1985). The
Ninth Circuit’s view is based primarily on a broad reading of the substantive due process right to
family association and the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the precursor to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418-1419.

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis is flawed in both respects. First, as already discussed, the
Supreme Court has cautioned against such broad interpretations of rights under the due process
clause. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. Second, the Ninth Circuit mischaracterizes the
legislative history on which it relies. The cited passage is a statement by Representative
Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts describing the Ku Klux Klan Act as “a remedy for wrongs,
arsons, and murders done. This is what we offer to a man whose house has been burned, as a
remedy; to the woman whose husband has been murdered, as a remedy; to the children whose
father has been killed, as a remedy.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 807 (1871) (emphasis
added). But a closer look at Butler’s remarks is revealing. See Michael S. Bogren, The
Constitutionalization of Consortium Claims, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 479 (1991), for an academic
discussion of this legislative history. Butler’s comments were directed at § 6 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act. Globe at 800, 804, 807. That section created a remedy for the “legal representatives”
of a deceased to recover no more than $5,000 in damages “for the benefit of the widow” or “next
of kin.” See id. at 804. Section 6 is now codified as § 1986, not § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
Representative Butler was an opponent of this provision, who mocked it and said that he did not

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 8

believe any real cases would be decided under it. Globe at 807. (“So far as this particular
provision is concerned . . . . I look upon it as utterly useless, a mere illusion and delusion.”). He
explained he was only voting for it in an apparent horse-trade to get another part of the bill
passed. Id. (“There is not a man who believes there will ever be a verdict under it. It is here that
we may throw dust into the eyes of the people, and for no other purpose. But for all that, I will
vote for the bill . . . although opposed to many things in it, because I must take . . . the bitter with
the sweet.”). Indeed, immediately after Butler concluded his remarks, Representative (and later
president) James Garfield, an advocate for the Act, condemned Butler’s continued opposition
and his attempt to “rise[] at the last moment to throw all the contempt he can upon the bill.” Id.
Garfield then took it upon himself to clarify the content of each section of the Act. Id.
This legislative history, contextualized, does not support the view that the Congress that
passed § 1983’s precursor intended that all children of parents wrongfully killed or incarcerated
by police were entitled to a constitutional remedy under § 1983. And even if it did, that statutory
conclusion about the scope of § 1983 would not affect the contours of the constitutional right to
familial association under the Due Process Clause. At most, it would suggest that the children of
an individual whose constitutional rights are violated may sue derivatively under § 1983 to
vindicate the parent’s constitutional rights—a proposition our case law has already rejected. See
Purnell, 925 F.2d at 948 n.6 (citing Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1984)); see
also infra at 8-9.

B.

Analogous cases from this circuit confirm that no constitutional violation of the right to
family association exists without a state action directed at the family relationship. In § 1983
cases where family members of those wrongfully killed by police claim infringement of the right
to familial association, we have rejected such claims as collateral. As we explained in Claybrook
v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2000):

In the Sixth Circuit, a section 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the
direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort. Accordingly, only the purported
victim, or his estate’s representative(s), may prosecute a section 1983 claim;
conversely, no cause of action may lie under section 1983 for emotional distress,

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 9

loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries suffered personally
by the victim’s family members.

Id. at 357 (citations omitted). Denying relief for a family member permanently deprived of a
loved one through state action suggests a fortiori that relief should also be denied for those
deprived of their loved ones for temporary periods, such as through wrongful incarceration.
While Claybrook involved a plaintiff who sought to assert the constitutional rights of a deceased
family member and not his own right to familial association, this court has applied the principle
more broadly.

In unpublished cases, we have consistently rejected § 1983 claims of family members
explicitly seeking to vindicate their own constitutional right to family integrity and not the rights
of their deceased family member. See LeFever v. Ferguson, 645 F. App’x 438, 447 (6th Cir.
2016); Foos v. City of Delaware, 492 F. App’x 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2012). In Foos, we reiterated
the language from Claybrook we previously quoted and explained that even when state action
that detains or kills an individual is reframed as a deprivation of his or her relation’s right to
familial association, no cause of action exists under § 1983. Id. at 592-93. Foos further rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Smith of allowing such claims. Even more recently in LeFever,
we again rejected a family-integrity claim by children whose parents were killed by state police
officers. Id. at 447-48. In that opinion, the panel majority—like that in Foos—expressly
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach of allowing claims by children who are deprived
of their familial relationships because their parent is wrongfully killed by a state actor. Id.
LeFever stands alongside Foos and Claybrook in rejecting similar claims to those brought by
Chambers and Smith.

Our precedent and that of most other circuits lead us to conclude that substantive due
process claims based on the right to family integrity require that the state official act with a
culpable state of mind directed at the family relationship. The due process right of familial
association does not protect against all forms of state action that impact parent-child
relationships.

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 10

C.

As we explained above, actions that collaterally impact the family relationship are
insufficient to give rise to a substantive due process claim that the state has violated an
individual’s right to family integrity. The government official must have, at a minimum, acted
with a culpable state of mind directed at the plaintiff’s family relationship or a decision
traditionally within the ambit of the family. Thus, many state actions with collateral effects on
families are not constitutional violations. See Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1155 (10th Cir.
2018).

To clarify this rule, two points must be made. First, the standard we adopt today will not
be met simply because a government official acted intentionally. A government official can
make a wrongful, intentional decision, as the alleged facts here demonstrate, without that intent
or the decision itself being aimed at the family relationship. Instead, as with any due process
violation, stating a claim in this context requires that the state actor act with a culpable state of
mind with respect to the plaintiffs themselves and their own alleged constitutional rights. This
rule aligns with precedent. As a baseline, the Supreme Court has held that merely negligent
conduct cannot give rise to a due process violation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333
(1986). A fortiori, a mere incidental harm cannot give rise to due process violation. “[T]he due
process guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever
someone cloaked with state authority causes harm.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848. To rise to the level
of a “conscience shocking” violation of rights in the constitutional sense, the harm suffered by a
family member must be more than a collateral consequence of other wrongful state action. See
generally Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 591 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Darrah v. City of Oak
Park, 255 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 2001)) (“A government actor who has time to deliberate
shocks the conscience if the actions ‘were taken with deliberate indifference towards the
plaintiff’s federally protected rights.’”) (emphasis added). It is not enough that some wrongful
intent existed at some point in the chain of events.

Second, it will admittedly be a rare case in the wrongful incarceration context that meets
this standard. That rarity is appropriate in light of both the narrow scope of substantive due
process generally and our case law and that of other circuits consistently rejecting such claims in

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 11

the Fourteenth Amendment context. On the other hand, were we to dispense with the
requirement that the government action at issue target the family relationship, then every close
family member of a wrongfully incarcerated individual would have a constitutional claim based
on the incidental, even unknowing, impact of that individual’s incarceration on the family
relationship. As discussed above, that conclusion cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s
case law, or that of this circuit and nearly all of our sister circuits.

D.

Applying this framework to the instant case, Chambers and Smith have not pled facts to
state a claim that Sanders’s conduct was directed at interfering with their parent-child
relationship. We cannot conclude that Sanders’s investigative misconduct and deliberate
indifference toward Burton’s federally protected rights also amounts to “conscience shocking”
treatment of his children’s federally protected rights. See also DE 1, Compl., Page ID 7
(“Defendant [Sanders] . . . conspired to knowingly deprive Mr. Burton of his constitutional rights
under the 4th Amendment, and to thereby deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to be
with their father.”) (emphasis added). Chambers and Smith do not allege that their rights were
targeted by Sanders, but instead that violations of their rights were an inevitable byproduct of
Sanders’s violation of their father’s constitutional rights. These allegations do not state a due
process claim. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Chambers and Smith’s
§ 1983 claim against Sanders in his individual capacity.

As no constitutional rights violation occurred under the facts alleged, Chambers and
Smith’s Monell claim was also properly dismissed. Monell claims allow for municipal liability
“for the constitutional violations of their employees only where the municipality’s policy or
custom led to the violation.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014). However,
“[t]here can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.” Id.
With no underlying rights violation plausibly established in their complaint, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Chambers and Smith’s Monell claim against the city.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 12
_________________
DISSENT
_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the
majority’s determination that Appellants failed to allege that Detective Sanders violated their
due-process rights to family association and integrity. When the state incarcerates a parent, there
are, as the majority notes, “incidental, even unknowing, impact[s] of that . . . incarceration on the
family relationship.” Majority Op. at 11. Those “incidental . . . impacts”—such as the loss of
companionship, the child’s ability to hug their parent, cry on their shoulder, celebrate an
accomplishment, or turn to their parent for advice—are often devasting to the child and the
family relationship. When the conviction turns out to be in error and the parent has been
mistakenly incarcerated for a crime that they did not commit, the impacts may feel even more
tragic and severe. Though unfair and unjust, the state and its official have not necessarily
deprived the child of their due-process rights. But that is not the case before us. Instead, we are
faced with children who lost their association with their father for thirty-two years because a
police officer deliberately and intentionally procured a false conviction against their father that
condemned him to a life sentence of imprisonment.

I disagree with the majority that a state official deprives a person of their due-process
right to family association and integrity only when the state official “acted with a culpable state
of mind directed at the plaintiff’s family relationship or a decision traditionally within the ambit
of the family.” Majority Op. at 10. I believe that this new requirement lacks support in our
controlling precedent. Instead, I believe that we should apply the shocks-the-conscience
standard to the official’s conduct. Therefore, I would measure whether Appellees’ conduct
towards the Appellants—intentionally and deliberately procuring a wrongful conviction against
their father and depriving them of their father—shocks the conscience. I would hold that when
the child loses this relationship to the perpetual absence of their parent because a state official
deliberately and intentionally procured a wrongful conviction, the official deprives the child of
their due-process right to family association and integrity. But even under the majority’s test,
I nonetheless believe that Appellants’ allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from those

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 13

allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to demonstrate that Sanders’s decision was aimed
at the family relationship.

Because the majority overlooks the intentional and bad-faith nature of Appellants’
allegations, I begin there.

I. DELIBERATE AND INTENTIONAL CONDUCT

In 1987, a Wayne County jury convicted Danny Burton of first-degree murder and a
felony-firearm charge, and he received a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 9) (Page ID #3). After thirty-two years of incarceration—thirty-two
years of separation between parent and child—the state finally freed Appellants’ father in light of
evidence of his innocence and the grossly unconstitutional and bad-faith investigation leading to
his wrongful convictions. See id. ¶ 13 (Page ID #3–4).

The relevant events began in May 1987, after the killing of Leonard Ruffin, when police
suspected Burton of the killing and arrested him. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14–15 (Page ID #3–4). According to
the Complaint, while Burton was in custody, Detective Sanders threatened, intimidated, and
inflicted physical violence on Burton to pressure him to confess to Ruffin’s killing and to waive
certain constitutional rights. See id. ¶¶ 6, 16–17 (Page ID #2, 4). On Appellants’ information
and belief, Sanders “knew” that their father had not killed Ruffin and knew who committed the
killing. Appellants Br. at 13; R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 25) (Page ID #6).

According to the Complaint, Sanders also suppressed exculpatory evidence, fabricated
evidence, and coerced witnesses into making false statements and false testimony through threats
and physical, mental, and emotional abuse—statements they subsequently recanted. One
witness, Felicia Gilchrist, whose trial testimony supported the convictions, later attested that she
made false statements and gave false testimony because of Sanders’s threats to charge her
mother and her uncle with murder and “make sure [her] children were taken from” her. R. 1-4
(Compl., Ex. 4 (May 9, 2005 Statement)) (Page ID #28–29); see also R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 19) (Page
ID #5). Gilchrist attested in her affidavit that when Sanders first asked about Burton and his codefendants, she “told him that they were not present at the time of the shooting” but Sanders
arrested her, threatened her with the loss of her children, and threatened to charge her mother and

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 14

uncle for the murder. R. 1-4 (Compl., Ex. 4 (April 13, 2007 Aff.) ¶¶ 3, 6–7) (Page ID #32–33).
Gilchrist also attests to repeated acts of bribery by Sanders. Id. ¶ 11 (Page ID #34).
Gilchrist’s mother, Lula Gilchrist, recalls a similar experience; she too gave “untrue”
testimony at trial because of Sanders’s threat to “charge [her] with the murder.” R. 1-5 (Compl.,
Ex. 5 (May 5, 2005 Statement) at 1) (Page ID #36); R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 20) (Page ID #5). Another
witness, Alfreda Jackson, attested that Sanders coerced her into signing a false statement that he
drafted while she was intoxicated on cocaine. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 22) (Page ID #5); R. 1-7 (Compl.,
Ex. 7 (April 6, 2007 Aff.) ¶ 5) (Page ID #44).

Deandre Bolden, a teenager at the time, “originally gave a statement . . . that [he] did not
see the shooting” or “the shooter” but after he was “questioned for most of a day with no food or
water” outside the presence of his mother, Sanders threatened that Bolden would be killed or
charged with the murder “if [Bolden] didn’t give Det. Sanders the answered he wanted.” R. 1-8
(Compl., Ex. 8 (Dec. 13, 2010 Aff.) ¶¶ 1–2) (Page ID #47); R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 23) (Page ID #5–6).
Bolden was also “punched in the stomach and the ribs.” R. 1-8 (Compl., Ex. 8 (Dec. 13, 2010
Aff.) ¶¶ 1, 3) (Page ID #47). Bolden attested to similar coercion and physical violence when he
tried to testify truthfully at trial. See id. ¶ 3 (Page ID #47). The Complaint also alleges that
“Detroit Police officers abused” Clara Hill Williams—also a minor at the time—and “kept her in
a room for hours without letting her go to the bathroom and forced her to sign a statement that
she did not make” that Burton and his co-defendants committed the killing. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 24)
(Page ID #6); R. 1-9 (Compl., Ex. 9 (Feb. 9, 2011 Interview) at 1–3) (Page ID #49–51). Then,
during trial, an “officer also kept her in a room over night to stop her from testifying at trial,
knowing that she would contradict the prosecution’s theory of the case.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 24)
(Page ID #6). Williams attested that she “thought [the police officers] were going to kill [her].”
R. 1-9 (Compl., Ex. 9 at 3) (Page ID #51).

According to Appellants, the “fabricated evidence was material to [both] a finding of
probable cause” in support of Burton’s arrest and a guilty verdict against Burton. R. 1 (Compl.
¶¶ 61–62) (Page ID #14). By knowingly suppressing exculpatory evidence before Burton’s trial,
(e.g., id. ¶¶ 28, 32, 45 (Page ID #7–8, 12)), and coercing and eliciting false testimony (e.g., id.
¶¶ 19–24, 34, 55–56 (Page ID #5–6, 8, 13)), Sanders and the City tore Appellants’ father away

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 15

from them for thirty-two years, deprived them of their right to a family unit, and caused them to
“grow up fatherless.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 50 (Page ID #6–7, 11).

Undoubtedly, Appellants’ Complaint contains numerous allegations regarding Sanders’s
and the City’s efforts to deprive Burton of his constitutional rights. Though a poor decision to
include so many references to the deprivation of Burton’s constitutional rights in a case alleging
the deprivation of only Burton’s children’s rights, that same underlying conduct serves as the
factual predicate for Appellants’ claims before this court—that Sanders and the City “targeted
Mr. Burton[’s] . . . family,” (R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 31) (Page ID #8)), by intentionally, knowingly, and
in bad-faith depriving them of their father for decades. Just because Appellants erroneously also
included allegations that Burton’s rights were violated does not erase their allegations regarding
their own rights. The majority should have just disregarded the references to how Sanders’s and
the City’s conduct violated Burton’s rights as merely irrelevant and superfluous to Appellants’
claims, Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2011),
rather than use those allegations to frame Appellants’ claims, Majority Op. at 6.
From the Complaint, I draw two common-sense inferences. See Ryan v. Blackwell, 979
F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2020). First, Sanders—“an experienced [and] well-trained police officer”
and detective (R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 29) (Page ID #2, 7))—spent months investigating Burton for
first-degree murder and presumably knew that the suspect of his investigation had children, (R. 1
(Compl. ¶¶ 9–10) (Page ID #3); see also id. ¶ 31 (Page ID #8)). Second, as an experienced
officer and detective, Sanders would certainly know, better than most, that incarceration
separates families. That Sanders had a deep appreciation for the consequences of what would
happen to the family unit by wrongfully incarcerating someone is further strengthened by
testimony that Sanders actually linked incarceration with the breaking of the family unit. The
sworn testimony of Felicia Gilchrist demonstrates his understanding of this link. See R. 1-4
(Compl., Ex. 4 (April 13, 2007 Aff.) ¶¶ 3, 6–7) (Page ID #32–33) (attesting Sanders arrested her
and threatened her with the loss of her children and jail time for her mother and uncle). To me,
this indicates Sanders’s knowledge that wrongful incarceration destroys the family unit. Thus, I
believe we could reasonably infer that Sanders knew that Burton had children and knew that
incarcerating him for the duration of his life would destroy Appellants’ family unit.

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 16

II. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE DUE-PROCESS RIGHT TO
FAMILY ASSOCIATION AND INTEGRITY

Our precedent well establishes “that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected.” Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Kottmyer v. Maas,
436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder the constitution, the parent-child relation gives rise
to a liberty interest.”). The Supreme Court’s numerous decisions regarding the Due Process
Clause’s protection of this relationship “made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a
parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.’” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); see also Schulkers v.
Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2020). The “attempt to force the breakup of a natural
family, over the objections of the parents and their children,” absent “some showing of
unfitness” “offend[s]” the Due Process Clause. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Org.
of Foster Fams. For Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the judgment)). “[F]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural
family ties.” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 787 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). These principles have deep roots in our caselaw.
The majority overlooks the unique nature of the due-process right to family association
and integrity—it is a reciprocal right that exists within one shared relationship between multiple
people. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 700 (6th Cir.
2013) (rejecting argument that only parents had a liberty interest in parent-child relationship
because “the Supreme Court has described the due-process right as one that applies to both
children and parents”); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“This right to
the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and
children.” (emphasis added)). A parent has an “interest . . . in the ‘companionship, care, custody
and management of his or her children,’” id. (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651), and children
maintain an interest “in not being dislocated from the ‘emotional attachments that derive from
No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 17
the intimacy of daily association,’ with the parent,”1
id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams.

For Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)); see also Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 700; Wooley v.
City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] child’s right to family integrity is
concomitant to that of a parent.”); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417–19 (9th Cir.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.
1999) (recognizing right’s reciprocal nature and children’s cognizable liberty “interest in the
continued companionship” of their parent). “This mutual interest in an interdependent
relationship has received consistent support in the cases of the Supreme Court.” Duchesne, 566
F.2d at 825. Unlike many other rights, here conduct that deprives one family member of their
ability to associate with their family likewise deprives the family of their constitutional right and
ability to associate with that member. This reciprocal nature of the right means that conduct
alleged to deprive each person of their rights to family association will also overlap. This reality
should inform determinations regarding whether a state official has violated the right.

III. THE MAJORITY’S “STATE OF MIND” REQUIREMENT
LACKS SUPPORT IN PRECEDENT

The majority’s introduction of a “state of mind” requirement lacks a basis in our
precedent and conflates the required degree of culpability of an official’s actions with a state-ofmind requirement. First, § 1983 itself “contains no independent state-of-mind requirement.”
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
(1961) (rejecting specific-intent requirement for § 1983 claims). Second, the Supreme Court’s
1The Second Circuit in Duchesne recognized the tremendous importance of this reciprocal liberty interest
to both the parent and the child.

[T]he reciprocal liberty interest of parent and child in the familial bond between them[] need[s] no
greater justification than that they comport with each state’s fundamental constitutional
commitment to individual freedom and human dignity. But the right of parents to raise their
children as they think best, free of coercive intervention, comports as well with each child’s
biological and psychological need for unthreatened and unbroken continuity of care by his parents.
No other animal is for so long a time after birth in so helpless a state that its survival depends upon
continuous nurture by an adult. Although breaking or weakening the ties to the responsible and
responsive adults may have different consequences for children of different ages, there is little
doubt that such breaches in the familial bond will be detrimental to a child’s well-being.
566 F.2d at 825 n.19 (quoting Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645, 649–50 (1977)).

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 18

precedent instructs that we ask whether the official’s conduct shocks the conscience to determine
whether an executive official violated a person’s substantive-due-process rights. But the
majority looks outside this framework and instead turns to other sibling circuits to impose a
state-of-mind requirement—a requirement with an outdated and mooted rationale.

In 1985, the Tenth Circuit appears to have first introduced a requirement similar to
today’s majority’s when it “conclude[d] that an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular
relationship protected by the freedom of intimate association is required to state a claim under
section 1983.” Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th
Cir. 1985). One of Trujillo’s rationales for the requirement was that allowing such claims in
instances of government negligence would swallow § 1983 and flood the courts with cases. See
id. Its specific-intent requirement served to “provide a logical stopping place for such claims.”
Id.; see also Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1155 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen our court first
applied this intent requirement in Trujillo . . . we did so to prevent this doctrine from turning all
negligent torts leading to the death of a child into constitutional violations. Some degree of
severity was required, we explained, to ‘provide a logical stopping place for such claims.’”
(quoting Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190)). Trujillo noted that “other courts ha[d] not imposed any
state of mind requirement to find a deprivation of intimate associational rights.” 768 F.2d at
1190 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court, shortly thereafter, alleviated the need for the “logical stopping place
for” due-process claims. See id. First, in Daniels, it determined that negligent conduct could not
give rise to a Due Process Clause violation. 474 U.S. at 334. Then, in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998), the Court explained that under the shocks-the-conscience
standard for substantive-due-process violations, which applies to executive action, an official’s
conduct constitutes a due-process violation when the official’s conduct is “something more than
negligence,” and is either intentional conduct or conduct that is “less than intentional conduct,
such as recklessness or gross negligence.” Id. (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 & n.3).
With the benefit of Daniels, the Ninth Circuit examined Trujillo’s specific-intent
requirement and explained why Daniels rendered that requirement unnecessary. City of
Fontana, 818 F.2d at 1420 n.12. City of Fontana explained:

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 19

Trujillo imposed this requirement of specific intent on a claim of interference with
the familial relationship in order to avoid throwing open the judicial floodgates to
claims based on merely negligent acts. Now that Daniels has closed this potential
floodgate by requiring the act causing the deprivation to have been more than
simply negligent, Trujillo’s additional focus on the state actor’s motivation is no
longer necessary to serve its purpose.

Id. (citations omitted). City of Fontana “therefore decline[d] to follow Trujillo” and established
that “[a]s long as the state official’s action which deprived the plaintiffs of their liberty was more
than merely negligent, the plaintiffs can state a section 1983 claim without further alleging that
the official was trying to break up their family.” Id.

Lewis specifically framed the inquiry as “[w]hether the point of the conscience shocking
is reached when injuries are produced with culpability falling within the middle range, following
from something more than negligence but ‘less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or
gross negligence.’” 523 U.S. at 849 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court told us to measure
the injury and the official’s conduct from which it flowed. See id. Lewis recognized that in
instances governed by “unforeseen circumstances [that] demand an officer’s instant judgment,”
conduct will rise to the level of conscience shocking where the officer has “a purpose to cause
harm.” 523 U.S. 853–54. It expressly distinguished between other instances in which
government officials have the benefit of time—an “extended opportunit[y] to do better.” Id. at
853. Lewis thus affords some latitude in the determination of whether a state official’s conduct
shocks the conscience by contextualizing the officer’s conduct with the speed and circumstances
of the events at issue. See id. at 853–54. Like Daniels, Lewis addressed the Tenth Circuit’s
judicial-economy concerns by elaborating on the spectrum of conduct that shocks the
conscience. It also indicates that, when, as here, an official had an “extended opportunit[y] to do
better,” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853, a specific intent is not required to establish a due-process
violation.

Like City of Fontana, I agree that a pre-Daniel and pre-Lewis justification for such an
intent requirement no longer remains applicable. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, nothing
about applying the shocks-the-conscience standard would “impose[] strict liability” and “hold[] a
government actor automatically responsible for incidental harms flowing from his actions.”
Majority Op. at 6. They would face liability only when their conduct shocks the conscience—

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 20

“a tough test” “[t]o say the least,” id. at 4—and when they caused the plaintiff’s injury, Powers
v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 2007). Further, that other
circuit courts followed Trujillo is not a reason to adopt an outdated and moot requirement.
In addition to the fact that there no longer remains a need for a “logical stopping place
for” such due-process claims, Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190, the requirement that the official’s
“intent or the decision itself be[] aimed at the family relationship,” Majority Op. at 10, is
arbitrary. I offer an example to highlight the arbitrariness of this requirement. A police officer,
angry that their child is bullied in school, chooses to punish their child’s bully, so the police
officer deliberately and wrongfully frames their parent for murder and incarcerates the bully’s
parent for thirty-two years. The majority, I presume, would consider this to be a violation of the
child’s right to family association and integrity. This example, of course, presents the exact
same misconduct and injury alleged by the Chambers brothers. There is only one difference that,
according to the majority, makes these circumstances constitutionally distinguishable—the
officer’s motive for why they destroyed the family unit—despite the same bad-faith investigation
and persisting with the wrongful conviction while knowing with substantial certainty the
deprivation that would result. “Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from
drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.’” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (alteration in original) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

The majority cites several cases concerning the right to family association and says that
these cases involve “state actions directed at the family relationship . . . or state regulation of
decisions within the ambit of parental control,” or in the case of Moore, the extended family.
Majority Op. at 4 (collecting cases). It lists, as examples, “educational decisions, the choice of
living arrangements, and the choice to have children.” Id. But by deliberately procuring the
wrongful conviction of Appellants’ father despite knowing of his innocence, the state, here too,
interfered with parental decisions regarding education, living arrangements, the size of the
family, and custody. Having inflicted these same injuries on Appellants’ family, that Detective
Sanders may have had other or additional motivations for his conduct, I believe, is not of

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 21

constitutional significance when he intentionally or knowingly procured this result. I simply fail
to see how intentionally procuring a wrongful conviction and incarcerating a father for thirty-two
years is not an intrusion into the decision to have a parent involved in their child’s education,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923); the “choice[] concerning [the] family living
arrangement[],” Moore, 431 U.S. at 499; and the parental-custody arrangement, see Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69, 72–73 (2000).

The majority’s next basis for its decision, some published “analogous cases” in the Sixth
Circuit, also fails to support its new requirement. I find little analogy in these cases as they
considered whether a plaintiff can bring a § 1983 claim to remedy the state’s deprivation of a
family member’s rights. In Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1984), we considered a
mother’s § 1983 claim wherein the mother alleged “violations of the decedent’s civil rights” and
requested relief for “compensation under Ohio’s wrongful death statute.” Id. (emphasis added).
Because the mother argued that her son’s constitutional rights had been deprived—not hers—we
explained that “[b]y its own terminology, [§ 1983] grants the cause of action ‘to the party
injured[]’ [and a]ccordingly, it is an action personal to the injured party.” Id. at 241 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983). In Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1991), we considered “a
survival action based on the violation of decedent’s constitutional rights by defendants” brought
under § 1983 that sought “damages only for a violation of [the decedent]’s constitutional rights”
and a second claim brought under Ohio’s wrongful death statute. Id. at 943, 948 (first emphasis
added).2

Similarly, in Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2000), we focused only on
causes of action brought in the plaintiffs’ representative capacity that alleged the deprivation of
their decedent-father’s constitutional rights. We interpreted the action as one in which plaintiffs
sued as “heirs at law” in both counts one and two regarding defendants’ “violat[ion of] the civil
rights [of the decedent]” and stated that “[Plaintiffs] adequately requested compensation for [the
decedent’s] alleged constitutional injuries in their representative capacities as co-administrators
2We “d[id] not address the merits of the difficult question of whether the children of [the decedent] . . .
could state a claim for damages under section 1983 based on the killing of their father.” Purnell, 925 F.2d at 948
n.6.

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 22

of his estate.” Id. at 356–57. Thus, our statement that “a section 1983 cause of action is entirely
personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort” reflects that procedural posture
and firmly squares with instances in which a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim does not allege a violation
of their own constitutional rights but rather seeks redress only for a violation of another
individual’s constitutional rights. See id. at 357. That is why we instructed that “only the
purported victim, or his estate’s representative(s), may prosecute a section 1983 claim.” See id.
Claybrook’s dicta that “no cause of action may lie under section 1983 for emotional distress, loss
of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by the
victim’s family members,” id., must also be read in the context of the procedural posture and
claims asserted before the Claybrook court. Having read the complaint to seek redress of only
the decedent’s constitutional injury, not the plaintiffs’, Claybrook determined that “the amended
complaint[’s] alleg[ations] . . . [stating] that ‘[a]s a result of the wrongful acts of the defendants,
plaintiffs . . . incurred medical and funeral expenses, as well as great emotional loss associated
with the wrongful death of their father,’” were not redressable under § 1983. See id. at 356–57
(final alteration in original). These injuries, as alleged, were not a deprivation of rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See id. Claybrook neither defines the scope of
the constitutional right nor precludes a plaintiff from bringing a § 1983 claim to redress their
own constitutional injuries merely because those injuries intertwine with another family
member’s injury. See Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 493 F. App’x 731, 739 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A
state may not interfere with this liberty interest, and indeed the violation of the right to family
integrity is subject to remedy under § 1983.” (quoting Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d
1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011)).3

IV. APPLYING THE SHOCKS-THE-CONSCIENCE STANDARD

I would hold that Appellees’ conduct shocks the conscience. Substantive due process
affords “freedom from government actions that ‘shock the conscience.’” Range v. Douglas, 763
F.3d 573, 588 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249–50 (6th Cir.

3

See also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining “[i]t is well established

that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child . . . [that] extends
to protect children from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents” and is redressable
under § 1983 (internal quotations omitted)).

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 23
2003)). The doctrine, at its core, protects against arbitrary government action—“government
power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
Courts have found that an officer’s conduct in both criminal and child-protectiveservices-investigations4 could shock the conscience and, in some instances, deprive a plaintiff of
their due-process right to familial association. See Ghaith, 493 F. App’x at 739 (considering
whether criminal investigation deprived plaintiff of right to family association); Kottmyer, 436
F.3d at 690–91, 691 n.1 (considering whether child-protective-services investigation deprived
parents of right to family association); Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs., 725 F.3d 581, 585–86
(6th Cir. 2013) (same); Heithcock v. Tenn. Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., No. 15-6236, 2016 WL
11786416, at *1–2, *4 (6th Cir. 2016) (order) (same). Allegations of a bad-faith investigation
are particularly important in this determination. See Heithcock, 2016 WL 11786416, at *1–2, *4.
Courts have also examined whether deliberately procuring a wrongful conviction against
someone shocks the conscience. See, e.g., Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 731, 736 (8th Cir.
2012). Another court has also determined that an “unwarranted state interference” with the
protected relationship between parent and child occurred when the police extradited the wrong
person from Los Angeles to New York, where they were wrongfully incarcerated for two years.
See Lee, 250 F.3d at 685; see also id. at 677–78, 686. The wrongful extradition and
incarceration violated the incarcerated-individual’s mother’s right to family association and
integrity. See id. at 685–86.

An official’s acts that “violate[] the ‘decencies of civilized conduct’” shock the
conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73
(1952)). “Such conduct includes actions ‘so brutal and offensive that [they do] not comport with

4

In child-protective-services cases, though “[m]ere investigation by authorities into child abuse allegations
without more . . . does not infringe upon a parent’s right to custody or control of a child,” an exception exists when
“the investigation was undertaken in bad faith or with a malicious motive or if tactics used to investigate would
‘shock the conscience.’” Kottmyer, 436 F.3d at 690–91, 691 n.1; Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs., 725 F.3d 581,
585 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] government investigation of child abuse will not automatically implicate the right to
familial association absent ‘evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or investigation tactics that shock the
conscience.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Teets v. Cuyahoga County, 460 F. App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2012)). In
Heithcock v. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, No. 15-6236, 2016 WL 11786416, at *1–2, *4 (6th Cir.
2016) (order), we applied this principle and held that because the plaintiff alleged that a child-protective-services
employee conducted the investigation in bad faith depriving her of her right to family association, the district court
erred by granting the defendant qualified immunity.

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 24

traditional ideas of fair play and decency.’” Range, 763 F.3d at 589–90 (alteration in original)
(quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847). Conscience-shocking conduct is “arbitrary in the
constitutional sense.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
129 (1992)). “[T]he ‘shocks the conscience’ standard is not a font of tort law, but is instead a
way to conceptualize the sort of egregious behavior that rises to the level of a substantive due
process violation.” Range, 763 F.3d at 590 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847–48).

We have offered a spectrum of conduct to guide our conscience-shocking inquiry. “The
bookends present the easier cases. Merely negligent tortious conduct is categorically beneath
constitutional due process, but conduct on the other extreme end of the culpability spectrum, that
which is ‘intended to injure’ without any justifiable government interest, most clearly rises to the
‘conscience-shocking’ level.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849). Conduct that is “something
more than negligence but less than intentional conduct” and more akin to gross negligence,
Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 923 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849),
“recklessness or gross recklessness, such as deliberate indifference” falls in the middle, Range,
763 F.3d at 590. Whether this conduct shocks the conscience “depend[s] on the context.”
Range, 763 F.3d at 590 (quoting Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529,
535 (6th Cir. 2008)).

When we consider the middle of the spectrum to determine deliberate indifference, we
examine “a multitude of considerations when evaluating an official’s alleged arbitrariness in the
constitutional sense, including the time for deliberation, the nature of the relationship between
the government and the plaintiff, and whether a legitimate government purpose motivated the
official’s act.” Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924 (“These factors help elucidate Lewis’s broader point that
simply making bad choices does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.”). Critical to our
analysis of deliberate indifference is “whether the circumstances allowed the state actors time to
fully consider the potential consequences of their conduct.” Range, 763 F.3d at 590 (quoting
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2002)). We have highlighted that
though “a police officer who exhibits a reckless disregard for life during a high-speed chase does
not shock the conscience because the circumstances require instant judgment,” on the other hand
“an officer who has five hours to decide whether to use tear gas and forced entry during a

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 25

standoff might shock the conscience if the officer is deliberately indifferent to the risks posed to
hostages.” Id. We consider, among other things, the amount of time for deliberation when
“determining whether the actor’s culpability ‘inch[es] close enough to harmful purpose to spark
the shock that implicates’ substantive due process.” Id. at 590–91 (alteration in original)
(quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853) (“For assessing whether conduct indicates harmful purpose and,
thus, constitutional culpability, both the substance of the risk and the time the official had to
appreciate it matter.”).

Here, in determining whether to apply the shocks-the-conscience standard to Appellants’
claim, both Range and this majority’s emphasis on the word “plaintiff’s” when citing Range,
Majority Op. at 10, are illuminating. In Range, we stated that “[a] government actor who has
time to deliberate shocks the conscience if the actions ‘were taken with deliberate indifference
towards the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.’” 763 F.3d at 591 (quoting Darrah v. City of
Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in Range were, in
fact, the family members of a deceased woman who had been sexually abused after her death by
a morgue attendant. Id. at 578. On appeal, we considered the family’s substantive-due-process
claims against county officials who allegedly knew or had reason to know of the morgue
attendant’s sexual abuse of deceased women at the morgue. Id. at 578–79. We applied the
shocks-the-conscience standard to determine whether the county officials’ conduct violated the
family members’ substantive-due-process rights. Id. at 589–91. We therefore examined the full
scope of the county officials’ conduct; we considered “the type of harm, the level of risk of the
harm occurring, and the time available to consider the risk of harm . . . [to] determine[e] whether
[the] official[s] w[ere] deliberately indifferent.” See id. at 591. We ultimately determined that
insufficient evidence existed at the summary-judgment stage to reasonably infer that the county
officials “acted with indifference towards the rights of the families involved.” Id. (emphasis
added).

Here too, I would examine the full scope of Sanders’s conduct to evaluate the claim that
he deprived Appellants of their rights to family association and integrity. Considering
Appellants’ allegations as true, as we must, I believe that Appellants adequately alleged that
Sanders’s conduct shocks the conscience. They allege that Sanders and the City acted

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 26

“intentionally, . . . purposefully, . . . recklessly, deliberately, maliciously, knowingly, carelessly,
[and] with gross negligence” when conducting the investigation that caused the decades-long
separation between them and their father. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 8) (Page ID #2–3). They demonstrate
as much by alleging a grotesque scheme by Appellees to threaten, intimidate, coerce, and
mentally, emotionally, and physically abuse Burton and numerous witnesses during the criminal
investigation; to fabricate evidence; and to suppress exculpatory evidence demonstrating
Burton’s innocence. Id. ¶¶ 16–25, 28–41, 49–65 (Page ID #4–14).

The risks and consequences of physically, mentally, and emotionally abusing witnesses
to obtain false statements and testimony, fabricating evidence, and refusing to turn over
exculpatory evidence in order wrongfully to convict an innocent person and deprive them of their
family—and necessarily deprive their family of them—are self-apparent and extreme. And
Gilchrist’s testimony of Sanders’s threats of incarceration to deprive her of her family further
demonstrate Sanders’s understanding and appreciation of these risks. Further, Sanders had
months between Ruffin’s death and Burton’s trial “to deliberate” and “fully consider the
potential consequences of [his] conduct,” but Sanders stayed the course. See Range, 763 F.3d at
590–91 (quoting Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 510); R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 9–10) (Page ID #3). In fact,
Sanders’s and the City’s alleged heinous behavior persisted during the trial when an officer “kept
[a fourteen-year-old witness] in a room over night to stop her from testifying at trial, knowing
that she would contradict the prosecution’s theory of the case” by “testif[ying] that Mr. Burton
did not commit the crime.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 24) (Page ID #6); see also R. 1-9 (Compl., Ex. 9 at
2–3) (Page ID #50–51). Police also “punched and threatened” another witness during trial “to
make [the witness] change [their] testimony.” R. 1-8 (Compl., Ex. 8 at 1) (Page ID #47).
Other courts considering similarly abhorrent criminal investigations involving fabricated
evidence and the suppression of exculpatory evidence found the conduct conscience shocking.
See, e.g., Winslow, 696 F.3d at 731–36 (reviewing plaintiffs’ claims that law enforcement
deprived them of their due-process liberty interest in a fair criminal proceeding by recklessly
investigating and fabricating evidence in a rape and murder investigation causing them to plead
guilty to crimes they had not committed). Law enforcement’s decision to “ignore[] exonerating
evidence,” id. at 731, “systematically coach[] witnesses into providing false testimony that was

No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 27

in line with the narrative of [law enforcements]’s theory as to how the murder had been
committed,” id. at 732–33, “exert pressure on vulnerable witnesses to provide testimony that was
not within those witnesses’ personal memory,” id. at 735, and “campaign to manufacture
evidence to implicate” the suspects, id. at 734, shocked the conscience, id. at 736.
The extent of brutality and malfeasance alleged here differs substantially from the kind of
deficient government investigations that do not shock the conscience. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Adams, 517 F. App’x 308, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding failures to interview certain
witnesses, consider results of medical examination, and consider certain statements not to shock
the conscience in child-protective-services case); Akins v. Epperly, 588 F.3d 1178, 1184 (8th Cir.
2009) (finding criminal investigation did not shock the conscience because there was no
evidence that law enforcement “purposefully ignored evidence suggesting [the accused’s]
innocence,” “intended to misconstrue the evidence against [the accused],” or “was pressured to
implicate [the accused] or to improperly strengthen the state’s case against him”).
Sanders engaged in conscience-shocking conduct when he intentionally and deliberately
procured a wrongful conviction that incarcerated Appellants’ father for thirty-two years, directly
depriving Appellants of their family association. It does not matter that Sanders’s primary
motivation may not have been to harm the relationship. Thus, I would hold that Sanders violated
Appellants’ rights to family association and integrity because his conduct shocks the conscience.

V. EVEN UNDER THE MAJORITY’S TEST, APPELLANTS SHOULD PREVAIL
BECAUSE THEY SUFFICIENTLY PLEADED THAT SANDERS’S CONDUCT
WAS DIRECTED AT THE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP

I would perhaps agree with the majority that many “incidental harms,” Majority Op. at 6,
on the family relationship arising from “routine interaction[s],” id. at 5, between government
officials and a family member do not amount to a due-process violation. I, however, find
nothing about the allegations in this case to be “routine” and nothing about Sanders’s conduct to
be “incidental.” And I fail to see how deliberately and wrongfully incarcerating a father for the
duration of his life is not a “decision . . . aimed at the family relationship.” Id. at 10. As I note
above, I believe that the panel can reasonably infer that Sanders knew that the Burton had

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children5 and knew that incarcerating him for the duration of his life would result in the
destruction of their family unit. These inferences, alongside the intentional, deliberate, and
knowing conduct of Detective Sanders, supply enough support to overcome a motion to dismiss
regarding whether Sanders “acted with a culpable state of mind directed at the plaintiff’s family
relationship or a decision traditionally within the ambit of the family.” Id. at 10.
Despite knowing that deliberately and wrongfully incarcerating Burton would deprive his
children of their father for the remainder of his life, Detective Sanders nonetheless took actions
to carry out that consequence. As the Restatement of Torts instructs, a person acts with intent
when they desire to or have the purpose of bringing about certain consequences or when they
“act[] knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.” Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Phys. & Emo. Harm § 1 & cmts. a–c (Am. L. Inst. 2010).6

The majority believes that

“[a] government official can make a wrongful, intentional decision . . . without that intent or the
decision itself being aimed at the family relationship.” Majority Op. at 10. It “requires that the
state actor act with a culpable state of mind with respect to the plaintiffs themselves and their
own alleged constitutional rights.” Id. That Sanders may have had other motivations while
doing so does not negate that he “act[ed] knowing that the consequence” of destroying the family
unit “[wa]s substantially certain to result,” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 1(b),7 yet affirmatively
proceeded to do so anyway. Under these circumstances, I believe that the law should treat
Sanders as having “acted with a culpable state of mind directed at the plaintiff’s family
relationship or a decision traditionally within the ambit of the family.” Majority Op. at 10.
And we should remember that Appellants allege that Sanders targeted their family. R. 1 (Compl.
¶ 31) (Page ID #8).

5To the extent the majority believes that it is necessary for Sanders to know that Burton had children before
finding that his decision to separate Burton from the family violated Appellants’ constitutional rights, I believe
Appellants should be entitled to discovery on this point.

6

See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A & cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (explaining that when “the
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he
is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result”).

7

See also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 1 cmts. a–c; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A & cmt. b.that
No. 22-1446 Chambers, et al. v. Sanders, et al. Page 29

VI. CONCLUSION

Only by “clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the
family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,”
could we “avoid applying the force and rationale of [our] precedents to the family choice[s]” and
the family unit taken from the Appellants. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (rejecting the attempt to
distinguish other precedents because of differences in certain facts before the Court). The
“caution and restraint” required of us when considering substantive-due-process rights “does not
counsel abandonment . . . [or] cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if
not arbitrary boundary.” Id. at 502. I would have exercised this “caution and restraint”
differently. I would therefore reverse and remand to the district court for further consideration of
Appellants’ claims

Outcome: Affirmed

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