Date: 11-10-2025

Case Style: United States of America v. Ryan R. Vandyke

Case Number: 23-CR-193

Judge: B. Lynn Winmill

Court: United States District Court for the District of Idaho (Bannock County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: United States District Attorney's Office in Pocatello

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: Pocatello, Idaho, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.

Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) prohibits firearm possession by an individual subject to a court order that “by its terms
explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against [an] intimate partner or child that
would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” VanDyke did not dispute that he was subject to a no-
contact order that not only reiterated that he could not contact his victim but also mandated that he not use, attempt
to use, or threaten physical force against her. By the time that order was issued, he had been dogging his victim for months, flouting both the conditions of his probation for a separate telephone-harassment offense and the terms of the earlier court-ordered protections obtained by his victim for herself and her minor child. Nor did VanDyke contest that by
carrying his gun at the courthouse he violated Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Instead, VanDyke argued that the application of that federal statute to him violated the Second Amendment. The
district court agreed that Section (C)(ii), as applied to VanDyke, does not fall within a historical tradition of
firearm regulation.

Outcome: Dismissed.

In light of intervening precedent in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). As the Court wrote in Rahimi, “[s]ince the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” The Court emphasized that a historical analogue suffices; a “historical twin” is not required. There is also a long historical tradition concerning “categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.” Such categories include criminals facing serious pending charges on pretrial release. VanDyke fits this description. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is therefore constitutional as applied to VanDyke.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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