Date: 08-19-2025

Case Style: Mubbrika S. Brown and Alquddus Brown v. Carl McMillion and John Rainey

Case Number: 25-CV-205

Judge: Jeffrey U. Beaverstock

Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (Moblie County)

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: Mobile, Alabama pro se Plaintiffs attempted to represent themselves with a lawyer in an employment discrimination case.

Ms. Brown is a former Walmart employee. Her twin
brother, Mr. Brown, has power of attorney over her estate. To-
gether, the Browns brought twelve claims against two Walmart
executives, CEO Carl McMillon and CFO John Rainey, for alleged
offenses that occurred during Ms. Brown’s employment.
According to the complaint and attached documents, Ms.
Brown was “discriminated against and wrongfully terminated be-
cause of [her] medical conditions” and “retaliated against” for filing
internal complaints and OSHA complaints. Additionally, “[d]ue to
negligence, [she] suffered damages” from exposure to “carbon
monoxide and other poisonous chemicals/gases.” The Browns do
not identify who was responsible for these alleged offenses. The
Browns also allege that Ms. Brown’s “civil rights as a disabled
woman” under the Americans with Disabilities Act were violated
“as a result of Walmart’s malicious and egregious conduct.”
In response to the alleged misconduct, Ms. Brown sent
Walmart and the executives a “conditional acceptance” letter. In
that letter, Ms. Brown asserted that if the recipients did not respond
to the letter within ten days, then they would “agree” to pay
$7,000,000 in damages and “a default judgment . . . by acquiescence
of law” would be imposed. She also sent the executives a “notice
of intent to lien” in which she notified them that she would secure
USCA11 Case: 24-131694 Opinion of the Court 24-13169
a lien against their property and financial interests if they did not
respond within ten days.
Ms. Brown did not hear from the recipients, so she sent them
a notice of default and opportunity to cure. Because Ms. Brown had
still not received the $7,000,000 she claims she was entitled to, she
sent Rainey a notice of demand of payment. In that notice, she as-
serted that he was “indebted” to her “in the amount of
$7,000,000 . . . in compensatory damages” related to the “Adminis-
trative Judgment” for which he was “in Default.” Ms. Brown also
sent a “Waiver of Tort” in which she declared that an “implied con-
tract” was created and that Walmart and the executives “agreed”
to pay $7,000,000 in damages. Lastly, Ms. Brown sent an “Interna-
tional Commercial Complaint” to Walmart and the executives
which stated that the Browns were “libellants” and Walmart and
the executives were “libellees.” The complaint included docu-
ments asserting the existence of a default judgment lien. As a con-
sequence of the executives’ silence, the Browns allege that there is
a “contractual agreement by acquiescence to pay for damages in
the amount of $14,300,000.”
After sending these notices and forms, the Browns brought
the present action in state court, which the executives removed to
federal court. The complaint listed twelve counts, numbered one
through six and eight through thirteen.
In Count One, Ms. Brown alleged that Human Resources
and Management at Walmart “retaliated” against her because she
complained of “misconduct and safety hazards,” and they “coerced
USCA11 Case: 24-1316924-13169 Opinion of the Court 5
[her] into taking time off” that she had not accumulated. In Count
Two, she alleged harassment and a hostile work environment on
the basis that Human Resources and Management at Walmart
“tried to provoke [her] into confrontations to make [her] seem un-
cooperative and unstable while on duty.” In Count Three, she al-
leged that Walmart violated her civil rights by “refusing to help ac-
commodate [her] special needs” and “taking advantage” of her, in
violation of the ADA. In Count Four, she alleged that Walmart vi-
olated the Toxic Substances Control Act by exposing her and other
employees to carbon monoxide and other gases and chemicals. In
Count Five, she alleged that Walmart partook in fraudulent mis-
representation by deceiving her into believing that they “pro-
tect[ed] their employees against misconduct, provid[ed] a safe
working environment, and respect[ed] human rights.” In Count
Six, she alleged that Walmart made “fraudulent claims pertaining
to [her] termination to avoid commercial liability.” In Count Eight,
she alleged that Walmart conspired to strip her of her title, bo-
nuses, raises, and retirement. In Count Nine, she alleged that
Walmart “wrongfully terminated” her because of her “complaints
about management misconduct.” In Count Ten, she alleged that
Walmart’s management “damaged her reputation” and “pre-
vented her from being hire[d] at Walmart stores.” In Count Eleven,
she alleged Walmart discriminated against her by “pretending to
help resolve issues” surrounding her disability and medical prob-
lems and that she was “overlooked after applying for an open posi-
tion.” In Count Twelve, she asserted that she suffered various eco-
nomic damages due to Walmart’s “egregious and malicious
USCA11 Case: 24-131696 Opinion of the Court 24-13169
conduct.” And finally, in Count Thirteen, she asserted that
Walmart was liable for punitive damages because of its “injurious
conduct, evil motives/intent, [and] recklessness towards her and
other employees’ federal rights.”
The executives moved to dismiss on several grounds. Most
relevant to this appeal, they argued that the claims were brought
under statutes that did not include a private right of action or pro-
vide for individual liability, were insufficiently pleaded, and failed
to state plausible claims.
The Browns responded by arguing that the executives “ac-
quiesced” to their “administrative Process,” “agreed by declaration
of waiver of tort to settle the tort action,” and “waiv[ed] . . . all
rights.” They also argued that nothing from the face of the com-
plaint would disprove their entitlement to relief and that the com-
plaint adequately “delineate[d] the requisite elements of all
counts.” In any event, they insist that the executives acknowledged
liability for all counts by “admission, confession, dishonor by si-
lence, and default.” Furthermore, they attached a UCC Financing
Statement to the response. That statement listed the executives as
debtors and Ms. Brown as the secured party, and it noted that the
executives “agree” that Ms. Brown “hold[s] a right of lien and levy”
against their assets worth $49,000,000. The statement was marked
as received by the Alabama Secretary of State.
The district court then held a hearing. At the hearing, Mr.
Brown explained that he and Ms. Brown “already did a[n] [admin-
istrative] process,” the executives “defaulted” on that process by
USCA11 Case: 24-1316924-13169 Opinion of the Court 7
failing to respond, and as a result, the Browns secured “a commer-
cial lien . . . filed with the Secretary of State.” Consequently, Mr.
Brown insisted that the Browns “already adjudicated the damages”
and that this suit was “pretty much to collect” those damages. He
reiterated this point, insisting that the Browns “already have a
judgement, so [they] didn’t come here for the judgment. [They]
came here for the collections[.]”
The court explained to Mr. Brown that the process he de-
scribed was “not how it works.” Specifically, the court told him that
he cannot “enter [his] own judgment and then record a lien.” Oth-
erwise, the “lien” is “just a piece of paper” unsupported by “the
process and the law.”

Outcome: Dismissed

Affirmed

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: