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Date: 07-18-2022

Case Style:

AKNESHA MILLER SUHUBA BARUTI vs LEIGH ANN VINGLE

Case Number: 5D21-2785

Judge:

PER CURIAM

F. Rand Wallis
Jay P. Cohen
Jay P. Cohen

Court:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT


On Appeal From The Circuit Court for Brevard County



James H. Earp
Judge

Plaintiff's Attorney:



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Defendant's Attorney: Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris
Appellate Law Office

Description:

Daytona Beach, Florida - Domestic Violence lawyer represented Appellant with appealing the judgment for protection against stalking violence.



Aknesha Miller Suhuba Baruti (“Baruti”) appeals the final judgment of
injunction for protection against stalking violence entered against her. She
argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred by issuing an injunction without
competent, substantial evidence of two incidents of stalking.
1 We agree and
reverse for dissolution of the injunction.
Baruti and her estranged husband were in the midst of an acrimonious
marital dissolution proceeding, during which Baruti believed that the
appellee, Leigh Ann Vingle, was her husband’s paramour. Vingle filed a
petition for protection against stalking against Baruti, alleging two pertinent
incidents. The first concerned an occasion when Baruti came to the
restaurant where Vingle worked, interrupted her while she was serving
customers, and stared at her, which made her “uncomfortable.”
The second incident was more serious. Vingle alleged a road rage
encounter, where Baruti cornered Vingle in her car, followed her onto a
highway ramp, intentionally collided with her vehicle, and approached her
1 Given our disposition, it is unnecessary to address Baruti’s arguments
regarding service of process. That said, while we do not disagree with the
trial court’s assessment that Baruti was evading service, the document
delivery was ineffective, because there was no testimony rebutting Baruti’s
claim that the deputy failed to announce he was drop-serving the documents
at the location of their encounter. Olin Corp. v. Haney, 245 So. 2d 669, 670–
71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (holding that when person flees from process server
in attempt to evade service, “the delivery requirement . . . may be satisfied if
the process server leaves the papers at a place from which such person can
easily retrieve them and takes reasonable steps to call such delivery to the
attention of the person to be served”).
3
aggressively afterward. Vingle believed that Baruti was trying to kill her. Both
vehicles had to be towed and a criminal investigation ensued. The day after
this incident, Vingle filed the instant petition. Because Baruti did not appear
at the initial or rescheduled hearing due to alleged insufficient service of
process, the trial court found consent by default and entered final judgment
against her. Once served with the injunction, Baruti filed a motion to vacate
and/or dissolve the final judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed.
We review entry of an injunction against stalking for competent,
substantial evidence. See Packal v. Johnson, 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2017). Under section 784.048, “[a] person who willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the
offense of stalking[.]” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). “‘Harrass’ means to
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate
purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021). “[B]y its statutory definition,
stalking requires proof of repeated acts”—i.e., a minimum of two. Laserinko
v. Gerhardt, 154 So. 3d 520, 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citation omitted); see
also Chiu v. Adams, 327 So. 3d 889, 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). Additionally,
each incident must cause substantial emotional distress under an objective
standard. See Laserinko, 154 So. 3d at 522. Substantial emotional distress
4
“is greater than ordinary distress,” and “[u]nder Florida law, a reasonable
person does not suffer substantial emotional distress easily.” Venn v.
Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citation omitted).
Here, the road rage incident meets that high threshold, as a reasonable
person would suffer substantial emotional distress from vehicular pursuit by
a known adversary resulting in an intentional collision. But the same cannot
be said of the encounter at Vingle’s workplace, because simply feeling
“uncomfortable” does not constitute substantial emotional distress. See
Klenk v. Ransom, 270 So. 3d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“It is not
enough to be ‘weirded out’ or uncomfortable.” (citation omitted)). In other
words, a “mean stare” does not suffice. See Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d
986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding insufficient evidence of stalking when
respondent, while “creeping” around utSility meters, stared at petitioner
sunbathing but made no accompanying threats or gestures); see also Smith
v. Melcher, 975 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that circling
restaurant where petitioner was eating, looking and pointing at petitioner
while shaking head, was not harassment).


Outcome: Because there was insufficient evidence of two incidents of
harassment, we reverse and vacate the injunction. We do so without
prejudice for Vingle to re-file should sufficient grounds exist.

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