Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 10-04-2019
Case Style:
JITANDER DUDEE vs. TIMOTHY PHILPOT
Case Number: C-180280
Judge: Candace Crouse
Court: COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
Plaintiff's Attorney:
If you need a defamation and false-light invasion of privacy Attorney in Ohio, call Kent Morlan at 888-354-4529.
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Call Kent Morlan at 888-354-4529 if you need a lawyer ⚖
MoreLaw Virtual ReceptionistsNever Miss Another New Client Call
Philpot has since retired from his position as a family court judge in
Lexington, Kentucky. Dudee is a medical doctor who practices in Lexington. The
novel, entitled Judge Z: Irretrievably Broken, discusses the contentious Patel
divorce case for two of its 257 pages. Dudee claims that Patel represents him, and
that the following six statements made in the book are defamatory and violate his
privacy by portraying him in a false light:
1. There was no longer any reason to tolerate his arrogance, affairs, and
silence.
2. He had already been to jail twice for failing to pay. Then, after
screaming under oath, “I have no money, I have no money,” he always
paid to get out.
3. He still owed money to his past two lawyers, and word gets around.
4. The next time he stayed in jail the full sixty days, growing a mangy
beard and claiming various religious convictions no one had heard of
to set up a discrimination suit against the jail and maybe even the
judge. He found out from Google that the judge was a Methodist and
therefore must be biased against Hindus. But his wife had testified
that in decades of marriage she had never seen any evidence of a
devout Hindu living in her home.
5. He could see his kids, but they hated him.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
4
6. He was a typical workaholic doctor at the University Hospital.
{¶5} Philpot included the following disclaimer at the beginning of his
novel—“All of the characters in this book are creations of the author’s imagination.
This is a work of fiction. Any resemblance to real individuals is purely coincidental.”
{¶6} The trial court granted summary judgment for Philpot on all counts,
finding that all six of the statements were either not well-pled, substantially true,
subject to the innocent-construction rule, nonverifiable opinion, or nonverifiable
hyperbole.
Standard of Review
{¶7} The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is de novo.
Esber Beverage Co. v. Labatt USA Operating Co., L.L.C., 138 Ohio St.3d 71, 2013
Ohio-4544, 3 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 9. Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment will be granted
when the moving party shows
that no genuine issues as to any material fact remain; the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and it appears from the evidence
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such
evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for
summary judgment is made, the conclusion is adverse to that party.
Amankwah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2016-Ohio-1321, 62 N.E.3d 814, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.).
Defamation
{¶8} “Defamation is the publication or communication of a false statement
of fact that injures someone by adversely affecting the person's reputation, business,
or position—by exposure to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame, or disgrace.”
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
5
Fuchs v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting. Co., 170 Ohio App.3d 679, 2006-Ohio
5349, 868 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.).
{¶9} Defamation includes both libel and slander. Gilson v. Am. Inst. of
Alternative Medicine, 2016-Ohio-1324, 62 N.E.3d 754, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). Libel refers
to written or printed defamatory words, while slander refers to spoken defamatory
words. Id.
{¶10} In Thomas v. Cohr, Inc., 197 Ohio App.3d 145, 2011-Ohio-5916, 966
N.E.2d 915, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), this court discussed the five essential elements of a claim
of defamation.
A private person who brings a defamation claim must plead and prove:
(1) a false and defamatory statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published
without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault or at least negligence on
the part of the defendant, and (5) that was either defamatory per se or
caused special harm to the plaintiff.
Id.
{¶11} Substantial truth is a complete defense to defamation. Fuchs at ¶ 48.
For purposes of summary judgment in a defamation case, the court must view the
truthfulness of the statements in favor of the nonmoving party—i.e., assume the
statements are false until shown to be true by the moving party. Brown v. Lawson,
169 Ohio App.3d 430, 2006-Ohio-5897, 863 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.).
Does Patel Represent Dudee?
{¶12} Philpot claims that Patel is a “composite character,” representative of
multiple real-life litigants. In his motion for summary judgment, Philpot argued that
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
6
Patel did not represent Dudee, and so the trial court should grant summary
judgment because the statements were not about Dudee.
{¶13} In order to be defamatory, words must refer to some ascertained or
ascertainable person, who then has standing to sue. Smith v. Huntington Pub. Co.,
410 F.Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D.Ohio 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.1976) (applying
Ohio law).
{¶14} In works of fiction, the test for identification is whether a reasonable
person could reasonably believe that the article referred to the plaintiff after
comparing the characteristics of the plaintiff with those of the fictional character. Id.
Neither the intent of the author, nor the recognition by the plaintiff that the article
might be about him, are relevant to identification. Id.
{¶15} The author in Smith wrote an article describing drug dependency, and
tried to conceal the identity of the drug-addicted subject of the article by using the
generic name “Randy Smith” to describe the subject. Id. at 1272. A real person
named Randy Smith who lived in the area sued the author for defamation after the
article was published in the local newspaper. Id. at 1272.
{¶16} There were many similarities between the plaintiff and the fictional
Randy Smith in the article. Both lived in the same small town, were 18-year-old
males, and had mothers involved in the drug-dependency program from which the
author drew his inspiration. Id. at 1273. The court found the similarities sufficient
that a person who “only knew the plaintiff casually, or who had not seen him in some
time might reasonably believe that the article concerned the plaintiff * * *.” Id.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
7
{¶17} Ultimately, the court in Smith granted summary judgment for the
defendant due to the innocent-construction rule, and because the article contained a
clear disclaimer that all names in the article were fictitious. Id. at 1274.
{¶18} Philpot admits that the novel is a thinly-veiled autobiography. Also,
Charlene Dudee, Dudee’s ex-wife, said in an affidavit, “It was immediately obvious to
me upon reading this section of the book that Gupta and Connie Patel represent
Jitander and myself.”
{¶19} Here are some of the most striking similarities between the fictional
Patel character and Dudee: (1) both Patel and Dudee were litigants in contentious
divorce cases in front of Judge Philpot, (2) both are medical doctors, (3) both are
from India, (4) both married American women they met during residency (Charlene
is Dudee’s ex-wife, Connie is Patel’s ex-wife), (5) Dudee’s annual income at the time
of the divorce was nearly identical to Patel’s, (6) both were ordered to give up
“million dollar” houses, (7) Patel was jailed twice for contempt of court for failing to
pay maintenance, Dudee was jailed three times for the same reason, (8) Patel claims
that the fictional Judge Z is biased against Hindus, Dudee complained to the
Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission that Philpot was biased against
nonChristians, (9) Patel owed money to two different lawyers, Dudee owed money to
four different law firms, (10) Judge Z accused Patel of hiding money from the court,
Philpot held in multiple rulings that Dudee had hidden funds from the court, and (11)
Judge Z says Patel came to court with a beard and a dot on his forehead, Dudee had a
beard and a dot on his forehead during at least one hearing before Philpot.
{¶20} There are also some differences. (1) Patel has three teenage children,
Dudee has four young children, (2) Patel purchased a house during the divorce and
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
8
paid cash, Dudee remained in the marital home, (3) Patel completed his residency in
1979, Dudee was 12 years old in 1979, (4) Patel worked at a university hospital and
then a small hospital in Corbin, Kentucky, while Dudee owned his own
ophthalmology clinic and never worked at a hospital in Corbin, Kentucky.
{¶21} In Smith, the disclaimer at the beginning of the news article was one of
the primary reasons the court held that the statements were not about the plaintiff.
However, Philpot’s disclaimer in the novel carries less effect than the one in Smith.
In Smith, the disclaimer appeared in bold before the article, and then once the
plaintiff expressed his concerns to the newspaper, the newspaper emphasized the
disclaimer again by publishing it in the clarifications section of the next day’s paper.
{¶22} In Philpot’s novel, the disclaimer is on the same page as the contact
information of the author and publisher, and is situated in between the copyright
warning and other text. The text of the disclaimer does not stand out in any way.
Also, the similarities between Patel and Dudee are more numerous and more
substantive than the plaintiff and the fictional character in Smith.
{¶23} When the court declines to grant summary judgment for the defendant
on the issue of whether a fictional character depicts a plaintiff, it becomes an issue of
fact for the jury to decide. See Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga.App. 86, 93, 660 S.E.2d 822
(2008). {¶24} The trial court wrote in its decision that Patel represents Dudee, and
declined to grant Philpot’s motion for summary judgment on that issue. There is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Patel represents Dudee, and so we
proceed to an analysis of the statements themselves. In other words, even if a trier of
fact found that Patel represents Dudee, does Dudee have viable claims?
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
9
“There was no longer any reason to tolerate his arrogance, affairs, and silence.”
{¶25} The trial court found this statement to be substantially true because
the record in the divorce case established that Dudee had an affair.
{¶26} At the final property and maintenance hearing on March 16, 2006,
Charlene testified several times regarding Dudee’s infidelity. She stated that Dudee
was unfaithful before she was ever unfaithful. In regards to an attempt at
reconciliation, Charlene testified that “[i]t appears that, you know, he’d been seeing
other women after we separated and, you know, it appeared that we forgave each
other and wanted to move on and try to see if we could make it work.” With regards
to a second attempt at reconciliation, Charlene said that at the time she knew he had
been seeing other people. She claimed that he admitted to her that he had been
“inappropriate” with three of his employees after one tried to sue him for sexual
harassment. She testified that she witnessed him kissing another woman. She found
sexually explicit emails between Dudee and his ex-girlfriend. Dudee did not testify
during the hearing, and so Charlene’s testimony serves as the only evidence on the
issue of Dudee’s infidelity.
{¶27} At trial, Charlene’s testimony served as sufficient, and unopposed,
evidence that Dudee was unfaithful during the marriage. Nevertheless, attached to
his memorandum opposing summary judgment, Dudee submitted an affidavit in
which he swears that he never committed an act of infidelity during his marriage. He
also submitted an affidavit from Charlene in which she swears “[b]ased on
information known and available to me, I do not believe that Jitander was unfaithful
during our marriage.” Charlene’s affidavit was sworn on January 19, 2018, nearly 12
years after Charlene testified at the final property and maintenance hearing.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
10
Charlene’s affidavit effectively recants her testimony and casts doubt on the only
evidence of Dudee’s infidelity. Dudee claims that these affidavits create a genuine
issue of material fact.
{¶28} In response, Philpot argues that collateral estoppel prevents Dudee
from relitigating the truth of his infidelity, and so it does not matter that Charlene
signed an affidavit recanting her testimony.
{¶29} Collateral estoppel prevents an issue from being relitigated where
(1) the party against whom estoppel is sought was either a party or in
privity with a party to the prior action; (2) a final judgment was rendered
on the merits in the previous action following a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue; (3) the issue on which estoppel is sought was either
admitted or actually tried and decided in the prior action, and was
necessary to the final judgment; and (4) the issue in the current case is
identical to the issue involved in the prior suit.
Monahan v. Eagle Picher Industries, Inc., 21 Ohio App.3d 179, 181, 486 N.E.2d 1165
(1st Dist.1984).
{¶30} Where the defendant clearly has had his day in court on the specific
issue brought into litigation at the later proceeding, he is estopped from relitigating
that issue. Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 200, 443
N.E.2d 978 (1983). Collateral estoppel should not be applied where a party could not
foresee that the issue would be subsequently utilized collaterally and the party had
little knowledge or incentive to fully and vigorously litigate the issue in the first case.
Id. at 201.
{¶31} In Kentucky, fault may be considered in divorce cases when
determining the amount of maintenance to be awarded in order to prevent a windfall
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
11
to the faulty party seeking maintenance. Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542, 543
(Ky.App.1987).
{¶32} In the divorce case, Dudee alleged that Charlene had been unfaithful,
and moved to reduce the amount of maintenance he was required to pay her. Judge
Philpot issued a final judgment entitled “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Amended Decree.” Philpot examined the infidelity of both Dudee and Charlene
when deciding whether Charlene’s “fault” should alter the amount of maintenance
she was owed. At the hearing, Charlene admitted to having an affair. She also
testified about Dudee’s affairs. In his Amended Decree, Philpot decided not to alter
the amount of maintenance to be paid to Charlene, stating “According to [Charlene’s]
uncontroverted testimony, [Dudee] engaged in similar affairs during the marriage.
There is plenty of fault on both sides.” (Emphasis in original.)
{¶33} Regarding the first two prongs, the party against whom estoppel is
sought (Dudee) is the same in the present case as in the divorce case. There was a
hearing on the issue, which presented Dudee with a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue of his infidelity. After the hearing, Judge Philpot issued a final
judgment on the merits.
{¶34} On the third prong, the issue of Dudee’s infidelity was actually decided
by Judge Philpot when he said, “[Dudee] engaged in similar affairs during the
marriage.” During his deposition, Philpot testified that he did not think the infidelity
of Dudee was relevant to any of the decisions he made in the divorce case. But, his
memory is belied by the amended decree. His finding that Dudee was unfaithful was
crucial to Philpot’s decision to not alter Charlene’s maintenance payments.
Maintenance payments constituted a significant issue in the case overall, which is
why Dudee moved for a hearing to have the maintenance payments reduced in the
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
12
first place. So, while it may not have been necessary as a matter of law that Philpot
find Dudee unfaithful when deciding not to reduce the maintenance payments, his
infidelity was necessary to Philpot’s ultimate determination. Despite Charlene’s
affairs, Philpot did not reduce the amount of maintenance to be paid because “there
is plenty of fault on both sides.”
{¶35} The fourth prong requires us to determine whether the current issue is
identical to the issue in the divorce case. The threshold issue Philpot was deciding at
the final property hearing was whether Charlene was unfaithful and therefore at
fault, not whether Dudee was unfaithful. Dudee argues that the hearing was meant
to determine Charlene’s fault and whether the amount of maintenance due to her
should be reduced as a result, and that since he was not seeking maintenance, his
infidelity was not the issue to be litigated.
{¶36} While the threshold issue may have been to determine Charlene’s
infidelity, Dudee’s infidelity became an issue when Charlene testified. Dudee had
incentive to fully and vigorously litigate the issue of his infidelity, because not to do
so would leave Charlene’s testimony unrefuted, and would effectively concede that he
had been unfaithful. In attempting to modify Charlene’s maintenance payments, he
had strong incentive to not only show that Charlene was at fault, but also that he was
not at fault, especially after Charlene raised the issue of his infidelity. Dudee had his
day in court on the issue of his infidelity.
{¶37} If collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of Dudee’s unfaithfulness,
his and Charlene’s affidavits may have created a genuine issue of material fact as to
that issue. But, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the issue of Dudee’s infidelity,
and so the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the infidelity
statement.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
13
“He had already been to jail twice for failing to pay. Then, after screaming under oath, ‘I have no money, I have no money,’ he always paid to get out.”
{¶38} Dudee argues that reading this statement in the context of the other
statements about Patel leads the reader to believe that Dudee committed perjury
when he testified that he was unable to pay. The trial court found this statement to
be substantially true, holding that the record in the divorce case established that
Dudee did claim to not have money to pay, and then later paid.
{¶39} Both parties agree that Dudee went to jail three times for failing to pay
his obligations. Dudee also acknowledged in his deposition that during his divorce
trial testimony he said something similar to “I have no money, how am I going to
pay, how do you expect me to pay?” Dudee then said that he borrowed money from
his girlfriend in order to make his contempt payments and get out of jail.
{¶40} In his order dated October 27, 2005, Philpot was not convinced that
Dudee was unable to comply with court orders to pay, found that Dudee had assets
which enabled him to pay, and held him in contempt for failure to pay.
{¶41} On June 9, 2006, Philpot found Dudee in contempt for failure to pay
attorney fees and maintenance obligations. Philpot found that Dudee “has the ability
to pay these amounts, but chooses not to do so.”
{¶42} In his “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree,” Philpot
found that Dudee “failed to disclose many assets throughout these proceedings,”
including the purchase of a thoroughbred race horse and commercial real estate.
Philpot also found that Dudee “attempted to conceal assets” by diverting money from
the marital estate to other bank accounts, such that Philpot ordered Dudee to restore
$85,000 to the marital estate.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
14
{¶43} Philpot’s findings and orders throughout the divorce case indicate that
Dudee concealed assets and failed to pay, and was jailed as a result. There are no
genuine issues of material fact as to the truth of the statement.
“He still owed money to his past two lawyers, and word gets around.”
{¶44} The trial court found this statement to be substantially true. Although
the broader context of the passage about Patel is that he was deceitful and refused to
pay his obligations, the immediate context surrounding this statement conveys a
different meaning. The statement appears in this context—“no lawyer would touch
his lawsuit. And now he was ‘pro se,’ meaning he represented himself and had a fool
for a client. He still owed money to his past two lawyers, and word gets around.”
{¶45} When read in context, it is clear that the statement is meant to
communicate that Patel did not pay his lawyers’ fees, and so now he could not find a
lawyer to take his case. “Word gets around” that Patel does not pay his legal fees. It
is undisputed that Dudee failed to pay his legal fees. When Dudee filed for
bankruptcy on August 2, 2011, he owed legal fees to four different law firms for legal
work done on his behalf. The statement is substantially true, and there is no genuine
issue of material fact with regards to this statement.
“The next time he stayed in jail the full sixty days, growing a mangy beard and claiming various religious convictions no one had heard of to set up a discrimination suit against the jail and maybe even the judge. He found out from Google that the judge was a Methodist and therefore must be biased against Hindus. But his wife had testified that in decades of marriage she had never seen any evidence of a devout Hindu living in her home.”
{¶46} The trial court did not review the merits of this statement because the
statement was not pled in the complaint as a defamatory statement, or as a false
light invasion of privacy.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
15
{¶47} In paragraph 11 of his complaint, Dudee listed the statements he
claimed were defamatory, and did not include the religious statement among them.
Dudee did reference his religious convictions in paragraph nine of the complaint
where he discussed the similarities between Patel and himself, but he did not identify
any statement from the book regarding his religious convictions as being false or
defamatory.
{¶48} In Boutsicaris v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 9th Dist. Summit No. 17941,
1997 WL 270552, *6 (May 14, 1997), the defamation-plaintiff did not specifically
identify which statements made by the defendants were defamatory. Instead, he
merely alleged in the complaint that the defendants had made false and defamatory
statements which denigrated his skills as a physician. Id. The court found that the
language of the complaint clearly identified the substance of the defamatory
statements and determined the defamation claim to be well-pled. See id.
{¶49} Dudee’s case is distinguishable from Boutsicaris. In his complaint,
Dudee identified the specific statements which he believed to be defamatory.
Nowhere in his complaint does he allege that the defendant made false statements
regarding his religious convictions. In fact, it was only in the portion of his
complaint where he listed out the similarities between himself and Patel that Dudee
mentioned anything about religious convictions. This was insufficient to put Philpot
on notice that the statement was being alleged as a defamatory statement. In
Boutsicaris, the plaintiff clearly identified the substance of the defamatory
statements—that the defendants denigrated his skills as a physician. Dudee failed to
clearly identify the substance of any defamatory statements regarding his religious
convictions.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
16
{¶50} The statement regarding Dudee’s religious convictions was not pled as
a defamatory statement, and so the trial court did not err when it granted summary
judgment as to that statement.
“He was a typical workaholic doctor at the University Hospital.”
{¶51} The trial court found the workaholic statement to be nonverifiable and
hyperbole. In his appellate brief, Dudee did not present the workaholic statement as
an issue for review under his assignment of error. In fact, he only mentioned the
workaholic statement twice in his brief. First, he made a blanket assertion in his
statement of facts that certain statements in the novel are defamatory, and included
the workaholic statement in that assertion. Second, he mentioned the workaholic
statement during his argument regarding the “kids hated him” statement.
{¶52} “To receive consideration on appeal, trial-court errors must be argued
and supported by citation to the record.” Berger v. Wade, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C
120863, 2014-Ohio-1262, ¶ 25. It is not the appellate court’s duty to make
appellant’s argument where he fails to make one on his own. See id.; see also James
v. My Cute Car, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-603, 2017-Ohio-1291, ¶ 10 (“the
burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal rests with the party asserting
error.”).
{¶53} Nowhere in Dudee’s brief did he argue why the statement is
defamatory, or in any way refute the trial court’s holding that the statement is
nonverifiable and hyperbole. Simply mentioning the statement a couple of times in
the brief does not suffice as argument. It is not this court’s job to make Dudee’s
argument for him.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
17
{¶54} Regardless, the trial court did not err in finding the statement to be
nonverifiable and hyperbole. A totality-of-the-circumstances test is used to
determine whether a statement is fact or mere hyperbole or opinion. Vail v. The
Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 649 N.E.2d 182 (1995). The
court should consider the “specific language used, whether the statement is
verifiable, the general context of the statement, and the broader context in which the
statement appeared.” Id. Where a statement “lacks a plausible method of
verification, a reasonable reader would not believe that the statement has specific
factual content.” Id. at 283.
{¶55} When determining whether a statement is hyperbole or opinion, the
court must consider whether the language used is meant to elicit an emotional
response, and whether the language is ambiguous or has a readily ascertainable
meaning. Brown v. Lawson, 169 Ohio App.3d 430, 2006-Ohio-5897, 863 N.E.2d
215, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.).
{¶56} The broader context of the statement leans towards fact. Although the
book is geared towards persuasion, its general tenor is factual. The novel was written
by a family court judge, and a reasonable reader could easily believe that the novel
accurately depicts actual court cases.
{¶57} But, the general context, the language used, and the fact that the
statement is nonverifiable all lean towards opinion and hyperbole. The statement
was made in the following general context: “he was a typical workaholic doctor at the
University hospital. Connie Patel put up with the doc because he made nearly a half
million a year. Interesting how thirty-five thousand a month can cover a lot of
husbandly failure.”
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
18
{¶58} The specific language—“workaholic”—is ambiguous and lacks a precise
meaning. Philpot is stating his opinion, phrased hyperbolically, that Dudee is a
neglectful husband who places work over family, none of which is verifiable. The
statement is nonverifiable and hyperbole.
{¶59} Dudee did not properly present the workaholic statement for our
review on appeal. Nonetheless, after discerning an argument as best as we can, it is
clear that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because no
genuine issue of material fact remains regarding this statement.
“He could see his kids, but they hated him”
{¶60} The trial court found this statement to be an opinion, nonverifiable,
and hyperbole. However, we find that the statement may be verifiable due to the
implication that Philpot, as the family court judge presiding over the case, has
private, first-hand knowledge about the children’s feelings towards Dudee.
{¶61} Subjective emotions are not verifiable. Stholmann v. WJW TV, Inc.,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86491, 2006-Ohio-6408, ¶ 27. But, when the author
indicates that he has “private, first-hand knowledge which substantiates the opinion
he expresses, the opinion becomes as damaging as an assertion of fact.” Scott v.
News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 251, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
{¶62} “Liability for libel may attach when a negative characterization of a
person is coupled with a clear, but false implication that the author is privy to facts
about the person that are unknown to the general reader.” Hotchner v. Castillo
Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.1977).
{¶63} What would otherwise likely be a nonverifiable opinion may be
considered a statement of fact due to the context of the statement and the speaker
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
19
defamer’s position within a company or organization. Wayt v. DHSC, LLC, 2017
Ohio-7734, 97 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 138 (5th Dist.), rev'd on other grounds, 155 Ohio St.3d
401, 2018-Ohio-4822, 122 N.E.3d 92, ¶ 138. In Wayt, the court considered the
speaker’s position as director of human resources in finding the defamatory
statement to be verifiable. Id.
{¶64} As discussed previously, in determining whether the “kids hated him”
statement is fact or opinion, we look to the broader context of the statement, the
general context, the specific language used, and whether the statement is verifiable.
Vail, 72 Ohio St.3d at 282, 649 N.E.2d 182.
{¶65} The broader context leans towards fact because the general tenor is
factual. The general context leans towards opinion because the author expresses his
opinion that Patel and Connie’s marriage was not a “love marriage” anymore. Also,
the language used—“hate”—is meant to elicit an emotional response, and so leans
towards hyperbole. See Brown, 169 Ohio App.3d 430, 2006-Ohio-5897, 863 N.E.2d
215, at ¶ 17.
{¶66} Finally, the statement would normally be considered nonverifiable
since the judge cannot know the true feelings of the children. But, the context of the
statement, and the author’s role as the family court judge, could lead a reasonable
reader to conclude that the children had communicated their feelings about their
father to the judge during the court proceedings.
{¶67} Philpot’s passage about Patel implies first-hand knowledge, and
therefore could potentially cause us to take what would otherwise be a nonverifiable
opinion and treat it as an assertion of fact. Nevertheless, we need not decide whether
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
20
the statement is verifiable because Dudee’s failure to plead special damages is fatal to
his claim with regards to the “kids hated him” statement.
Special Damages and Defamation Claims
{¶68} In order for a statement to be defamatory per se, it must be
defamatory upon the face of the statement. Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549,
556, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956). When a statement is only defamatory through
interpretation, innuendo, or consideration of extrinsic evidence, then it is
defamatory per quod and not defamatory per se. Id. When the statement is
defamatory per se, special damages need not be pled or proven, they are presumed.
Id. at 553. In an action for defamation per quod, special damages must be pled and
proven. Id. at 556.
{¶69} In order for a statement to be defamatory per se, it must fall into one
of three categories:
(1) the imputation of a charge of an indictable offense involving moral
turpitude or infamous punishment, (2) the imputation of some offensive
or contagious diseases calculated to deprive the person of society, or (3)
having the tendency to injure the plaintiff in his trade or occupation.
Williams v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., 162 Ohio App.3d 596,
2005-Ohio-4141, 834 N.E.2d 397, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).
{¶70} The “kids hated him” statement is not defamatory per se, and Dudee
does not argue that it is. Therefore, it can only be defamatory per quod, and so
Dudee was required to plead special damages.
{¶71} Special damages are distinct from general damages. General damages
are those which are a necessary consequence of the harm; they are implied by law
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
21
and do not need to be pled. Klein Structural Steel Co. v. John J. Pool Co., 26 Ohio
App. 420, 423, 160 N.E. 520 (6th Dist.1927); See F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284,
295-296, 132 S.Ct. 284, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) (in defamation cases, general
damages “cover loss of reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the feelings and
the like”).
{¶72} As stated in our recent case of Martin v. Wegman, 1st Dist. Hamilton
Nos. C-180268 and C-180308, 2019-Ohio-2935, ¶ 15, “special damages are those
direct financial losses resulting from the plaintiff’s impaired reputation, such as lost
profits to his business.” Where a defamation plaintiff has not claimed a pecuniary
harm, an economic harm, or any specific harm related to his profession, he has failed
to plead special damages. Id. at ¶ 20. Also, Civ.R. 9(G) requires that claims for
special damages in cases of defamation per quod be pled with specificity. Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶73} In his complaint, Dudee claimed that as a result of Philpot’s
statements, he suffered “humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish,
emotional distress, and damage to his reputation and career.” He has not claimed a
pecuniary harm, an economic harm, or any specific harm related to his profession.
Therefore, he has failed to plead special damages at all, much less with the specificity
required by Civ.R. 9(G). The trial court did not err when it granted summary
judgment on the “kids hated him” statement.
False-Light Invasion of Privacy
{¶74} Dudee contends that the trial court erred in finding that his false-light
claim fails because three of the statements (infidelity, hiding money from the court,
and failure to pay his attorneys) are substantially true, and the “kids hated him”
statement is an opinion.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
22
{¶75} In Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866
N.E.2d 1051, ¶ 61, the Ohio Supreme Court formally adopted the false-light invasion
of-privacy claim under Ohio law.
[O]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy if (a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
Id.
{¶76} If the statement is true, then there is no false light. Id. at ¶ 52. To be
highly offensive, the plaintiff must be justified in the eyes of the community in feeling
seriously offended and aggrieved by the publicity. Id. at ¶ 55. The statement must be
“such a major misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or beliefs that
serious offense may reasonably be expected.” Id.
{¶77} As discussed above, the statements about hiding money from the court
and not paying his attorneys are substantially true, and collateral estoppel prevents
Dudee from relitigating the truth of the infidelity statement.
{¶78} Also, as discussed above, the implication of first-hand knowledge
could turn the “kids hated him” statement from nonverifiable hyperbole into a
statement of fact. But, since Dudee did not properly plead special damages, his false
light claim fails just the same as his defamation claim.
Special Damages and False-Light Claims
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
23
{¶79} Whether a claim for false-light invasion of privacy based on language
that is defamatory per quod requires a plaintiff to plead special damages appears to
be an issue of first impression in Ohio. Ohio courts have found it desirable to impose
certain procedural limitations on defamation actions. This includes a statute of
limitations on all defamation actions, and requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove
special damages in defamation-per-quod actions. Ohio, and the majority of other
states, applies the defamation statute of limitations to false-light claims. Stout v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., N.D. Ohio No. 3:14-CV-02169, 2015 WL 7259795,
*3 (Nov. 17, 2015).
{¶80} California statutorily requires the pleading of special damages in
defamation-per-quod cases. Fellows v. Natl. Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 234, 235, 228
Cal.Rptr. 215, 721 P.2d 97 (1986). The California Supreme Court found this
requirement to apply to false-light claims based on language that is defamatory per
quod as well. Id. at 251. The court held that to find otherwise would circumvent the
statutory “zone of protection” afforded to the press by allowing plaintiffs to take
statements which fail on defamation-per-quod grounds due to a lack of special
damages, and to plead them as false-light claims in order to get around the special
damages requirement. Id. at 250.
{¶81} Illinois followed suit in Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill.App.3d 727, 736,
554 N.E.2d 988 (1990), agreeing with the California Supreme Court in Fellows, and
finding that special damages were required in false-light actions “based on language,
the defamatory meaning of which can be established only by reference to extrinsic
facts.”
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
24
In considering the applicability of the special damages requirement to a
false-light claim, the Fellows court acknowledged the evolution of
restrictions and limitations on liability for defamatory speech as courts
and legislatures attempted to balance the interest in a person's reputation
against the interests in freedom of speech and press. It suggested the
requirement of special damages in a per quod action represented a
legislative determination that the imposition of liability for a publication
which afforded no warning of its defamatory nature, and did not cause
actual pecuniary injury, placed too great a burden on the editorial process
and interfered with the free dissemination of news. The court also
recognized that privacy suits threaten the freedoms of speech and press in
the same manner as defamation actions.
Id. at 735.
{¶82} While related, false light and defamation are different causes of action.
False light often serves as an additional or alternative remedy for defamatory
statements, but a plaintiff need not be defamed to have a cause of action for false
light invasion of privacy. Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 652(E) (1977).
False-light claims are separate and distinct from defamation because they protect a
different interest—harm to character, reputation, or trade (defamation) vs. publicity
of false information (false light). A claim for false-light invasion of privacy is not an
avenue for plaintiffs to get into court due to their failure to otherwise set forth a
defamation claim.
{¶83} Since claims for false light and defamation are so closely related, the
procedural limitations developed by courts over the years on defamation claims
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
25
(statute of limitations, special damages, etc.) should be applied to false-light claims.
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the false-light cause of action not because it
wanted plaintiffs to have an alternative cause of action where they could not sustain
a defamation claim due to a lack of special damages, but because it wanted to give
plaintiffs the ability to protect their interests against having false information
publicized about them. See Welling, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866
N.E.2d 1051, at ¶ 39, 50, 60.
{¶84} When discussing the standard of fault required for both types of
claims, the Welling court held that “False light defendants enjoy protections at least
as extensive as defamation defendants.” Id. at ¶ 58. This suggests that the same
limitations that apply to defamation claims apply to false-light claims. See id.
{¶85} We therefore hold that whenever a false-light invasion-of-privacy
claim is based on language that is defamatory per quod, pleading and proof of special
damages is required. Dudee’s false-light claim for the “kids hated him” statement
falls in the category of per quod, and so requires that special damages be pled. As
discussed above, Dudee failed to plead special damages. Therefore, his claim for
false-light invasion of privacy based on the “kids hated him” statement fails, and the
trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment on that statement.
Outcome: The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all of
Dudee’s claims for defamation and false-light invasion of privacy. Dudee’s sole
assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: