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Date: 01-24-2021
Case Style:
Jonathan Huey Lawrence v. State of Florida
Case Number: SC18-810
Judge: Supreme Court of Florida
Court: PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff's Attorney: Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia A. Terenzio,
Assistant Attorney General, Palm Beach, Florida
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Tallahassee, FL - Criminal defense attorney represented Jonathan Huey Lawrence with appealing his sentence of death for the 1998 firs tdegree murder of Jennifer Robinson that was imposed in a 2018 resentencing proceedings .
In 2000, Lawrence pleaded guilty to principal to the first-degree murder of
Robinson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, giving alcoholic beverages to
a person under twenty-one, and abuse of a dead human corpse, and he was
sentenced to death for Robinson’s murder. Lawrence v. State, 846 So. 2d 440, 442
(Fla. 2003). Robinson’s murder followed two separate criminal episodes in which
Lawrence and his codefendant murdered one individual and attempted to murder
another individual. See id. at 443 n.3. We detailed the facts of Robinson’s murder
on direct appeal, explaining that Lawrence and his codefendant, who was also
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for Robinson’s murder,
carried out their crimes against Robinson in accordance with notes in Lawrence’s
handwriting:
Lawrence’s codefendant, Jeremiah Martel Rodgers, picked up
eighteen-year-old Jennifer Robinson from her mother’s home on May
7, 1998. Rodgers and Robinson met Lawrence, and all three drove in
Lawrence’s truck to a secluded area in the woods. After imbibing
alcoholic beverages, Robinson had sex with Rodgers and then with
Lawrence. At some point thereafter, Rodgers shot Robinson in the
back of the head using Lawrence’s Lorcin .380 handgun. The gunshot
rendered Robinson instantly unconscious, and she died minutes later.
Lawrence and Rodgers loaded Robinson’s body into Lawrence’s truck
and drove further into the woods. Lawrence made an incision into
Robinson’s leg and removed her calf muscle. Rodgers took Polaroid
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pictures of the body, including a picture of Lawrence’s hand holding
Robinson’s foot. Lawrence and Rodgers buried Robinson at that site.
Investigators traced Robinson’s disappearance to Lawrence and
Rodgers. When confronted by Investigator Todd Hand, Lawrence
denied knowing Robinson and consented to Hand’s request to search
Lawrence’s trailer and truck. After recovering multiple notes written
by Lawrence and Polaroid photographs depicting Robinson postmortem, Hand arrested Lawrence. One page of the recovered notes
states in part: “get her very drunk,” “yell in her ears to check
consicouse [sic],” “even slap hard,” “[r]ape many, many, many
times,” “ ‘slice and dice,’ [d]isect [sic] completely,” “bag up eatabile
[sic] meats,” and “bag remains and bury and burn.” Another page of
notes provides a list of items and tasks, some of which had been
checked off or scribbled out. That list includes “coolers of ice = for
new meat,” strawberry wine, everclear alcohol, scalpels, Polaroid
film, and “.380 or-and bowies [knives].” Other items located by
investigators during their search of Lawrence’s trailer and truck
included a box for a Lorcin .380 handgun; empty Polaroid film
packages; a piece of human tissue in Lawrence’s freezer; a blue and
white ice chest; an empty plastic ice bag; disposable gloves; a
scrapbook; and several books, including an anatomy book []titled The
Incredible Machine, within which had been marked female anatomy
pages and pen lines drawn at the calf section of a leg. Lawrence
subsequently confessed to his involvement, after waiving his Miranda
[v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] rights, and led detectives to
Robinson’s body.
Id. at 442-43 (footnotes omitted). On direct appeal, Lawrence appealed only his
sentence of death, and we affirmed, id. at 446, including on the basis that
Lawrence’s death sentence was proportionate in comparison to other cases in
which we have upheld the imposition of the death penalty, id. at 452-55.
We subsequently affirmed the denial of Lawrence’s initial postconviction
motion and denied his habeas petition. Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 315
(Fla. 2007).
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Thereafter, the trial court granted Lawrence’s successive postconviction
motion, vacated his death sentence, and ordered a new penalty phase proceeding
pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from by State v.
Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).
Before the second penalty-phase proceeding, which is at issue here, began,
Lawrence sent a handwritten letter to the trial court requesting that his death
sentence be “reinstated,” stating in pertinent part:
[M]ay I request to please have my death sentence reinstated? I’ve
never wanted a new trial or anything to do with the Hurst
hearing/ruleing [sic] and have been trying for ten years to have my
last attorney . . . drop all my appeals but he has completely ignored
me and refused any form of communications with me until telling me
my new attorney’s names and that I’m to go . . . for a new sentencing
that I do not want. I’m guilty of all my charges and deserve my death
sentence. I’ve had no intention of putting the families, friends and
loved ones of the innocent people I deliberately helped murder
through all these 20 long years of grief, suffering and loss, to have to
indure [sic] more. They deserve justice and every amount of peace
my death sentence and conclusion might give them.
Through appointed counsel, Lawrence subsequently moved to waive his
rights to a penalty-phase jury, to present mitigation, and to challenge the State’s
evidence. After inquiring of Lawrence and hearing testimony from a doctor who
had evaluated Lawrence and found him competent, the trial court found
Lawrence’s waivers to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court
ordered a presentence investigation and appointed special counsel pursuant to
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Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464 (Fla. 2015), to assist it in considering available
mitigation.
Thereafter, following the State’s penalty-phase presentation and special
counsel’s presentation at a subsequent hearing that also served as a Spencer1
hearing, the trial court sentenced Lawrence to death, finding that the aggravating
circumstances2 “greatly outweigh” the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.3 In sentencing Lawrence to death, the trial court further found as
follows:
1. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
2. The trial court found that the State had proven two statutory aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and assigned both of them great weight:
(1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person; and (2) the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.
3. The trial court found and assigned moderate weight to two statutory
mitigating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed while Lawrence
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) the
capacity of Lawrence to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
The trial court also found four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to
which it assigned the noted weight: (1) the defendant told the probation officer that
he is mainly guilty and feels like he deserves to die (slight weight); (2) the
defendant was raised in an abusive and dysfunctional home (slight weight); (3) the
defendant cooperated with the police in locating the scene of the crime and the
body (slight weight); and (4) the defendant’s history of mental health problems that
do not rise to the level of statutory mitigation (moderate weight).
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The Court has carefully considered and weighed the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances found to exist in this
penalty phase. The State has proven beyond and to the exclusion of
every reasonable doubt the existence of two serious aggravators. The
prior violent felony aggravator was given great weight due to the fact
that both prior offenses were committed prior to the murder of
Jennifer Robinson, were committed with the co-defendant, Rodgers,
and involved murder and attempted murder. Both of these prior
crimes were senselessly violent and without any moral or legal
justification. They are indicative of the same total disregard for
human life evidenced in this case. In each case, Lawrence and
Rodgers killed or attempted to kill another human being. In addition,
the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator was given great
weight due to Lawrence’s significant involvement in the planning,
preparation, and execution of the murder.
The Court finds that these two aggravators greatly outweigh all
of the statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances, inclusive
of the significant mental mitigation.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Lawrence argues that his death sentence is disproportionate in
comparison to other cases in which the sentence of death has been imposed. The
State urges us to recede from precedent holding that we must review the
comparative proportionality of every death sentence to “ensure uniformity of
sentencing in death penalty proceedings,” Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891
(Fla. 2019), by reserving the death penalty “for only the most aggravated and least
mitigated of first-degree murders.” Id. at 892 (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d
411, 416 (Fla. 1998)); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (providing that the
Court shall review proportionality on direct appeal whether or not the issue is
presented by the parties). In support of its argument, the State contends that
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comparative proportionality review violates the conformity clause of article I,
section 17 of the Florida Constitution. We agree with the State and write to
explain why our precedent is erroneous and must yield to our constitution.
The Florida Constitution Precludes Comparative Proportionality Review
The conformity clause of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution
provides that “[t]he prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” The Supreme Court has held that comparative
proportionality review of death sentences is not required by the Eighth
Amendment. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984) (“There is . . . no basis
[in Supreme Court case law] for holding that comparative proportionality review
by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty is
imposed and the defendant requests it.”).
In Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539, 546-49 (Fla. 2014), this Court addressed
whether our state-law precedent requiring comparative proportionality review
survived the addition of the conformity clause to article I, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution in 2002. In holding that it did, Yacob sourced the requirement for
comparative proportionality review from three other provisions of Florida law
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outside of article I, section 17. Specifically, Yacob held that comparative
proportionality review “flows from Florida’s capital punishment statute—section
921.141, Florida Statutes,” Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 546, from the due process clause
of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, id. at 549, and from article V,
section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, which grants this Court mandatory,
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing
the death penalty, id. at 547. None of these provisions, however, requires the
comparative proportionality review that we have held to be required and codified
in our procedural rules as within the scope of our appellate review. See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.142(a)(5).
Comparative proportionality review is not referenced anywhere in the text of
section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2019). Yet, Yacob read this requirement into the
portion of the statute which provides that “[t]he judgment of conviction and
sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review” by this Court “in
accordance with rules adopted by” this Court. § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (2019); see
Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 546 (quoting then-subsection (4) of the statute for this
proposition). In support of this conclusion, Yacob reasoned that this Court had
previously “interpreted section 921.141 as including proportionality review of
death sentences” in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973). Yacob, 136 So. 3d
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at 546. However, Dixon did no such thing. Rather, as Justice Canady explained in
dissenting from this portion of the Yacob decision,
Dixon—which upheld Florida’s capital punishment statute against a
constitutional challenge—contemplated that in any case where “a
defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in light
of the other decisions [imposing sentences of death] and determine
whether or not the punishment is too great.” 283 So. 2d at 10. The
reasoning of Dixon, however, does not in any way tie this comparative
review to a provision of section 921.141. Instead, the comparative
review envisioned by Dixon can only reasonably be understood as a
judicial-created means to ensure that the statute would be
implemented in a way that would avoid the constitutional concerns
articulated in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 346 (1972), concerns which were rooted in the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments. The Dixon court understood that such
comparative review would be consistent with the statute, but that is
different from concluding that the statute requires or specifically
authorizes comparative proportionality review.
Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 561 (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Yacob Court also relied on our pre-conformity clause decision in
Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991), which cited two provisions of the
Florida Constitution in addition to article I, section 17 as requiring comparative
proportionality review. These provisions were the due process clause of article I,
section 9, and the provision granting this court mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty—
article V, section (3)(b)(1). See Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 547, 549 (citing Tillman’s
reliance on article V, section 3(b)(1) and article I, section 9 for comparative
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proportionality review). However, neither provision imposes any such requirement
for the reasons Justice Canady explained in dissenting from this portion of Yacob:
Tillman states that the “obvious purpose” of our mandatory
jurisdiction “is to ensure the uniformity of death-penalty law by
preventing the disagreement over controlling points of law that may
arise when the district courts of appeal are the only appellate courts
with mandatory appellate jurisdiction.” [Tillman, 591 So. 2d at 169];
see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. But “preventing the disagreement
over controlling points of law” does not require comparative
proportionality review. Furthermore, the jurisdictional provision is
purely a matter of procedure; it does nothing to substantively define
the review undertaken by the court. Tillman’s reliance on this
jurisdictional provision as a basis for proportionality review is
untenable.
It is no more tenable to skirt the conformity clause by
proclaiming that comparative proportionality review is required by the
due process clause rather than by the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. Under the federal Constitution, “the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [is] made
applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010)]. The
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments thus is a particular
aspect of due process. And the conformity clause expressly limits the
authority of this Court with respect to that aspect of due process. To
conclude otherwise is to treat the conformity clause as meaningless
for all practical purposes.
Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 561-62 (Canady, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The only legitimate state-law source for comparative proportionality review
was the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in article I, section
17 of the Florida Constitution—before the conformity clause was added to that
provision in 2002. See Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 560-61 (Canady, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (summarizing this Court’s “repeated reliance on the cruel
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and unusual punishments prohibition as the basis for our proportionality review”).
Post-conformity clause, we have wrongly continued to enforce a state-law
requirement for comparative proportionality review and have wrongly written this
requirement into our procedural rules governing the scope of our appellate review.
See Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 894 So. 2d 202, 204,
218-19 (Fla. 2005) (adding a proportionality review requirement to rule 9.142 to
“make the rule consistent with this Court’s practice” concerning the scope of its
appellate review).
When confronted with the issue in Yacob, this Court should have held that a
judge-made comparative proportionality review requirement violates article I,
section 17 of the Florida Constitution in light of the Supreme Court’s precedent
establishing that comparative proportionality review is not required by the Eighth
Amendment, see Pulley 465 U.S. at 50-51. We cannot judicially rewrite our state
statutes or constitution to require a comparative proportionality review that their
text does not. See art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Nor can we ignore our constitutional
obligation to conform our precedent respecting the Florida Constitution’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment precedent by requiring a comparative proportionality review that the
Supreme Court has held the Eighth Amendment does not. See art. I, § 17, Fla.
Const. Yacob wrongly did both.
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Yacob Must Yield to the Florida Constitution
The State argues that we should recede from Yacob. We recently explained
“the proper approach to stare decisis” as follows:
In a case where we are bound by a higher legal authority—whether it
be a constitutional provision, a statute, or a decision of the Supreme
Court—our job is to apply that law correctly to the case before us.
When we are convinced that a precedent clearly conflicts with the law
we are sworn to uphold, the precedent normally must yield.
We say normally because “stare decisis means sticking to some
wrong decisions.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct.
2401, 2409 (2015). “Indeed, stare decisis has consequence only to the
extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need
for that principle to prop them up.” Id. But once we have chosen to
reassess a precedent and have come to the conclusion that it is clearly
erroneous, the proper question becomes whether there is a valid
reason why not to recede from that precedent.
The critical consideration ordinarily will be reliance. It is
generally accepted that reliance interests are “at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828 (1991). And reliance interests are lowest in cases . . .
“involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” Id.; see also Alleyne,
570 U.S. at 119 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hen procedural
rules are at issue that do not govern primary conduct and do not
implicate the reliance interests of private parties, the force of stare
decisis is reduced.”).
Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507.
Viewing our erroneous decision in Yacob through this lens, we fail to find “a
valid reason why not to recede from” it. Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507. In light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pulley, the conformity clause expressly forecloses this
Court’s imposition of a comparative proportionality review requirement that is
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predicated on the Eighth Amendment.
4
The reliance interests of death-sentenced
defendants on this Court’s comparative proportionality review are low to
nonexistent, as defendants do not alter their behavior in expectation of such
review. In contrast, victims and the State have strong interests in this Court’s
upholding death sentences obtained in compliance with section 921.141.
Moreover, there is no reason to continue to apply erroneous precedent that,
though well-intentioned,5 relies on perceived deficiencies in section 921.141 that
do not exist. See Yacob, 136 So. 3d at 549 n.2. Florida’s death penalty statute
4. We note, however, that Florida’s conformity clause does not preclude the
Legislature from requiring comparative proportionality review of death sentences
by statute. Although the State argued to the contrary in its brief, at oral argument,
the State appeared to concede the point that our conformity clause is not so broadly
worded as to preclude a statutory requirement for comparative proportionality
review. Indeed, other state legislatures have mandated comparative proportionality
review by statute. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 590 (Mo. 2019)
(explaining that section 565.035.3., Mo. Rev. Stat., “imposes an independent duty
on [the Supreme Court of Missouri] to undertake a proportionality review to
determine,” among other things, “(3) [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant”). We express no opinion as
to whether the Florida Legislature should adopt such a requirement; we simply
note that the State is incorrect to the extent it contends that the Florida Legislature
could not do so.
5. We recognize our valued colleague’s dissent and its argument that
reviewing death sentences for comparative proportionality would be good policy.
Even were we to agree with the dissent’s policy analysis, however, we would still
be sworn to follow our constitution—which does not permit the result for which
the dissent argues.
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comports with due process; it has been amended since Yacob to comply with
federal and state constitutional requirements regarding death-eligibility, see
§ 921.141(3);
6 it provides adequate safeguards against the arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty; and, since Yacob, it has been amended to exceed
what the federal and state constitutions require by mandating (in non-jury-waiver
cases) that the jury’s recommendation for death be unanimous, see
§ 921.141(2)(c).
7
6. See also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under Ring
[v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a
jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death
eligible. But importantly, in a capital sentencing proceeding, just as in an ordinary
sentencing proceeding, a jury (as opposed to a judge) is not constitutionally
required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the
ultimate decision within the relevant sentencing range.”); Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507
(“reced[ing] from Hurst v. State except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously
to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt”).
7. See also Poole, 297 So. 3d at 504 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment, as
interpreted in Spaziano [v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984)], does not require
any jury recommendation of death, much less a unanimous one. . . . [W]e further
erred in Hurst v. State when we held that the Eighth Amendment requires a
unanimous recommendation of death. The Supreme Court rejected that exact
argument in Spaziano.”); id. at 505 (holding that Hurst v. State erred in concluding
that a unanimous jury recommendation is required by article I, section 22 of the
Florida Constitution governing the right to a jury trial, and further holding that
“our state constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, article I,
section 17, does not require a unanimous recommendation—or any jury
recommendation—before a death sentence can be imposed” (footnote omitted)).
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Accordingly, we recede from Yacob’s requirement to review death sentences
for comparative proportionality and thus eliminate comparative proportionality
review from the scope of our appellate review set forth in rule 9.142(a)(5).
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we decline to review Lawrence’s claim that his
death sentence is disproportionate and affirm his sentence of death
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