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Date: 01-24-2021
Case Style:
State of Florida v. Jose Maisonet-Maldonado
Case Number: SC19-1947
Judge: Ricky L. Polston
Court: Supreme Court of Florida
Plaintiff's Attorney: Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey
Paul DeSousa, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
- Criminal defense attorney represented Jose Maisonet-Maldonado with one count of first-degree murder with a weapon for the murder of Ms. Alvelo, three counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death, and two counts of vehicular homicide> charges.
In 2010, Jose Maisonet-Maldonado stabbed his girlfriend, Berlitz Alvelo,
and ran over her with a car, resulting in her death. After fleeing the scene,
Maisonet-Maldonado was quickly pursued by law enforcement officers. He then
led police on a dangerous, high-speed chase that ended when he crashed into
another vehicle. The vehicle’s driver, James Laconte, sustained serious injuries,
while the vehicle’s passengers, Amanda Taylor and Francesca Jeffrey, were killed.
A jury convicted Maisonet-Maldonado of one count of first-degree murder
with a weapon for the murder of Ms. Alvelo, three counts of fleeing or attempting
to elude a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death, and two counts
of vehicular homicide. Amanda Taylor and Francesca Jeffrey were each named as
the victim for one count of fleeing and eluding causing serious bodily injury or
death and one count of vehicular manslaughter. Maisonet-Maldonado’s
convictions were upheld by the Fifth District in 2014. Maisonet-Maldonado v.
State, 149 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). In 2016, Maisonet-Maldonado filed a
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
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postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850,
alleging, among other things, that his convictions for vehicular homicide and
fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death
violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Noting that each
offense contained a unique element, the lower court denied Maisonet-Maldonado’s
motion. Maisonet-Maldonado appealed.
On appeal, the Fifth District concluded that Maisonet-Maldonado’s
convictions were prohibited under the single homicide rule, which prohibits dual
convictions for a single homicide under two different statutes. Relying on our
decision in Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985), the Fifth District held that
the single homicide rule “prohibits his convictions . . . for vehicular homicide and
fleeing and eluding causing serious injury or death that involve the same victim.”
Maisonet-Maldonado, 283 So. 3d at 862. Accordingly, the Fifth District reversed
the postconviction order and certified the question currently before us.
II. ANALYSIS
Because the statutory language of section 775.021, Florida Statutes (2010),
clearly states the intent of the Legislature to punish each available offense and does
not provide an exception for offenses arising from a single death, we conclude that
section 775.021 supersedes our decisions establishing the single homicide rule and
that our decision holding otherwise, State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993),
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was wrongly decided.2
Accordingly, we recede from Chapman, answer the
certified question in the negative, and quash the Fifth District’s decision in
Maisonet-Maldonado.
A. Double Jeopardy Principles and the Single Homicide Rule
“As this Court has explained, both the United States and Florida
Constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses that ‘prohibit[ ] subjecting a person
to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal
offense.’ ” State v. Shelley, 176 So. 3d 914, 917 (Fla. 2015) (alteration in original)
(quoting Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009)). But “there is no
constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for different offenses
arising out of the same criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to
authorize separate punishments.” Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1070. “The prevailing
standard . . . is whether the Legislature ‘intended to authorize separate punishments
for the two crimes.’ ” Id. (quoting Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 2001),
receded from on other grounds by Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1077).
“ ‘[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate
punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger [v. United States, 284
2. “A double jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure
question of law and is reviewed de novo.” Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206
(Fla. 2006).
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U.S. 299 (1932)] “same-elements” test pursuant to section 775.021(4), Florida
Statutes[,] is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are
double-jeopardy violations.’ ” Shelley, 176 So. 3d at 917 (alterations in original)
(quoting Gaber v. State, 684 So. 2d 189, 192 (Fla. 1996)).
Section 775.021(4) provides:
(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or
episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate
criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be
sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing
judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or
consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are
separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other
does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof
adduced at trial.
(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for
each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode
or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in
subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule
of construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided
by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of
which are subsumed by the greater offense.
§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2010). “The statute expresses the legislative intent that
defendants be charged with every offense that arises out of one criminal episode
unless an exception applies.” Gil v. State, 118 So. 3d 787, 792 (Fla. 2013).
“Subsections (b)(1)-(3) have been described as setting forth ‘exceptions to the
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Blockburger same-elements test,’ Gaber, 684 So. 2d at 192, because even if the
offenses are separate under that test, dual convictions are barred if the offenses
meet the criteria in one of the exceptions.” State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945
n.2 (Fla. 2005), receded from on other grounds by Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1077.
In Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (Fla. 1985), this Court held
that convictions for DWI manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter were
prohibited under double jeopardy principles, despite being separate offenses under
a Blockburger analysis. Observing that the codified Blockburger test was only a
“tool[ ] of statutory interpretation,” the Houser Court established what would come
to be known as the single homicide rule, that dual convictions for offenses
resulting from a single death were prohibited in Florida. Id. at 1196. The Court
concluded that it should “resolve[ ] all doubts in favor of lenity” and follow the
presumption that the Legislature did not intent to punish a single homicide under
two different statutes. Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 170 (Fla. 1987)
(describing Houser). This Court later reaffirmed the single homicide rule in
Carawan, in which it held that dual punishments for attempted manslaughter and
aggravated battery arising from a single act were similarly prohibited. Id.
Embracing the rule of lenity in the context of double jeopardy, the Carawan Court
found that “Florida’s lenity requirement constitute[d] a rule of construction
coequal to the Blockburger test codified in section 775.021(4)” and reconciled the
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two by concluding that the rule of lenity prevailed “where there [was] a reasonable
basis for concluding the legislature did not intent multiple punishments.” Id. at
168.
The Legislature, however, disagreed with our decision in Carawan and, in
1988, enacted an amendment to section 775.021, Florida Statutes, to clarify that
the principle of lenity should not be applied in a double jeopardy analysis. Ch. 88-
131, § 7, Laws of Fla. (“The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for
each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or
transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to
determine legislative intent.”); State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 616-17 (Fla. 1989)
(explaining the 1988 amendment changes). Nonetheless, in Chapman, when
addressing whether the Legislature’s disavowal of Carawan and the principle of
lenity affected the single homicide rule, this Court concluded that the 1988
amendment did not supersede Houser and that the single homicide rule was still
the law in Florida. 625 So. 2d at 839 (“We see nothing more in the 1988
amendment than that it was intended to limit the rule of lenity and to override
[Carawan]. Especially, we do not read the amendment as an overruling of
Houser . . . .” (citations omitted)). Faced with a plain reading of section 775.021,
however, we now conclude otherwise.
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“A court’s determination of the meaning of a statute begins with the
language of the statute.” Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State, 278 So. 3d 545, 547
(Fla. 2019) (citing Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018)). If the language
of the statute is clear, “the statute is given its plain meaning, and the court does not
‘look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of
statutory construction.’ ” Id. (quoting City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176
(Fla. 2008)). For the following reasons, we conclude that the plain meaning of
section 775.021, Florida Statutes, abolished the single homicide rule and
superseded our decision in Houser, and thus our decision holding otherwise,
Chapman, was incorrectly decided.
First, subsection (4)(a) expresses the intent of the Legislature that the text of
the statutory offense, not the facts of the crime, are relevant for a double jeopardy
analysis. See Gaber, 684 So. 2d at 190 (“Thus, we cannot examine facts from the
record . . . . Rather our double-jeopardy analysis must look only to the statutory
elements . . . .”). The subsection states that “[w]hoever, in the course of one
criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or
more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be
sentenced separately for each criminal offense.” § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010)
(emphasis added). Further it states that the question of whether offenses are
separate should be determined “without regard to the accusatory pleading or the
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proof adduced at trial.” Id. After the 1988 amendment, the language of the statute
specifically addresses a circumstance in which one criminal act constitutes more
than one offense and makes clear that the Legislature intends to punish each
available offense. Subsection (4)(a) rejects the “single underlying act” principle
that had been previously employed to deduce legislative intent for the purposes of
a double jeopardy analysis and clarifies that statutory language is the only factor
for determining whether the Legislature intended to punish separate offenses. See
also Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1072-74 (rejecting the “primary evil” or “core offense”
approach previously taken by this Court in interpreting section 775.021(4)(b)(2)).
This textual change is incompatible with the single homicide rule because the
single homicide rule requires a judge to look at the factual circumstances of the
crime to determine whether the convictions arise from the same death.
Second, the Legislature clearly stated its intent to convict for all offenses
that pass the Blockburger test and rejected the principle of lenity as it applies to
double jeopardy analysis in the text of subsection (4)(b), undermining the
reasoning of the Houser Court. Specifically, the amended language states that
“[t]he intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense
committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the
principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent.”
This language conflicts with the Houser Court’s conclusion that “Florida courts
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have repeatedly recognized that the legislature did not intend to punish a single
homicide under two different statutes.” See Chapman, 625 So. 2d at 839-40
(quoting Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1197). Further, as we have explained, the Houser
decision and resulting single homicide rule were rooted in principles of lenity. See
Carawan, 515 So. 2d at 170 (“Finding no legislative intent to the contrary, we
therefore resolved all doubts in favor of lenity.”) (summarizing Houser). But in
the 1988 amendment to section 775.021, the Legislature provided clear language to
the contrary and rejected the application of lenity in double jeopardy analysis.
Finally, subsection (4)(b) gives three exceptions to the Blockburger sameelements test, none of which recognizes the single homicide rule. The statute
states that these exceptions “are” the exceptions to the same-elements test and does
not use terms of expansion like “include” or “are not limited to,” so we can
conclude from the text that this list is exhaustive. Cf. White v. Mederi Caretenders
Visiting Servs. of Se. Fla., LLC, 226 So. 3d 774, 781 (Fla. 2017) (concluding that
“includes” introduces a nonexhaustive list). Exceptions 1 and 3 give specific
exclusions based on the elements of proof needed for an offense, which can vary
depending on the type of homicide offense. Exception 2 provides for offenses that
are degrees of one another and only prohibits dual convictions for a single death
for offenses that are explicitly designated as degree variants or aggravated forms of
one another. Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1075-76. None of these exceptions grants a
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general protection against multiple convictions for offenses arising from a single
death, and because the list is exhaustive, we may not add an exception where the
text does not provide for one.
After the 1988 amendment, the plain language of section 775.021 clearly
expresses that offenses which pass the codified Blockburger test should be
punished separately and that there is no exception for offenses arising from a single
death. Accordingly, we conclude that the 1988 amendment to section 775.021
superseded our decision in Houser, and our decision in Chapman holding
otherwise was wrongly decided.
A conclusion that a predecessor Court has erred, however, does not end our
analysis. As we have explained, “[w]hen we are convinced that a precedent clearly
conflicts with the law we are sworn to uphold, precedent normally must
yield. . . . But once we have chosen to reassess a precedent and have come to the
conclusion that it is clearly erroneous, the proper question becomes whether there
is a valid reason why not to recede from that precedent.” State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d
487, 507 (Fla. 2020). “The critical consideration ordinarily will be reliance.” Id.
In evaluating reliance interests, courts consider “legitimate expectations of
those who have reasonably relied on the precedent.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140
S. Ct. 1390, 1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). “It is generally
accepted that reliance interests are ‘at their acme in cases involving property and
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contract rights.’ ” Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828 (1991)). “And reliance interests are lowest in cases . . . ‘involving
procedural and evidentiary rules.’ ” Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 828). “As the
Supreme Court has observed, the role of stare decisis is reduced in the cases of
procedural rules . . . that do not ‘serve as a guide to lawful behavior.’ ” Knight v.
State, 286 So. 3d 147, 154 (Fla. 2019) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 521 (1995)).
In this case, Maisonet-Maldonado and other defendants who might benefit
from the single homicide rule have minimal reliance interests in the Chapman
decision. Maisonet-Maldonado does not claim to have changed his behavior based
on the existence of the single homicide rule, nor does it appear that he has changed
any legal positions to his detriment in reliance on the rule. Accordingly, we now
recede from State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993), and hold that the 1988
amendment to section 775.021, Florida Statutes, superseded Houser v. State, 474
So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985), and that the single homicide rule is no longer applicable
under Florida law.
B. This Case
Proceeding to the facts at hand, we must address whether MaisonetMaldonado’s dual convictions for vehicular manslaughter and fleeing or eluding
causing serious injury or death are prohibited under the same-elements test
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codified in section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes. We conclude that they are not
prohibited and quash the decision of the Fifth District.
Maisonet-Maldonado contests his dual convictions for fleeing or eluding a
law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death under section
316.1935(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), and vehicular manslaughter under section
782.071(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2010). Section 316.1935(3)(b) makes it a firstdegree felony to flee a law enforcement officer and drive in a wanton manner and
cause serious bodily injury or death to another person:
(3) Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law
enforcement officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle,
with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently
displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated, and during
the course of the fleeing or attempted eluding:
. . . .
(b) Drives at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates
a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, and causes
serious bodily injury or death to another person, including any law
enforcement officer involved in pursuing or otherwise attempting to
effect a stop of the person’s vehicle, commits a felony of the first
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall
sentence any person convicted of committing the offense described in
this paragraph to a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years
imprisonment. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a court from
imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.
§ 316.1935(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010).
Section 782.071(1)(a) establishes vehicular homicide as a second-degree
felony:
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“Vehicular homicide” is the killing of a human being, or the killing of
a viable fetus by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a
motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the
death of, or great bodily harm to, another.
(1) Vehicular homicide is:
(a) A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
§ 782.071(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010).
“Under the plain meaning of section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1993),
a court is required to examine each of a defendant’s convictions arising out of the
same incident to determine whether ‘each offense requires proof of an element that
the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced
at trial.’ ” Gaber, 684 So. 2d at 190 (quoting § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993)). A
court may not examine the facts of the record but may only examine the statutory
elements of the two offenses to determine whether one requires proof of an
element that the other does not. Id. at 190-91. Therefore, “when considering a
statute that proscribes conduct in the alternative (offenses that can be committed in
more than one way), the analysis must consider the entire range of conduct
prohibited by the statutes, not the specific conduct charged or proven at trial.”
Tambriz-Ramirez v. State, 248 So. 3d 1087, 1094 (Fla. 2018) (quoting TambrizRamirez v. State, 213 So. 3d 920, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)).
Maisonet-Maldonado’s dual convictions are not prohibited by section
775.021, Florida Statutes. Fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing
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serious bodily injury or death requires the State to prove that a defendant (1)
willfully fled or attempted to elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized
vehicle, (2) drove at a high speed or manner demonstrating a wanton disregard for
persons or property, and (3) caused serious bodily injury or death to another
person. § 316.1935(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010). Vehicular homicide requires the State
to prove that a defendant (1) killed a human being (2) by operation of a motor
vehicle in reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to,
another. § 782.071(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). The fleeing or eluding offense requires
that the defendant be fleeing a law enforcement officer. Vehicular homicide
requires that defendant kill another human being, which is not a required element
in the fleeing or eluding statute even though it is sufficient conduct to establish an
element of the crime. Simply put, a defendant can commit fleeing or eluding
causing serious injury or death without committing vehicular homicide and can
commit vehicular homicide without committing fleeing or eluding causing serious
injury or death. See Tambriz-Ramirez, 248 So. 3d at 1095 (“In other words, one
can commit a burglary with a battery without committing an attempted sexual
battery.”).
Additionally, none of the three statutory exceptions in section 775.021(4)(b)
apply to Maisonet-Maldonado’s offenses. First, the fleeing or eluding offense and
vehicular manslaughter do not require identical elements of proof. Fleeing or
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eluding causing serious injury or death requires proof of an attempt to flee, while
vehicular manslaughter requires proof of death, which is not necessarily required
for the fleeing or eluding offense. Second, the offenses are clearly not degree
variants of each other because they do not share a common name, contain very
different formal elements, and exist in completely different chapters of Florida
Statutes. See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1075-76 (holding that the second exception only
applies when a criminal statute itself provides for an offense with multiple
degrees). Finally, because these two offenses satisfy the Blockburger sameelements test, the third exception does not apply because, as we explained in
Gaber, “[i]f two statutory offenses are found to be separate under Blockburger,
then the lesser offense is not subsumed by the greater offense.” 684 So. 2d at 192.
Outcome: For the above reasons, we recede from State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838
(Fla. 1993), and hold that this Court’s decision in Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193
(Fla. 1985), establishing the single homicide rule, was superseded by section
775.021, Florida Statutes (1988). Accordingly, we conclude that dual convictions
for fleeing or eluding causing serious injury or death and vehicular manslaughter
are not prohibited by section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes, answer the certified
question in the negative, quash the Fifth District’s decision in MaisonetMaldonado, and remand for proceedings consistent with our decision.
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Defendant's Experts:
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