West Palm Beach, Florida - Insurance Law lawyer represented Appellees with appealing a final judgment on the insurer's duty to defend claim.

In 2014, the insurer issued a Lawyer's Professional Liability Policy to the law

firm. The law firm notified the insurer of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act ("RICO”) suit filed against it during the policy period. The

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RICO suit involved allegations that stemmed in part from the law firm's

representation of plaintiffs in earlier filed human rights lawsuits.

• The Underlying Lawsuits

1. The Human Rights Lawsuits

On March 20, 2009, one of the law firm's partners ("Collingsworth”) filed three

human rights lawsuits against Drummond Company, Inc. ("Drummond”) under

the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 in the

Northern District of Alabama. The complaints alleged Drummond aided and

abetted a Colombian paramilitary group in the wrongful death of union activists

and other civilians related to Drummond's Colombia mining operations.

2. The Defamation Lawsuit

On October 21, 2011, Drummond filed a one-count defamation complaint

against Collingsworth and the law firm alleging that Collingsworth wrote three

letters defaming Drummond in 2011 at the behest of Llanos Oil Exploration

Limited, a Drummond rival. Two letters were sent to Dutch government officials

and one to the Itochu Corporation, a potential Japanese investor. The letters

urged the recipients to take notice of Drummond's actions in Colombia, including

its alleged relations with paramilitary groups and the resulting human rights

violations.

3. The RICO Lawsuit

Nearly four years later, on March 27, 2015, Drummond filed the RICO lawsuit

against the law firm and others. The complaint was 106 pages long with 86

pages of appendices. It alleged that since 2007, Collingsworth, the law firm,

foreign attorneys, human rights groups, oil executives, and others engaged in a

coordinated "enterprise” against Drummond in violation of RICO. Part of the

alleged enterprise were the three human rights lawsuits filed in 2009. The law

firm submitted the RICO case to its insurer and requested a defense. The insurer

refused to defend the law firm.

• THIS CASE

The law firm filed a one-count complaint against the insurer requesting a

declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend it in the RICO case and to

reimburse the law firm for incurred defense fees and costs. The insurer admitted

the RICO case had been filed during the policy period and involved Professional

Legal Services but denied both a duty to defend and coverage based on the prior

litigation exclusion and other policy provisions. It asserted multiple affirmative

defenses, a counterclaim, and a third-party complaint against Collingsworth,

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which sought a declaration of no coverage, no duty to defend, and recission of

the policy.

Both the law firm and insurer moved for summary judgment on the duty to

defend. Their arguments were limited to the application of Exclusion C—the

prior litigation exclusion. The circuit court granted the law firm's motion and

denied the insurer's motion in an extensive written order. The court specifically

found the insurer had a duty to defend the law firm in the RICO case.

The insurer moved for rehearing, arguing the circuit court's order did not

address all its affirmative defenses and the court had ruled on issues not raised

in the motions. The court denied the motion.

The insurer then moved for clarification and/or to set aside the order, arguing

the circuit court: (1) failed to consider its other affirmative defenses; (2) ruled on

issues not raised by the motions; and (3) failed to address the rescission

counterclaim. In denying the motion, a successor judge reviewed the record and

found the summary judgment order "addresse[d] all [the law firm's] claims

against [the insurer] and . . . all of [the insurer's] affirmative defenses and

counterclaims against [the law firm].” But the successor judge found the order

on the summary judgment motions was not final because there had been no

determination of the attorney's fees, costs, and interest owed to the law firm.

Following discovery, briefing, and an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered

the insurer to pay $2,553,699.56 in fees and costs, and prejudgment interest.

The successor judge reserved jurisdiction to award further fees and expenses, to

enforce the insurer's duty to defend and duty to indemnify, and to enter such

further orders as the court deemed "just, necessary, and proper.” From these

orders, the insurer now appeals.

• THE ANALYSIS

More than two thirds of the briefs in this appeal focus on the insurer's duty

to defend, the application of the prior litigation and related claims exclusions,

and whether the eight corners rule applies. In its last and shortest issue,

however, the insurer argues the case must be reversed because the circuit court

did not address its remaining affirmative defenses and rescission counterclaim

before entering its "final” judgment. It is this last argument upon which we

focus.

We do not reach the duty to defend issue and express no opinion on the

merits. Rather, we address the error that occurred when the successor judge

found that the order on the motions for summary judgment addressed "all [the

law firm's] claims against [the insurer] and it addresse[d] all of [the insurer's]

affirmative defenses and counterclaims against [the law firm]” and "no

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outstanding issues of liability remain at issue.” See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Seitlin

& Co., 919 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). That simply was not true.

When the court ruled in favor of the law firm on the duty to defend, its judicial

labor was not at an end. The insurer twice brought the remaining affirmative

defenses and rescission counterclaim to the attention of the court to no avail.

Rather than resolve those remaining issues, the successor judge declared that

all issues had been resolved when in fact they had not. Despite the trappings of

finality found in the successor judge's order, other interrelated issues remained

outstanding.

Florida adheres to the principal that “piecemeal appeals should not be

permitted where claims are legally interrelated and in substance involve the

same transaction.” Mendez v. W. Flagler Family Ass’n, 303 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla.

1974); see also S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).

There can be no doubt that the declaratory relief and rescission claims in this

case are interrelated. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrick, 763 So. 2d 1133

(Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We therefore reverse and remand the case for the court to

vacate the January 11, 2021 order and the order denying the insurer’s motion

for clarification. We remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.