Defendant Michael Harris (Harris) appeals from a verdict awarded after a bench trial finding him liable for payment of $2,675 jointly and severally with defendants Society Hill at University Heights III (the condominium association) and Impac Property Management (Impac), the firm that manages the condominium property. For the reasons that follow, we reverse as to Harris.

Harris rais

¶1 The novel issue in this case is whether the Wisconsin Condominium Ownership Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 703 (2005-06),[1] limits the duration of a developer’s control over a master-planned community. In Wisconsin, a condominium developer may maintain control only for three years or until seventy-five percent of the units are sold, whichever comes first, or ten years for an expandable condominium.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the Montgomery Towne Homeowners’ Association (“Montgomery Towne”), brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants-appellees, Edward Greene and Priscilla Greene. Montgomery Towne alleged that the Greenes had installed glass-block windows in their condominium unit in violation of Article X of Montgomery Towne’s Declaration of Condo

The plaintiff in this construction negligence case, Natividad Garcia, injured his back while employed by JP Cullen & Sons, an ironworking subcontractor, doing work on a condominium project. The plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Wooton Construction, Ltd., the general contractor of the project. We are presented with two questions: (1) whether Wooton retained

This is an appeal from a partial judgment holding that the University of Idaho Foundation is obligated to make payments under a contract between it and Civic Partners Idaho, LLC, and from the award of costs and attorney fees to the Capital City Development Corporation. We affirm the judgment of the district court and award attorney fees on appeal to the Capital City Development Corporation.
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In this action for specific performance of a real estate option contract, the Court of Appeal reversed a judgment for the plaintiff. Over a vigorous dissent, the court held that the contract was too uncertain to enforce because it lacked the essential terms of time and manner of payment. We reverse. It is settled that if a contract for the sale of real property specifies no time of payment, a reas

The litigation underlying this appeal arose out of the dispute between the two equal owners of two hotels and a condominium in Ocean City, Maryland. The appellee, Edward J. Dyas, Jr. (Dyas), was the plaintiff below. One of the appellants, Joseph M. Della Ratta (Della Ratta), was a defendant below. We shall refer to Della Ratta and Dyas collectively as "the Developers."

The earliest of their

This lawsuit arises from a dispute between Don C. Wang, appellee, and Sean Shahparast, the sole member of Royal Investment Group, LLC, (collectively, “Royal”), appellants, over their negotiations for Royal to purchase from Mr. Wang a house and real property located at 5281 Goldsboro Road in Montgomery County (“the Property”). Negotiations broke down, and the parties did not proceed to sett

Although the general rule is that if the purchaser of a property at a foreclosure sale fails to make timely payment of the purchase price he thereby becomes obligated to pay interest on the unpaid balance, there have evolved at least three recognized exemptions from the strict application of that general rule. The question before us on this appeal is whether a purchaser's possible entitlement to o

The issue presented to the Court by this case is whether a condominium council of unit owners, which under Md. Code, Real Property Article, § 11-109(d) (2003 & Supp. 2008) “may be either incorporated as a nonstock corporation or unincorporated,” has standing to file and maintain a lawsuit during the time its corporate charter was forfeit. The Circuit Court for Worcester County, entering summa

In this case, we are called on to determine whether a rule of practice requiring a ‘‘review of the finding of facts and hearing on any objections’’ to a fact finder’s report requires that the trial court listen to the arguments of counsel. We conclude that it does. Following the rule of construction that specific provisions prevail over more general provisions, we conclude that a hearing

This is an appeal from a take-nothing summary judgment on David and Sherry Schindler's claims against Stacie Baumann. See Footnote 1 The Schindlers sued Baumann for damages to their condominium after water allegedly leaked into their unit from Baumann's condominium. In two issues, appellants assert the trial court erred in granting Baumann summary judgment and in denying their motions for rehea

Pukka Development appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs Saverio Pugliese, Michael Mieves, Antonio Saladino and Stephen Matolyak. This case turns on the interpretation of sections 1702 and 1703(d) of the Interstate Land Sales Act (the “ILSA”). We disagree with the district court’s interpretation of the statute. We therefore reverse the district court’s

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Charles Margines, Judge. Affirmed. Kulik, Gottesman, Mouton & Siegel, LLP, Thomas M. Ware II, Sharon Barber; Borton, Petrini & Conron, LLP, Matthew J. Trostler for Defendant and Appellant. Enterprise Counsel Group, David A. Robinson, Benjamin P. Pugh; Jeffrey Lewis for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Marquesa at Monarch Beach (Marqu

Appellants Martin J. Coyne (Coyne) and Brian Murphy O’Flynn (O’Flynn) are former owners of a parcel of undeveloped property located on Lombard Street in San Francisco that was acquired by respondent City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) in an eminent domain proceeding. The taking frustrated appellants’ plan to develop a multiunit residential and commercial complex on that site, and in the

¶1 Shumaker Trucking and Excavating Contractors, Inc. (Shumaker) appeals from various rulings of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, during the course of a jury trial where the jury found in favor of Cody J. Olson (Olson). Olson cross-appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. We affirm.

¶2 Shumaker presents

Marquesa at Monarch Beach (Marquesa) is a common interest development governed by the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Civ. Code, § 1350, et. seq.). It is comprised of single family homes in the Monarch Beach development of Dana Point, many of which have ocean and golf course views. The community is managed by the Marquesa at Monarch Beach Homeowners Association (the Association),

The plaintiff, Cue Associates, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Cast Iron Associates, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly applied the statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 52- 577 to bar the plaintiff’s trespass claim, when the defendant did not plead this statute of limitations as a special defense. We agree wi

Plaintiff Rafferty & Towner, an Oregon corporation, brought this claim against defendant Bengio Corporation, a Florida corporation, under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, ORS 95.200 to 95.310, asserting that plaintiff's judgment debtor, Wallbangers Oregon, Inc., fraudulently transferred real property to defendant. Plaintiff appeals from a limited judgment dismissing the claim, assigning error

Jeff Hodges ("Defendant") appeals the trial court's judgment against him and in favor of Larry Mays ("Plaintiff") in the amount of $2,673.32 for past-due rent. Defendant challenges the judgment in three points: (1) he was not the tenant under the rental agreement; (2) any ambiguity as to the tenant's identity should be construed against Plaintiff as the drafter; and (3) there was substantial and c

IDC Properties, Inc. (“IDC”) appeals the judgment declaring the title insurance policy issued by Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”) null and void because of material misrepresentations by IDC. On this appeal, IDC argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard for material misrepresentation. Finding that the district court applied the correct standar

This is a diversity case, and the parties agree that Massachusetts law controls. The hostilities initially took the form of a garden-variety insurance dispute — but the case has now morphed into an interesting question about the preclusive effect (if any) of a declaratory judgment on a subsequent action for damages arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts. The district court determined

The plaintiff, Cue Associates, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Cast Iron Associates, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly applied the statute of limitations found in General Statutes § 52- 577 to bar the plaintiff’s trespass claim, when the defendant did not plead this statute of limitations as a special defense. We agree wi

Plaintiff Mettler Walloon LLC (Mettler Walloon) appeals of right the trial court’s final judgment upon remaining claims, and the decision after trial. The trial court’s orders decided in defendants’ favor, finding no cause for action on plaintiff’s damages claims.1 We affirm.

I

The principal member of plaintiff is Louis P. Mettler (Mettler). Mettler acquired the property at

We are asked to balance the interests of an insured defendant in reaching a reasonable settlement with a claimant against the insurer's interest in fully litigating its insured's legal obligation to that claimant. In the case before us, Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company (MOE), the insurer, vigorously defended its insured, a construction corporation, almost to the end. However, MOE decline