¶1 The gravaman of appellant Helen I. Sisk's appeal is whether "costs", as used in 12 O.S. 1971 § 1101 1, includes attorney's fees. That section reads:

The defendant, in an action for the recovery of money only, may, at any time, before the trial, serve upon the plaintiff or his attorney an offer, in writing, to allow judgment to be taken against him for the sum specified therein. If the

¶1 Defendant/Appellants, Stanley D. Booker, Paula J. Booker, James L. Davis, and Jane Davis (collectively Landowners), seek review of the trial court's order granting the motion of Plaintiff/Appellee, City of Marlow (City), to dismiss Landowners' counterclaim for inverse condemnation in City's condemnation action. We hold Landowners may not prosecute a counterclaim in City's condemnation action.

¶1 The Oklahoma Department of Transportation ("ODOT") brings this appeal from the District Court's order denying exceptions and affirming the appraisal report of commissioners appointed by the Court pursuant to the State's eminent domain procedures. This Court has jurisdiction to review only a final order or judgment which affects substantial rights of the parties. Having reviewed the Appellate b

Maetta Vance was the only African- American working in her department at Ball State University (“Ball State”) when racially charged discord erupted. In 2005, Vance began filing complaints with Ball State about her coworkers’ offensive conduct, which included the use of racial epithets, references to the Ku Klux Klan, veiled threats of physical harm, and other unpleasantries. In 2006 she file

Maetta Vance was the only African-American working in her department at Ball State University(“Ball State”) when racially charged discord erupted. In 2005, Vance began filing complaints with Ball State about her coworkers’ offensive conduct, which included the use of racial epithets, references to the Ku Klux Klan, veiled threats of physical harm, and other unpleasantries. In 2006 she filed

The City of Tulsa sued James A. Parker on an eminent domain theory seeking to acquire by condemnation rights, title and interest in real property owned by defendant for public purposes.

The commissioners appointed by the Court awarded Defendant $55,000.00.

The City of Enid sued Marsau Enterprises, Inc. on an eminent domain theory seeking to acquire by condemnation certain rights, title and interests in real property owned by Defendant for public use.

The Commissioners appointed by the Court awarded Defendant $10,000.

The City of Enid, Oklahoma sued Larisa L. Toy, John Lipor, Bank of America, N.A., and the Board of Commissioners of on Garfield County on an eminent domain theory seeking to acquire by condemnation certain rights, title and interest in real owned by Defendant or in which they held some interest.

The commissioners appointed by the Court awarded the Defendants $3,500 which was deposited with

Robert Brenner, Steven and Cristy Wickenhauser, and Allan and Susan Seidling (collectively, the Landowners) appeal an order dismissing their Wis. Stat. § 32.10 petition for inverse condemnation proceedings.[1] The Landowners argue the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard when it concluded that there was no taking because the Landowners were not deprived of all or practically all benef

Scott and Lynnea Waller had part of their property taken by American Transmission Co. (ATC) to allow ATC to construct a high voltage transmission line. The Wallers filed an action under Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5) (2009-10)[1] contesting the partial taking, alleging that their property after the taking was an “uneconomic remnant” as defined in § 32.06(3m).

¶2 This appeal addresses

Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P., frustrated by two state agencies' restrictions on its development of a coastal residential subdivision in Narragansett, Rhode Island, appeals the district court's dismissal of its federal takings claims under the Supreme Court's ripeness requirements for such claims, set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473

In this appeal, we review the circuit court’s dismissal, upon demurrer and pleas in bar, of a property owner’s claims for compensation and damages following the demolition of a residential building by the City of Norfolk.

FACTS

The circuit court dismissed the case below on demurrer and pleas in bar without taking evidence. “Where no evidence is taken in support of a plea in bar

Plaintiffs-Appellants (the “plaintiffs”), twenty-two Argentinian residents,1 bring suit against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (DCAG) alleging that one of DCAG’s subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MBA)2 collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill the plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”3 Some of the plaintiffs are th

Appellants Garrett Operators, Inc. and George Thomas Cox appeal the trial court’s grant of appellee City of Houston’s plea to the jurisdiction on all of appellants’ claims and of the City of Houston’s objections to appellants’ discovery requests and deposition notice. In five issues, appellants argue the trial court erred by (1) dismissing Garrett Operators’ inverse condemnation claim

Appellant Lynette Harris (“Harris”) challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her claims against her employer, Appellee Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (collectively, the “City”), for hostile work environment and failure to promote under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; deprivation of constitutional equal protection under 42

¶1 The only issue presented1 is whether a landowner is entitled to additional compensation when fiber optic cables are installed within the confines of a public right of way or easement on which public highways or roads are established. We hold that under the facts presented, no additional compensation is warranted.

FACTS

¶2 This cause concerns a class action lawsuit2 brought by th

The City of Houston appeals from a judgment in favor of Maguire Oil Company and others[1] arising from an inverse condemnation claim predicated on the erroneous invocation of an inapplicable city ordinance to revoke Maguire’s natural gas drilling permit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

The fight over Maguire’s thwarted effort to drill for natural gas near Lake

In these consolidated interlocutory appeals, the City of North Richland Hills (the City) challenges the trial courts’ respective denials of the City’s partial pleas to the jurisdiction in the lawsuits filed against it by Appellees Hometown Urban Partners, Ltd. (Urban Partners), Arcadia Land Partners 25, Ltd., and Arcadia Holdings (collectively, Arcadia).[1] The City contends that governmental

Fred Eppenberger, Maxine Smith, and William Bain (hereinafter and collectively, “Homeowner”) brought suit against Metropolitan Saint Louis Sewer District (hereinafter, “MSD”) for a known dangerous condition of the River des Peres and inverse condemnation in connection with the flooding of their homes. MSD filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. Homeowner b

This is an appeal from the registration of a Canadian defamation judgment. We reverse. Because only questions of law are at issue, we review de novo. State ex rel. Nixon v. Griffin, 291 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009).

The appellant, Ms. Lord, is an American citizen, resident of St. Charles County, Missouri, who was born in the Philippines. The respondent, Leodegaria Sanchez, is Ms. Lo

Elizabeth E. Nail appeals from the judgment of the bankruptcy court determining that her failure to turn over $46,016.25 in lawsuit settlement proceeds to Arvest Mortgage Company and the Federal National Mortgage Association (together, “Creditor”) resulted in a non-dischargeable debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The Creditor cross-appeals, arguing that the bankruptcy court should have f

Arlene Pecora appeals from a final summary judgment determining that she was not entitled to exercise a right of first refusal in the sale, by a court-appointed receiver, of Signature Grand, a catering facility located in Broward County. We affirm, holding that, given the nature of the sale, and the express language of the agreement creating the right of first refusal, the trial court was correct

¶1 The dispositive issue before us is whether the board of county commissioners is liable to a bank on a court clerk's depository voucher (delivered to a lawyer in compliance with a court order and cashed at the bank upon a payee's forged endorsement) either (1) as the voucher's drawer under the Uniform Commercial Code's [UCC] "Impostor Rule"1 or (2) as a principal of the county treasurer or cour

¶1 In the trial court, plaintiffs (Morgan, et al.) filed an action to quiet their title to a certain quarter section of land in Blaine County, Oklahoma, through which the defendant railroad company had a right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that they owned the fee simple title to the quarter section, subject only to the railroad company's easement on a strip of land 100 feet wide. By answer and cross

Whether and how Smith County[1] might get a new jail has been an ongoing public issue. Recently, in some fallout from that debate, Ken W. Good sought a judgment declaring that Joel P. Baker, the Smith County Judge, and JoAnn Fleming, the Commissioner for Smith County Precinct Number 1, had violated[2] the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) by attending meetings to develop a jail plan in secret.[3] H