In this eminent domain action, initiated pursuant to General Statutes § 7-247, the plaintiff, the town of Montville (town), appeals from the judgment rendered following a trial to the court. On appeal to this court, the town claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied its motion to correct and alter the court's memorandum of decision, and (2) determined the damages sustained by the

Motions for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are subject to strict time limits that begin to run when the party seeking such relief is served with a written notice of entry of judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 629, 659, 660.) A party intending to move for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must do so within 15 days of such service. (§§ 659, 629.)

A public sewer maintained by the City of Los Angeles runs under property owned by John T. Barnard (and his wife, Virginia I. Barnard, who is included in our references to Barnard except where the context makes it clear we are referring only to him). In August 1993, the City discovered the sewer had deteriorated and caused Barnard's property to subside. In November 1995, Barnard retained the

On August 10, 1998, the Hulses filed their complaint surrounding their purchase of a piece of real property. The Hulses alleged breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and bad faith against First American Title Company of Crook County (First American) and negligence and fraud against BHJ, the real estate broker of the selling party. The basis of the complaint stemmed from allegations that th

Duer Wagner owned an undivided 39.232955 percent of the 1,798.4 acres that were condemned by the City of Sweetwater. The City condemned the property in order to obtain water from the underlying aquifer as an additional, municipal water supply source. For many years prior to the condemnation, the City had purchased water from the owners of that property. After Duer Wagner purchased the property,

This case arises out of a surety's obligation under a performance bond. Appellee Nkwazi, L.L.C. ("Nkwazi"), a limited-liability company owned and operated by four persons, including Kalpesh Patel and Rajeev Patel, (1) contracted with Salinas Construction & Design ("Salinas") for the construction of a motel in Bastrop. Appellant Cumberland Casualty & Surety Co. ("Cumberland") issued performance

Appellant, Malcomson Road Utility District ("the District"), appeals from two final judgments that denied the District's motions for partial summary judgment; granted the motions for summary judgment of appellee, Frank George Newsom; denied the District the right to condemn Newsom's property; awarded Newsom attorney's fees and possession of and improvements on the property that the District had

Defendant, Level 3 Communications, L.L.C. (Level 3), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its counterclaim for condemnation filed in response to the action of plaintiff, Ladue Group, L.C., for trespass and injunctive relief for Level 3's installing conduit for fiberoptic cable on plaintiff's property. We affirm.

Plaintiff owned real property fronting Ladue Road in the C

The Jenkses owned a 735-acre tract of land in Brazoria County. The land had been owned by the Jenks family since 1906 and was used for agricultural purposes. WesTTex desired to construct a 12-inch oil and gas pipeline on the Jenkses' property. After it could not reach an agreement with the Jenkses, WesTTex petitioned the county court to condemn a 50-foot-wide strip of land on the property for t

Condemnation of 80 acres of farm land owned by the Marie Conner Family Limited Partnership for use by the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport for construction of a new runway. The airport offered $33,000 an acre. Defendants were willing to take $50,000.00 an acre. The property had been in the Conner family for two hundred years and was located on Conner road which was built by

1 The only issue presented1 is whether a landowner is entitled to additional compensation when fiber optic cables are installed within the confines of a public right of way or easement on which public highways or roads are established. We hold that under the facts presented, no additional compensation is warranted.

FACTS

2 This cause concerns a class action lawsuit2 brought by the a

This appeal is from a judgment against Weslie R. Marks and in favor of Brad C. Martin and Kathy I. Martin for breach of a warranty deed. The jury found Marks breached the deed and awarded the Martins $251,735 in damages, $52,000 for attorney fees, and $7,500 for attorney fees on appeal. Marks brings this appeal.

We first address a cross-point raised by appellees. The Martins contend the t

In this case, plaintiffs seek to certify a class consisting of homeowners who were allegedly denied insurance benefits by 21st Century Insurance Company and 21st Century Casualty Company (both 21st Century) in the aftermath of the January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake. The trial court denied plaintiffs' class certification motion, finding that common questions of law and fact did not pred

The issue in this action for inverse condemnation and damage to property is when plaintiff's claims accrued. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer and dismissed the action based on its conclusion that the action is barred by the statute of limitations and the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq., "Tort Claims Act").

We conclude the trial court erred. In an ac

Evelyn Sue Kauffman and Thomas A. Kauffman appeal the trial court's judgment dissolving their marriage. In three of Wife's four points on appeal, Wife contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's identification of certain property as Husband's separate property. In her other point, Wife contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's valuation of certain marital

Lesaffre Yeast Corporation appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), dismissing its complaint against MMSD alleging inverse condemnation and nuisance. Lesaffre claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because it applied the wrong legal standards to reach its conclusion that MMSD was entitled to judgment as a matter

The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether a condemnor may consider the presence of environmental contamination in valuing the subject property or must value the property as if it were uncontaminated and bring a separate action for costs of cleanup under applicable environmental statutes. We conclude that environmental contamination is relevant to a valuation of property and therefor

Dennis Beckworth argues on appeal that the superior court erred in awarding long-term alimony to Anne Beckworth. We hold that Anne's lack of earning capacity and her medical condition justified long-term alimony. We also hold that the trial court permissibly deviated from evidence of investment earning rates and did not err in determining Anne's projected monthly expenses. We therefore affir

Sunbelt Properties, a Partnership, (Sunbelt) appeals from a judgment requiring it to refund excess proceeds to the State of Texas in a condemnation proceeding. We affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On December 2, 1999, the State filed a petition for condemnation seeking a partial taking of property located on North Loop Road in El Paso for an expansion of North Loop. The petition named the f

Appellants, W.C. Bussing, Jr., and Bussing Construction Corp. (collectively "Bussing"), sued Appellee, the Indiana Department of Transportation ("INDOT"), See footnote under the theory of inverse condemnation after INDOT informed Bussing of its intention to eliminate left-hand turns from State Road 66 onto Brentwood Avenue, which connects Bussing's apartment complex to S.R. 66. Following the tr

This case requires us to determine how 'measurable damages' should be calculated when a city annexes territory covered by the certificate of a private solid waste collection company. Former RCW 35A.14.900 (1996) provides that when a city annexes territory, the city may allow the territory's garbage hauler to continue to serve the territory for five years.1 If the city so chooses, the cit

The issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC, has standing under General Statutes § 22a- 161 to bring an action against the defendants to enjoin the demolition of thirty-nine buildings. The defendants are the New London Development Corporation (corporation), Antonio H. Alves, the New London building official, and the city of New London

This case involves the extent of a taking in condemnation and the nature of compensation. The ultimate issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff, the Illinois Department of Transportation (the Department), an agency of the State, took the defendants' outdoor advertising signs in addition to the defendants' leasehold interests, to be used in a road construction project. The Department argues that

By Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(7) (166 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(7)), The Sunnyside Partnership, L.P. (Sunnyside), files this interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court's June 7, 2002, order finding that the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) has the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain over property owned by Sunnyside, that Sunnyside's property is subject to IDOT's exer

The Yates built a home on a 10-acre lot they purchased in a Butler County subdivision. The particular lot they purchased was identified as Lot 7, Towakoni Hills. The Yates' lot and other lots in the subdivision were subject to covenants and restrictions requiring them to be used for residential purposes. The properties to the north of the Yates' lot were zoned commercial, and some of the proper