Appellant G.B.C. (the Father) appeals from the decree terminating his parental rights to a daughter, G.S. (the Child). The Father brings four issues arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support termination; (3) the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) failed to make reasonable efforts to reuni

The Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department�) filed its petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the fathers of the four subject children. This is an appeal by the mother, Ernestina, and one of the fathers, Abel, from the trial court’s judgment terminating their parental rights. We affirm the judgment as to Abel. Because we conclude the evidence is le

J.M. appeals from a judgment on reserved issues granting joint physical custody of
his son Joey to J.M. and G.H., Joey’s mother, and allowing her to take Joey with her to
live in Israel during the school year. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
We use the parties’ first names to simplify and humanize our opinion in this
intensely contested custody case. (

¶1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Osage county rendered against Edna Drew Pryor, administratrix of the estate of Antwine Pryor, deceased, and against the estate of said deceased, and in favor of Antwine Pryor, a minor, and putative bastard child of Antwine Pryor, deceased.

¶2 The record discloses that bastardy proceedings were instituted in the county court of

In 1998, A.S., A.E.D.’s mother, filed a petition to establish that K.D. is the biological father of A.E.D. The parties signed an agreed decree of paternity, which adjudicated K.D. as a parent of A.E.D., appointed A.S. and K.D. as joint managing conservators, gave A.S. the exclusive right to establish A.E.D.’s primary residence, and ordered K.D. to pay child support. In 2011, the Texas Attorney

Appellant father appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to his child, N.M.G. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department�) moved to have appellant’s parental rights terminated on a variety of grounds. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(1)(A)-(H), (J)-(K), (M)-(Q); 161.003(a) (West 2014). After a bench trial, the trial court found ap

Indiana and Wisconsin are among the shrinking majority of states that do not recognize the va-lidity of same-sex marriages, whether contracted in these states or in states (or foreign countries) where they are law-ful. The states have appealed from district court decisions invalidating the states’ laws that ordain such refusal.
Formally these cases are about discrimination against the small

A mother seeks review of an order by a successor judge, which effectively vacated a final order in a paternity action. She argues the successor judge erred in sua sponte ordering a new trial in the paternity action unless the parties could reach an agreement on the wording of the final order. We agree and reverse.
A father petitioned the court to determine paternity. The original trial court h

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we will hold that there was insufficient
evidence to support jurisdiction based on the mother’s alleged failure to protect the
children against sexual abuse by the father. However, there was sufficient evidence to
support jurisdiction based on the mother’s substance abuse; moreover, the juvenile court
also found jurisdiction on other

After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order which terminated the parental rights of N.C. (Mother) and A.P. (Father) to their daughters, K.P., K.P., and K.P.1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West 2014).2 In this appeal of the judgment terminating their parental rights, Mother raises three issues and Father raises seven issues.
1We identify the minor children by initials to protect

James J. and Sarah J. appeal the denial of their petition to declare Sarah's three children free from the custody and control of the children's father, Christopher M. (Fam. Code, § 7822.)1 James and Sarah also contend that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue a temporary visitation order allowing Christopher to have supervised visitation with the children during the pendency, or upon dism

J.M. appeals from a judgment on reserved issues granting joint physical custody of his son Joey to J.M. and G.H., Joey’s mother, and allowing her to take Joey with her to live in Israel during the school year. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
We use the parties’ first names to simplify and humanize our opinion in this intensely contested custody case. (In re Marria

A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights. She contends the evidence failed to prove she abandoned the child or that termination is in the best interest of the child. We conclude the district court properly terminated the mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b) (2011). We conclude termination of the mother’s parental righ

Appellant K.K.L. appeals a decree, rendered after a bench trial, terminating the parent-child relationship between him and his minor daughter, K.R.L. Among its findings, the trial court determined that the evidence supported termination pursuant to Family Code section 161.002(b)(1) because Appellant, an “alleged father,� had not filed an admission of paternity after being served in the termina

Lilas Moua (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Pittullo, Howington, Barker, Abernathy, LLP;
P. Timothy Pittullo (Pittullo) and Jonathon A. Zitney (Zitney) (collectively respondents)
on appellant’s claim against respondents for legal malpractice. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was born and educated in

¶1 R.P., an alleged biological father, appeals from the district
court’s dismissal of his petition to establish paternity under the
R.P. v. K.S.W. and D.R.W.
2. Unless otherwise specifically noted, all citations to the Utah Code
are to the 2012 edition of the Utah Code Annotated.
20120559-CA 2 2014 UT App 38
Utah Uniform Parentage Act (the UUPA). See Utah Code Ann.
Â

¶1 In this case, Christopher Carlton asks us to once again
consider both the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act (Act)
as well as the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who
wish to contest adoptions in Utah. Mr. Carlton argues first that
the Act is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him,
and second, that the district court erred when, bas

Troy J. Wilson and Georgette George-Wilson appeal the trial court’s final decree terminating the parental rights of minor child A.T.’s parents and appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department�) as sole managing conservator of A.T. The Wilsons argue on appeal that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in striking their petition to intervene because

Appellant David M. appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his son, D.M. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court’s order erroneously terminated his parental rights pursuant to section 161.002 of the Texas Family Code; and (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he constructively abandoned his son. We af

Adam Scott Perkins appeals the trial court’s Order Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship and in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (Order). The facts of this case are well known to the parties, and we do not recite them here. Further, because all dispositive issues are well settled in the law, we issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to rule 47.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate P

Roy1 filed suit to terminate the parent-child relationship between him and J.K.B. and J.D.B., pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.005. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005 (Vernon 2014). The statute permits a man to terminate the parent-child relationship with a child if he satisfies certain statutory criteria

1 We refer to the parties involved by either first names only or initials to

¶ 1 The issues in this case are (1) whether section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2012)) permits a trial court to award child support to a noncustodial parent and (2) if so, whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded $600 per month in child support to the noncustodial parent here in addition to requiring the custodial paren

Appellant Juan P., (“Father�) the father of minor Jonathan P., appeals from an order of the juvenile dependency court denying Father’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,1 petition seeking custody of Jonathan P., or in the alternative, family reunification services. Before this court, Father argues that the court erred in failing to assess his request for custody pursuant to section 3

After the infant child, OLRM, was adopted, appellant, Brandon O., filed a petition to adjudicate parentage. Appellee, Adoption Advocates, Inc., filed a plea to the jurisdiction and request for the trial court to dismiss Brandon’s suit on the grounds that he lacked standing. The trial court granted appellee’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal by Brandon ensued. We affirm

Family Code1 section 7613, subdivision (b) (hereafter, section 7613(b)) currently provides: “The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in assisted reproduction of a woman other than the donor’s spouse is treated in law as if he were not the natural parent of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by th