We affirm in part and reverse in part in this contentious civil rights case brought by a family of plaintiffs, the Kennedys, against the Town of Billerica, Massachusetts, and numerous individual police officers. Before us are cross-appeals from jury verdicts and court rulings in the two trials in this bifurcated case.

Specifically, we hold that error in instructing the jury in the

¶1 In this action initiated under the Surface Damages Act, 52 O.S. 2001 §§318.2 et seq. (the Act), Appellant, Bays Exploration, Inc. (Bays), appeals from the trial court's Order Granting Attorney's Fees and Costs to Defendant Douglas Jones (Jones). We hold the relief requested by Bays is precluded by the law of the case doctrine and affirm.

¶2 Jones is the surface owner of 140 acres of

¶1 Defendant/Appellant, Rich Cope (Father), appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee, Terri L. Cope (Mother), determining that the parties' oral agreement waiving Mother's right to child support from Father was void and unenforceable, and awarding Mother a judgment against Father in the amount of $97,401.50 plus interest. After review, we reverse and remand with direction

¶1 The Rural Water, Sewer, and Solid Waste Management District No. 1 (Logan-1), filed an action in the Western District of Oklahoma against the City of Guthrie, an Oklahoma Municipality and the Guthrie Public Works Authority, a public trust (collectively Guthrie), claiming unlawful encroachment on its service area in an alleged violation of a federal law that protects rural water districts from c

{1} Defendant Katherine Allen appeals from a jury verdict finding her liable for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, malicious abuse of process, and defamation. Based on these findings of liability, the jury awarded Plaintiff Bill Papatheofanis, Katherine’s ex-husband, $257,500 in compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, Katherine argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the elem

{1} This case involves a property ownership dispute. Defendant White’s ownership interest in the property arose from a quitclaim deed from Defendant Hayden, whose ownership interest arose out of a real estate contract between Hayden and Plaintiff, which Plaintiff contended was invalid. In Plaintiff’s action against Defendants, Hayden failed to answer requests for admissions, which resulted in

{1} Plaintiffs-Respondents (Plaintiffs) are royalty owners who brought a class action lawsuit claiming that Defendant-Petitioner (Burlington) has underpaid royalties by improperly deducting the costs and expenses associated with placing natural gas in a marketable condition. The district court certified a class under Rule 1-023(B)(2) and (B)(3) NMRA, finding that “[t]he common pre-tailgate deduc

Carla Campbell appeals the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Abrazo Adoption Associates. In one issue, Campbell contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because a fact issue exists as to whether Campbell exercised due diligence in obtaining service of citation on Abrazo. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedu

The prior tortured procedural history of the underlying cause between Darren S. and Stacy D. Fallis (“the Fallises�) and River Mountain Ranch Property Owners Association, Inc. (“the Association�) is detailed in this court’s opinion in In re Fallis, No. 04-08-00781-CV, 2009 WL 262119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 4 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam). In this appeal, the Fall

Ta Chong Bank (“the Bank�) filed a complaint wherein it asserted several claims against Hitachi High Technologies America, Inc. (“Hitachi�). Those claims were based on the Bank’s interest in the accounts receivable of a third party, CyberHome Entertainment, Inc. (“CyberHome�), pursuant to certain factoring agreements entered into by those entities. Although the factoring agreements p

Section 101.106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is entitled “Election of Remedies� and is applicable when an employee of a governmental unit is sued. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106 (Vernon 2005). Since 2003, this statute has required a plaintiff to “decide at the outset whether an employee acted independently and is thus solely liable, or acted within the general

Jamshid Aryeh appeals from the order (judgment) of dismissal of his second amended complaint brought under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.1 The trial court sustained respondent Canon Business Solutions, Inc.‟s (Canon) general demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that the allegations failed to state a cause of action and that the claim is b

Plaintiffs Josie Faulkinbury and William Levene (together, Plaintiffs), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, appeal from the trial court‟s order denying their motion for class certification. They sought to represent and certify a class of about 4,000 current and former employees of defendant Boyd & Associates, Inc. (Boyd), which provides security guard services throughout S

Plaintiff insurance carrier, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration in Washington Superior Court that landlord’s liability insurance policies do not cover tenants’ claims for breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The trial court granted insurance carrier’s motion for summary judgment on the issue. Defendants Parsons Hill Partnership,[1] Willard Group,[2] Poulin Gr

Plaintiffs-appellants ProShipLine, Inc. and EP-Team, Inc. appeal from two district court decisions in favor of defendantappellee Aspen Infrastructures Ltd. Both decisions involve a writ of maritime attachment that ProShipLine and EP-Team obtained against Aspen pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule Bâ€

This appeal presents the question of whether the intramilitary immunity doctrine, as embraced by our circuit in Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1995), was superseded by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (“1997 Amendments�), Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 522(a), 111 Stat. 1629, 1734 (1997), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a). We conclude that the 1997 Amendments did not r

Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone of Nevada, a federally-recognized Indian tribe (“the Tribe�), the Western Shoshone Defense Project (“WSDP�),1 and Great Basin Mine Watch (“GBMW�)2 (collectively,“Plaintiffs�) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment, and the grant of summary judgment to the Department of the Interior (“DOI�), the Bureau of Land

[¶1] M.M. and Thomas Moore appeal from a judgment dismissing their personal injury action against Fargo Public School District No. 1 ("District") and Eugenia Hart. We conclude the district court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 53-08, barred this personal injury action against the District. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I

[¶2] In May 200

Gerald Trooien brought this action against Peter Mansour and Barry Roitblat, former executive officers of Sproqit Technologies, Inc. (Sproqit), alleging violations of the Minnesota Securities Act (MSA), negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty, arising from Trooien's investment in Sproqit. The district court dismissed several of the securities and misrepresentation

Constitutional specialists and U.S. history buffs will recall that the original Constitution of 1787 took a cautious approach toward the election of public officials. It interposed the Electoral College between the voters and the President, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, and it provided that each state’s two senators would be chosen by the state legislature, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. “Judges of th

As we explain anon, the plaintiff in this difficult shareholder derivative suit must be given leave to amend his second amended complaint so as to allege violations of director fiduciary duty under California law. The plaintiff had alleged violations of California law in his prior, first amended complaint, but the trial court -- erroneously as we show below -- thought the case was governed by Neva

Appellant Ronald C. Hatfield challenges the trial court’s money judgment against him based on the jury’s breach-of-contract findings in favor of appellee Glenn J. Solomon. In six issues, Hatfield asserts that the trial court erred in several respects in charging the jury, and that the trial court erred in awarding Solomon certain costs in the judgment. We conclude that the trial court did no

Appellant, Michael Valls, agreed to settle a business dispute with his former employer and business partner – appellees Prime Directional Systems, L.L.C. (“Prime�) and Ernie Parker, respectively – by accepting a contingent financial interest in their ongoing lawsuit against an unrelated entity. When that lawsuit settled, however, Valls was left out of the distribution of settlement procee

It is a fundamental principle that the corporate structure normally insulates shareholders, officers, and directors from individual liability for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the corporation. See Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271-72 (Tex. 2006). Nevertheless, their abuse of this privilege can result in the “piercing of the corporate veil� and the imposition of individual

Appellants James MacIvor and Phoenix Air Transport, Inc., (hereinafter, “MacIvor�), seek reversal of the trial court’s order refusing to compel arbitration. In opposing arbitration, appellee Zuehl Airport Flying Community Owners Association argued the parties’ arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was part of a mediated settlement agreement incorporated into an agreed final ju