Paris Wilson is the sole survivor of a tragic mass slaying. He was left for dead with life-threatening wounds as his mother and siblings lay dying nearby in their home. After enduring multiple stab wounds allegedly inflicted by his uncle, Paris was finally able——more than thirty hours after the attack——to telephone a Jersey City 9-1-1 operator for help. Rescue arrived almost immediate

In this direct appeal from the Commonwealth Court, we consider whether “canned” computer software1 constitutes “tangible personal property,” such that the purchase of such software is subject to sales tax under the Tax Reform Code, 72 P.S. § 7201 et seq. (the “Code”).2 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that canned computer software is tangible personal property, and, therefore,

This petition for review comes before us on remand from the Supreme Court. Previously we held, with Judge Leval dissenting, that the indecency policy of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007

This is a junk fax case, and like most such cases, the facts are not especially juicy. In 2004 Prism Business Media, Inc., sent CE Design, Limited, a fax advertising a trade show.1 That’s it. But that small act sparked a lawsuit that presents some interesting jurisdictional and regulatory questions. CE Design sued Prism under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which prohibits the use

This is a petition for writ of mandamus or certiorari which seeks to compel a ruling on the question whether the petitioner is required to proceed to arbitration.

We conclude that the petition is well taken.

Garcia Stromberg, LLC (“the Architect”) is an architectural firm which entered into two contracts with RC Rose Island Hotel Company, Ltd. for architectural services. The cont

Global NAPs, Inc. (GNAPs) appeals from entry against it of a judgment for $57,716,714 for access charges that GNAPs owed but failed to pay Verizon New England Inc. (Verizon) for services Verizon provided between 2003 and 2006. Concerned that GNAPs could not pay a judgment, Verizon also successfully brought counterclaims alleging alter ego liability and disregard of the corporate form against GNAPs

In this case we must decide whether the Federal Communications Commission has authority to regulate an Internet service provider’s network management practices. Acknowledging that it has no express statutory authority over such practices, the Commission relies on section 4(i) of the Communications Act of 1934, which authorizes the Commission to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and re

This appeal from a judgment following a jury trial arises from a dispute between appellant Etan Industries, Inc. and Etan Industries, Inc., d/b/a CMA Cablevision and/or CMA Communications ("Etan") over its authority to install, own, and operate fiber optic and coaxial cable lines on land owned by appellees Ronald and Dana Lehmann without the Lehmanns' permission. The jury found that (i) Etan tresp

This case involves the balance the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“the Act”) strikes between providing newer competitors access to previously monopolistic telecommunications markets, on the one hand, and encouraging and protecting infrastructure investments of older, incumbent telecommunications providers on the other. We must interpret two provisions of the Act that impose requirements on ol

Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 152 et seq., to mandate “that local service, which was previously operated as a monopoly overseen by the several states, be opened to competition.” MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Bell Atl., 271 F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 2001). Congress required the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to cooperate with competitive local exchange carrie

The dispute in this telecommunications case stems from Appellant North County Communication’s (North County) contention that it has a private right of action to enforce various compensation arrangements pursuant to the Federal Communications Act. In its complaint, North County, a NORTH COUNTY COMM. v. CELLCO. 2425 competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), alleged that Appellees, as commercial m

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the President authorized the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to conduct a warrantless, electronic surveillance program on millions of American telephones. Numerous lawsuits have claimed the program was illegal and unconstitutional, e.g., Al- Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2007), including a c

In July 2006, plaintiff Wen Y. Chiang sued his telecommunications company, Verizon New England Inc. (Verizon NE), in state court, alleging in part that the company had billed his account for telephone service he had not ordered. Chiang filed a second state court suit against Verizon NE in February 2007 over a billing dispute triggered by Chiang's conceded failure to pay telephone bills on two acc

The question presented here is whether the district court
erred in dismissing the claims of Coto Settlement (Coto) as
barred by the statute of limitations. Coto claims that it is entitled
to part of $1.4 million refunded by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) following a judgment against Coto, Ian
Eisenberg and other entities. Eisenberg and Olympic Telecommunications,
Inc. (

¶1 The Conservation Attorney for the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Commission) filed this Application in the Corporation Commission on March 23, 1990.1 The Amended Application named Appellants Citation Oil & Gas Corporation (Citation), Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil), and Raymond Punneo, Mayor of the City of Cyril as Respondents. Appellant Union Texas Petroleum Corporation (Union), also describe

This case asks our court to decide whether Washington will

become a locus of nationwide class action litigation. In the context of this case, we

believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to certify such a class. To

the extent a class action is feasible here, the only appropriately certified class for

plaintiffs' contract claims is

Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independentexpenditures for speech defined as an “electioneering communication” or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. Limits on electioneering communications were upheld in McCon-nell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 203–209 (2003).

Rex Carr, a successful class action lawyer in southern Illinois, is locked in mortal combat with his former law partners, the defendants in a RICO case (with a supplemental state-law claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367) that he brought in federal district court.

The dispute is over the division of legal fees in cases handled by the law firm (Carr Korein Tillery, LLC) before it broke up; Carr is seekin

This appeal centers on communications between the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") and a telecommunications company, in which the company allegedly lobbied DOJ to take its side in litigation with a client of law firm Hunton and Williams, LLC ("Hunton"). The district court upheld DOJ’s decision to deny Hunton’s request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), ("FOIA") for

¶2 Dr. Mary J. Carter, plaintiff-appellant,1 is a general surgeon practicing in Oklahoma City. Dr. Carter met Michael Schuster, defendant-appellee, during her residency in 2001. Mr. Schuster is an officer and director of Apex Practice Management, L.L.C. (Apex) and TSG, Inc., which provide professional, administrative and business operating services for medical practices. He solicited Dr. Carter a

This appeal presents issues concerning whether a non-signatory may enforce an arbitration clause in a contract signed by its subsidiary corporation, the scope of that arbitration agreement, and whether, even if included therein, the Legislature nevertheless intended statutory antitrust claims to be non-arbitrable. Defendants National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg, PA (National

In this diversity action, John Gates alleges that the presence of Sprint Spectrum’s telecommunications equipment on his property constitutes a trespass. The district court granted summary judgment to Sprint on the basis that the alleged injury took place prior to Mr. Gates’s acquisition of the property and that, absent an assignment, a cause of action for trespass belongs only to the property

USCOC of Greater Missouri commenced this action against the City of Ferguson, alleging that the City violated its rights under the Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), by failing to act on its applications for zoning variances and a special use permit within a reasonable period of time and by denying them without substantial evidence in a written record. The district court1 grante

Plaintiff travel agencies appeal the district court’s dismissal of their Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired to reduce, cap, and eventually eliminate the payment of base commissions in a concerted effort to drive plaintiffs out of business in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1. We affirm. In doing so, we hol

Defendants and appellants Darrell Kruse (Kruse) and Claremont All Natural Nutrition Aids Buyers Information Service (also known as CANNABIS)1 appeal from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent City of Claremont (the City) after the trial court issued a permanent injunction preventing defendants from operating a medical marijuana dispensary anywhere within the City. We affirm the