Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 03-14-2017
Case Style:
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAURICE SNOWDEN
|
Case Number: AC 38758
Judge: William J. Sullivan
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Plaintiff's Attorney: Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and Robin D. Krawczyk, senior assistant state’s attorney
Defendant's Attorney: Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, with whom was S. Max Simmons, assigned counsel
Description:
MoreLaw Suites - Legal Suites and Virtual Offices - Downtown Tulsa
The defendant, Maurice Snowden, appealsfromthejudgmentofconviction,renderedafter a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54aandcriminalpossessionofapistolorrevolver inviolationofGeneralStatutes(Rev.to2011)§ 53a-217c (a) (1) (criminal possession). On appeal, the defendant claimsthat(1)thetrialcourterredinpermittingjoinder ofoneinformationchargingmurderwithasecondinformationchargingaseparateinstanceofcriminalpossession; and (2) this court should adopt a ‘‘clear failure of judicial obligation’’ standard for conducting a harmless error analysis under the facts of this case.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.2 For some time preceding the murder of the victim, Michael Taylor, the defendant and the victim had been involved in an ongoing dispute. Additionally, approximatelyoneweekpriortothemurder,thedefendant told a lifelong friend, Everett Walker, that he wanted to kill the victim. Indeed, the victim knew that the defendant intended to harm him because he had told Walker, also a lifelong friend, that the defendant was ‘‘out to get me,’’ and the victim was so nervous that he sat on his porch armed with knives. Early in the morning on July 26, 2011, T.M.3 was driving with his cousin, Desmond Wray, around the north end of Hartfordselling drugs when the defendant flagged him down on Enfield Street and asked to buy crack. At first, T.M. did not recognize the defendant, whom he had known since childhood and spent time with earlier the same month, because the defendant waswearingadisguisecomprisedofafakebearddrawn on with a marker and a shirt over his head, as well as utilizing crutches. At the same time, the defendant engaged the victim, who was nearby, in a discussion, lookingtobuymarijuanafromhim.Afterthedefendant crossedthestreettoapproachthevictim,thedefendant shot the victim in the face, resulting in his death. Thereafter, the defendant got into the back of T.M.’s car and told him to drive to Earle Street in Hartford. Once the defendant was in the car and began removing hisdisguise,T.M.recognizedhimasthedefendant.T.M. took the defendant to Earle Street and the defendant exited the car. At approximately 3 a.m. on July 26, 2011, the defendant arrived at the apartment of another childhood friend,LatiaAvril,at31OwenStreetinHartford.During his visit, the defendant showed Avril a black gun, and how to open and fire it. Later that evening while the defendant was still there, police officers knocked on Avril’sdoortoserveawarrantforthedefendant’sarrest for unrelated offenses. The defendant threw a .38 caliber revolver into a clothes hamper and attempted to
escape through a bedroom window, but police officers, who were waiting outside the window, apprehended him.Asthepoliceofficersescortedhimtotheirvehicle, he stated, ‘‘that gun I used it’s not here, it’s on Enfield Street.’’ Meanwhile,Avrilwenttothedoorandpoliceofficers enteredtheapartment.Avrilindicatedtopolicethatthe defendanthadthrownsomethinginaclotheshamperin abedroomcloset.Intheclotheshamper,policelocated a.38 caliberSmith&Wesson revolverwitha fiveround capacity, but it contained only four cartridges when retrieved. The victim died from a single bullet wound under his left eye. Upon entry, the .38 caliber bullet shattered. The medical examiner recovered two fragments from thevictim’sskull.Thestate’sballisticsexpertcouldnot makeapositivematchofthebulletfragmentsrecovered from the victim to those test-fired from the revolver recovered from Avril’s apartment, but one of the fragments possessed rifling characteristics consistent with that revolver. Accordingly, the expert could not eliminate or identify the weapon seized as the weapon used in the victim’s murder. On October 28, 2013, in a long form information, the state charged the defendant with murder and criminal possession in violation of the aforementioned statutes, as well as attempt to tamper with a witness in violation ofGeneralStatutes§§ 53a-151(a)and53a-49.Thecriminal possession charge arose from the defendant’s possession of the revolver at Avril’s apartment. Originally, the state had charged the defendant with the three offenses in three separate informations, but the state moved to join the informations on October 28, 2013, the day that jury selection began. That day, the defendantorallyobjectedtotheconsolidationonthegrounds that the tampering and criminal possession charges werenotcrossadmissibleinthemurdercase.Thecourt granted the motion for joinder, finding that the tamperingandcriminalpossessionchargeswerecrossadmissible in the murder case and that the defendant was not prejudiced under the factors established in State v. Boscarino,204Conn.714,722–24,529A.2d1260(1987). Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the murder and criminal possession charges and not guilty on the tampering charge. The court accepted the jury’s verdict and, on January 27, 2014, sentenced the defendant to fifty-four years incarceration on the murder count and five years on the criminal possession count, to be served consecutively. This appeal followed. Thedefendantclaimsonappealthatthecourterredin permitting joinder of one information charging murder with a second information charging criminal possession. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court failed to consider whether the murder allegations were
significantly more shocking and brutal than the allegations in the criminal possession case. Additionally, he assertsthatthestatedid notattempttomeetitsburden of proving that the evidence from the murder case would be admissible in a separate trial for criminal possession, or that the defendant would not be unreasonablyprejudicedbythedisparityintheegregiousness oftheconductsupportingeachcharge.Thestatecounters that the defendant did not raise this issue in his objectiontothejoinderofthesecharges,therebyeither waiving or failing to preserve this claim for appeal. We agreewiththestatethatthedefendantfailedtopreserve his claim. ‘‘The standards for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion pertaining to joinder are discussed at length in our [Supreme Court’s] decisions in State v. LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115, 159, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012), and State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 544–50, 34 A.3d 370 (2012). In those cases, [our Supreme Court] rejected the notion of a blanket presumption in favor of joinder . . . and clarified that, when charges are brought in separate informations, and the state seeks to join those informations for trial, the state bears the burden of proving that the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced by joinder pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19. The state maysatisfythisburdenbyproving,byapreponderance of the evidence, either that the evidence in the cases is cross admissible or that the defendant will not be unfairly prejudiced pursuant to the factors set forth in State v. Boscarino, [supra, 204 Conn. 722–24].4 . . . Although thestate bearsthe burdenof proof inthe trial court, [i]t is the defendant’s burden on appeal to show that joinder was improper by proving substantial prejudice that could not be cured by the trial court’s instructions to the jury . . . . As [our Supreme Court] emphasized in LaFleur, our appellate standard of review remains intact. Accordingly, [i]n deciding whether to [join informations] for trial, the trial court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Devon D., 321 Conn. 656, 664– 65, 138 A.3d 849 (2016). ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit this court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial. See, e.g., Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 550, 911 A.2d 712 (2006) (declining to consider claim not raised before habeas court); State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 85–89, 905 A.2d 1101 (2006) (declining to review claim not preserved at trial) [cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S.Ct.1491,167L.Ed.2d236(2007)];PracticeBook§ 605 (court not bound to consider claim unless distinctly raised at trial).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rowe v. Superior Court, 289 Conn. 649, 660, 960 A.2d 256 (2008). We abide by ‘‘the fundamental principle
that if the defendant deems an action of the trial court necessary to the fairness of his trial, he has a responsibility to present such a claim clearly to the trial court sothatthetrialcourtmayconsideritand,ifitismeritorious, take appropriate action. That is the basis for the requirement that ordinarily a defendant must raise in the trial court the issues that he intends to raise on appeal. State v. Groomes, 232 Conn. 455, 466, 656 A.2d 646 (1995).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn. App. 628, 633, 926 A.2d 681, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912, 931 A.2d 934 (2007). The following additional procedural facts reveal that the defendant did not preserve his claim challenging the joinder of informations. As previously stated, the state originally charged the defendant in three separate informations with murder, criminal possession, and tampering. The state moved to consolidate those informations and the defendant orally objected in a hearing held on the same day. The basis for the defendant’s objectionwasthatitwouldbeconfusingandmisleading to the jury to combine the criminal possession case with the murder case because, he argued, there was an inadequate nexus between the revolver found in the apartment on OwenStreet, the defendant, andthe murder. Additionally, he contended that the firearm was recovered in a closet and not on his person, which he claimed to be of consequence because he did not live at the Owen Street address. He also argued that no evidence connected the revolver to the one used in the murder and that the time span between the events was too attenuated.5 The state argued that even if the revolver was not the one used in the murder, it would be admissible as uncharged misconduct to show that the defendant had the means to commit the crime. In ruling on the motion to consolidate, the court stated as follows: ‘‘Now as far as the tampering is concerned andthe laterin theday possession ofthe means . . . the Boscarino factors, the[y] do involve discrete easily distinguishable factual scenario[s]. The matters . . . being consolidated are not of violent nature, brutal or shocking; it’s a possession and tampering. It would involve only a couple or three witnesses. It doesn’t affect the duration particularly. And if what the state claims is true, and I would require them to put the evidence on in front of the court before it goes in front of the jury, it would be cross admissible under possession of the means as far as the possession of the pistol is concerned and consciousness of guilt as far as the tamperingisconcerned.NowIwillallowtheconsolidation, the defense may have an exception. But I wish any of the evidence of the events at Owen Street to have more than just an oral offer of proof from the state’s attorney; I would like to at least hear from the witnessesbeforetheytestifyinfrontofthejurytomake surethattherulingcanstand.Now—sothat’sgranted.’’
It is clear from the record that the defendant did not raise at trial his claim now on appeal that the evidence supporting the murder charges was inadmissible in the criminal possession case. ‘‘[T]o review [a] claim, which has been articulated for the first time on appeal and not before the trial court, would result in a trial by ambuscadeofthetrialjudge.’’(Internalquotationmarks omitted.) State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328, 374, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007), quoting West Farms Mall, LLC v. West Hartford, 279 Conn. 1, 28, 901 A.2d 649 (2006). Additionally, we presume that the trial court properly considered the legal standards applicable to a motion for joinder. Johnson v. de Toledo, 61 Conn. App. 156, 161–62, 763 A.2d 28 (2000) (‘‘The general rule that a judgment, rendered by a court with jurisdiction, is presumed to be valid and not clearly erroneous until so demonstrated raises a presumption that the rendering court acted only after due consideration, in conformity with the law and in accordance with its duty. . . . It is important to recognize that a claim of error cannot be predicated on an assumption that the trial court acted incorrectly. . . . Rather, we are entitled to assume, unless it appears to the contrary, that the trial court . . . acted properly, including considering the applicablelegalprinciples.’’[Citationsomitted;internal quotation marks omitted.]), appeal dismissed, 258 Conn. 732, 785 A.2d 192 (2001). The ground for the defendant’s objection to joinder before the trial court waslimitedtotheadmissibilityoftheevidencesupporting the criminal possession charge in the murder case. On appeal, he raises a distinct claim that the evidence supporting the murder charge was unduly prejudicial and inadmissible in his criminal possession case. The defendantdid notraisethis claimbeforethe trialcourt, and, thus, it was not properly preserved. Moreover, at no point did the defendant move for severance afterthe informations were joined.See State v. Berube, 256 Conn. 742, 747–48, 775 A.2d 966 (2001) (failure to raise issue of severance at trial, with no indication failure not tactical, renders claim unreviewable). In fact, the court conditioned its joinder determination on an offer of proof from witnesses before they testified in front of the jury to ensure that the matters were cross admissible. When the court subsequently determined, however, that offer of proof was unnecessary, the defendant did not renew his objection to joinder or move to sever. At that time, he had the opportunity to raise a claim that the evidence of the murderwasundulyprejudicialtohimintheprosecution of the criminal possession charge, but he failed to raise anyobjection.Accordingly,weconcludethatthedefendant has failed to preserve his claim for appeal, and, therefore, his claim is not reviewable.6
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: