Date: 03-01-2017

Case Style: Jack Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company

Case Number: A155335

Judge: Sercombe

Court: Oregon Court of Appeals on appeal from the Circuit Court, Clackamas County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Robert C. Muth

Defendant's Attorney: Ryan J. Hall

Description: This case involves an insurance dispute between
plaintiffs and defendant, Allstate Property and Casualty
Insurance Company (Allstate). After a theft at their home,
plaintiffs filed claims with Allstate, their insurance carrier,
under two policies. More than two years after the loss,
Allstate denied coverage for the loss and plaintiffs brought
an action against Allstate relating to that denial seeking,
among other things, damages for breach of contract and for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the action was untimely in light of a two-year suit-limitation
provision contained in the insurance contracts. The trial
court agreed and granted the motion. Plaintiffs appeal the
resulting general judgment in favor of Allstate, raising two
assignments of error. In their first assignment, plaintiffs
contend that the court erred in granting the motion “in
light of * * * evidence supporting [plaintiffs’]” position that
Allstate should be estopped from invoking the suit-limitation
provision. In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs
argue that, in any event, the court erred in granting summary
judgment on their claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing because that claim “did
not come into existence until Allstate issued its denial letter,”
and the action was filed within two years of that denial.
As explained below, we affirm.
Because the trial court granted a defense motion
for summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs. Shell v. Schollander Companies, Inc.,
358 Or 552, 554 n 1, 369 P3d 1101 (2016).
On September 6, 2009, plaintiffs discovered that
a hole had been cut in their fence, and that property had
been stolen from their backyard. They reported the theft to
the police and, on September 8, 2009, called their Allstate
agent to inform him of the theft. After their initial contact
with the Allstate agent, plaintiffs discovered that additional
property was missing (some from their boat and some from
their travel trailer) and, in the summer of 2010, they talked
with their Allstate agent about the additional missing
items. On September 10, 2010, plaintiffs participated in a
86 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.
telephone conference with an Allstate investigator regarding
the items they claimed had been stolen during the theft
incident. During that telephone call, the investigator did not
mention the “contractual provision in the insurance policies
which required [them] to file a lawsuit or any other claim
arising from this loss within two years from the date of the
loss itself.”
On September 17, 2010, Allstate sent a letter to
plaintiffs regarding its investigation of their claims. The
letter informed plaintiffs that they were required to provide
Allstate with a sworn statement of proof of loss, and
to include “documentation that supports the ownership
and value of any stolen items claimed.” (Boldface omitted.)
Allstate also informed plaintiffs that the “statute of limitations
on this claim expires 2 years from the date of loss,”
insisted on “complete compliance with all of the terms of the
[insurance] policy and the laws of Oregon,” reserved all of
its rights and defenses in conjunction with the policy, and
stated that “[n]o waiver or estoppel of any kind is intended,
nor may any be inferred.” Thereafter, Allstate sent plaintiffs
a number of letters seeking additional documentation
or information and stating that it was continuing to investigate
the claimed loss. In September 2011, Allstate requested
that plaintiffs participate in examinations under oath. It
conducted those examinations in October 2011. After those
examinations, Allstate again sought additional information
and documents and continued to investigate the loss until
February 2012. In many, but not all, of its letters to plaintiffs,
Allstate repeated its admonishment that it insisted
on compliance with all policy terms, reserved its rights and
defenses, and that no waiver or estoppel of any kind was
intended or should be inferred. In February 2012, Allstate
denied plaintiffs’ claims based on its determination that
plaintiffs had misrepresented material facts and failed to
cooperate with the investigation. Allstate also pointed out
that “Section I—Conditions” of plaintiffs’ insurance policies
provide:
“No one may bring an action against us in any way related
to the existence or amount of coverage or the amount of
loss for which coverage is sought, under a coverage to which
Section I—Conditions applies, unless:
Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 87
“(a) there has been full compliance with all policy
terms; and
“(b) the action is commenced within two years after the
date of the loss.”1
(Emphasis added; boldface omitted.)
Plaintiffs commenced this action against Allstate on
September 5, 2012. In its answer, Allstate raised as an affirmative
defense the suit-limitation provision of the insurance
policies. Allstate later sought summary judgment, asserting
that plaintiffs’ case should be dismissed in light of the
suit-limitation provision because it was filed approximately
three years after the loss and was, therefore, precluded as a
matter of law. Plaintiffs responded that there were genuine
issues of fact regarding whether Allstate was estopped from
relying on the suit-limitation provisions as a bar to their
claim:
“Clearly Plaintiffs were justified in relying on Allstate’s
conduct since each and every letter, including letters from
Allstate’s lawyer, included the date of loss of September 6,
2009 and recited that Allstate was still continuing to
investigate the claim. Even more telling is the letter from
Allstate’s attorney after the purported two-year limitation
stating ‘Allstate can neither admit or deny coverage at this
time.’ ”
(Underscoring in original.) In plaintiffs’ view, that conduct
created genuine issues of fact regarding estoppel. Plaintiffs
1 As Allstate points out, loss as a result of theft falls within Section I of the
policies, and “Section I—Conditions” applies to such losses.
Furthermore, as Allstate also points out, those provisions are consistent with
ORS 742.240, which states:
“A fire insurance policy shall contain a provision as follows:
“No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy
shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within 24 months
next after inception of the loss.”
Both insurance policies at issue in this case insure against fire losses, and we
have held that ORS 742.240 applies to homeowner’s insurance policies. See
Herman v. Valley Ins. Co., 145 Or App 124, 126 n 1, 928 P2d 985 (1996), rev den,
325 Or 438 (1997) (although, “by its terms, ORS 742.240 applies only to fire insurance
policies,” as it has been construed, “it applies to homeowner’s insurance
policies as well” (citing Hatley v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 261 Or 606, 494 P2d
426 (1972))).
88 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.
also asserted that their claim for breach of the duty of good
faith arose under the General Condition provision of the
insurance contracts:
“Plaintiffs are alleging a claim for breach of the duty of
good faith arising from Allstate’s claims handling as set
forth above, which under Oregon law is separate and distinct
from a claim for breach of the express terms of the
insurance contract. Thus, the applicable provision for
actions against Allstate relating to the claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith is found in the General Provision
section, wherein an action ‘must be commenced within two
years of the date the cause of action accrues’ not two years
from the inception of loss or damage.”
(Citation omitted.) Because, in their view, the claim for
breach of the duty of good faith accrued when Allstate
denied their insurance claims in February 2012, plaintiffs
contended that that claim, at least, was not time barred. As
to that contention, Allstate replied that plaintiffs could not
maintain their claim for breach of the duty of good faith as a
matter of law, regardless of when the denials occurred.
The trial court held a hearing on the summary
judgment motion. At the hearing, among other things, the
court asked the parties to discuss the applicability of ORS
742.056, which provides:
“Without limitation of any right or defense of an insurer
otherwise, none of the following acts by or on behalf of an
insurer shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of or an
estoppel to assert any provision of a policy or of any defense
of the insurer thereunder:
“(1) Acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of loss or
claim under the policy.
“(2) Furnishing forms for reporting a loss or claim,
for giving information thereto, or for making proof of loss,
or receiving or acknowledging receipt of any such forms or
proofs completed or uncompleted.
“(3) Investigating any loss or claim under the policy or
engaging in negotiations looking toward a possible settlement
of any such loss or claim.”
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court granted
the motion for summary judgment based on the Section I
Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 89
two-year suit limitation. Accordingly, it entered a general
judgment in favor of defendant.
We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if,
viewing the summary judgment record in the light most
favorable to the adverse party, we determine that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. General
Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 420, 939 P2d 608 (1997); ORCP
47 C.
As noted, plaintiffs raise two assignments of error
on appeal. In their first assignment of error, they contend
that there are issues of fact regarding estoppel and, therefore,
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
based on the suit-limitation provision.
It is undisputed in this case that the insurance contracts
contain a clause providing that no one may bring an
action against Allstate “related to the existence or amount
of coverage or the amount of loss for which coverage is
sought” for a claimed loss such as the one at issue in this
case unless, among other things “the action is commenced
within two years after the date of the loss.” It is also undisputed
that plaintiffs’ action was commenced more than two
years after the date of loss in this case. Nonetheless, plaintiffs
assert, the trial court should not have ruled in favor of
Allstate with respect to any of the claims set forth in the
complaint because the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.
Specifically, in plaintiffs’ view, the evidence presented on
summary judgment “clearly demonstrates issues of fact on
the issue of estoppel; i.e. affirmative conduct on the part of
Allstate * * * which [plaintiffs were] reasonably justified in
relying upon.”
“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘a person
may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is
his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise
would have had.’ ” Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, 336 Or 511,
518, 86 P3d 678 (2004) (quoting Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or
506, 518, 154 P2d 547 (1944)). In “proper circumstances, an
insurer may be [equitably] estopped from asserting a suit
limitation provision as a defense to liability on an insurance
policy.” Herman v. Valley Ins. Co., 145 Or App 124, 133, 928
90 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.
P2d 985 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 438 (1997). The elements of
equitable estoppel are as follows:
“[T]here must (1) be a false representation; (2) it must be
made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party must
have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made
with the intention that it should be acted upon by the other
party; (5) the other party must have been induced to act
upon it.”
Day, 336 Or at 518-19 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted); see Herman, 145 Or App at 133-34. For a plaintiff
to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the insurance
company “must have done something that amounted
to an affirmative inducement that would cause [the] plaintiff
to delay” in bringing his or her action. Herman, 145
Or App at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304-05, 490 P2d 181 (1971).
Furthermore, there must be “justifiable reliance by the
party seeking to invoke estoppel, and that reliance must be
reasonable.” Herman, 145 Or App at 134 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Finally, as relevant to the circumstances of
this case, under ORS 742.056, as a matter of law, an insurance
company’s investigation of a loss or claim under an
insurance policy does not estop the insurance company from
asserting “any provision of [the insurance] policy or of any
defense of the insurer thereunder.”
In this case, viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, the record does not contain evidence “from which an
objectively reasonable juror could find an estoppel.” Herman,
145 Or App at 134. There is no evidence that Allstate made a
misrepresentation to plaintiffs regarding the suit-limitation
provision. Instead, the evidence is that, on September 17,
2010, Allstate informed plaintiffs that their time to file an
action relating to their claims “expires 2 years from the
date of loss.” See Herman, 145 Or App at 134 (noting that,
although the insurer was not required to “remind” the plaintiff
of “the suit limitation provision in her policy,” it nonetheless
did so). Furthermore, in its letters, Allstate repeatedly
stated that it reserved all its rights and defenses and that
no waiver or estoppel was intended or should be inferred.
See id. (noting insurer’s repeated warnings that it would not
Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 91
waive its rights under insurance policy and that no waiver or
estoppel was intended or should be implied). Furthermore,
Allstate’s numerous communications with plaintiffs stated
that it was continuing to investigate their claim.2 There is no
evidence in the record suggesting that that was not the case
and, under ORS 742.056, Allstate’s investigation of plaintiffs’
claims cannot be used to estop Allstate from asserting
the suit limitation. In sum, we conclude that, on the facts
in the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, no objectively reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Allstate should be estopped from raising
the suit-limitation provision as a defense in this case.
See Herman, 145 Or App at 134 (on summary judgment, no
evidence from which an objectively reasonable factfinder
could find that insurer should be estopped from raising suitlimitation
provision where record showed no false representations,
and the insurer reminded the plaintiff of suitlimitation
provision in insurance policy and warned the
plaintiff that it would not waive its rights under the policy
and that no waiver or estoppel was intended or should be
implied). Cf. Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 223 Or App 357, 371-72, 196 P3d 1000 (2008) (genuine
issues of material fact existed regarding waiver of suitlimitation
provision where letter from insurer that was sent
three years after the expiration of the policy’s suit-limitation
provision stated that the plaintiff had coverage for her claim
and the only “remaining issues [were] liability and damages
due to” the plaintiff (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ first assignment of error.
2 We note that, as they did before the trial court, plaintiffs emphasize that
Allstate sent letters more than two years after the date of loss that stated that
Allstate was continuing to investigate their claim and that plaintiffs’ lack of
cooperation was impeding the investigation. They assert that, to be consistent
with their present assertion of the suit-limitation provision, Allstate “should
have written, ‘This claim is now barred and Allstate is closing its file.’ ” As we
explained in Herman, a suit-limitation is not a condition of forfeiture, which “disallows
claims that otherwise are covered under a policy.” 145 Or App at 131.
Instead, a suit-limitation provision “does not nullify insurance coverage. Rather,
it precludes an insured from starting an action against its insurer once the limitation
period had passed, regardless of the extent of coverage.” Id. (emphasis
added). Furthermore, for purposes of evaluating the issue of estoppel, Allstate
correctly observes that letters sent more than two years after the date of loss
could not “have influenced the decision by [plaintiffs] not to file suit” before the
end of that two year period.
92 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.
In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs argue
that, in any event, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment as to their claim for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith. They contend that that claim is not
covered by the Section I suit-limitation provision and is,
instead, governed by a different suit limitation provision
in the insurance contracts. Specifically, the policies, in the
General Conditions, set forth a default suit-limitation as
follows:
“No one may bring an action against us unless there has
been full compliance with all policy terms.
“Any action against us to which neither the Action Against
Us provision located in Section I—Conditions nor the Action
Against Us provision located in Section II—Conditions
applies must be commenced within two years of the date
the cause of action accrues.”
(Boldface omitted.) It is that default suit-limitation provision
that plaintiffs contend applies to their claim for a
breach of the duty of good faith. Plaintiffs point out that the
Section I suit-limitation provision applies to an action “in
any way related to the existence or amount of coverage or
the amount of loss for which coverage is sought, under a coverage
to which Section I—Conditions applies.” They assert
that the claim in question does not relate to the existence or
amount of coverage or the amount of loss for which coverage
is sought. Instead, it relates to Allstate’s conduct in processing
and investigating the claim. Thus, in their view, their
action based on that claim had to be brought within two
years of the date it accrues and, they assert, the claim did
not accrue until Allstate denied coverage.
Allstate responds that plaintiffs cannot circumvent
the Section I suit limitation through their claim for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. According
to Allstate, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, only the
“Section I suit limitation” has “any relevance in this matter.”
Allstate further asserts, in the alternative, that, in the
circumstances here, plaintiffs cannot maintain their claim
for breach of the implied duty of good faith, which “does not
vary the substantive terms of the bargain” but, instead, only
effectuates the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 93
contract. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Allstate’s
view, in light of the summary judgment record in this case,
plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing fails as a matter of law.
With respect to that issue, plaintiffs reply that they
can maintain an action for breach of the duty of good faith
based on the facts in the summary judgment record. They
assert:
“Allstate’s conduct was contrary to [plaintiffs’] reasonable
expectations. [Plaintiffs] expected that Allstate would fairly
evaluate and investigate the claim. A jury could find that
* * * Allstate’s conduct in taking more than 17-months to
evaluate a simple property theft, requiring Examinations
under Oath and production of documents past the limitation
deadline and the issuance of a denial asserting misrepresentation
and concealment well past the limitation
deadline to be a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.”
Plaintiffs argue, as they did with respect to the issue of estoppel,
that “the evidence and conduct of Allstate, affirmative
as it was, reasonably induced [plaintiffs] not to commence
any legal action prior to September 6, 2011.” Accordingly,
in plaintiffs’ view, the “facts presented warrant review by
a trier of fact.” We agree with Allstate that, based on the
record on summary judgment, there are no issues of fact
regarding the alleged breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing and that, under the circumstances, plaintiffs
cannot maintain that claim as a matter of law. Accordingly,
we address only that issue.
As explained in Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc.
v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001),
we may affirm the ruling of a lower court on an alternative
basis when certain conditions are met:
“The first condition is that, if the question presented is
not purely one of law, then the evidentiary record must
be sufficient to support the proffered alternative basis for
affirmance. That requires: (1) that the facts of record be
sufficient to support the alternative basis for affirmance;
(2) that the trial court’s ruling be consistent with the view
of the evidence under the alternative basis for affirmance;
94 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.
and (3) that the record materially be the same one that
would have been developed had the prevailing party raised
the alternative basis for affirmance below. In other words,
even if the record contains evidence sufficient to support an
alternative basis for affirmance, if the losing party might
have created a different record below had the prevailing
party raised that issue, and that record could affect the disposition
of the issue, then we will not consider the alternative
basis for affirmance. The second condition is that the
decision must be correct for a reason other than that upon
which the lower court relied. Third, and finally, the reasons
for the lower court’s decision must be either (a) erroneous
or (b) in the reviewing court’s estimation, unnecessary in
light of the alternative basis for affirmance.”
(Emphasis in original.) The requirement that the record be
“materially the same one as would have been developed had
the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance
below” is of particular importance on summary judgment.
See Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or 717, 736, 385 P3d 1074
(2016) (that “criterion is of particular importance where * * *
the [party opposing summary judgment] had no reason to
adduce evidence on an issue that was not raised in the summary
judgment motion”).
Here, Allstate asserted before the trial court that
plaintiffs could not maintain a claim for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. To the extent that, on
appeal, Allstate relies on different arguments in support of
that contention, we conclude that the record is materially
the same as would have been developed had the arguments
been raised below. In support of their claim for breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiffs rely on
the same conduct that they assert estopped Allstate from
relying on the suit-limitation provision. In particular, plaintiffs
assert a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
based on Allstate’s continued investigation and communications
with them, which they say reasonably induced them
not to commence any legal action prior to September 6, 2011,
when the two-year period in the Section I suit-limitation
provision expired. Because plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the
duty of good faith is premised on the same conduct that they
assert supported the application of estoppel to this case, in
the circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the
Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 95
record on summary judgment, which includes affidavits and
documentation detailing plaintiffs’ description of interactions
with Allstate through the time that Allstate denied
the claim, is sufficient to support the alternative basis. In
other words, given the nature of the claims and defenses in
this case, plaintiffs created the same record that would have
been created had the issue been addressed before the trial
court. See Eklof, 360 Or at 736. Accordingly, it is appropriate
to consider the alternative basis for affirmance.
We begin by observing that plaintiffs’ claim for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in this case
“sounds in contract.” Employers’ Fire Ins. v. Love It Ice Cream,
64 Or App 784, 791, 670 P2d 160 (1983) (insurance first party
bad faith claim sounds in contract). In other words, plaintiffs’
claim for breach of the duty of good faith is a claim for
breach of the insurance contracts. Every “contract contains
an implied duty of good faith.” Uptown Heights Associates v.
Seafirst Corp., 320 Or 638, 645, 891 P2d 639 (1995). “The
purpose of that duty is to prohibit improper behavior in the
performance and enforcement of contracts, and to ensure
that the parties will refrain from any act that would have
the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Klamath Off-
Project Water Users v. PacifiCorp, 237 Or App 434, 445, 240
P3d 94 (2010), rev den, 349 Or 602 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is to be
applied in a manner that will effectuate the objectively reasonable
expectations of the parties to the contract. Id. In
particular, because the rights and duties of the parties to
an insurance policy are contractual, “the duties of each are
limited to those derived from the policy.” Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Masood, 264 Or App 173, 178, 330 P3d 61, rev den, 356 Or
638 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). An “implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing [cannot] be construed in
a way that changes or inserts terms into a contract.” Id.; see
Uptown Heights Associates, 320 Or at 645 (implied contractual
obligation of good faith cannot serve to vary the terms
of a contract, nor does it provide a remedy for an unpleasantly
motivated act that is expressly permitted by contract).
Instead, the law imposes that duty “in contracts to facilitate
96 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.
performance and enforcement in a manner that is consistent
with the terms of the contract.” Masood, 264 Or App at
178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under those principles, “if a written contract between
the parties expressly allows for a particular remedy by one
of the parties, in the face of a specified breach, the parties’
objectively ‘reasonable expectations’ under the contract
include invocation of that remedy in the face of that breach.
The party invoking its express, written contractual right
does not, merely by doing so, violate its duty of good faith.”
Uptown Heights Associates, 320 Or at 645.
Here, we conclude that, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, there is not a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, and Allstate is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. We begin by noting that plaintiffs emphasize
that, in many of its communications, Allstate failed to state
its view that any action to enforce plaintiffs’ claims had to be
commenced on or before September 6, 2011. However, that
two-year limitation provision is contained in the insurance
contracts and state statute and was pointed out by Allstate
in an early letter to plaintiffs. More importantly, the insurance
contracts impose no duty on Allstate to remind plaintiffs
of the terms thereof, Herman, 145 Or App at 134, and
the implied duty of good faith cannot be construed in a way
that inserts new terms into the contracts. Plaintiffs had
no objectively reasonable expectation that Allstate would
inform them of the suit-limitation set forth in the written
contracts, much less that Allstate would repeat that information
having once included it in a communication with
plaintiffs during its investigation of their claims.
Likewise, the remaining conduct asserted by plaintiffs
in this case cannot support their claim for breach of
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Again, in its
letters, Allstate repeatedly informed plaintiffs that it continued
to investigate their claims; it did not make any representation
that could reasonably have led them to believe
that their claims would inevitably be accepted. Further, as
we noted above, there is no evidence that, despite its communications,
Allstate was not, in fact, investigating the claims.
Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 97
To the contrary, Allstate’s communications reflect its continued
attempts to ascertain the losses attributable to the
theft of plaintiffs’ property, and plaintiffs point to nothing in
the record suggesting that such investigation was improper.
Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, there is no
evidence that Allstate engaged in behavior to reasonably
“induce [plaintiffs] not to commence any legal action prior
to September 6, 2011.” To the contrary, as we discussed with
respect to the first assignment of error, Allstate repeatedly
informed plaintiffs that it insisted on compliance with all
policy terms, reserved its rights and defenses, and that no
waiver or estoppel of any kind was intended or should be
inferred. In light of those admonishments, along with all
of the other circumstances in this case, no reasonable juror
could conclude that Allstate breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing in this case. In short, none of the conduct
plaintiffs assert on Allstate’s part contravened plaintiffs’
reasonable expectations based on the terms of the contracts.
Accordingly, regardless of whether the Section I suitlimitation
provision applies, the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claim for
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Outcome: Affirmed.

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