Marina Pacifica Homeowners Association v. Southern California Financial Corporation

SUMMARY

Since January 1, 2008, Civil Code sections 1098 and 1098.5

have governed the circumstances under which certain fee

payments, imposed when real property is transferred, may or

may not be collected.1 In Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v.

Southern California Financial Corp. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 494

(Marina Pacifica I), this court determined that a monthly

“assignment fee,” payable by individual condominium unit

owners to the developers of the condominium project, was

properly collectible under those statutory provisions. The

Supreme Court denied review. Our remittitur issued on April 22,

2015, remanding the case to the trial court for “further

proceedings as necessary to enter an amended judgment

consistent with [our] opinion,” including “amended amounts due

and owing for the assignment fee.” (Id. at p. 513.)

Marina Pacifica Homeowners Association (plaintiff) now

appeals from the trial court’s judgment determining the amended

amounts owing from unit owners to the developers’ successor in

interest, Southern California Financial Corporation (defendant),

for the assignment fee. Plaintiff does not contend the trial court

erred in its calculations, but contends we erred in our earlier

construction of the statute, and should now correct that error and

declare the assignment fee uncollectible. Our error is

demonstrated, plaintiff maintains, by the Legislature’s clarifying

amendment of sections 1098 and 1098.5, effective January 1,

2016, an amendment intended to overrule our decision in Marina

Pacifica I.



1 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.

3

We affirm the judgment. We need not decide whether we

could properly reconsider our decision in Marina Pacifica I,

because the amended statute and its legislative history

demonstrate the Legislature intended in any event to permit the

Marina Pacifica I assignment fees to remain in place.

FACTS

This is the fourth appeal in litigation over the assignment

fee that began in 2006. Only two appeals are significant here:

the appeal before us and our decision in Marina Pacifica I

upholding the collectibility of the assignment fee.2 The history of

the dispute is described in detail in Marina Pacifica I, supra, 232

Cal.App.4th at pages 497-504. We summarize here the facts

necessary to an understanding of our opinion in this appeal.

When unit owners purchased their units in the Marina

Pacifica complex, they bought an ownership interest in their

individual units and a share of an undivided leasehold interest in

the land on which the complex was built. That leasehold interest

included the obligation to pay monthly rent to the landowner and

an assignment fee to the developers. These two obligations were

to continue until 2041. Both payments were to be nominal until

2006, when the rent and assignment fee would be recalculated so



2 The first appeal concerned the process for selection of an

appraiser to determine the fair market value of the property for

purposes of adjustment of the assignment fees in 2006.

(Lansdale v. Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. (Aug. 14, 2007,

B192520) [nonpub. opn.].) A third appeal (after our decision in

Marina Pacifica I) dealt primarily with issues of costs and

attorney fees. (Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v. Southern

California Financial Corp. (March 4, 2016, B255413 & B256664)

[nonpub. opn.].)

4

that together they would equal 10 percent (on an annual basis) of

the fair market value of the land underlying the units. (Marina

Pacifica I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 497-498.) Another

recalculation would occur as of October 1, 2021. These

assignment fee provisions were described in the unit lease, and

an information sheet plaintiff gave to each purchaser of a unit in

the complex stated that the fee would be readjusted in 2006 and

2021. The parties stipulated at trial that “each purchaser of a

Marina Pacifica unit had notice of the unit lease and its contents,

including the specific paragraph setting forth the assignment

fee.” (Id. at p. 499.)

In 1999, plaintiff bought the land underlying the

development and sold pro rata shares to the individual unit

owners, thus terminating rent payments under the unit leases.

The assignment fee, however, was separate and independent

from the other lease provisions, and created a separate

contractual obligation from the unit owner to the developers.

(Marina Pacifica I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 499, 498.)

In 2000, plaintiff bought out the assignment fee rights of

two of the three development partners. But the remaining

partner, William Lansdale, retained his 43.75 percent interest in

those fees. In 2005, Mr. Lansdale and plaintiff began to litigate

disputes over the appraisal process that would determine the fair

market value of the property for purposes of readjustment of the

assignment fee. (Marina Pacifica I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p.

499.)

In 2007, the Legislature enacted sections 1098 and 1098.5

to regulate “transfer fees.” A transfer fee was defined broadly to

include fees imposed in any document affecting the transfer of an

interest in real property. For transfer fees imposed before

5

January 1, 2008, the recipient of the fee was required to record a

separate document meeting specified requirements, including a

title (“Payment of Transfer Fee Required”) and certain items of

information about the fee. In order to continue collecting transfer

fees on and after January 1, 2009, this separate document had to

be recorded on or before December 31, 2008. (§ 1098.5, subd. (a).)

There were, however, nine exceptions to the definition of a

transfer fee. One of the fees not included in the statutory

definition was “[a]ny fee reflected in a document recorded against

the property on or before December 31, 2007, that is separate and

apart from any covenants, conditions, and restrictions, and that

substantially complies with subdivision (a) of Section 1098.5

[recited just above] by providing a prospective transferee notice”

that payment of a transfer fee was required, the amount or

method of calculation of the fee and several other items. (Former

§ 1098, subd. (i).)

In January 2008, Mr. Lansdale transferred his right to the

assignment fees to defendant. By December 2008, the appraisal

litigation had been concluded, an arbitration had been held, and

the fair market value of the property for purposes of calculating

the assignment fee was set at $60,615,500 (as of October 1, 2006).

Defendant then began billing the unit owners for their respective

shares of the readjusted assignment fee. (Marina Pacifica I,

supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.) Defendant did not record the

separate document described in section 1098.5.

Plaintiff instructed unit owners not to pay the assignment

fee bills defendant sent, and in March 2009 plaintiff sued

defendant. Along with other allegations, plaintiff asserted the

assignment fee was a transfer fee as defined by section 1098, and

could not be collected after December 31, 2008, because

6

defendant did not comply with the recording requirements in

section 1098.5. The trial court agreed, and also held that the fees

imposed before that date should have been calculated under a

four-percent formula advocated by plaintiff, rather than the

higher 10-percent formula sought by defendant.

Both parties appealed. In Marina Pacifica I, we concluded

the assignment fee came within the general definition of a

transfer fee as described in the first sentence of section 1098, but

was excluded from that definition by the “substantial compliance”

exception described in then-section 1098, subdivision (i). (Marina

Pacifica I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.) We observed that

the unit lease contained all the required information and, while

the unit lease itself was not recorded, numerous documents that

were recorded against the property incorporated the unit lease by

reference. (Id. at p. 510.) These included lease assignments and

resale assignments that contained provisions in which the unit

owners promised to pay the assignment fee set forth in

paragraph 4 of the unit lease, and acknowledged they had

received and reviewed the unit lease. (Id. at pp. 511-512.) We

observed the evidence showed that “far from being hidden, the

assignment fee was clearly disclosed to purchasers,” who had

both constructive notice and actual notice of the assignment fee.

(Id. at p. 512.)

Accordingly, we reversed the trial court’s judgment to the

extent it held the assignment fee was an uncollectible transfer fee

after December 31, 2008. (We agreed with the trial court that the

four percent formulation should have been used to calculate the

fees.) As already noted, we remanded the case to the trial court

for “further proceedings as necessary to enter an amended

judgment consistent with [our] opinion,” including “amended

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amounts due and owing for the assignment fee.” (Marina

Pacifica I, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.)

Our opinion in Marina Pacifica I was filed December 16,

2014. Plaintiff did not seek rehearing in this court, but

petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court denied the petition on March 11, 2015, and the

remittitur issued on April 22, 2015.

During 2015, legislation was enacted to amend section

1098, effective January 1, 2016. Among the changes were the

addition of a new subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) provides, with

respect to the substantial compliance exception to the definition

of a transfer fee, that the specified information “shall be set forth

in a single document and shall not be incorporated by reference

from any other document.” (§ 1098, subd. (b).) The bill as

enacted included a legislative finding that “the addition of

subdivision (b) to Section 1098 . . . and [other specified

amendments] . . . made by this act are clarifying and declaratory

of existing law.” (Stats. 2015, ch. 634.)

The amendments as enacted also added a new

subparagraph to the substantial compliance exception. (§ 1098,

subd. (a)(9)(B).) We will refer to it as the savings clause. This

new provision stated:

“(B) A fee reflected in a document recorded against the

property on or before December 31, 2007, that is not

separate from any covenants, conditions, and restrictions,

or that incorporates by reference from another document, is

a ‘transfer fee’ for purposes of Section 1098.5. A transfer

fee recorded against the property on or before December 31,

2007, that complies with subparagraph (A) [the substantial

compliance exception] and incorporates by reference from

8

another document is unenforceable unless recorded against

the property on or before December 31, 2016, in a single

document that complies with subdivision (b) and with

Section 1098.5.” (§ 1098, subd. (a)(9)(B), italics added.)

The legislation producing these amendments appeared on

the “consent calendar” in both the Assembly and the Senate, was

approved unanimously in committees and by both chambers, and

was signed by the Governor on October 8, 2015.

Meanwhile, after our remittitur issued in April 2015, a

referee was appointed to make recommendations to the trial

court as to amounts owing and the proposed form of judgment.

Two weeks after the Governor signed the legislation amending

section 1098, plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to recall the

referee and to brief the impact of the legislation on the case.

The trial court permitted briefing, and plaintiff argued

that, in light of the amendments that would become law on

January 1, 2016, the court should enter an amended judgment

finding the assignment fees became uncollectible on January 1,

2009. The trial court declined to do so.

On December 28, 2015, the court entered a 97-page final

judgment determining the assignment fee obligations of the

individual unit owners in accordance with our remittitur. The

judgment stated the legislation was adopted “after the Court of

Appeal Opinion was rendered in this case and the cause was

remanded back to this Court to enter an amended judgment

consistent with that Opinion,” and the court therefore “does not

purport to interpret or apply AB 807 to this Judgment.”

Plaintiff filed a timely appeal.3



3 After briefing and before oral argument, defendant filed a

motion for judicial notice of legislative materials concerning the

9

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asks us to reverse the trial court’s judgment and

direct entry of a new judgment declaring defendant cannot collect

the assignment fees as of January 1, 2009. Plaintiff contends the

Legislature found “that this Court got it wrong in Marina

Pacifica I,” and “there are no bars to this Court’s right to take

another look at sections 1098 and 1098.5 and to now reach the

result the Legislature intended.”

We conclude that “the result the Legislature intended” was

that the Marina Pacifica assignment fees should remain in place,

so long as defendant recorded a document reflecting the

assignment fee, “in a single document that complies with

subdivision (b) and with Section 1098.5,” before December 31,

2016. The language of the savings clause supports our

conclusion, and the legislative history of the amendments makes

the Legislature’s intent on this point unmistakable.4

We first describe that legislative history, and then briefly

address certain of plaintiff’s contentions.



recent introduction of a bill to further amend the transfer fee

statutes. We deny the request because the materials are

irrelevant to this case.

4 At defendant’s request, the author of the legislation

amending sections 1098 and 1098.5 submitted a letter to this

court concerning his view of the intent underlying the legislation.

We rejected the filing, since statements by an individual

legislator that were not communicated to the Legislature as a

whole are not relevant to a determination of legislative intent,

and we have not considered the letter for any purpose.

10

1. The Legislative History

To summarize, the legislative history demonstrates several

salient points. First, the Legislature repeatedly stated it was

clarifying the law with respect to the prohibition on incorporation

by reference, and that its intent in the 2007 law had been to

require a separate document. (E.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary,

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 807 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Apr. 8, 2015, pp. 5-6 (Assembly Analysis of Assembly

Bill 807).)

Second, the Legislature recognized that Marina Pacifica I

was a final decision when the California Supreme Court declined

to review it, and understood there was no pending litigation.

(Assem. Analysis of Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 5 [“(It should be

noted that in March 2015, the [California] Supreme Court

declined to review the case, letting the Court of Appeal[] decision

stand and effectively ending the litigation.)”].)

Third, as we explain further below, the Legislature

intended the new law to overrule the holding in Marina Pacifica

I, and expressly recognized that, despite its repeated statements

that the bill would clarify existing law, “its provisions may attach

new legal consequences to events completed before its

enactment.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Report on Assem. Bill

No. 807 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 8, 2015, p. 7

(Senate Report on Assembly Bill 807).) For that reason, the bill

was amended in the Senate to include the savings clause.

In short, we are in no doubt the Legislature intended that

the assignment fees we found enforceable in Marina Pacifica I

were to remain enforceable if defendant recorded the necessary

conforming documents during 2016. The pertinent details from

the legislative history are as follows.

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a. The bill in the Assembly

When the legislation amending sections 1098 and 1098.5

was introduced (Assembly Bill No. 807 or AB 807), and when it

was first voted on by the Assembly, it did not contain the savings

clause. The “key issue” addressed by AB 807 was described this

way:

“Should existing law be clarified to ensure that private

transfer fees [(PTF’s)] are always disclosed to prospective

property buyers in a transparent and meaningful fashion,

and that newly structured types of transfer fees do not

circumvent current disclosure requirements?” (Assem.

Analysis of Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 1; see also Assem.

Com. on Judiciary, Mandatory Information Worksheet on

Assem. Bill No. 807 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) p. 1 [describing

the author’s view of the key issue raised by the bill as

“[s]hould existing law requiring recordation and disclosure

of private transfer fees (PTF) be updated to close a loophole

that may be exploited by some developers to creatively

structure PTFs to avoid disclosure requirements intended

to protect homebuyers?”].)

It is helpful to bear in mind that this legislation (and the

original statute) was directed at recording and disclosure of all

transfer fees, not just those originating before the enactment of

sections 1098 and 1098.5 in 2007. Thus the Assembly’s analysis

explained that existing law “provides that when a PTF is imposed

on real property on or after January 1, 2008, the person or entity

imposing the transfer fee must, as a condition of payment of the

fee, concurrently record against the property a separate

document entitled ‘Payment of Transfer Fee Required.’ ” (Assem.

Analysis of Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 1.) The purpose of the

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new bill was “to further the intent of AB 980 [(the 2007 law)] and

ensure that all PTFs on real property continue to be recorded

with the county and disclosed to prospective purchasers in a

transparent manner.” (Ibid.)

Further: “According to the author, this bill is needed to

ensure continued notification and disclosure of PTFs to

homebuyers because some PTFs are being structured differently

since AB 980 became law in 2007. For example, these new types

of PTFs may be structured so that they are not necessarily based

on the sale price of the home or paid immediately upon transfer

of the home, as was contemplated by AB 980. As a result, there

may not be appropriate disclosure of all PTFs, contrary to the

intent of existing law. To nip this potential problem in the bud,

this bill does the following: (1) clarifies the definition of PTF to

capture any fee that must be paid ‘as the result of’ the transfer of

the property; (2) clarifies that the method of calculating the

amount of the PTF is disclosed if the fee is neither a flat fee, nor

a percentage of the sales price; and (3) clarifies that required

disclosures about the PTF must appear in a single document and

cannot be incorporated by reference into other documents. The

bill provides that these changes are clarifying and declaratory of

existing law. The bill . . . has no known opposition.” 5 (Assem.

Analysis of Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 1.)



5 The Legislative Counsel’s Digest for AB 807, as amended in

the Assembly on April 8, 2015, describes existing law on pre-2008

transfer fees this way: “Existing law excludes from the definition

of a transfer fee any fee reflected in a document recorded against

the property on or before December 31, 2007, that is separate

from any covenants, conditions, and restrictions, and that

provides a prospective transferee notice of specified information,

including the amount or method of calculation of the fee. [¶]

13

The Assembly’s analysis refers to Marina Pacifica I as

“illustrat[ing] the author’s contention that existing law needs to

be clarified to ensure that all private transfer fees are recorded

and disclosed to prospective homebuyers. . . . [T]he case

demonstrates that payment of a PTF: (1) did not have to occur

upon transfer of the property, but could be required a number of

years after the property had been transferred; and (2) did not

have to be based on the sale price of the property, but could be in

any amount or calculated by any other method. . . . [¶] Although

the fee in Marina Pacifica was recognized as a PTF, the case

illustrates that if these newly structure[d] types of PTFs are ever

determined by other courts to fall outside the current statute,

disclosure to prospective homebuyers is not necessarily assured.”

(Assem. Analysis of Assem. Bill 807, supra, at pp. 4-5.)

On May 11, 2015, the Assembly passed the bill

unanimously and ordered it to the Senate.

b. The bill in the Senate

The June 9, 2015 report prepared for the Senate Committee

on Judiciary describes Marina Pacifica I at some length in

connection with documents recorded before December 31, 2007.

(Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at pp. 5-7.) Specifically:

First, the report observes that the bill would, “among other

things, specify that, in order for a document recorded against a

property on or before December 31, 2007, to be excluded from the

definition of a ‘transfer fee,’ it must set forth specified



This bill would specify that the information shall be set forth in a

single document and may not be incorporated by reference from

any other document.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 807

(2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 8, 2015, p. 2, italics

added.)

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information about the fee in a single document and may not

incorporate by reference such information from another

document.” (Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 5.)

Second, the report describes the Marina Pacifica I

litigation and our holding that the unit leases incorporated by

reference in recorded documents contained all the information

required to qualify under the statutory exemption at issue. The

report then states: “By specifying that a recorded document

providing notice of fees may not rely on other information

incorporated by reference and still qualify under the statutory

exemption, this bill seeks to overrule the holding in [Marina

Pacifica I]. Furthermore, as a matter of policy, . . . requiring

record documents to contain pertinent information about fees for

which a prospective transferee will be responsible arguably

provides better notice about the obligation the transferee will

take on should they purchase or obtain the real property at

issue.” (Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at pp. 5-6.)

Third, the report then turns to a discussion of “retroactive

application,” stating: “This bill would find and declare that

amendments made by it to existing law pertaining to transfer

fees are clarifying and declaratory of existing law. However, as

noted above, some of these amendments may substantively

change the way existing law has been interpreted, raising

the possibility that they could be given retroactive application.”

(Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 6, boldface and

italics added.)

Fourth, after further discussion of judicial decisions on

retroactivity and on legislation that merely clarifies existing law,

the report concludes: “This bill contains express language

indicating that its provisions are clarifying and declaratory of

15

existing law irrespective of the fact that its provisions may

attach new legal consequences to events completed before

its enactment. To ensure that fees reflected in documents

recorded against a property on or before December 31,

2007, that do not comply with this bill’s provisions do not

become automatically uncollectable by this change in the

law, the author offers the following amendment that would

allow a one-year time period for the separate recording of such

fees.”6 (Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 7, boldface

and italics added.)

The bill was amended accordingly on June 15, 2015, and

again on September 3, 2015, and was passed by the Senate

unanimously on September 8, 2015.

c. The Assembly’s concurrence

The Assembly then concurred in the Senate amendments.

A report from the Assembly Committee on Judiciary states: “The

Senate amendments clarify that any fee reflected in a document

recorded against the property on or before December 31, 2007, . . .

that incorporates by reference from another document constitutes

a ‘transfer fee,’ and that any such transfer fee is unenforceable

unless recorded against the property, in a single document, on or

before December 31, 2016 (i.e. one year after the operative date of

this bill, if enacted.)” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Concurrence in



6 The amendment stated, “Any fee reflected in a document

recorded against the property on or before December 31, 2007, . . .

that incorporates by reference from another document shall

constitute a ‘transfer fee’ for purposes of Section 1098.5, unless it

is recorded against the property on or before December 31, 2016,

in a single document that complies with subdivision (a)(9) and (b)

of this section.” (Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at p. 7.)

16

Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 807 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Sept. 3, 2015, p. 1) (Concurrence in Senate

Amendments).)7

The concurrence report further explains: “With respect to

any fee reflected in a document recorded against a property on or

before December 31, 2007 that . . . incorporates by reference from

another document, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted a

concern that, when this bill goes into effect, such fees will

cease to comply with the new law. Accordingly, in order to

ensure that such fees do not automatically become

uncollectable overnight, recent amendments to the bill

provide a one year time period for the separate recording

of such fees, running from January 1, 2016 (the operative

date of this bill, if enacted) until December 31, 2016.”

(Concurrence in Sen. Amends., supra, at p. 4, boldface and italics

added.)



7 See also Legislative Counsel’s Digest, Assembly Bill

No. 807 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended September 3, 2015,

page 2 (italics and strikethroughs omitted) (“This bill would

provide that a fee reflected in a document recorded against the

property on or before December 31, 2007, that is not separate

from any covenants, conditions, and restrictions, or that

incorporates by reference from another document, constitutes a

transfer fee for the purposes of requirements relating to these

fees. The bill would make unenforceable a transfer fee recorded

against the property on or before December 31, 2007, that

complies with the provisions described above and that

incorporates by reference from another document unless it is

recorded against the property on or before December 31, 2016, in

a single document that complies with the provisions described

above.”).

17

On September 9, 2015, the Assembly concurred

unanimously in the Senate amendments, and the bill was

presented to and later approved by the Governor.

2. Contentions and Conclusions

In our view, the history we have recited leaves no room for

doubt about the intention of the Legislature. In addition, the

Legislature’s intent that the assignment fees we found

enforceable in Marina Pacifica I were to remain enforceable (if

recorded during 2016) is entirely consistent with established

legal principles on the finality of judgments, shown in the

legislative history to be well understood by the Legislature.

As mentioned earlier, the Legislature was aware that the

Marina Pacifica I decision on the enforceability of the assignment

fees at issue there was final – the reports repeatedly said so.8 We

likewise cannot doubt the Legislature’s recognition of the general

principles governing final judgments and subsequent legislative

actions that purport to change their legal effect; the Senate

report shows that, too. (Sen. Report on Assem. Bill 807, supra, at

pp. 6-7.) And, while there are exceptions to those finality

principles, here the Legislature made plain it intended to adhere



8 See Assembly Analysis of Assembly Bill 807, supra, at

page 5 (“the [California] Supreme Court declined to review the

case, letting the Court of Appeal[] decision stand and effectively

ending the litigation”); Concurrence in Senate Amendments,

supra, at page 3 (same); see also Assembly Committee on

Judiciary, Mandatory Information Worksheet on Assembly Bill

No. 807, supra, at page 3 (describing Marina Pacifica I’s

discussion of the assignment fee as coming within the purview of

the statute and stating that “the issue is now settled because the

[California] Supreme Court has declined to hear an appeal”).

18

to them. (Id. at pp. 6, 7 [adding the savings clause because “some

of these amendments may substantively change the way existing

law has been interpreted, raising the possibility that they could

be given retroactive application,” and “[the bill’s] provisions may

attach new legal consequences to events completed before its

enactment”]; Concurrence in Sen. Amends., supra, at p. 4

[providing one-year period for separate recording of preJanuary

1, 2008 fees because “when this bill goes into effect, such

fees will cease to comply with the new law”].)

We recognize it is inconsistent to state, as the legislation

and the legislative reports do, both that the amendments are

“clarifying and declaratory of existing law” and that the

amendments “may attach new legal consequences to events

completed before [the bill’s] enactment.” But the Senate report

recognized that inconsistency, and the Legislature resolved it

with the savings clause – a clause that would be entirely devoid

of meaning if construed other than in accordance with its plain

language. In short, our role is to discern the Legislature’s intent,

not to substitute our judgment based on the inconsistencies,

particularly since that intent – like the language of the savings

clause itself – is plain.

In view of the legislative history, little remains to be said

about plaintiff’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The trial

court did not err, complying precisely with our remittitur in

Marina Pacifica I, as it was required to do. (See Snukal v.

Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 774, fn. 5

[“The appellate court clerk’s issuance of the remittitur effects the

transfer of jurisdiction to the lower court. [Citation.] The

reviewing ‘court has no appellate jurisdiction over its own

judgments, and it cannot review or modify them after the cause

19

has once passed from its control by the issuance of the remittitur’

[citation] . . . . At the same time, the terms of the remittitur

define the trial court’s jurisdiction to act.”].) Plaintiff does not

question the calculation of amounts due from the unit owners to

defendant. Consequently, there is no trial court error to review.

Plaintiff insists we have jurisdiction now to revisit our

interpretation of the substantial compliance exception in Marina

Pacifica I, and that we should do so in light of the amendments to

sections 1098 and 1098.5, because the “overarching principle is to

give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” That is exactly what we

are doing. We have no reason to consider our authority to revisit

Marina Pacifica I, because the Legislature has made clear it did

not intend those amendments to interfere with the Marina

Pacifica I judgment.

Accordingly, we give effect to the Legislature’s intent and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.