Date: 10-11-2000

Case Style: Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster

Case Number: 99-2170

Judge: Lynch

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Plaintiff's Attorney: Karen Frink Wolf, with whom Harold J. Friedman, Sally A. Morris, and Friedman Babcock & Gaythwaite were on brief, for appellant Estados Unidos Mexicanos.

Herman Schwartz and Bruce Goldstein on brief for amicus curiae Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc.

Defendant's Attorney: Rita H. Logan, with whom Timothy J. O'Brien, William C. Knowles, and Verrill & Dana LLP were on brief, for appellee Austin J. DeCoster, d/b/a/ DeCoster Egg Farm, d/b/a/ Austin J. DeCoster Co.

Timothy H. Somers, with whom Michael E. Cassidy and Hoff, Curtis, Pacht, Cassidy & Frame, P.C. were on brief, for appellees Quality Egg of New England, LLC and Maine Ag, LLC.

Description: Claims of deplorable working and living conditions for migrant workers at DeCoster Egg Farms, a large Maine employer, were made in a civil rights action filed in May of 1998. The thrust of the complaint was that workers of Mexican descent, be they American or Mexican citizens, were treated harshly because of their Mexican background, and that white, non-Mexican workers fared better. The primary cause of action asserted violations of the workers' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The complaint also asserted other claims, including claims of unsafe and unsanitary housing under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. The complaint was filed by fourteen individuals, who proposed to represent a class of "all former and current migrant farm workers of Mexican race and descent" employed by Austin J. DeCoster and DeCoster Egg Farm.

The other plaintiff was the Government of Mexico, the Estados Unidos Mexicanos, which said it was appearing in its parens patriae capacity to protect its citizens and its own quasi-sovereign interests. It is unusual for a foreign nation to claim standing under the parens patriae doctrine; more common is the appearance of other nations in suits to protect their own distinct interests or as amicus curiae in actions that may affect them. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has addressed the question of whether the parens patriae doctrine may be so employed by a foreign nation. The district court dismissed Mexico as a plaintiff for lack of standing. See Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 59 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123-25 (D. Me. 1999). At Mexico's request, final judgment was entered as to this issue while the underlying action of the fourteen individual plaintiffs proceeded.(2) We review the determination of lack of standing de novo, see, e.g., Serpa Corp. v. McWane, Inc., 199 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1999), and affirm the dismissal of Mexico as a party to this action.

The Doctrine of Parens Patriae

"Parens patriae means literally 'parent of the country.'" Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). The doctrine has developed as to States of the United States. It creates an exception to normal rules of standing applied to private citizens in recognition of the special role that a State plays in pursuing its quasi-sovereign interests in "the well-being of its populace." Id. at 602; see also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (a State "has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain").(3) It is a judicially created exception that has been narrowly construed. The most complete explanation of the parens patriae doctrine in its modern incarnation,(4) as applied to the States of this country, appears in the Supreme Court's opinion in Snapp:

In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest. Although the articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case development -- neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstract -- certain characteristics of such interests are so far evident. These characteristics fall into two general categories. First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being -- both physical and economic -- of its residents in general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.

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Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

Outcome: Affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts: Unknown

Defendant's Experts: Unknown

Comments: None