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Chicago, IL - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with
possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm while a convicted felon charges.

In Spring 2018, as part of a large antidrug operation, the
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) obtained a search
warrant for Perryman’s home in Indianapolis. A team of federal and local law enforcement agents arrived at the property,
just as Perryman was departing in his car. After stopping Perryman and reading him his Miranda rights, the agents
searched the home, which had a master suite that consisted of
a bedroom, bathroom, and a large closet accessible only
through the bathroom. In the master bathroom, on a shelf on
top of the vanity next to the closet door, they found fentanyl,
baggies, and a digital scale. In the closet, there was a loaded
AR-15 rifle, three to four steps away from the fentanyl, along
with men’s shoes and clothes.
Perryman, with the agents’ permission, called his thengirlfriend, Rasheema Moore, who arrived soon after. Although she lived elsewhere, she had signed the lease for the
home. Moore said that the drugs, money, and gun were not
hers.
The agents read Perryman his Miranda rights for a second
time after the search, and he agreed to talk. He admitted that
the drugs were his, then provided the agents with the name
of his drug supplier. He did not, however, claim ownership
of the gun. The rifle “belonged to a girlfriend,” Maurita
Thomas, who had originally bought the weapon with Perryman at a gun show. The pair had lived together at different
No. 20-1453 3
places over the years in homes leased under Thomas’s name.
And they occasionally went shooting together. When Perryman relocated to the home that agents would later search, the
rifle went with him. The two, though, spoke regularly. During
one post-arrest conversation, Perryman asked Thomas to lie
about the gun. He wanted her to say that she took the weapon
from one house to the other. She initially complied, telling an
investigator and defense counsel that she moved the weapon.
But once under oath, she admitted those statements were untrue; she lied “to protect Michael.”
Perryman was indicted on charges of possessing fentanyl
with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1), and possessing a firearm while a convicted felon,
Id. § 922(g)(1).
Prior to trial, the government moved in limine to exclude
questioning concerning the disciplinary record of Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Sergeant Clifton Jones,
who participated in the search of Perryman’s home. The disciplinary offense stemmed from a complaint about Officer
Jones’s involvement in an unrelated investigation.1 The Disciplinary Board issued a “Written Reprimand” based on its review. Perryman wished to impeach Officer Jones’s credibility
using this incident and focused his arguments on evidentiary
points, adding in one sentence though that “[he] should be
able to exercise his rights under the Confrontation Clause.”
The district court, ruling only on the evidentiary question,
granted the government’s motion in a sealed entry,
1 Like the district court below, we decline to elaborate upon the details
out of respect for Officer Jones’s privacy.
4 No. 20-1453
concluding that any potential probative value of the evidence
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, and confusing the issues.
The trial lasted two days. Near the end of the trial, Perryman again sought to impeach Officer Jones with the disputed
evidence. The government objected, and the district court excluded the evidence. After the close of the government’s case,
Perryman moved for acquittal under Rule 29, which the district court denied. The jury convicted him on all counts. The
district court sentenced Perryman to 228 months in prison,
followed by five years of supervised release.
II. Discussion
Perryman argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on any count and that excluding Officer Jones’s disciplinary action violated the Confrontation Clause.2 We address each argument in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review the denial of a motion for acquittal under Rule
29 de novo. United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990, 998 (7th Cir.
2017). A jury verdict will only be overturned “if, after viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the government, there
was insufficient evidence to convict.” United States v. Jett, 908
F.3d 252, 273 (7th Cir. 2018). The defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Tantchev, 916 F.3d
2 Perryman filed a pro se brief to raise additional concerns about his
sentencing. We have discretion to reject a pro se brief without considering
the issues argued when a defendant is represented by counsel, see United
States v. Hunter, 932 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2019), and choose to do so here.
No. 20-1453 5
645, 650 (7th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d
540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Such a challenge leads to a ‘“reversal
only if the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”’”
(quoting United States v. Moore, 572 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir.
2009))). We have described this challenge for the defendant as
an “uphill battle,” United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744, 750
(7th Cir. 2003), a “momentous task,” United States v. Lawrence,
788 F.3d 234, 239 (7th Cir. 2015), a “‘heavy’ burden,” Jett, 908
F.3d at 273 (citation omitted), and a “nearly insurmountable”
hurdle, id., one which Perryman cannot overcome for any
count.
1. Possession of a Controlled Substance
Section 841(a)(1) criminalizes the possession of a controlled substance, such as fentanyl, with the intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(2). To convict, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed
fentanyl with the intent to distribute and knew that fentanyl
was a controlled substance. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 973
F.3d 667, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2020) (marijuana); United States v.
Campbell, 534 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) (cocaine). Perryman
only disputes whether he possessed the fentanyl. For
§ 841(a)(1), possession can be either actual or constructive.
United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2012). In this
case, the government relies on constructive possession.
“Constructive possession,” we have said, “is a legal fiction
whereby a person is deemed to possess contraband even
when he does not actually have immediate, physical control
of the object.” Id. The defendant must have both the “power
and intention to exercise dominion and control over the object, either directly or through others,” requiring some
6 No. 20-1453
connection between the defendant and the illegal drugs. Id.
That connection can come “in one of two ways.” Id. The first
way is where the defendant alone maintains “‘exclusive control’ over the property where the contraband was discovered,” which allows the logical inference that the defendant
possesses the drugs located there. Id. (quoting United States v.
Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 2005)). The second way of
showing constructive possession, absent the defendant exercising exclusive control over the property, requires “‘a substantial connection’ to the location where contraband was
seized,” one “sufficient to establish the nexus between that
person and [any contraband].” United States v. Morris, 576
F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). In either case, the government
can show constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence. Lawrence, 788 F.3d at 240.
Here, a reasonable jury could easily conclude that Perryman constructively possessed the fentanyl by his exclusive
control over the drugs. Perryman confessed that the drugs
were his, telling the agents immediately that the drugs belonged to him and even providing them with the name of his
drug supplier. Perryman claims that this confession was false.
But the government offered uncontroverted testimony about
its veracity from the task force officer who interviewed Perryman after the search and heard his confession. The jury was
entitled to credit that testimony in arriving at its verdict. Perryman even concedes, in his brief before this Court, that “[t]he
jury could’ve relied on the testimony from [the testifying officer] that Mr. Perryman stated that everything in the condo
is his except the rifle.”
Additional evidence further links Perryman with the
drugs. The police found the fentanyl in the home where
No. 20-1453 7
Perryman resided by himself, paid the bills, and was seen exiting when agents arrived. See Griffin, 684 F.3d at 695 (“Exclusive control over the premises allows the jury to infer the
knowledge and intent to control objects within those premises
… .”). The drugs were in the master suite, where Perryman
slept, by a closet filled with men’s clothes. Perryman submits
that because other people have stayed over, even leaving
toothbrushes and feminine hygiene products behind, he
could not have been the true possessor. But a person can still
constructively possess drugs while living in a space visited by
others. Whether a person maintains “exclusive control” over
a residence generally turns on the number of live-in residents—requiring only one—not the number of visitors, the
number of signees on the lease, or even the number of people
with keys to the home. Cf. Lawrence, 788 F.3d at 240 (“If a defendant lives alone in an apartment and a search reveals contraband, proving constructive possession is relatively easy.”
(emphasis added)). And both Moore and Thomas, the two
most frequent visitors, denied owning the drugs. Cf. United
States v. Rebolledo-Delgadillo, 820 F.3d 870, 876 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]e afford great deference to the jury’s factual findings and
credibility determinations.”). Therefore, the evidence demonstrating Perryman’s possession of the drugs, combined with
his confession, dooms this challenge.
2. In Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), a defendant cannot possess
a weapon “in furtherance of” a “drug trafficking crime.” See
also United States v. Johnson, 916 F.3d 579, 588–89 (7th Cir.
2019). Perryman argues that, assuming he committed a drug
trafficking crime and possessed the firearm located in his
8 No. 20-1453
closet, the weapon was not used “in furtherance” of any drug
crime.
The “‘in furtherance of” element is fact intensive. United
States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2005). Courts frequently “list factors that seem relevant and leave it to the trier
of fact to apply them to the facts of the case at hand.” United
States v. Brown, 724 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2013). These factors
include “the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the
weapon is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or
illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug
profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun
is found.” Id. (quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d
409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2000)). No single factor determines the
outcome; this inquiry is holistic. See id. (“It can be easier to
determine ‘furtherance’ by a holistic analysis than by dissecting the issue into parts … .”).
Here, sufficient evidence establishes that Perryman possessed the gun “in furtherance” of his drug crime. The gun
was located three to four steps away from large quantities of
fentanyl, in the master closet, accessible only by going
through the drug-filled master bathroom, and propped up
against the wall, not locked away or hidden. Expert testimony
at trial explained that such close proximity suggests that the
gun was used to protect the drugs. Moreover, the gun was no
ordinary weapon; it was a loaded AR-15 rifle, a weapon outlawed in several states, which Perryman could not own under
federal law. Together, this evidence more than supports the
jury’s verdict.
No. 20-1453 9
3. Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Federal law prohibits certain felons from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government must establish
four elements to prove a defendant guilty of this charge: (1)
the defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by more
than one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; (3) the defendant knew of his felon status; and (4) the
gun possessed by the felon had been in or affected interstate
commerce. Id.; Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195–96
(2019); see also United States v. Parsons, 946 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th
Cir. 2020). Perryman does not contest the first, third, and
fourth elements. He contends only that the government failed
to meet its burden for the second element, possession of a firearm.
Section 922(g) “covers possession in every form,” whether
actual or constructive.3 Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S.
622, 626 (2015). As explained above, constructive possession
“is established when a person, though lacking such physical
custody, still has the power and intent to exercise control over
the object.” Id. A jury can infer constructive possession when
the defendant exercises exclusive control over the premises.
Griffin, 684 F.3d at 695 (describing the two forms of constructive possession, “exclusive control” being the first and more
straightforward); see also United States v. Davis, 896 F.3d 784,
791 (7th Cir. 2018). A person who owns a home controls the
objects within, whether drugs or illegal firearms. United States
v. Caldwell, 423 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2005). Third-party access
to a home “does not negate the inference that [the defendant]
3 We need not consider the government’s argument that Perryman actually possessed the rifle.
10 No. 20-1453
had access to the firearm as well.” United States v. Villasenor,
664 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, the evidence permitted a rational jury to find that
Perryman constructively possessed the weapon discovered in
his closet.4 Perryman lived alone in the home where the police
found the weapon and, thus, controlled the premises. While
others may have had access, no one else resided there, so there
was never joint ownership. And, as previously noted, when a
defendant alone controls a property, a jury can reasonably assume that he controls the weapons present there. Caldwell, 423
F.3d at 758 (holding that where the defendant resides in the
home, there “is sufficient [evidence] to establish that he had
constructive possession of the firearms seized there”); United
States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 1995) (“‘Constructive possession can be established by a showing that the firearm was seized at the defendant’s residence.’” (quoting United
States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1993))). Moreover,
the weapon was in Perryman’s closet, by his clothes, feet away
from the drugs that he confessed to own, and in the same master suite where he slept every night. Testimony at trial revealed that Perryman brought the rifle to the house and
would later ask Thomas, a previous girlfriend, to lie about
that fact.
Nor does ultimate ownership of the gun matter, as Perryman contends. Owning an item is different than possessing it.
See Henderson, 575 U.S. at 626 (“By its terms, § 922(g) does not
4 Perryman concedes as much, “The facts may have led the jury to
convict based on constructive possession and that Mr. Perryman has a
substantial connection to the home.” The concession aside, the record also
supports the government’s case.
No. 20-1453 11
prohibit a felon from owning firearms. Rather, it interferes
with a single incident of ownership—one of the proverbial
sticks in the bundle of property rights—by preventing the
felon from knowingly possessing his (or another person’s)
guns.”). Courts do not look to a weapon’s paperwork. A defendant need only possess a gun to be found guilty under
§ 922(g)(1). See United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir.
2009). Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, the evidence was more than sufficient to enable
a rational jury to find that Perryman constructively possessed
the AR-15, so his sufficiency claim fails.
B. The Confrontation Clause
We review a direct implication of the constitutional right
to confrontation de novo.5 United States v. Rivas, 831 F.3d 931,
934 (7th Cir. 2016). Absent any direct implication though, we
review a limitation on cross-examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 597 (7th Cir. 2017).
The Confrontation Clause protects the right of a criminal
defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to confront a witness also
includes the right to cross-examine that person for any bias or
motivation to lie. United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 894
(7th Cir. 2011); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51
(1987). If the defendant’s cross-examination, however, does
5 The government asserts that Perryman did not preserve this constitutional claim below, because he focused his challenge on evidentiary
grounds. Perryman notes, however, that his memorandum in support of
his motion to the district court stated that he “should be able to exercise
his rights under the Confrontation Clause.” We assume, without deciding,
that his one-sentence reference preserved the issue under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 51(b).
12 No. 20-1453
not implicate a core confrontational value—exposing motivation, bias, or incentive to lie—then the constitutional concerns
are diminished. United States v. Hart, 995 F.3d 584, 589 (7th
Cir. 2021); see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)
(“[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.”). District court judges otherwise “retain ‘wide
latitude’ to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination
based on concern about matters including harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or interrogation that is repetitive
or only marginally relevant, all without running afoul of the
Confrontation Clause.” Rivas, 831 F.3d at 934 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).
Here, the proposed line of questioning into Officer Jones’s
unrelated disciplinary action did not implicate a core value of
the Confrontation Clause. Contrary to Perryman’s many assertions, Officer Jones’s reprimand did not involve tampering
with evidence. Rather, Officer Jones’s participation in a police
investigation fifteen years ago was questioned, which the Disciplinary Board decided warranted only a written warning.
Perryman has not shown, nor could he, that this irrelevant
and dated offense relates to his case. See United States v. Clark,
657 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that “the Confrontation Clause does not give a defendant a boundless right
to impugn the credibility of a witness”). Officer Jones was not
motivated to lie or harbor any bias against someone unconnected to his disciplinary incident, and Perryman was otherwise able to extensively cross-examine Officer Jones about his
role in the investigation. See, e.g., Hart, 995 F.3d at 589–90 (noting that the defendant had “ample opportunity to impeach or
discredit” the witness); Carson, 870 F.3d at 597 (holding that
No. 20-1453 13
there was no error where the defendant had ample opportunity to expose motivations); Clark, 657 F.3d at 584 (rejecting
“barely relevant” and “highly inflammatory” questioning).
Given then that a core confrontational value was not implicated, the district court properly exercised its “wide latitude” under the Confrontation Clause to exclude the evidence. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679; see also Hart, 995 F.3d at 589
(stating that when the “defendant’s argument indirectly implicates a core value,” we ask only whether the district court
abused its discretion under the Confrontation Clause in limiting a defendant’s cross-examination). Introducing the minor, fifteen-year-old reprimand, at best, tangentially related
to truthfulness and would likely have prejudiced or confused
the jury. See United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 530–31 (7th
Cir. 2009). And again, Perryman already had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine Officer Jones. Perryman’s constitutional rights, therefore, were not violated.

Outcome: For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.

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