Date: 05-11-2022

Case Style:

Donna S. v. Travis S.

Case Number: 21-0166

Judge: Tim Armstead

Court:

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

On appeal from The Circuit Court of Mercer County

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Click Here to Watch How To Find A Lawyer by Kent Morlan

Click Here For The Best Charleston, West Virginia Divorce Lawyer Directory

Tell MoreLaw About Your Litigation Successes and MoreLaw Will Tell the World.

Re: MoreLaw National Jury Verdict and Settlement

Counselor:

MoreLaw collects and publishes civil and criminal litigation information from the state and federal courts nationwide. Publication is free and access to the information is free to the public.


MoreLaw will publish litigation reports submitted by you free of charge


Info@MoreLaw.com - 855-853-4800

Defendant's Attorney: David R. Karr, Jr.

Description:

Charleston, West Virginia - Divorce lawyer represented Petitioner with appealing a Mediated Settlement Agreement with Respondent .

The parties to this action were married on August 19, 2000, and two children
were born of the marriage. On February 15, 2019, Petitioner filed for divorce in Mercer
County, West Virginia, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. On May 15, 2019,
the family court granted the parties joint custody of the children and named Petitioner as
the primary residential parent, utilizing the statutory child support formula to determine
child support responsibilities. Thereafter, on November 6, 2019, the family court entered
an “Agreed Bifurcated Order of Divorce.” This bifurcated order directed the parties to
engage in mediation to attempt to reach an agreement on the equitable distribution of the
marital estate, appointed a guardian ad litem for the children, granted Petitioner a name
change, and set the matter for another hearing following mediation to finalize equitable
distribution.
2
After entry of the bifurcated order, the parties participated in mediation and
entered into the MSA that gives rise to this action. This MSA detailed the equitable
distribution of marital property, including the marital residence. Pertinent to this appeal,
the MSA also included the parties’ agreement to transfer three acres of marital property to
Respondent’s parents.1
In exchange, Respondent agreed that his parents would transfer a
right of way across the parents’ land to Petitioner. This was memorialized in the December
17, 2019, Corrected Agreed Final Bifurcation Order:
8. The parties agree that they will deed [three] acres of
the marital real estate to [Respondent’s parents] as discussed
and specifically agreed to in the mediation. The parties agree
to have an independent surveyor to survey the [three] acres to
obtain a legal description and [Respondent’s parents] have
agreed to pay the surveyor to survey the [three] acres to obtain
the legal description and costs of the deed and transferring the
property to them.
9. [Respondent] will have a right of way deeded to
[Petitioner] to her home. As part of the transaction,
[Respondent] shall pay for the preparation and conveyance of
the right of way to the property.
Following entry of the Corrected Agreed Final Bifurcation Order, the parties
endeavored to divide the property according to its terms. However, Petitioner filed a
petition for contempt on March 26, 2020, alleging Respondent refused to execute a deed
transferring the marital home, refused to convey his ownership interest in the three acres
of marital property to Respondent’s parents, and refused to have a survey of the three acres.
1 The parties agree that Respondent made a rough sketch of the area to be
conveyed to his parents at the mediation. This sketch was estimated to contain three acres.
The mediator took possession of the sketch and ultimately destroyed it as a matter of
course. Thus, that rough sketch no longer exists.
3
Respondent’s response2 sought modification of the MSA for various reasons.
First, Respondent alleged that the conveyance of the three acres involved his parents, who
were not parties to the action.3
Second, Respondent argued that Petitioner had “defected
from the agreement reached with [Respondent’s parents].” Third, Respondent alleged that
the MSA should be rendered void due to uncertainty based upon the lack of agreement as
to the size and location of the three acres.
The family court conducted a hearing on these issues. During that hearing,
the family court took testimony from Petitioner and Respondent and heard detailed
argument from their counsel. Following this hearing, the family court concluded that the
parties did not have a “meeting of the minds” in reaching the MSA and determined that the
entirety of the MSA was unenforceable, specifically finding as follows:
7. The Court concludes:
a. There was no meeting of the minds with respect to the
overall [MSA] which was attached to and incorporated into the
Corrected Agreed Final Bifurcation Order, entered on
December 17, 2019.
2 The response was contained as part of a Petition for Modification. As the
other issues raised in that Petition are not relevant to this appeal, they are not discussed
herein.
3 We note that the parents filed a petition to intervene in the divorce
proceeding, which was denied by the family court. Also, pending in the circuit court is a
declaratory judgment action filed by the parents regarding the alleged easement. From the
record, the declaratory judgment action was set for a bench trial on March 31, 2021. We
do not know the outcome, if any, of that action.
4
b. The diagram of the real estate to be transferred to
[Respondent’s] parents is unavailable to the Court because the
mediator destroyed it.
c. The [MSA] made an attachment (Exhibit A) to the
Corrected Agreed Final Bifurcation Order is hereby FOUND
and CONCLUDED to be UNENFORCEABLE as a contract or
other agreement and VOID to that effect.
d. The clear and sole purpose of the Corrected Agreed
Final Bifurcation Order was the ratification, adoption[,] and
enforcement of the [MSA].
e. The December 17, 2019, Order in this matter, and in
particular the nineteen (19) several specific terms of that Order
putting into effect the [MSA] should be and hereby are
VACATED and SET ASIDE.
8. Based upon the conclusions and ruling that the parties
did not have a meeting of the minds, [Petitioner’s] petition for
contempt pending against [Respondent] is hereby DENIED
and the same is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
9. The vacation of the December 17, 2019, Order in this
matter and the complete rejection of the [MSA] as a property
settlement agreement, therefore, fully REINSTATES this
Court’s jurisdiction as it existed on and before December 17,
2019, with respect to its duty to perform equitable distribution
of the parties’ marital property.
10. The Court shall take up this matter for an all-day hearing
for consideration of the parties’ contested presentation of
evidence on equitable distribution of the parties’ marital
property. . . .
Petitioner then appealed the family court’s ruling to the circuit court arguing
that there was a meeting of the minds, that there was no timely appeal of the Corrected
Agreed Bifurcation Order, and that the entire MSA should not be rendered void. However,
the circuit court disagreed and affirmed the family court’s decision. The circuit court held:
5
The provisions of the [MSA] surrounding the proposed
easement, and the term obligating [Respondent’s parents] to
pay for the surveying of the disputed three acres, are illusory
promises. These terms are illusory because they create an
obligation to third parties who are not bound by the [MSA].
The presence of these illusory terms renders the formation of
the [MSA] defective. The [f]amily [c]ourt cites this in the
written order and makes mention of it on the electronic record
wherein the [f]amily [c]ourt found that there was “no meeting
of the minds” because the [MSA] obligated nonparties to the
contract. Therefore, the [c]ourt finds that the [f]amily [c]ourt
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the [MSA] lacked
mutual assent.
It is from the circuit court’s order affirming the family court’s decision to set aside the
MSA that Petitioner appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court
judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final
order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact
made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse
of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo.
Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).
III. ANALYSIS
Petitioner essentially raises two arguments in support of her position. First,
she alleges that the family court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its Corrected Agreed Final
Bifurcation Order and then invalidate the MSA. Second, Petitioner maintains that the
6
family court should have only invalidated portions of the MSA, enforced the remaining
provisions, and held a hearing solely on the invalid portions of the MSA.
I. Jurisdiction
Under our law, “a family court has the right and authority to adjudicate
actions for divorce and the power to carry its judgment and order into execution.” W. Va.
Code § 48-5-102 (2001). This jurisdiction includes actions for divorce and proceedings
for property distribution. See W. Va. Code § 51-2A-2 (2018). Division of marital property
shall be equitable. See W. Va. Code § 48-7-101 (2001). Parties to a divorce may agree to
an MSA that provides for equitable distribution of marital property and a family court may
accept such agreements and incorporate them into a final order. Rule 44, W. Va. R. Fam.
Ct.
4
4 Rule 44 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Courts provides:
Upon receipt of a mediated agreement the court shall
review the agreement to determine if it is knowing, voluntary,
and in the best interests of the parties' children. The court shall
cause the child support formula to be calculated based on the
allocation of custodial responsibility in the parenting plan
contained in the mediated agreement; and by way of
comparison, shall cause the child support formula to be
calculated in accordance with W. Va. Code, §§ 48-13-401 to
404, 501, and 502. After being informed on the record of the
mediated agreement's child support implications, if the parties
assent to the agreement on the record, and if the court
determines there is no impediment to the validity of the
agreement, the court shall incorporate the mediated agreement
in an order.
7
Once a final divorce order has been entered, family courts may modify that
final order in certain situations:
In modifying a final divorce order, the court may, when
other means are not conveniently available, alter any prior
order of the court with respect to the distribution of marital
property, if:
(1) The property is still held by the parties;
(2) The alteration of the prior order as it relates the
distribution of marital property is necessary to give effect to a
modification of spousal support, child support or child custody;
or
(3) The alteration of the prior order as it relates the
distribution of marital property is necessary to avoid an
inequitable or unjust result which would be caused by the
manner in which the modification will affect the prior
distribution of marital property.
W. Va. Code § 48-5-706 (2001). Petitioner argues that the “or” at the end of subsection
(2) is a drafting error by our Legislature and it should be read as an “and,” requiring all
three conditions to be met before a family court can modify a final order.5
In support of
this position, Petitioner points us to the case of Segal v. Beard, 181 W. Va. 92, 380 S.E.2d
444 (1989). As we discuss below, we disagree and decline to write into the statute that
which the Legislature did not.
5 Respondent urges this court to apply the provisions of Rule 60 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to affirm the family court and circuit court. However,
we believe West Virginia Code § 48-5-706 is directly on point.
8
“It is always to be presumed that the Legislature designed the statute to take
effect, and not to be a nullity.” Syllabus Point 2, Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875).
“‘[T]he Legislature is presumed to intend that every word used in a statute has a specific
purpose and meaning,’ State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W. Va. 579, 582, 251 S.E.2d
505, 508 (1979)[.]” Stone v. United Eng’g, a Div. of Wean, Inc., 197 W. Va. 347, 355, 475
S.E.2d 439, 447 (1996). See also Bullman v. D & R Lumber Co., 195 W. Va. 129, 133,
464 S.E.2d 771, 775 (“[E]very word used is presumed to have meaning and purpose, for
the Legislature is thought by the courts not to have used language idly.”). Even so,
Petitioner urges this Court that the Legislature committed a clerical error and it is this
Court’s duty to correct it. We acknowledge we have the authority in limited circumstances
to correct statutory clerical errors. “Clerical errors in a statute will be disregarded, or read
as corrected, where the true intention of the Legislature is manifest from the language used
and the purpose sought to be attained.” Syllabus Point 1, Anderson v. Town of Friendly, 86
W.Va. 554, 104 S.E. 48 (1920). There are a number of examples of clerical errors this
Court has corrected. See St. Mary’s Hosp. v. State Health Planning and Dev. Agency, 178
W. Va. 792, 796 n.3, 364 S.E.2d 805, 809 n.3 (1987) (incorrect citation to another statute);
McClanahan v. Putnam County Com’n, 174 W. Va. 478, 482, 327 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1985)
(correcting a clear transcription error from the then-existing Uniform Vehicle Code);
Boggess v. Workers’ Compensation Div., 208 W. Va. 448, 453, 541 S.E.2d 326, 331 (2000)
(List contained in a Legislative Rule was misnumbered).
9
Here, there is no evidence demonstrating a clerical mistake, as Petitioner
urges us to find. In fact, the entirety of Chapter 48 of the West Virginia Code was
recodified in 2001. See W. Va. Code § 48-1-101 (2001) (“The recodification of this chapter
during the regular session of the Legislature in the year 2001 is intended to embrace in a
revised, consolidated, and codified form and arrangement the laws of the State of West
Virginia relating to domestic relations at the time of that enactment.”). In the West Virginia
Code as it read immediately prior to the 2001 revision, the general provisions now
contained in West Virginia Code § 48-5-706 were found in West Virginia Code § 48-2-15
(1999), which provided:
In granting relief under this subsection, the court may,
when other means are not conveniently available, alter any
prior order of the court with respect to the distribution of
marital property, if such property is still held by the parties, and
if necessary to give effect to a modification of alimony, child
support or child custody or necessary to avoid an inequitable
or unjust result which would be caused by the manner in which
the modification will affect the prior distribution of marital
property.
W. Va. Code 48-2-15(e) (1999) (emphasis added) superseded by statute, W. Va. Code §
48-5-706 (2001). In comparing these two enactments, the Legislature left the disjunctive
“or” in the same location in the 2001 reenactment as where it was located in the prior
enactment.
Turning to Petitioner’s argument regarding Segal, a case that interpreted an
even earlier version of 48-2-15(e) (1986), we find it to be inapplicable to the current version
of the statute. Segal held that the subsection allowing for modification of divorce decrees
10
only applies to modifications for alimony, child support and child custody. See Syllabus
Point 2, Segal. The Court in Segal reached this conclusion:
[B]y giving effect to the words at the beginning of the second
sentence, referring to the relief authorized by the first sentence:
“In granting such relief, ...” The remainder of the second
sentence, including the language relied upon by the appellee,
is thus expressly hinged upon a modification involving
alimony, child support or child custody, and the redistribution
of the former marital property, if still held by the parties, is
allowed either to (1) give effect to a modification of alimony,
child support or child custody or to (2) avoid an inequitable or
unjust result which would be caused by the manner in which
the modification of alimony, child support or child custody will
affect the prior distribution of the former marital property.
Segal, 181 W. Va. at 98, 380 S.E.2d at 450 (emphasis in original). In 1990, the Legislature,
following this Court’s opinion in Segal, amended the statute and removed the language
“[i]n granting such relief,” replacing that language with “[i]n granting relief under this
subsection,” completely eliminating the word “such.” Compare W. Va. Code § 48-2-15(e)
(1986) with W. Va. Code § 48-2-15(e) (1990). This change was carried forward to the
1999 provision quoted above. See W. Va. Code § 48-2-15(e) (1999). Further, this language
was completely removed from the 2001 recodification, also quoted above. Compare W.
Va. Code § 48-5-706 (2001) with 48-2-15(e) (1986) and W. Va. Code § 48-2-15(e) (1990).
The Legislative history leads us to the conclusion that Segal does not support the
proposition urged by Petitioner and that the provisions of West Virginia Code 48-5-706
are not limited to modifications involving alimony, child support, or child custody.
11
Having declined to find and correct an alleged clerical mistake in West
Virginia Code § 48-5-706, and having further concluded that its application is not limited
to modifications involving alimony, child support, or child custody, we now apply the rules
of statutory construction. “The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syllabus Point 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s
Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). See also Syllabus Point 8, Vest
v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953) (“The primary rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.”).
Accordingly, “[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain,
the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the
courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syllabus Point 5, State v. General Daniel
Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).
Based upon our analysis of the statute in question, we reach the inescapable
conclusion that the clear and unambiguous provisions of West Virginia Code § 48-5-706
(2001) provide a family court jurisdiction to modify a final divorce decree if any of the
requirements contained in its subsections are met. Here, the family court had jurisdiction
to modify the divorce decree under the catch-all provision contained in subsection (3)
because the inability to consummate the exchange of the three acres for the right of way
directly impacts the equitable distribution of marital property.
II. Mediated Settlement Agreement
12
Having found that the family court had jurisdiction to set aside the MSA, we
now analyze whether the entire MSA should have been set aside, as was done by the family
court and affirmed by the circuit court, or whether, as Petitioner urges, only the invalid
portions of the agreement should be relitigated, leaving the other portions of the MSA
undisturbed.
On this issue, the family court found there was no meeting of the minds and
the circuit court agreed. The circuit court accordingly found that the promises requiring
Respondent’s parents – who were not parties to the divorce – to transfer a right of way to
Petitioner and to pay the costs associated with transferring the three acres from the marital
estate to them rendered the entire agreement illusory. We agree with the lower tribunals.
We have stated:
A promise becomes consideration for another promise only
when it constitutes a binding obligation. Unlike a binding
obligation, an “illusory promise” appears to be a promise, but
it does not actually bind or obligate the promisor to anything.
Because an illusory promise is not binding on the promisor,
an illusory promise cannot constitute consideration. Hill v.
Peoplesoft USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 2005).
Toney v. EQT Corp., No. 13-1101, 2014 WL 2681091, at *4 (W. Va. June 13, 2014)
(memorandum decision). “If one party to a contract is not bound to do the act which forms
the consideration for the promise, undertaking, or agreement of the other, the contract is
void for want of mutuality.” Syllabus Point 5, Eclipse Oil Co. v. S. Penn Oil Co., 47 W.
Va. 84, 34 S.E. 923 (1899). Accord Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, Williston on
Contracts § 7.7 (4th ed 2008) (“Where an illusory promise is made, that is, a promise
13
merely in form, but in actuality not promising anything, it cannot serve as consideration.
Even if it were recognized by law, it would impose no obligation, since the promisor always
has it within his power to keep his promise and yet escape performance of anything
detrimental to himself or beneficial to the promisee.”).
Further, “[a] meeting of the minds of the parties is a sine qua non of all
contracts.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Burdette v. Burdette Realty Improvement, Inc., 214
W. Va. 448, 590 S.E.2d 641 (2003). “[A] court may only enforce a settlement when there
has been a definite meeting of the minds.” State ex rel. Evans v. Robinson, 197 W.Va. 482,
485, 475 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1121 (1997). Similarly, in Riner
v. Newbraugh, 211 W. Va. 137, 144, 563 S.E.2d 802, 809 (2002), we stated, “[i]t is wellunderstood that ‘[s]ince a compromise and settlement is contractual in nature, a
definite meeting of the minds of the parties is essential to a valid compromise, since a
settlement cannot be predicated on equivocal actions of the parties.” (internal citation
omitted).
The purpose of mediation is for the parties to the dispute to give up something
in exchange for something else to reach a resolution of their disagreements. Here, no party
to the agreement had the authority to transfer the right of way. Respondent’s parents were
not parties to the divorce and the family court had no mechanism to enforce the agreement
against the parents. Nonetheless, Petitioner urges that the parents are third-party
beneficiaries and that the MSA is binding upon them, citing us to the case of Eastern Steel
14
Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 209 W. Va. 392, 549 S.E.2d 266 (2001). However, we
do not believe this case supports Petitioner’s position as its holdings apply to special
relationships between design professionals and contractors, clearly inapplicable in this
matter. See Syllabus Points 6, 7, and 9, id. Further, the facts show that Respondent’s
parents were not third-party beneficiaries to the MSA. They were an integral part of the
consideration of the parties’ agreement, yet as non-parties to such agreement, could not be
bound by its terms.
A third-party beneficiary may enforce a contract only if it is made for its sole
benefit:
If a covenant or promise be made for the sole benefit of
a person with whom it is not made, or with whom it is made
jointly with others, such person may maintain, in his own
name, any action thereon which he might maintain in case it
had been made with him only, and the consideration had
moved from him to the party making such covenant or promise.
W. Va. Code § 55-8-12 (1923). To establish a person as a third-party beneficiary to a
contract, we have held, “[w]here plaintiff seeks recovery as a third party beneficiary under
a contract to which he is not a party under W.Va. Code, 55-8-12 (1923), it is necessary that
plaintiff demonstrate that the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit upon the
plaintiff by their contract.” Syllabus Point 2, Woodford v. Glenville State Coll. Hous.
Corp., 159 W. Va. 442, 225 S.E.2d 671 (1976). “The fundamentals of a legal “contract”
are competent parties, legal subject–matter, valuable consideration, and mutual assent.
There can be no contract, if there is one of these essential elements upon which the minds
15
of the parties are not in agreement.” Syllabus Point 5, Virginian Exp. Coal Co. v. Rowland
Land Co., 100 W. Va. 559, 131 S.E. 253 (1926). “While the promise of a third-party
beneficiary to a contract may serve as the requisite consideration to form a binding contract
. . . that conclusion is premised on such consideration being bargained for in exchange for
the return promise.” State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 216 W. Va. 766, 776, 613 S.E.2d 914,
924 (2005).
The promise of a party to a contract, in order to be a
good consideration for the undertaking of the other party
thereto, must be such as to impose a legal liability. Where the
promise relied upon as constituting the consideration for the
contract does not impose any legal liability upon the promisor,
it will not ordinarily be held to be a sufficient consideration on
the part of the other party.
Syllabus Point 2, Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat, 85 W. Va. 750, 102 S.E. 726
(1920).
Even if there was consideration in the MSA for the exchange, the provisions
in the MSA were not made for Respondent’s parents’ sole benefit. Its purpose was to
equitably divide the marital estate between the parties to the divorce. The illusory promise
to transfer three acres to the parents in exchange for their conveyance of the right of way
was integral and inextricably intertwined as part of the consideration for the entire MSA
and the requirement that Respondent’s parents convey a right of way they solely owned to
Petitioner and pay the sundry costs associated with the transfer of the three acres was to
the parents’ detriment. Accordingly, the parents are not third-party beneficiaries as they
16
were required to give up something in the MSA rather than benefitting from it, making
them an integral part of the bargained-for exchange forming the MSA.
Because we agree with the lower tribunals that the MSA was invalid, we note
our law requires equitable distribution of marital assets. Where, as here, the conveyance
of the land and right of way were integral parts of the overall MSA, we are unable to
conclude that the remaining portions can stand alone. Without making such determination
at this stage, we recognize that any modification or removal of the land agreements from
the MSA may also require modification of the remaining terms of the MSA in order to
ensure an equal distribution of the marital property. “Except as provided in this section,
upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or separation, the court shall divide the marital
property of the parties equally between the parties.” W. Va. Code § 48-7-101 (2001). “In
order to achieve the equitable distribution of marital property, the court shall, unless the
parties otherwise agree, order, when necessary, the transfer of legal title to any property
of the parties. . . .” W. Va. Code § 48-7-105 (2001) (emphasis added). We have previously
held that:
“‘Equitable distribution ... is a three-step process. The
first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or
nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets. The
third step is to divide the marital estate between the parties in
accordance with the principles contained in [former] W.Va.
Code, 48-2-32 [now W.Va. Code § 48-7-103].’ Syllabus Point
1, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).”
Syl. Pt. 2, Stuck v. Stuck, 218 W.Va. 605, 625 S.E.2d 367
(2005).
17
Syllabus Point 3, Mulugeta v. Misailidis, 239 W. Va. 404, 801 S.E.2d 282 (2017). We
have also held that, “[t]he burden is on both parties to the litigation to adduce competent
evidence on the values to be assigned in equitable distribution cases.” Syllabus Point 8,
Mayhew v. Mayhew, 197 W. Va. 290, 475 S.E.2d 382 (1996), overruled on other grounds
by Mayhew v. Mayhew, 205 W. Va. 490, 519 S.E.2d 188 (1999).
Clearly, family courts have a duty to ensure that a division of marital assets
is equitably accomplished. If the Court were to accept Petitioner’s argument that the
remainder of the MSA should be enforced and only the illusory portions be litigated, such
could result in an unequitable resolution of the distribution of marital property as the entire
MSA represented the parties’ bargained-for exchange. Thus, the family court was
obligated to reopen the entire distribution of marital assets to recalculate equitable
distribution.

Outcome: For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: