Date: 12-16-2023

Case Style:

State of Michigan v. Shanda Vander Ark

Case Number: 23-000110-FC

Judge: Matthew R. Kacel

Court: 14th Circuit Court, Muskegon County, Michigan

Plaintiff's Attorney: Muskegon County

Defendant's Attorney: Public Defender's Office

Description: Norton Shores, Michigan criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with open murder and first-degree child abuse.

Shanda Vander Ark, was accused of killing her 15-year-old son Timothy Ferguson in violation of 750.316 of the Michigan Penal Code, which provides:

(1) Except as provided in sections 25 and 25a of chapter IX of the code of criminal procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 769.25 and 769.25a, a person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole:
(a) Murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, or third degree, child abuse in the first degree, a major controlled substance offense, robbery, carjacking, breaking and entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the first or second degree, larceny of any kind, extortion, kidnapping, vulnerable adult abuse in the first or second degree under section 145n, torture under section 85, aggravated stalking under section 411i, or unlawful imprisonment under section 349b.
(c) A murder of a peace officer or a corrections officer committed while the peace officer or corrections officer is lawfully engaged in the performance of any of his or her duties as a peace officer or corrections officer, knowing that the peace officer or corrections officer is a peace officer or corrections officer engaged in the performance of his or her duty as a peace officer or corrections officer.
(2) Immediately following a conviction under this section, a court shall enter an order committing the convicted person to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections for incarceration in a state correctional facility pending sentencing using a form created by the state court administrative office for this purpose. This order becomes effective if both of the following apply:
(a) The sheriff agrees to transport for final sentencing the person from the state correctional facility to the county and from the county back to the state correctional facility.
(b) The convicted person was not less than 18 years of age at the time he or she committed the offense for which he or she was convicted under this section.
(3) A court shall hold the sentencing hearing not more than 45 days after a person is committed to the department of corrections under subsection (2).
(4) As used in this section:
(a) "Arson" means a felony violation under chapter X.
(b) "Corrections officer" means any of the following:
(i) A prison or jail guard or other prison or jail personnel.
(ii) Any of the personnel of a boot camp, special alternative incarceration unit, or other minimum security correctional facility.
(iii) A parole or probation officer.
(c) "Major controlled substance offense" means any of the following:
(i) A violation of section 7401(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7401.
(ii) A violation of section 7403(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7403.
(iii) A conspiracy to commit an offense listed in subparagraph (i) or (ii).
(d) "Peace officer" means any of the following:
(i) A police or conservation officer of this state or a political subdivision of this state.
(ii) A police or conservation officer of the United States.
(iii) A police or conservation officer of another state or a political subdivision of another state.

and

Section 750.136 of the Michigan Penal Code, which provides:

(a) "Child" means a person who is less than 18 years of age and is not emancipated by operation of law as provided in section 4 of 1968 PA 293, MCL 722.4.
(b) "Cruel" means brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that which torments.
(c) "Omission" means a willful failure to provide food, clothing, or shelter necessary for a child's welfare or willful abandonment of a child.
(d) "Person" means a child's parent or guardian or any other person who cares for, has custody of, or has authority over a child regardless of the length of time that a child is cared for, in the custody of, or subject to the authority of that person.
(e) "Physical harm" means any injury to a child's physical condition.
(f) "Serious physical harm" means any physical injury to a child that seriously impairs the child's health or physical well-being, including, but not limited to, brain damage, a skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury, poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut.
(g) "Serious mental harm" means an injury to a child's mental condition or welfare that is not necessarily permanent but results in visibly demonstrable manifestations of a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree if the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a child. Child abuse in the first degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years.
(3) A person is guilty of child abuse in the second degree if any of the following apply:
(a) The person's omission causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a child or if the person's reckless act causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act likely to cause serious physical or mental harm to a child regardless of whether harm results.
(c) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that is cruel to a child regardless of whether harm results.
(d) The person or a licensee, as licensee is defined in section 1 of 1973 PA 116, MCL 722.111, violates section 15(2) of 1973 PA 116, MCL 722.125.
(4) Child abuse in the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment as follows:
(a) For a first offense, not more than 10 years.
(b) For an offense following a prior conviction, not more than 20 years.
(5) A person is guilty of child abuse in the third degree if any of the following apply:
(a) The person knowingly or intentionally causes physical harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that under the circumstances poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to a child, and the act results in physical harm to a child.
(6) Child abuse in the third degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment as follows:
(a) For a first offense, not more than 2 years.
(b) For an offense following a prior conviction, not more than 5 years.
(7) A person is guilty of child abuse in the fourth degree if any of the following apply:
(a) The person's omission or reckless act causes physical harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that under the circumstances poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to a child, regardless of whether physical harm results.
(8) Child abuse in the fourth degree is a crime punishable as follows:
(a) For a first offense, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year.
(b) For an offense following a prior conviction, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years.
(9) This section does not prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable force.
(10) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant's conduct involving the child was a reasonable response to an act of domestic violence in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant at that time. The defendant has the burden of establishing the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. As used in this subsection, "domestic violence" means that term as defined in section 1 of 1978 PA 389, MCL 400.1501.
(11) If the prosecuting attorney intends to seek an enhanced sentence based upon the defendant having 1 or more prior convictions, the prosecuting attorney shall include on the complaint and information a statement listing the prior conviction or convictions. The existence of the defendant's prior conviction or convictions must be determined by the court, without a jury, at sentencing or at a separate hearing for that purpose before sentencing. The existence of a prior conviction may be established by any evidence relevant for that purpose, including, but not limited to, 1 or more of the following:
(a) A copy of the judgment of conviction.
(b) A transcript of a prior trial, plea-taking, or sentencing.
(c) Information contained in a presentence report.
(d) The defendant's statement.
(12) As used in this section, "prior conviction" means a violation of this section or a violation of a law of another state substantially corresponding to this section.

The State alleged that Vander Ark and her other 20-year-old son Paul Ferguson participated in the abuse against Timothy. The fed the boy hot sauce, giving him ice baths and forcing him to stand against the wall for hours.

Ark

Outcome: Defendant was found guilty.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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