Date: 03-20-2024

Case Style:

Stephanie Rein v. Walmart, Inc.

Case Number: 3:23-cv-00071

Judge: Gilbert C. Sison

Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois (St. Clair County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Meagan Schweickert - 312-629-0099

Defendant's Attorney: East St. Louis, Illinois insurance defense lawyer represented the Defendant.

Description: East St. Louis, Illinois personal injury lawyer represented the Plaintiff who sued on a premises liability negligence theory.

This case was filed in the Circuit Court, Franklin County, Illinois, case number 22-LA-56, and was removed to federal court by the Defendant.

(740 ILCS 130/1)

Sec. 1. This Act is called and may be cited as the "Premises Liability Act".

Sec. 2. The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees as to the duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is abolished.

The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them. The duty of reasonable care under the circumstances which an owner or occupier of land owes to such entrants does not include any of the following: a duty to warn of or otherwise take reasonable steps to protect such entrants from conditions on the premises that are known to the entrant, are open and obvious, or can reasonably be expected to be discovered by the entrant; a duty to warn of latent defects or dangers or defects or dangers unknown to the owner or occupier of the premises; a duty to warn such entrants of any dangers resulting from misuse by the entrants of the premises or anything affixed to or located on the premises; or a duty to protect such entrants from their own misuse of the premises or anything affixed to or located on the premises.
This amendatory Act of 1995 applies to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date.
(Source: P.A. 89-7, eff. 3-9-95.)

(Text of Section WITHOUT the changes made by P.A. 89-7, which has been held unconstitutional)
Sec. 2. The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees as to the duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is abolished.
The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them.
(Source: P.A. 83-1398.)

(740 ILCS 130/3) (from Ch. 80, par. 303)
(Text of Section WITH the changes made by P.A. 89-7, which has been held unconstitutional)
Sec. 3. Nothing herein affects the law as regards the trespassing child entrant. An owner or occupier of land owes no duty of care to an adult trespasser other than to refrain from willful and wanton conduct that would endanger the safety of a known trespasser on the property from a condition of the property or an activity conducted by the owner or occupier on the property.
This amendatory Act of 1995 applies only to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date.
(Source: P.A. 89-7, eff. 3-9-95.)

(Text of Section WITHOUT the changes made by P.A. 89-7, which has been held unconstitutional)
Sec. 3. Nothing herein affects the law as regards any category of trespasser, including the trespassing child entrant.
(Source: P.A. 83-1398.)

(740 ILCS 130/4) (from Ch. 80, par. 304)
Sec. 4. Notwithstanding this Act, the liability of any owner or occupier of a premises to anyone who enters or uses those premises for a recreational purpose, as defined by the Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act, is governed by that Act.
(Source: P.A. 100-863, eff. 8-14-18.)

(740 ILCS 130/4.1)
Sec. 4.1. Off-road riding facilities; liability.
(a) As used in this Section, "off-road riding facility" means:
(1) an area of land, consisting of a closed course,

designed for use of off-highway vehicles in events such as, but not limited to, dirt track, short track, flat track, speedway, drag racing, grand prix, hare scrambles, hill climb, ice racing, observed trails, mud and snow scrambles, tractor pulls, sled pulls, truck pulls, mud runs, or other contests of a side-by-side nature in a sporting event for practice, instruction, testing, or competition of off-highway vehicles; or
(2) a thoroughfare or track across land or snow used

for off-highway motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles.
(b) An owner or operator of an off-road riding facility in existence on January 1, 2002 is immune from any criminal liability arising out of or as a consequence of noise or sound emissions resulting from the use of the off-road riding facility. An owner or operator of an off-road riding facility is not subject to any action for public or private nuisance or trespass, and no court in this State may enjoin the use or operation of an off-road riding facility on the basis of noise or sound emissions resulting from the use of the off-road riding facility.
(c) An owner or operator of an off-road riding facility placed in operation after January 1, 2002 is immune from any criminal liability and is not subject to any action for public or private nuisance or trespass arising out of or as a consequence of noise or sound emissions resulting from the use of the off-road riding facility, if the off-road riding facility conforms to any one of the following requirements:
(1) All areas from which an off-road vehicle may be

properly operated are at least 1,000 feet from any occupied permanent dwelling on adjacent property at the time the facility was placed into operation.
(2) The off-road riding facility is situated on land

otherwise subject to land use zoning, and the off-road riding facility was not prohibited by the zoning authority at the time the facility was placed into operation.
(3) The off-road riding facility is operated by a

governmental entity or the off-road riding facility was the recipient of grants under the Recreational Trails of Illinois Act.
(d) The civil immunity in subsection (c) does not apply if there is willful or wanton misconduct outside the normal use of the off-road riding facility.
(Source: P.A. 98-847, eff. 1-1-15; 99-642, eff. 7-28-16.)

(740 ILCS 130/5)
Sec. 5. Firearm ranges; liability.
(a) As used in this Section, "firearm range" means a rifle, pistol, silhouette, skeet, trap, black powder, or other similar range in this State used for discharging firearms in a sporting event, for practice or instruction in the use of a firearm, or for the testing of a firearm. "Firearm range" also includes licensed shooting preserves and public hunting areas operated or licensed by the Department of Natural Resources.
(b) An owner or operator of a firearm range in existence on January 1, 1994, is immune from any criminal liability arising out of or as a consequence of noise or sound emissions resulting from the normal use of the firearm range. An owner or operator of a firearm range is not subject to any action for public or private nuisance or trespass and no court in this State shall enjoin the use or operation of a firearm range on the basis of noise or sound emissions resulting from the normal use of the firearm range.
(c) An owner or operator of a firearm range placed in operation after January 1, 1994, is immune from any criminal liability and is not subject to any action for public or private nuisance or trespass arising out of or as a consequence of noise or sound emissions resulting from the normal use of the firearm range, if the firearm range conforms to any one of the following requirements:
(1) All areas from which a firearm may be properly

discharged are at least 1,000 yards from any occupied permanent dwelling on adjacent property.
(2) All areas from which a firearm may be properly

discharged are enclosed by a permanent building or structure that absorbs or contains sound energy escaping from the muzzle of firearms in use.
(3) If the firearm range is situated on land

otherwise subject to land use zoning, the firearm range is in compliance with the requirements of the zoning authority.
(4) The firearm range is operated by a governmental

entity or is licensed by the Department of Natural Resources.
(5) The firearm range met the requirements of clause

(1) of this subsection (c) at the time the range began its operation and subsequently an occupied permanent dwelling on adjacent property was built within 1,000 yards from an area of the range from which a firearm may be properly discharged.
(Source: P.A. 94-387, eff. 7-29-05.)

Outcome: Stipulation of Dismissal filed by Stephanie Rein. When pleadings contain multiple attorney signatures, the non-filing attorney must include the language "with consent" with his/her signature. See Section 2.1 of the CM/ECF Users Manual. This notice is for informational purposes and therefore no action is required. (aza)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/20/2024)

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