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Date: 03-15-2024
Case Style:
Case Number: 125,632
Judge: Marla Jo Luckert
Court: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
Plaintiff's Attorney: Michael R. Serra, deputy district attorney, Michael F. Kagay, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
The facts underlying Edwards convictions, which arise from the shooting of a
marijuana dealer in a robbery attempt turned deadly, are developed in his prior appeals.
State v. Edwards, 311 Kan. 879, 467 P.3d 484 (2020) (affirming denial of motion for new
trial based on results of DNA testing); State v. Edwards, 264 Kan. 177, 955 P.2d 1276
(1998) (affirming conviction on direct appeal and remanding for nunc pro tunc correction
of journal entry of sentencing). Edwards was convicted of felony first-degree murder,
conspiracy to possess with intent to sell hallucinogenic drugs, and aggravated robbery.
Multiple witnesses testified they saw Edwards arrive at the residence of the victim,
Donnie Smart. A struggle ensued between the two, and witnesses heard gunshots and saw
Smart slump to his knees and then to the ground.
After this court affirmed Edwards' conviction and sentences on direct appeal, he
mounted several collateral attacks. See Edwards v. Roberts, 479 Fed. Appx. 822, 2012
WL 1573619 (10th Cir. 2012); Edwards v. State, No. 99,868, 2009 WL 1858243 (Kan.
App. 2009) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied May 18, 2010; Edwards v. State, 31 Kan.
App. 2d 778, 73 P.3d 772 (2003); Edwards v. State, No. 83,575, 2000 WL 36746174
(Kan. App. 2000) (unpublished opinion).
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After filing those cases, Edwards filed a motion in 2011 seeking DNA testing of
blood samples, clothes, drug paraphernalia, and a broken watch. The district court
granted the motion. DNA testing of some items was inconclusive or "effectively
excluded" Edwards as a source of the DNA. Edwards then asked for a new trial based on
the DNA results. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, but ultimately
denied relief. The court recognized that the DNA test results favored Edwards and that no
physical evidence had been admitted at trial linking Edwards to the murder. Even so, the
court denied Edwards a new trial after noting that Edwards' attorney emphasized the lack
of physical evidence throughout the trial, but the jury convicted him despite knowing no
physical evidence linked him to the crime. The court held it was not reasonably probable
the DNA test results would change the outcome of his trial because the eyewitness
accounts and overall totality of the evidence provided strong evidence that Edwards
committed the crimes.
Edwards filed a notice of appeal in which he sought appellate review of the district
court order denying his motion for a new trial "and all other adverse or partially adverse
rulings made in the course [of] the pursuit of his motion for DNA testing filed September
20, 2011." This court affirmed the district court. Edwards, 311 Kan. at 892.
In 2018, while Edwards' appeal of his 2011 motion was pending, he filed another
pro se motion for DNA testing. This time he requested testing of two additional untested
items—a bullet and a cigarette butt. The district court denied the motion, reasoning the
new tests results would be cumulative and nonexculpatory even if they favored Edwards
because the jury knew there was no implicating physical evidence, including DNA
evidence, admitted at trial. Edwards did not appeal this denial.
In early 2022, Edwards filed yet another motion for DNA testing, which was
functionally identical to the 2018 motion. The district court denied the motion, holding
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that "Edwards' present petition is identical to his Second Petition, which was denied by
this Court in April 2019. This Court will not relitigate this issue and relies on the doctrine
of the law of the case to deny Edwards' request."
Edwards now appeals that ruling.
ANALYSIS
Edwards argues the law of the case doctrine cannot be applied to preclude his
request for new testing. He contends the district court lost jurisdiction over his case when
he filed his notice of appeal in May 2018 and thus lacked jurisdiction to deny his
November 2018 motion. For support, he cites the general rule that an appeal divests the
district court of jurisdiction over the case. See State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 749, 415
P.3d 430 (2018) ("Once the case is appealed and the appeal is docketed, the district court
loses jurisdiction."). Second, he argues the statute does not restrict successive motions
and does not say that res judicata or other preclusion principles apply to K.S.A. 21-2512
motions.
Questions of jurisdiction, interpretation of statutes, and application of preclusion
doctrines—all of which come into play in this analysis—present issues of law. State v.
Smith, 311 Kan. 109, 111, 456 P.3d 1004 (2020); State v. Parry, 305 Kan. 1189, 1194,
390 P.3d 879 (2017). Exercising our de novo review of questions of law, we reject both
of Edwards' arguments.
The District Court had Jurisdiction over the 2018 Motion
In Thurber, 313 Kan. 1002, we rejected an argument like Edwards'. There, we held
a district court did not lose jurisdiction over another defendant's DNA testing motion
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even though an appeal was underway. The Thurber court acknowledged the general rule,
subject to several exceptions, that "'once a district court enters a valid judgment and the
time for appeal has expired, a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a postconviction
motion. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Smith, 309 Kan. 977, 981-82, 441 P.3d 1041
(2019)." Thurber, 313 Kan. at 1007; but see Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 285-87, 200
P.3d 467 (2009) (listing cases where district courts retained jurisdiction over portions of
case even while other parts were on appeal).
The Thurber court held the language of the DNA testing statute created an
exception to that general rule:
"Twice, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-2512 authorizes action 'notwithstanding any other
provision of law'—a phrase that, when combined with the absence of any limitation on
the timing of a petition ('at any time after conviction') or the timing of the district court's
authority to appoint counsel for a petitioner ('at any time'), leads us to conclude that the
Legislature intended to carve out K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-2512 as a special extension of the
district court's jurisdiction." 313 Kan. at 1007.
This holding suggests that the district court had jurisdiction over Edwards' 2018
motion. But Edwards argues Thurber can be distinguished. He notes that Thurber
involved a direct appeal raising issues separate from whether DNA testing should be
performed. Here, both the appeal of his 2011 motion and his 2018 motion relate to DNA
testing. He adds that "[n]owhere in the reasoning of Thurber is the suggestion that the
district court retains jurisdiction of the same subject matter under appellate review." He
also contends the general divestiture rule must apply when the subject of the appeal is
also presented in the motion pending in the district court. Otherwise, conflicting rulings
could result, creating confusion.
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The Thurber court recognized the same concerns Edwards now raises. But the
language of K.S.A. 21-2512, and the policy behind it, led the court to conclude the
district court had authority to hear a motion even when a case is on appeal:
"The risk of procedural confusion or uncertainty—or for a district court's ruling under
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-2512(f) to render moot an entire ongoing direct appeal—is not
insignificant. But the Legislature has decided to expand the district court's jurisdiction to
proceedings under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-2512, irrespective of ongoing appellate
proceedings.
"We further recognize the policy goals behind such an expansion in the case of
DNA evidence, which, by its very nature, is impermanent. A discussion of the likelihood
of such degradation—or of the methods used by law enforcement to prevent such
degradation—is far beyond the purview of this opinion. Suffice it to say that we, like the
Legislature, recognize the risk that an innocent individual convicted of a crime covered
by the statute could lose the ability to establish innocence via postconviction procedures
due solely to the caprice of fate and time.
"Consequently, we conclude that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-2512 grants continuing
jurisdiction to 'the court that entered the judgment' to consider a petition for DNA testing
'at any time' following conviction and to appoint counsel 'at any time,' regardless of other
ongoing appellate proceedings." (Emphasis added). 313 Kan. at 1008-09.
Granted, the Thurber court continued by restating its holding in the context of the
case before it—a direct appeal without appellate finality. But that statement merely
reflected the facts of the case. It did not derive from language in the statute, for there is
no such limitation expressed by the Legislature. Rather, the Legislature chose broad,
unrestricted language—language about "notwithstanding any other provision of the law"
and "at any time." Imposing the limitation Edwards seeks would require us to add words
creating an exception that would say something like "anytime, except when a case is on
appeal." But courts do not add or delete words to plain language written by the
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Legislature, and the words of K.S.A. 21-2512 are clear. See State v. Young, 313 Kan.
724, 728, 490 P.3d 1183 (2021) (when statute's language is unambiguous, courts do not
add or ignore words).
Applying Thurber, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction to deny Edwards'
November 2018 motion. This means the court's order became the law of the case. The
remaining question is whether the district court erred by applying the law of the case
doctrine to a successive motion under K.S.A. 21-2512.
Law of the Case Can Apply to a K.S.A. 21-2512 Motion
Edwards argues the law of the case doctrine should not be applied because K.S.A.
21-2512 does not expressly limit successive motions. In contrast, the Legislature has
explicitly stated in another postconviction statute that "[t]he sentencing court shall not be
required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the
same prisoner." K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(c). His argument, which presumes a statute
must authorize use of the doctrine, presents a legal question over which an appellate court
exercises unlimited review. Parry, 305 Kan. at 1194. Our unlimited review is guided by
the history and purpose of the doctrine.
In general, the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary preclusion doctrine courts
employ to avoid indefinitely relitigating the matter at issue. Parry, 305 Kan. at 1194; see
State v. Collier, 263 Kan. 629, 631-34, 952 P.2d 1326 (1998) (discussing the doctrine and
its history). Collier explains that the doctrine derives from court decisions that date back
at least to the 1800's. 263 Kan. at 631 (citing Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. [5 Cranch] 313, 3 L.
Ed. 111 [1809]; Headley v. Challiss, 15 Kan. 602, 605-06 [1875]). The doctrine applies
not only to matters decided in prior proceedings, but also to matters in prior proceedings
for which the party failed to seek review. Parry, 305 Kan. at 1195 (citing Smith v.
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Bassett, 159 Kan. 128, Syl. ¶ 3, 152 P.2d 794 [1944]). And Kansas appellate courts have
applied the doctrine in many criminal cases. See 305 Kan. at 1194 (discussing variety of
cases).
Contrary to Edwards' argument, we do not see the Legislature's inclusion of the
successive motion provision in K.S.A. 60-1507 as an indication that K.S.A. 21-2512
needed a statement like that in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(c) before a court could apply
the law of the case doctrine. Edwards presents no legal or policy reasons suggesting
courts cannot apply the doctrines in the absence of a statute. And we see nothing in
K.S.A. 21-2512 that would prevent application of a preclusion doctrine. While the statute
allows a motion to be filed at any time, thus freeing the filings from temporal limitations
and from restrictions on the procedural postconviction stage at which a motion can be
filed, no language explicitly permits relitigating settled issues. Further, Edwards'
requested limitation would be contrary to another case in which we recognized that
preclusion doctrines applied to motions under K.S.A. 21-2512.
In State v. Bailey, 315 Kan. 794, 510 P.3d 1160 (2022), the petitioner sought DNA
testing of materials alleged to be in the State's possession. The State no longer had those
materials, and the question of what was in the State's possession had already been
litigated and resolved. Under those circumstances, Bailey held the defendant was barred
from relitigating prior judicial determinations by the application of the doctrine of res
judicata. 315 Kan. at 803. While the decision rested on res judicata, the Bailey court
included language covering the law of the case doctrine as well. The court recognized
that "[r]es judicata is one of three doctrines—the other two being law of the case and
collateral estoppel—that put into practice the policy that courts generally will not reopen
matters already decided by a court." 315 Kan. at 797.
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We extend Bailey to hold the law of the case doctrine applies to K.S.A. 21-2512
motions and prevents a party from relitigating an issue already decided in the same
proceeding. Here, Edwards' 2022 motion for DNA testing under K.S.A. 21-2512 is
identical to his 2018 motion. The district court denied the motion, and it became the law
of the case. The district court correctly held the law of the case doctrine precluded
Edwards from relitigating the same issue through his 2022 motion for DNA testing.
Affirmed.
Outcome:
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: