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Date: 07-02-2024
Case Style:
State of Colorado v. Ricardo Castro
Case Number: 2024 CO 56
Judge: Not Available
Court: District Court, Denver County, Colorado
Plaintiff's Attorney: Denver County District Attorney's Office
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Denver, Colorado criminal defense lawyers represented the Defendant who was charged with a felony.
¶1 Trial by jury is perhaps the most vital cog in the wheel of our criminal justice system. We have long attached "great importance to the concept of relying on a body of one's peers to determine guilt or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970). Accompanying this hallowed tradition is the right in felony cases to a fair and unanimous verdict by a jury of twelve free from outside interference. Colo. Const. art. II, § 23; Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 90-93 (2020); People v. Boulies, 690 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Colo. 1984). Because the incapacitation of a juror in the middle of deliberations can place this right in jeopardy, our court has developed a framework to shield the right while preventing a mistrial. We now reaffirm this framework.
¶2 In the case before us, a juror became incapacitated after deliberating for approximately nine hours on felony charges brought against the defendant, Ricardo Castro. To salvage the trial, the court replaced the unavailable juror with an alternate juror. Although it acknowledged that mid-deliberations juror substitution raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583, 590 (Colo. 1989), it rightly explained that such a presumption may be overcome by taking the thorough precautions developed in Burnette and Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 492 (Colo. 1999). After applying such precautions, the court instructed the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew.
¶3 The reconstituted jury deliberated for five and a half hours and then returned a guilty verdict. Castro appealed, arguing that the trial court had reversibly erred by replacing a regular juror with the alternate juror. But a division of the court of appeals upheld the trial court's actions. People v. Castro, No. 18CA2389, ¶¶ 6, 29 (Aug. 11, 2022).
¶4 Before us, Castro maintains that whether the trial court has authority to replace a regular juror with an alternate juror after deliberations have begun presents a question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review. Relying on that standard of review, he urges us to conclude that the controlling statute, section 16-10-105, C.R.S. (2023), does not allow for the mid-deliberations substitution of a juror and, therefore, the trial court erred. Castro then reminds us that in James v. People, 2018 CO 72, 426 P.3d 336, we adopted a harmlessness standard of reversal in a situation in which the alternate juror was inadvertently permitted to be present and briefly participate as a thirteenth juror during the first ten minutes of deliberations. This, he asserts, is also the appropriate standard of reversal in a mid-deliberations juror-substitution situation. Consequently, he asks us to reject the presumption-of-prejudice standard of reversal from Burnette and Carrillo. And, because in his view the People have failed to establish that the mid-deliberations substitution in this case was harmless, he argues that his conviction must be reversed.[1]
¶1 Trial by jury is perhaps the most vital cog in the wheel of our criminal justice system. We have long attached "great importance to the concept of relying on a body of one's peers to determine guilt or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970). Accompanying this hallowed tradition is the right in felony cases to a fair and unanimous verdict by a jury of twelve free from outside interference. Colo. Const. art. II, § 23; Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 90-93 (2020); People v. Boulies, 690 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Colo. 1984). Because the incapacitation of a juror in the middle of deliberations can place this right in jeopardy, our court has developed a framework to shield the right while preventing a mistrial. We now reaffirm this framework.
¶2 In the case before us, a juror became incapacitated after deliberating for approximately nine hours on felony charges brought against the defendant, Ricardo Castro. To salvage the trial, the court replaced the unavailable juror with an alternate juror. Although it acknowledged that mid-deliberations juror substitution raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583, 590 (Colo. 1989), it rightly explained that such a presumption may be overcome by taking the thorough precautions developed in Burnette and Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 492 (Colo. 1999). After applying such precautions, the court instructed the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew.
¶3 The reconstituted jury deliberated for five and a half hours and then returned a guilty verdict. Castro appealed, arguing that the trial court had reversibly erred by replacing a regular juror with the alternate juror. But a division of the court of appeals upheld the trial court's actions. People v. Castro, No. 18CA2389, ¶¶ 6, 29 (Aug. 11, 2022).
¶4 Before us, Castro maintains that whether the trial court has authority to replace a regular juror with an alternate juror after deliberations have begun presents a question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review. Relying on that standard of review, he urges us to conclude that the controlling statute, section 16-10-105, C.R.S. (2023), does not allow for the mid-deliberations substitution of a juror and, therefore, the trial court erred. Castro then reminds us that in James v. People, 2018 CO 72, 426 P.3d 336, we adopted a harmlessness standard of reversal in a situation in which the alternate juror was inadvertently permitted to be present and briefly participate as a thirteenth juror during the first ten minutes of deliberations. This, he asserts, is also the appropriate standard of reversal in a mid-deliberations juror-substitution situation. Consequently, he asks us to reject the presumption-of-prejudice standard of reversal from Burnette and Carrillo. And, because in his view the People have failed to establish that the mid-deliberations substitution in this case was harmless, he argues that his conviction must be reversed.[1]
Outcome: Defendant was convicted.
Affirmed on appeal.
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