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Date: 07-02-2024
Case Style:
William Grant v. Isaac Argon, et al.
Case Number: 1:24-CV-216
Judge: William P. Johnson
Court: United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (Bernalillo County)
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Defendant's Attorney: Allison M. Beaulieu for Aragon
Stephanie M. Griffin for the City of Albuqueque
Description:
Albuquerque, New Mexico civil rights lawyer represented the Plaintiff who sued personal injury theory.
On March 7, 2021, Mr. Aragon was a police officer with the City of Albuquerque (Doc. 1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 6 ¶ 4). Mr. Aragon conducted a traffic stop of a blue van because it had “attempted to run him off the road.” Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 4-5. During this encounter, Mr. Aragon was in his marked police vehicle, id. at ¶ 4, and Mr. Grant was the driver of the van. Id. at ¶ 5.
Once Mr. Grant stopped driving, he then concealed his identity, provided a stolen driver's license, lied about his age, and claimed to not know his social security number (Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 67). Mr. Aragon then asked Mr. Grant to exit the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 8. He did not. Ibid. Instead, Mr. Grant reached for a gun, id. at ¶ 8, before grabbing his keys and driving away. Ibid.
Because of the threat posed, Mr. Aragon fired shots as Mr. Grant fled the scene. Doc. 6 at ¶ 10. Mr. Grant was then followed by law enforcement (who had their lights and sirens engaged)- but he eluded them (refusing to yield or pull over). Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
Ultimately, Mr. Grant escaped. Doc. 6 at ¶ 13. To further throw law enforcement off his trail, he disposed of the blue van and the contents. Ibid. Mr. Grant knew that the van and its contents would be important (i.e., material evidence) to a future lawsuit (i.e., potential litigation). Id. at ¶ 14. Mr. Aragon alleges that Mr. Grant's disposal of the van was done intentionally to disrupt any such future litigation. Id. at ¶ 15. And because of Mr. Grant's failure to preserve the evidence-again, the van and its contents-Mr. Aragon has been “adversely affected” in his ability to “defend this lawsuit, assist with any criminal prosecution of the matter, and/or prove his affirmative defenses.” Id. at ¶ 16.
Accordingly, Mr. Aragon now brings a counterclaim under New Mexico state law[2] for the tort of spoliation of evidence.
* * *
New Mexico recognizes the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. See Gcm, Inc. v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 1997-NMSC-052, at ¶ 16, 124 N.M. 186, 947 P.2d 143 (N.M. 1997) (citing Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 1995-NMSC-70, 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) (recognizing intentional spoliation of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001)). The Coleman case outlines the elements of spoliation as follows:
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(1) the existence of a potential lawsuit; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the potential lawsuit; (3) the destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of potential evidence; (4) intent on part of the defendant to disrupt or defeat the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the act of spoliation and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages.
Coleman, 1995-NMSC-70, at ¶ 13 (citing Philip A. Lionberger, Interference with Prospective Civil Litigation by Spoliation of Evidence: Should Texas Adopt a New Tort?, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 222 (1989)); cf. UJI § 13-1650 NMRA (“Spoliation of Evidence”).
Mr. Grant argues that New Mexico law does not recognize the tort of spoliation in the factual scenario outlined above (Doc. 15 at 2-3). Lacking here, in his view, is the “intent to disrupt or defeat” a “civil claim.” Id. at 2.
Outcome: "Counter-Claimant's tort claim for spoliation of evidence (Doc. 6 at 5-7) is plausible. The Court, therefore, DENIES Counter-Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: