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Date: 07-05-2024
Case Style:
William A. White v. United States of America
Case Number: 5:20-CV-141
Judge:
Court: United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (Oklahoma County)
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Defendant's Attorney: United States Attorney's Office in Oklahoma City
Description:
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma personal injury lawyer represented the Plaintiff who sued on a Federal Tort Claims Act negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Mr. William A. White, a federal prisoner, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED") and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress ("NIED") in connection with the use of "black-box" restraints and for the time he spent in a Special Housing Unit ("SHU") (also known as "solitary confinement") under restricted-environmental-stimuli ("RES") conditions during his incarceration at the Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma ("FTC Oklahoma City") between April 21, 2015, and April 30, 2015. White claimed that he "suffered, among other afflictions, post-traumatic stress disorder ('PTSD') as a result of these conditions
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Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title
18)." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The PLRA does not define "physical injury" in the statute. See Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We note at the outset that the phrase 'physical injury' does not wear its meaning on its face."); see also Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). "In drafting § 1997e(e), Congress failed to specify the type, duration, extent, or cause of 'physical injury' that it intended to serve as a threshold qualification for mental and emotional injury claims. Nor did it define the meaning or limits of 'mental or emotional injury.'" Oliver, 289 F.3d at 626.
In light of this omission, courts have used various principles of statutory interpretation to define the contours of § 1997e(e)'s physical injury requirement. To date, all circuits to have addressed the issue have read into § 1997e(e)'s "physical injury" requirement a "threshold of degree or severity"-specifically, a more-than-de-minimis-injury requirement. Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2023); see also id. ("On its face, § 1997e(e) requires only a 'physical injury' without a set threshold of degree or severity. But so far, all seven circuits to address the issue have required plaintiffs to show more than a de minimis physical injury to recover for a mental or emotional injury.").[5] While the Tenth Circuit has not yet held in a published opinion whether a physical injury must be more than de minimis to recover for a mental or emotional injury, we assumed without deciding in Johnson that the more-than-de-minimis standard applied, and-as both parties note-district courts in this circuit have required a physical injury to be more than de minimis to support recovery for a mental or emotional injury. See Johnson, 57 F.4th at 777; see, e.g., Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1246 (D. Colo. 2006); Edwards v. Miller, No. 06-cv-933, 2007 WL 951696, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2007); Jordanoff v. Lester, No. 15-cv-939, 2018 WL 1352184, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2018); Johnson v. Aucoin, No. 18-cv-194, 2019 WL 699111, at *8 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2019).
White v. United States, 21-6007 (10th Cir. Jul 05, 2024)
Outcome: Dismissed.
Affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: