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Date: 08-22-2024
Case Style:
James D. Buchanan v. Dr. Cooper and Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC
Case Number: 6:18-cv-00171
Judge: Eric F. Helgren
Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma (Muskogee County)
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Defendant's Attorney: Alexander C. Vosler, Anthony C. Winter, Austin J. Young, Sean Snider, Shade Kremer
Description:
Muskogee, Oklahoma 1983 civil rights violation lawyers represented the Plaintiff.
On September 16, 2016, Plaintiff was riding his bicycle when a vehicle struck him. He suffered multiple injuries due to the accident and was taken to Eastar Health System, where doctors diagnosed him with facial abrasions and lacerations, tenderness in his ribs and back, and diminished breathing sounds. A CT scan showed fractures in four ribs, a collapsed left lung, and an apparent hematoma along his spine. The following day, Plaintiff was transferred to St. John's Medical Center and admitted to the intensive care unit, where doctors again diagnosed Plaintiff's hematoma. St. John's Medical Center discharged Plaintiff from its care on September 30, 2016, but he returned on October 14, 2016, to be seen at the emergency department and complained of persistent neck pain. The emergency department diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from muscle spasms in his neck and prescribed methocarbamol and naproxen.
On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff saw a chiropractor and complained of intense and constant pain in his neck, shoulders, and arms. Plaintiff went to the chiropractor four times over the next ten days, and the chiropractor each time ordered cold pack therapy and electrical stimulation. During this period, Plaintiff also sought treatment from a doctor at Riverwest Medical Clinic, where he complained of constant neck pain and a tingling sensation in his left arm. The doctor diagnosed Plaintiff as having suffered an acute cervical and thoracic spine injury, a left shoulder injury, left rib fractures, and posttraumatic headaches resulting from the motor vehicle accident in September. He recommended Plaintiff continue taking his prescribed medication and seeing the chiropractor, and he advised Plaintiff should return for a reevaluation in two weeks.
On November 3, 2016, before Plaintiff could return to his doctor, he was booked into the Muskogee County Jail. During booking, Nurse Rosemary Kotas and Plaintiff completed a medical intake form indicating that he was taking anti-inflammatory medication, muscle relaxers, and pain medication as prescribed by Dr. Trinidad of the Riverwest Medical Center. Plaintiff further indicated that he had broken ribs, a collapsed lung, burnt fingers, and “neck problems” following his motor vehicle accident.
The following day, Nurse Delena Ayers contacted Dr. William Cooper, who prescribed 500mg of naproxen twice per day for Plaintiff. On November 6, 2016, Plaintiff complained of shoulder pain, but there is no indication of any treatment provided at that time or shortly after his complaints. On November 11, 2016, Plaintiff complained that he was experiencing pain and decreased range of motion in his limbs and neck. Consequently, Plaintiff was placed on sick call to see Dr. Cooper.
The Court has reviewed the related exhibit and is skeptical of the assertion that it states Plaintiff should receive naproxen twice per day. The exhibit appears to state “Naproxen 500mg 1 PD.” Dkt. No. 149-1 at 5. However, Plaintiff has admitted that the order was for twice daily medication. Dkt. No. 172 at 3. It is also unclear whether the medication was administered twice per day. Defendant cites a medication administration record indicating that the medication was dispensed both in the morning and evening [Dkt. No. 149-1 at 12], but Plaintiff testified he only received evening medication (Dkt. No. 172-11 at 179:16-24). McCullar, who supposedly administered the morning medications according to the record, could not recall providing medication to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 172-15 at 24:16-25:9). The Court assumes, as it must, that medication was dispensed only once per day and McCullar was not the nurse who provided it to Plaintiff.
The same day he was placed on sick call, Plaintiff participated in a video call with his brother. Plaintiff appears extremely disheveled in the video, with his orange jumpsuit unbuttoned and hanging off one shoulder. During that call, Plaintiff is helped to his feet by a fellow inmate after he had presumably been sitting on the ground. Plaintiff can stand and walk, though seemingly with difficulty, and he exhibits limited use of each hand. He also complains to his brother of being in pain and having trouble getting medical treatment.
The parties disagree as to how to interpret what the video shows. The Court's description of the video reflects what is shown with minimal interpretation or assumptions. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
On November 14, 2016 at 11:27 a.m., Nurse McCullar arrived at Plaintiff's cell in response to Plaintiff's complaint to jail staff that he could not walk. When she arrived, Plaintiff was sitting at a table with his head down and complained of pain, an inability to walk or otherwise move his legs, and tingling in his legs. According to Nurse McCullar's deposition testimony, Plaintiff was not flaccid and had no outwardly obvious signs of paralysis, and she could see muscle tone as he was sitting. Nurse McCullar contacted Dr. Cooper, who told her to place Plaintiff on the list to be seen for the upcoming week. She also placed a records request regarding Plaintiff's hospitalization related to his motor vehicle accident.
Later that same day, at 8:10 p.m., jail staff asked Nurse Kotas to come and investigate Plaintiff's medical needs. She found Plaintiff sitting at a table with his head down and decreased range of motion in his neck and limbs. She also determined that Plaintiff had lost control of his urinary functions and urinated on himself and the floor. After Plaintiff complained of his pain being ten out of ten, Nurse Kotas checked Plaintiff's vitals and found his heart rate was 116 beats per minute, his blood pressure was 139/93, and his oxygen saturation was between 84 and 90 percent. She called Dr. Cooper and relayed the information to him. Dr. Cooper ordered that Plaintiff be sent to an emergency department for evaluation.
Muskogee Emergency Medical Services arrived at the Jail and took Plaintiff to the Wagoner Emergency Department. According to Wagoner Community Hospital records, Plaintiff complained of body pain, neck pain, and weakness. A few hours later, Plaintiff received transportation to Hillcrest Medical Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. On November 16, 2016, Dr. Clinton Baird performed surgery on Plaintiff after concluding that he was suffering from an epidural spinal abscess.
Plaintiff complains the Hillcrest Medical Center records are illegible, but the Court's review indicates that the date on the records shows Plaintiff's surgery occurred on November 16, 2016. Dkt. No. 144-13 at 4.
Plaintiff claims that “substantial evidence” exists “that overcrowding at the Jail and understaffing of detention officers obstructed the Turn Key nursing staff from conducting sick call and from providing adequate care to the inmates at the Jail.” His only specific citation for this assertion is to the entirety of his broad, non-particularized, argumentative response to Defendants' particularized facts. This response fails to controvert Defendants' evidence, including direct testimony from Dr. Cooper that there was no reason to believe Jail staff prevented Turn Key staff from providing Plaintiff with medical care. While Plaintiff cites a March 2016 inspection showing Jail overcrowding, the Sheriff puts forth an October 2016 inspection-closer in time to the November 2016 events underlying the lawsuit-showing no violations and substantial compliance with inspection requirements.
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“Persons” subject to § 1983 liability include both “municipalities and other local government units.” Such local government units include counties. The Supreme Court has held that a unit of local government can be liable under § 1983 for violations of civil rights if the violation is a result of a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.” This “official policy” requirement distinguishes the act of the local governmental unit from acts of its employees, as governmental liability cannot derive from a theory of respondeat superior.
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A plaintiff must establish three elements to prove governmental or municipal liability: an official policy or custom, causation, and state of mind. A policy or custom may include:
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013).
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions-and the basis for them-of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
Deliberate indifference is defined differently regarding municipal and individual § 1983 defendants. In the municipal context, “the municipality [must have] actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and [it must] consciously or deliberately choose[] to disregard the risk of harm.” In general, notice is “established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct, ” but occasionally it may be proven “if a violation of federal rights is a ‘highly predictable' or ‘plainly obvious consequence' of a municipality's action or inaction.” This is a “stringent standard of fault, ” as a lesser burden on a plaintiff “would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities.”
“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality.” He must show that “the municipality was the ‘moving force' behind the injury alleged, ” meaning “the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and [there was] a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”
Outcome: Settled for an undisclosed sum and dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: