Date: 09-11-2024

Case Style:

Aaron McLaughlin, et al. v. Tesla, Inc.

Case Number: 22-CV-7849

Judge: Sudan Dan Keulen

Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco County)

Plaintiff's Attorney:

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Defendant's Attorney: Travis A. Bustamente

Description:

San Francisco, California personal injury product liability lawyers represented the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Aaron McLaughlin and Tara Clark, husband and wife, reside in Virginia. In 2018, they purchased a car from Tesla in Virginia. Tesla is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Texas but designed and manufactured the car in question in California.[3] In October 2020, while Plaintiff McLaughlin was driving on the highway in Virginia, he was involved in a car accident. The Parties dispute the cause of the accident; Plaintiffs blame Tesla's allegedly defective design and manufacture of the car, and Tesla blames Plaintiff McLaughlin's allegedly negligent operation of the car.

Two years after the accident, Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover for Plaintiff McLaughlin's injuries under theories of strict liability and negligence and to recover for Plaintiff Clark's alleged loss of consortium. See Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 34-84. The Parties dispute whether Virginia law or California law governs these claims.

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Tesla identifies four discrete principles of Virginia law that it wants the Court to apply:

• Only medical doctors can opine as to the cause of a human injury, as opposed to California's less-restrictive requirements;

• Products liability is evaluated under a negligence regime, as opposed to California's strict-liability regime;

• The availability of a contributory-negligence defense, as opposed to California's comparative-fault scheme; and

• A $350,000 cap on punitive damages, as opposed to California's lack of a fixed-dollar cap.

As discussed below, the first principle of Virginia law does not apply to this action, but the remaining three principles do.

A. Virginia's Limitation On Opining About Human Injuries Does Not Apply

Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Fratto opines that the car crash in question caused Plaintiff McLaughlin to suffer certain injuries. Dr. Fratto is a neuropsychologist, not a medical doctor, and under Virginia law, “only a medical doctor is qualified to give expert testimony about the cause of human physical injury.” Hollingsworth v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 279 Va. 360, 364 (2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Tesla argues, Dr. Fratto may not opine as to the cause of Plaintiff McLaughlin's injuries. Plaintiffs counter that this principle of Virginia law does not apply to this
action because it concerns admissibility, and in federal court, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and not state law, governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Plaintiffs' position is incorrect because they conflate competency under Rule 601 with admissibility under Rule 702.

Under Rule 601, where state law governs a claim or defense in a civil action, state law also governs a “witness's competency regarding [that] claim or defense.” See Fed.R.Evid. 601. Competency, to be sure, remains difficult to distinguish from admissibility, as both concepts encompass the qualifications of an expert to offer an opinion. See 27 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6003 (2d ed. June 2024 update) (“While the distinction between competence and admissibility is basic to Rule 601, that distinction has not always been clear in the law of evidence.... [F]ederal courts still invoke the word competency when discussing admissibility ....” (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit instructs that the two concepts are different: “A witness may be competent but unable to testify as to anything [admissible].” Liebsack v. United States, 731 F.3d 850, 857 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Thus, rather than usurping admissibility standards under Rule 702, Rule 601 “leave[s] room for application of Rule 702 after state competency standards and Rule 601 are satisfied.” See Id. The Virginia rule in question constitutes such a state competency standard. See, e.g., Id. at 854-57 (treating Alaska statute setting forth qualifications for experts who may opine on standard of care in professional-negligence actions as setting forth competency requirement).

The question remains whether Virginia law or California law governs Dr. Fratto's competency to opine as to the cause of Plaintiff McLaughlin's injuries, and the Court resolves that question through analysis under California's choice-of-law principles. See Est. of Aguirre ex rel. Aguirre v. Koruga, 42 Fed.Appx. 73, 75 (9th Cir. 2002). Under California's choice-of-law principles, the Court must apply governmental-interest analysis to determine which state's substantive law applies; procedural issues, however, remain subject to the law of the forum. See Arno v. Club Med Boutique Inc., 134 F.3d 1424, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1998); Saw v. Avago Techs. Ltd., 51 Cal.App. 5th 1102, 1108 (1st Dist. Div. 1 2020); Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Techs. Inc., 50 Cal.App. 5th 1009, 1016 (4th Dist. Div 1 2020). “As defined in the case law, the terms ‘practice' and ‘procedure' include the mode of procedure by which a legal right is enforced as distinguished from the substantive law which gives or declares the right.” Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc., 167 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 (6th Dist. 2008) (citation omitted); accord City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, 44 Cal.App. 5th 243, 268 (4th Dist. Div. 3 2020). Under this framework, evaluating the competency of an expert constitutes a procedural issue under California law because the expert's competency does not concern the giving or declaring of a right but instead concerns the method through which rights are enforced. See also Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39 Cal.2d 12, 19 (1952) (“The law of the forum controls the rules of evidence ....” (citations omitted)); accord Spector v. Glob. Aerospace Underwriting Managers, Ltd., No. B271085, 2017 WL 2806881, at *4 n.6 (Cal.Ct.App. 2d Dist. Div. 1 June 29, 2017); see, e.g., Prod. Mktg. Concepts, Inc. v. Streamline Shippers Ass'n, Inc., No. B158688, 2003 WL 1788796, at *4 (Cal.Ct.App. 2d Dist. Div. 8 Apr. 4, 2003) (“[I]t is irrelevant whether Virginia law permits a party to use non-record or extrinsic evidence to prove an issue was adjudicated in a prior proceeding. Evidentiary questions are controlled by the law of the forum. California law therefore governs the question whether evidence outside the record of the underlying proceeding may be used to prove an issue was adjudicated.” (citation and footnote omitted)).

Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, the Court resolves the choice-of-law issues presented by Tesla as follows:

• Tesla's request to exclude Dr. Fratto's testimony under Virginia law is DENIED.

• Tesla's request to apply Virginia's negligence regime is GRANTED.

• Tesla's request to apply Virginia's contributory-negligence rule is GRANTED.

• Tesla's request to apply Virginia's $350,000 cap on punitive damages is GRANTED.

• Tesla's request to broadly apply Virginia law to every substantive issue in this action is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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