Defendant's Attorney: Linda D. Fegins

Description:

Detroit, Michigan civil rights personal injury lawyer represented the Plaintiff who claimed that their civil rights were violated by the Defendant.

On a Friday night, Lamonte Jackson-Gibson celebrated his birthday with several friends, including his girlfriend, Toriel Dixon. After midnight, the group took the celebration to Detroit’s Greektown neighborhood. There, they stopped on the sidewalk to listen to street musicians. Sergeant Reginald Beasley, accompanied by several other police
officers, engaged the group and asked them to move along. Jackson-Gibson questioned Sgt. Beasley as to why he needed to leave, and the situation escalated. After a series of mostly nonviolent verbal exchanges, with some pushing and pulling thrown into the mix, Sgt. Beasley tased Jackson-Gibson in his back while he embraced Dixon. Jackson-Gibson and Dixon were
then arrested.

Defendant filed a motion for summary claiming qualified immunity.


Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages under § 1983
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quotation omitted). “Such immunity is an expression of policy designed to aid in the effective
functioning of government,” Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted), giving “government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments about open legal questions” so that only the “plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law” are subject to suit, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)
(quotation omitted). “At summary judgment, a government official is entitled to qualified
immunity unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a
reasonable juror to find that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was
clearly established.” Raimey v. City of Niles, 77 F.4th 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where video evidence depicts the events, we view the facts “in the
light depicted by the videotape” and do not adopt a version of the facts that is “blatantly
contradicted by the record.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007).

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures by police officers. U.S. Const.
amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable seizures bars police officers from
using excessive force when making an arrest.” Farris v. Oakland County, 96 F.4th 956, 964 (6th
Cir. 2024). “Whether an officer exerts excessive force is determined under an objective
reasonableness standard.” Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 952 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Objective reasonableness is judged “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer at the scene, and not from the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Puskas v. Delaware County, 56 F.4th 1088, 1094 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). In our review, we consider the totality of the circumstances and specifically address: (1) the severity of the crime; (2) the suspect’s immediate threat to officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting or evading arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)

We start by reflecting on the seriousness of the crimes at issue. The
confrontation underlying this action began when Sgt. Beasley approached Jackson-Gibson and
his companions as they gathered on the sidewalk listening to street musicians. Sgt. Beasley
believed the group to be loitering, and so he asked them to move along. Loitering is a civil
infraction. But when Jackson-Gibson did not leave the area, Sgt. Beasley believed that Jackson-
Gibson committed the crimes of resisting or obstructing an officer and disturbing the peace. See
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.170; 750.479(1)(b). Resisting or obstructing an officer is a felony
offense which prohibits individuals from “knowingly and willfully” obstructing “an officer
enforcing an ordinance.” Id. § 750.479(2). Disturbing the peace is a misdemeanor. Id.
§ 750.170. Jackson-Gibson was charged with, and acquitted of, those offenses.
We have previously determined that disturbing the peace is “relatively minor” in the
excessive-force context. Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2009).
As for the offense of resisting or obstructing an officer, not all felony offenses are severe
crimes. Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44 F.4th 427, 441 (6th Cir. 2022). In fact, “numerous
misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 14 (1985). Here, a reasonable jury could find, based on the video evidence, that even if
Jackson-Gibson committed the offense of resisting or obstructing an officer, he did so in a
nonviolent manner. True, Jackson-Gibson may have made statements that Sgt. Beasley did not
appreciate and, according to Sgt. Beasley, Jackson-Gibson took a fighting stance after Sgt.
Beasley shoved Dixon. But at no point did he act in a manner that a reasonable officer would
perceive as violent. See Shumate, 44 F.4th at 441 (opining that even if the officer believed the
plaintiff committed the felony offense of resisting or obstructing an officer, “there was minimal
(if any) connotation of violence”); LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, 30 F.4th 572, 580 (6th Cir.
2022) (“[T]here is no allegation that Plaintiff’s offense was violent or otherwise resulted in any
injuries.”).

Under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, an officer can tase a suspect who “actively
resists arrest . . . to subdue him.” Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2015).
“Active resistance has been found where some outward manifestation—either verbal or
physical—on the part of the suspect had suggested volitional and conscious defiance.” Shumate,
44 F.4th at 446 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also King v. City of Rockford, 97 F.4th
379, 395 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Active resistance can be characterized by physical force, a show of
force, or verbal hostility coupled with failure to comply with police orders.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). An officer cannot, however, tase a suspect who does not actively resist arrest
or who has stopped resisting arrest. Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 642. Surrendering to arrest by law
enforcement is one way to stop actively resisting arrest. But it is not the only way. Complying
with officers’ commands and doing nothing to resist arrest are also ways a suspect can stop
actively resisting arrest. Id. at 641. And “the fact that a suspect does not immediately surrender
does not inherently mean that he is resisting.” LaPlante, 30 F.4th at 580. So when a suspect
passively resists arrest by refusing to comply, an officer cannot use a taser to compel
compliance. Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 323 (6th Cir. 2015). In other words,
“when individuals behave nonviolently and are merely noncompliant, this Court has found that
they are only passively resisting arrest, which weighs against the reasonableness of a use of
force.” Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995, 1005 (6th Cir. 2024)

Outcome: For these reasons, we DISMISS Sgt. Beasley’s appeal as to Jackson-Gibson’s and
Dixon’s wrongful-arrest claims and AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Sgt. Beasley as to Jackson-Gibson’s excessive-force claim

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