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Date: 11-12-2024
Case Style:
State of New Jersey v. Dale Edwards
Case Number: 11-07-0635
Judge: Not Available
Court: Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergan County)
Plaintiff's Attorney: Bergen County, New Jersey Prosecutor's Office
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Hackensack, New Jersey criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with third-degree possession of meth.
A grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging defendant with: (1) third-degree possession of methamphetamine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); (2) fourth-degree possession of a counterfeit New Hampshire Driver's License, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1d; (3) second-degree possession of a handgun without first having a permit to carry same, N.J.S.A. 2C:39:5b(1); (4) fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d; and (5) second-degree certain persons not to have a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).
Defendant's vehicle was stopped for making an illegal U-turn.
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"Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee that '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.'" Witt, 223 N.J. at 421-22 (quoting N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7; U.S. Const. amend. IV).
"A lawful roadside stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure under both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017). Therefore, "[i]n order to justify such a seizure, 'a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense.'" Id. at 533 (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)).
"During an otherwise lawful traffic stop, a police officer may inquire 'into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop.'" Ibid. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); and then citing State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 479 (1998) ("[T]he reasonableness of [a] detention is not limited to investigating the circumstances of the traffic stop.")). "Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes 'ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.'" Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)) (alteration in original). Ordinarily, such inquiries-as happened here-include "checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Ibid. When, "as a result of the initial stop or further inquiries, 'the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden [the] inquiry and satisfy those suspicions.'" Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 533 (quoting Dickey, 152 N.J. at 479-80) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"An officer's ability to pursue incidental inquiries, however, is not without limitations." Ibid. "A lawful traffic stop can transform into an unlawful detention 'if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes' on constitutionally protected interests." Ibid. (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Therefore, "the incidental checks performed by a police officer may not be performed 'in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.'" Id. at 533-34 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; and then citing Dickey, 512 N.J. at 476-79 (noting that detention can become unlawful if longer than needed to diligently investigate suspicions)).
"In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court must consider 'the totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture.'" State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554 (2019) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 361 (2002)). We must "not engage in a 'divide-and-conquer' analysis by looking at each fact in isolation." Id. at 555 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018)). Therefore, "[t]he reasonable suspicion inquiry . . . considers the officers' background and training, and permits them 'to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an
untrained person.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying these legal principles, the totality of the circumstances: (1) Officer Oliver's observation that defendant's "pupils were extremely constricted"; (2) Officer Oliver's training and experience that informed him that someone with "extremely constricted pupils" was usually "under the influence or in possession of narcotics"; (3) defendant's extreme nervousness, shaking, and avoiding eye contact; and (4) defendant's outstanding warrant; provided Officer Oliver with reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and to broaden his inquiry into his suspicions that defendant possessed or was under the influence of illegal drugs.
Given that Officer Oliver had reasonable suspicion regarding defendant's drug possession or use, his request that defendant consent to a search of the motor vehicle and the suggestion that he could bring a canine to sniff the motor vehicle were appropriate in these circumstances. See State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002) (consent searches of motor vehicles are justified based on "reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist or passenger has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal act ivity."); see also Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 540 ("if an officer has articulable reasonable suspicion independent from the reason for the traffic stop that a suspect possesses narcotics, the officer may continue a detention to administer a canine sniff.").
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State v. Edwards, A-3184-22 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov 12, 2024)
Outcome: Affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: