Date: 12-03-2009

Case Style: George Morrill v. Maine Turnpike Authority

Case Number: 2009 ME 116

Judge: Levy

Court: Supreme Court of Maine on appeal from the Superior Court, Cumberland County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Deborah Mann and Natalie Burns, Jense Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, Maine

Defendant's Attorney: John Lambert and Teresa Cloutier, Lambert Coffin Haenn, Portland, Maine

Description: [¶1] George Morrill appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Delahanty, J.) granting the Maine Turnpike Authority’s motion to dismiss Morrill’s complaint, which challenged the compensation awarded to him in an eminent domain proceeding. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that Morrill failed to provide notice of his appeal to the State Claims Commission pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 156 (2008). Because we conclude that a recently enacted statutory revision to the appeals process applies retroactively to his claim, we vacate the Superior Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Morrill’s property was taken by eminent domain in June 2005, and the Maine Turnpike Authority awarded him $190,000 as compensation. Morrill claimed that this sum was insufficient, and the matter was referred to the State Claims Commission in accordance with 23 M.R.S. § 155 (2008). Following a hearing, the Commission mailed him a copy of its decision awarding him $31,134.72 in additional compensation. On May 20, 2008, and within thirty days of the decision, Morrill filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the Commission failed to award him the fair market value of his property. He did not, however, designate to the Commission the award he was appealing as was then required by 23 M.R.S. § 156.1 The Superior Court granted the Authority’s motion to dismiss the complaint for Morrill’s failure to give notice of his appeal to the Commission.2

[¶3] After Morrill’s case was dismissed and while this appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted “An Act To Clarify the Purpose of the Notice Requirement of Land Taking by the Department of Transportation,” P.L. 2009, ch. 265 (effective Sept. 12, 2009), which amended 23 M.R.S. §§ 156, 157 (2008). The amendment altered the appeals process for parties seeking to challenge the Commission’s eminent domain awards in the Superior Court. Public Law 2009, ch. 265, has three distinct sections. Section 1 eliminates the requirement that parties give notice to the Commission before appealing to the Superior Court. Section 2 mandates that an appealing party provide a copy of any complaint filed to initiate such an appeal to the other party or parties within thirty days of issuance of the Commission award.3 Section 3 addresses the retroactive application of sections 1 and 2:

Sec. 3. Application. This Act applies to appeals from an award of the State Claims Commission that were pending on or after January 1, 2009, except that an appeal pending on or after January 1, 2009 but prior to the effective date of this Act for which notice was provided in accordance with the law in effect prior to this Act may not be dismissed for failure by a party to provide a copy of the complaint to the other party or parties within 30 days of the date of issuance of the commission award.

Because the Superior Court entered a judgment on Morrill’s appeal prior to the enactment of P.L. 2009, ch. 265, the court did not have the opportunity to consider its application to this case.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶4] The parties dispute whether P.L. 2009, ch. 265, applies to Morrill’s appeal. Morrill contends that P.L. 2009, ch. 265, eliminated the requirement that parties designate to the Commission the award or awards they are appealing. It follows from this contention that the new procedural requirements for appealing a Commission award, which are outlined in sections 1 and 2, apply retroactively to his appeal based on the plain meaning of section 3. The Authority construes section 3 as not making the new procedural requirements applicable because although the appeal was pending on or after January 1, 2009, and before the effective date of the Act, the notice of the appeal Morrill provided was not in keeping with the law in effect prior to the Act.

[¶5] We review the interpretation of a statute de novo as a question of law. State v. Thongsavanh, 2007 ME 20, ¶ 27, 915 A.2d 421, 427. The underlying purpose of statutory interpretation “is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Arsenault v. Sec’y of State, 2006 ME 111, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 285, 288. In construing statutes, we first look to the statute’s plain meaning and seek to “avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results.” Temm v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 118, ¶ 8, 887 A.2d 39, 41 (quotation marks omitted). We have also stated that “all statutes will be considered to have a prospective operation only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is clearly expressed or necessarily implied from the language used.” Terry v. St. Regis Paper Co., 459 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Me. 1983) (quotation marks omitted).

[¶6] A plain reading of section 3 leads to the conclusion that sections 1 and 2 apply retroactively to Morrill’s appeal. Section 3 is divided into two distinct clauses: (1) “This Act applies to appeals from an award of the State Claims Commission that were pending on or after January 1, 2009,” and (2) “except that an appeal pending on or after January 1, 2009 but prior to the effective date of this Act for which notice was provided in accordance with the law in effect prior to this Act may not be dismissed for failure by a party to provide a copy of the complaint to the other party or parties within 30 days of the date of issuance of the commission award.”

[¶7] The first clause articulates the Legislature’s general intent that P.L. 2009, ch. 265, §§ 1, 2, apply to all appeals that were pending during a specific time period—“on or after January 1, 2009.” The second clause, which applies only to appeals in which “notice was provided in accordance with the law in effect prior to this Act,” prevents the dismissal of those appeals that were in compliance with the former notice requirement in 23 M.R.S. § 156, but do not satisfy the new requirement in section 2—namely that the appealing party provide a copy of the complaint to the other party or parties within thirty days of the date of issuance of the Commission award.4 Morrill’s appeal is not affected by the second clause because he did not provide notice in accordance with the law in effect prior to the Act.

[¶8] Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the Authority’s interpretation of section 3—that it applies only to parties that complied with the notice provision of the law in effect prior to the Act—because that interpretation is inconsistent with the statute’s plain meaning.

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See: http://www.courts.state.me.us/court_info/opinions/2009%20documents/09me116mo.pdf

Outcome: Judgment of the Superior Court vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.

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