Date: 02-01-2011

Case Style: Anthony Raftopol v. Karma A. Ramsey

Case Number: (SC 18482

Judge: McLachlan

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Plaintiff's Attorney: Victoria T. Ferrara, with whom was Jeremy F. Hayden, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Defendant's Attorney: Patrick B. Kwanashie, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, for the appellant (defendant department of health).

Kenneth J. Bartschi, Karen L. Dowd, Thomas W. Ude, Bennett H. Klein, pro hac vice, Karen L. Loewy, pro hac vice, John Weltman, pro hac vice, and Scott Buckley, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the American Society for Reproductive Medicine et al. as amici curiae.

Description: This appeal raises the question of whether Connecticut law permits an intended parent1 who is neither the biological2 nor the adoptive parent of a child to become a legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement. The use of technology to accomplish reproduction by means other than sexual intercourse no longer may be considered ‘‘new’’ science, and, indeed, the legislature has recognized the validity of such agreements.3 Moreover, no one can deny that assisted reproductive technology implicates an essential matter of public policy—it is a basic expectation that our legal system should enable each of us to identify our legal parents with reasonable promptness and certainty. Despite the facts that assisted reproductive technology has been available for some time, and that the technology implicates the important issue of the determination of legal parentage, our laws, and the laws of most other states, have struggled unsuccessfully to keep pace with the complex legal issues that continue to arise as a result of the technology.

The defendant department of public health (department) appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff Shawn Hargon, an intended parent under the gestational agreement.5 On appeal, the department argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction both to terminate the putative parental rights of the gestational carrier, the defendant Karma

A. Ramey,6 and to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children to whom Ramey gave birth, and, consequently, to order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to General Statutes § 7-48a,7 naming Hargon and the named plaintiff, Anthony Raftopol, the children’s biological father, as the children’s parents.

The department also argues that the trial court improperly concluded that § 7-48a conferred parental status on Hargon solely on the ground that he was an intended parent and party to a valid gestational agreement.8 We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the declaratory judgment. Moreover, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment declaring Hargon to be the parent of the children and ordering the department to place his name on the replacement birth certificate is supported by the applicable statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects the following facts, either as found by the trial court or undisputed. The plaintiffs, who were domestic partners living in Bucharest, Romania, 9 entered into a written agreement (gestational agreement), dated July 29, 2007, with Ramey, in which she agreed to act as a gestational carrier10 for the plaintiffs. Pursuant to the gestational agreement, eggs were recovered from a third party egg donor and fertilized with sperm contributed by Raftopol. Three of the resulting frozen embryos were subsequently implanted in Ramey’s uterus. As a result of the procedures, Ramey gave birth to two children on April 19, 2008.11 DNA testing confirmed that Raftopol was the biological father of the children. Pursuant to the gestational agreement, Ramey had agreed to terminate her parental rights to any children resulting from the procedures, and to sign any forms necessary for the issuance of a replacement birth certificate naming the plaintiffs as the parents of such children. Ramey also had agreed to consent to the adoption of any such children by Hargon and to cooperate fully to obtain this goal.12

Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid, that the plaintiffs were the legal parents of the children and requesting that the court order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey, were parents of the children. The department responded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Hargon did not allege that he had conceived the children and because the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the gestational carrier, the egg donor, and any husbands either may have, which the department argued would be a necessary prerequisite to the declaration that Hargon is a parent of the children.13 Finally, the department contended that the allegations of the complaint did not sufficiently establish the paternity of the children.

Following a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling declaring that: (1) the gestational agreement is valid;14 (2) Raftopol is the genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon is the legal father of the children; and (4) Ramey is not the genetic or legal mother of the children. The court therefore ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to § 7- 48a. This appeal followed.15

I

We first turn to the issue of whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children because Hargon was not biologically related to the children and did not adopt them. Included within this issue is the question of whether the court was required, as a prerequisite to making any determination regarding Hargon’s parental status, to terminate Ramey’s parental rights, and, if so, whether the court had jurisdiction to terminate those rights. We conclude that: (1) because Ramey did not have any parental rights with respect to the children, the termination of those nonexistent rights was not a necessary prerequisite to a determination of Hargon’s parental status with respect to the children; and (2) the court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling regarding Hargon’s parental status.

A

Preliminarily, we address the department’s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a parent because the termination of Ramey’s parental rights—over which the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction—was a necessary prerequisite to Hargon’s acquiring parental status with respect to the children.16 ‘‘[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 570, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995). Because Ramey had no parental rights to terminate, we conclude that the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction.

Our statutes and case law establish that a gestational carrier who bears no biological relationship to the child she has carried does not have parental rights with respect to that child. We have long recognized that there are three ways by which a person may become a parent:

conception, adoption or pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes.17 See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 116–17, 429 A.2d 833 (1980). The definitional section of chapter 803 of the General Statutes, which deals with termination of parental rights and adoption, defines ‘‘ ‘[p]arent’ ’’ as ‘‘a biological or adoptive parent . . . .’’ General Statutes § 45a-707 (5). The same definitional section defines ‘‘ ‘[t]ermination of parental rights’ ’’ as ‘‘the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child’s parent or parents . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 45a-707 (8). Reading these two subdivisions of the same statute together suggests that only persons who are biological or adoptive parents have parental rights with respect to the subject children.

In 1975, the legislature provided the third means by which a person may gain parental status. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-233, now codified at General Statutes § 45a- 774. Section 45a-774 provides: ‘‘Any child or children born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D.’’ ‘‘ ‘A.I.D.’ ’’ is defined as ‘‘artificial insemination with the use of donated sperm or eggs from an identified or anonymous donor.’’ General Statutes § 45a-771a (2). ‘‘ ‘Artificial insemination’ ’’ is specifically defined to include both ‘‘intrauterine insemination and in vitro fertilization . . . .’’ General Statutes § 45a-771a (1). Accordingly, a child born to a married woman and conceived through artificial insemination by an egg or sperm donor is the child of the wife and husband who requested and consented to the use of A.I.D.18

Our decisions prior to the passage of § 7-48a confirm that these three avenues were the exclusive means by which a person could acquire parental status. The question of the meaning of the term parent has most commonly arisen in the context of dissolution actions, when the parties have raised claims relating to custody or support. For example, in Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra, 180 Conn. 120, the attorney general sought an order compelling the defendant husband to pay support for his wife’s minor child, Jennifer, who was not the defendant’s biological child.19 Three years prior to the dissolution action, the husband had filed an affidavit of parentage, seeking to change Jennifer’s birth certificate to list himself as her father and her name as Jennifer Remkiewicz. Id., 116. In affirming the judgment of the trial court denying the motion for an order of support, 20 we framed the issue as ‘‘whether the court had any authority to issue such an order as against a husband who was neither the biological nor adoptive parent of the child for whom support was sought.’’ Id., 116–17.

We began with the proposition that the duty to support ‘‘is one imposed on parents.’’ Id., 117. Weconcluded that the defendant was not Jennifer’s legal father because he was not her biological father, had not been adjudicated so in a paternity proceeding, and had not adopted her.

Id. This rule, we reasoned, was consistent with the legislative intent expressed in the statutory scheme for adoption; see General Statutes c. 803; namely, that ‘‘no person shall acquire parental status unless certain formalities are observed. . . . If a stepfather could acquire parental rights through the simple expedient of changing his stepchild’s birth certificate, all sorts of mischief could result.’’ Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra, 120.

In Doe v. Doe, supra, 244 Conn. 435, 447, we reaffirmed the principle that, under the then existing statutory scheme, parentage could arise only by conception, adoption, or by way of the artificial insemination statutes.

Doe involved a custody dispute within a dissolution action and concerned the defendant father’s biological child, who was conceived by impregnating a surrogate with his sperm through a syringe.21 Id., 410.

Although the child, who was fourteen at the time of the appeal, was neither the plaintiff’s biological nor adopted child, both parties had raised her together as their daughter.22 Id., 405, 411. The trial court had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the custody dispute because the child was not a ‘‘ ‘child of the marriage . . . .’ ’’ Id., 413, 422. We disagreed. Although we concluded that the concept embodied by ‘‘ ‘child of the marriage’ ’’ remained an implicit part of the statutory scheme governing dissolution, we concluded that the concept no longer imposed jurisdictional limitations on the trial court with respect to custody disputes. Id., 422. Having determined that we had jurisdiction over the custody dispute, we turned to the question of whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim a right to custody of the child by virtue of being her parent. Recognizing that ‘‘[t]he child of the marriage and the parent of the child are two sides of the same coin’’; id., 439; we concluded that the plaintiff was not a parent of the child. Id., 442. Although the term ‘‘ ‘child of the marriage’ ’’ had not been expressly defined in our statutes, we stated that its meaning was ‘‘limited to a child conceived by both parties, a child adopted by both parties, a child born to the wife and adopted by the husband, a child conceived by the husband and adopted by the wife, and a child born to the wife and conceived through artificial insemination by a donor pursuant to [General Statutes] §§ 45a-771 through 45a-779.’’ Id., 435.

Under that definition, because the plaintiff was not the birth mother, bore no biological relationship to the child, had not adopted the child and was not the mother of the child by virtue of the artificial insemination statutes, she was not the child’s parent. Id., 442.

Under any of the three specified ways of acquiring parental status, as set forth both in our statutes and interpretive case law, Ramey is not a parent of the children in the present case. It is undisputed that she is neither the biological nor the adoptive mother to the children. Nor does she fall within the parameters of the artificial insemination statutes. Accordingly, Ramey did not have parental rights that required termination before Hargon could acquire parental status with respect to the children.

B

The department also claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare Hargon a parent. Specifically, the department argues that, because a person may become a parent only by conception, adoption, or by compliance with our statutes governing artificial insemination, and because Hargon does not claim parentage by virtue of any of these three avenues, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hargon’s request for a declaratory judgment that he is the parent of the children.

We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter.

‘‘Where a decision as to whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is required, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ Demar v. Open Space & Conservation Commission, 211 Conn. 416, 425, 559 A.2d 1103 (1989). We often have stated that ‘‘the Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction.’’ Carten v. Carten, 153 Conn. 603, 612, 219 A.2d 711 (1966). ‘‘Article fifth, § 1 of the Connecticut constitution proclaims that [t]he powers and jurisdiction of the courts shall be defined by law, and General Statutes § 51-164s provides that [t]he Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 153, 913 A.2d 428 (2007). ‘‘[T]he general rule of jurisdiction . . . is that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court but that which specially appears to be so; and . . . nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court but that which is expressly so alleged. . . . [N]o court is to be ousted of its jurisdiction by implication.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carten v. Carten, supra, 612–13.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29, the declaratory judgment statute,23 Hargon sought a determination that he was the parent of the children. The department appears to argue that because Hargon was not the genetic parent of the children, and because the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction to preside over adoption proceedings, the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaration of law as to Hargon’s legal status with respect to the children. It is true that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, which are within the original jurisdiction of the Probate Court. See General Statutes §§ 45a-727 (a) (1),24 46b-1 (14)25 and 46b-121 (a) (1).26 There were, however, no adoption proceedings before the trial court in the present case. Hargon sought a declaration that he had acquired parental status by virtue of the gestational agreement and § 7-48a, despite the fact that he had not adopted the children. In other words, Hargon sought a declaration that § 7-48a creates a fourth means by which he had gained parental status, independent of and in addition to conception, adoption, or the artificial insemination statutes. The department appears to argue that, because the trial court would have lacked subject matter jurisdiction to preside over adoption proceedings instituted by Hargon, we should infer that the court lacked jurisdiction over any alternate claim that Hargon might advance in support of his legal parentage of the children. Put another way, the department asks us to infer that, because the Probate Court has original jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, it has original jurisdiction over all claims to parentage, except for claims advanced by persons who are the biological parents.

This inference would conflict with our established rules that we will not oust the Superior Court of jurisdiction by implication and we will not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Probate Court beyond that which is expressly committed to it by statute. Carten v. Carten, supra, 153 Conn. 613–14. The declaration of law sought by Hargon required the trial court to engage in a statutory interpretation of § 7-48a to determine whether that statute creates an alternate means, in addition to and separate from the three existing means, by which a nongenetically related, intended parent may attain legal parentage.

That determination lies within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Thus, the Superior Court is ‘‘a court of competent jurisdiction’’ within the meaning of § 7- 48a.

II

The jurisdictional questions now resolved, we turn to the merits of the department’s claim that the trial court improperly concluded that § 7-48a conferred parental status on Hargon by virtue of the gestational agreement. The plaintiffs contend that § 7-48a evidences a legislative recognition of the validity of intended parentage. Accordingly, they claim that, pursuant to § 7-48a, a court of competent jurisdiction may declare Hargon to be the parent of the children, and, consistent with that declaratory ruling, may order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting his parental status. The department claims that the legislature intended that § 7-48a would allow only intended parents who are also the genetic parents of the children to gain legal parental status without first adopting the children. We conclude that § 7-48a allows an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement to become a parent without first adopting the children, without respect to that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children. Consistent with that conclusion, we conclude that the trial court properly ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate listing Hargon as parent of the children.

We emphasize that the court’s order to the department to place Hargon’s name on the replacement birth certificate follows from its declaratory judgment concluding that Hargon is a parent to the children. No one should misunderstand this opinion to state that the department, by placing Hargon’s name on the replacement birth certificate, or by refusing to do so, confers or declines to confer parental status on Hargon. In this particular case, that relationship was created by the valid gestational agreement, and that relationship is accurately reflected by naming Hargon as a parent to the children on the replacement birth certificate. A birth certificate is a vital record that must accurately reflect legal relationships between parents and children—it does not create those relationships. General Statutes §§ 19a-40 and 19a-42; see footnotes 33 and 34 of this opinion.

Preliminarily, we must note that because in the present case the department has not challenged the trial court’s finding that the gestational agreement at issue is valid, that issue has not been presented to us. See footnote 14 of this opinion. Accordingly, our analysis is predicated on this important starting point: we assume without deciding that the gestational agreement at issue is valid. The question of whether § 7-48a allows a nonbiological intended parent to acquire parental status through a valid gestational agreement without first adopting the children presents a question of statutory interpretation, over which we exercise plenary review. Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., 296 Conn. 579, 587, 997 A.2d 453 (2010). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine the meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Specifically, § 1-2z provides:

‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ ‘‘The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., supra, 587.

As directed by § 1-2z, we begin with the text of the statute. Section 7-48a provides in relevant part: ‘‘On and after January 1, 2002, each birth certificate shall be filed with the name of the birth mother recorded. If the birth is subject to a gestational agreement, the Department of Public Health shall create a replacement certificate in accordance with an order from a court of competent jurisdiction not later than forty-five days after receipt of such order or forty-five days after the birth of the child, whichever is later. Such replacement certificate shall include all information required to be included in a certificate of birth of this state as of the date of the birth. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) What is clear from the text of the statute is that if the birth is subject to a ‘‘gestational agreement’’ and if a court of competent jurisdiction orders the department to do so, the department is both authorized and required to issue a replacement birth certificate in accordance with that order.

It follows that, because some gestational agreements would justify a court order to the department to issue a replacement birth certificate, at least some gestational agreements are valid under Connecticut law. Beyond that, however, the statutory text gives rise to numerous ambiguities. For example, although § 7-48a initially provides that the name of the birth mother shall be placed on the birth certificate, it does not define the term ‘‘birth mother . . . .’’27 Nor, more significantly, does § 7-48a define the key phrase, ‘‘gestational agreement . . . .’’28 Section 7-48a says nothing about the nature and scope of the court order. It is, therefore, not clear whether § 7- 48a sets forth merely procedural guidelines or effects a substantive change in the law. In other words, it is possible that the ‘‘court order’’ contemplated by the statute is merely a ministerial order for the issuance of a replacement birth certificate. It is also possible that § 7-48a effects a substantive change in the law, creating a new means by which a person may become a parent, thus justifying an order declaring parentage. That is, does § 7-48a contemplate, as happened in the present case, a court issuing a declaratory judgment that the intended parents are, by virtue of the gestational agreement, legal parents, and an order consistent with that judgment directing the department to issue the replacement birth certificate? Additionally, § 7-48a does not set forth any guidelines as to who may qualify, and by what means, to be named as a parent on a replacement birth certificate.29 In other words, it is unclear from the text of § 7-48a: (1) which types of gestational agreements are intended to be included within the statutory phrase ‘‘gestational agreement’’; (2) whether a court may order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate naming an intended parent as the parent, despite the fact that the intended parent is the parent neither by conception nor adoption; and (3) whether the statute creates a new means by which persons may become legal parents.

Related statutes provide little guidance in resolving the many ambiguities suggested by the text of § 7-48a. Although the phrase ‘‘gestational agreement’’ appears in three related statutes within chapter 93 of the General Statutes, which governs registrars of vital statistics, the phrase is not defined in any of those provisions. The definition section of that chapter unhelpfully defines ‘‘ ‘[p]arentage’ ’’ as including ‘‘matters relating to adoption, gestational agreements, paternity and maternity . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-36 (13). The broad wording of that definition does not clarify the meaning of ‘‘gestational agreement’’ or provide guidance as to who may be named as a parent on a replacement birth certificate pursuant to § 7-48a. The remaining two references to ‘‘gestational agreements’’ are in General Statutes §§ 7- 51 and 7-51a, which establish rules governing access to vital records. Both of those statutes limit access to confidential files containing, inter alia, information regarding gestational agreements.30 Neither statute clarifies the types of gestational agreements included within the term ‘‘gestational agreement’’ or provides guidance as to the effect of such agreements on parental rights.

We observe that in interpreting the text of § 7-48a, we write on a clean slate. This court has not previously construed this statute. Compare Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 496, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (recognizing that in interpreting statutory language that had been construed in earlier decisions, court was not writing on ‘‘clean slate’’ and relying on prior judicial interpretations to construe statute’s plain meaning).

Although Doe v. Doe, supra, 244 Conn. 403, and Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra, 180 Conn. 114, address related issues, both cases were decided prior to the passage of § 7-48a, and, therefore, those decisions do not provide helpful guidance in discerning the meaning and scope of § 7-48a. In the absence of such interpretive tools, we conclude that the plain language of § 7-48a does not unambiguously indicate whether the legislature intended § 7-48a to authorize the Superior Court to declare an intended parent who bears no biological relationship to a child to be a legal parent of that child absent adoption proceedings.

Moreover, the department’s contention that the only reasonable interpretation of the plain language of § 7- 48a is that only biological intended parents may gain legal parental status solely by virtue of being parties to a valid gestational agreement, runs afoul of a basic principle of statutory construction. We often have stated that ‘‘it is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes . . . do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 710, 998 A.2d 1 (2010); see also Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 361, 972 A.2d 715 (2009).

Accordingly, ‘‘[w]e construe a statute in a manner that will not . . . lead to absurd results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. New Haven, 275 Conn. 580, 616, 881 A.2d 978 (2005). The department’s contention that the legislature expressed an intent, via the plain language of § 7-48a, that only a biological intended parent may gain parental status absent adoption proceedings, when examined in relation to the artificial insemination statutes, leads to the not very remote possibility of a child who comes into the world with no parents—a parentless child. Specifically, General Statutes § 45a-775 provides: ‘‘An identified or anonymous donor of sperm or eggs used in A.I.D., or any person claiming by or through such donor, shall not have any right or interest in any child born as a result of A.I.D.’’ As we previously have noted, the definitional section defines ‘‘ ‘A.I.D.,’ ’’ or ‘‘ ‘[a]rtificial insemination with donor sperm or eggs’ ’’ to include in vitro fertilization.

General Statutes § 45a-771a. Thus, neither an egg or sperm donor, nor their spouses, if any, gain parental status by virtue of the contribution of gametes for use in in vitro fertilization. Furthermore, as we already have set forth in part I A of this opinion, a gestational carrier who is a party to a valid gestational agreement does not have any parental rights. A corollary to this conclusion is that any spouse of the gestational carrier similarly would not acquire parental status by virtue of a valid gestational agreement. Following this process of elimination, it takes little imagination to visualize the absurd consequence. Suppose an infertile couple who desire to have children but cannot supply the womb, the eggs, or the sperm—a scenario far more likely than the hypothetical imaginary horrible. These intended parents would need to rely on third party egg and sperm donors to produce embryos that are implanted in a gestational carrier pursuant to a gestational agreement.

If § 7-48a confers parental status only on biological intended parents, the intended parents are not the parents of any resulting child, nor are the gestational carrier, any spouse she may have, the gamete donors, or any spouses each may have. Every possible parent to the child would be eliminated as a matter of law, yielding the result of a child who is born parentless, not due to the death of the parents, but simply due to elimination by operation of law.31 The legislature cannot be presumed to have intended this consequence, which is so absurd as to be Kafkaesque. Thus, our examination of the language of the statute pursuant to § 1-2z yields only ambiguity and the department’s interpretation of the language of the statute leads to an absurd result.

The mere fact, however, that the department’s proposed interpretation of § 7-48a leads to an absurd result does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, based on the language of the statute, that § 7-48a confers parental status on Hargon by virtue of the gestational agreement.

As we have explained, there are many ambiguities in § 7-48a—the nature and scope of ‘‘an order from a court of competent jurisdiction,’’ the types of gestational agreements that would give rise to such an order, whatever it may be, who may be an intended parent, just to name a few. In light of the many remaining ambiguities, we turn to extratextual sources in order to discern the intent of the legislature.

Section 7-48a initially was enacted by No. 01-163, § 28, of the 2001 Public Acts (P.A. 01-163), and, at the time of passage, provided merely: ‘‘On and after January 1, 2002, each birth certificate shall contain the name of the birth mother, except by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.’’ (Emphasis added.) The raised bill that preceded P.A. 01-163 had been much more detailed, and provided in relevant part: ‘‘(a) On receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction approving a gestational agreement, the department shall prepare a new birth certificate for the child born of the agreement. The new birth certificate shall include all the information required to be set forth in a certificate of birth of this state as of the date of birth, except that the intended parent or parents under this agreement shall be named as the parent or parents. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Raised Bill No. 6569, January 2001 Sess., § 27. Thus, although the original language specifically had provided that an intended parent’s name should be placed on the replacement birth certificate, that language was omitted from the final language in P.A. 01-163 that was codified at § 7-48a. During discussion of the amendment during house proceedings, Representative Mary U. Eberle remarked on the omission of the original language, observing: ‘‘This amendment makes a number of technical corrections and changes . . . and it removes the language on gestational agreements and simply substitutes the requirement that the mother on the birth certificate shall be the birth mother unless—except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.’’ (Emphasis added.) 44 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 2001 Sess., p. 3719. Representative Eberle’s remarks indicate that the amendment, in addition to and separate from certain technical changes, deleted the language that had referred to gestational agreements and had provided that intended parents be named as parents on replacement certificates. The omission of this language in the raised bill suggests one of two possibilities: (1) the legislature considered, then rejected, the notion of parenthood created solely by intent; or (2) the legislature left it to the courts to decide what additional information the department could be ordered to place on birth certificates.

Section 7-48a was amended in 2004 to add language requiring the department to issue a replacement birth certificate in accordance with an order from a court of competent jurisdiction.32 Public Acts 2004, No. 04-255, § 28. Representative Donald B. Sherer offered some background on the amendment during the floor discussion of the bill, observing: ‘‘A number of years ago . . . this legislature changed the birth certificate registration law to permit a court of [competent jurisdiction] being the Superior Court to find parentage in accordance with the biological relationship to a child rather than the birth mother if she wasn’t the biological mother.’’ (Emphasis added.) 47 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 2004 Sess., pp. 4456–57. Although Representative Sherer did not directly state that the finding of parentage contemplated by § 7-48a could be confined to those intended parents who share a biological relationship with the children, but are not the birth parents, his remark does provide some support for that interpretation.

A subsequent exchange could be read more broadly. At one point during the discussion of the amendment, Representative Lenny T. Winkler remarked: ‘‘[F]rom what I understand it’s been difficult for some individuals to adopt and they’ve been required to go to [P]robate [Court] and this would avoid that and make it easier, could you explain that all?’’ Id., p. 4459. Representative Sherer responded: ‘‘That’s correct. There’s been the difficult situation where due to the birth being, the parents not being the birth parents the only way to obtain a new birth certificate would be to go to [P]robate [C]ourt and basically adopt their own child, which no one really thinks is the right thing to do.’’ Id. This exchange indicates that the legislature was focused on allowing nonbirth parents, which could include the intended parents under a gestational agreement, to circumvent Probate Court. The exchange leaves open the possibility that the legislature intended that nonbiological intended parents would benefit from the rule. Both exchanges also clarify one ambiguity in § 7-48a. Sherer stated that the ‘‘court of [competent jurisdiction]’’; id., 4456–57; referred to in the statute is the Superior Court, and that the intent of the statute is to circumvent proceedings in the Probate Court because of the difficulty some parties to gestational agreements had encountered in adopting. Id., 4459. This legislative history clarifies that § 7-48a does not merely provide for a ministerial order by a court, but rather, has effected a substantive change in the law and has created a new way by which persons may become legal parents.

With respect to whether this substantive change in the law was intended to include nonbiological intended parents, we recognize that the legislative history is inconclusive, but we already have rejected, on the basis of our plain language analysis, the department’s contention that only biological intended parents may acquire legal parentage solely by virtue of a valid gestational agreement. On the basis of our analysis of both the text of the statute, as well as its legislative history, we conclude that the legislature intended § 7-48a to confer parental status on an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement irrespective of that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children.

Such intended parents need not adopt the children in order to become legal parents. They acquire that status by operation of law, upon an order by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to § 7-48a.

Consistent with our conclusion that § 7-48a confers parental status on a nongenetic, intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement, we also conclude that the trial court properly ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate listing Hargon as a parent of the children. This conclusion is also consistent with the principle that information on a birth certificate must be accurate. See General Statutes §§ 19a-4033 and 19a-42;34 In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 572, 756 A.2d 214 (2000) (Probate Court did not have authority to delete biological parent’s name from birth certificate without allegation that information was inaccurate).

The department relies on Doe v. Doe, supra, 244 Conn. 403, to argue that a person may become a parent under Connecticut law only by conception, adoption or by virtue of the artificial insemination statutes. As we already have observed, however, Doe was decided prior to the enactment of § 7-48a and represented a statement of the existing law at the time that case was decided.

We did not state in Doe—nor could we have—that the legislature lacked the power to enact legislation that would provide another means by which persons could become legal parents. Doe stated that the court was ‘‘not at liberty to bestow parental status independent of [the adoption statutory] scheme.’’ Id., 444. Furthermore, we were very aware in Doe that our law had not yet addressed the myriad issues presented by the use of ever-advancing assisted reproductive technology. We carefully limited the scope of our holding in Doe by stating that the case did ‘‘not involve questions of how, if at all, to reconcile our family relations statutes, as interpreted by this court, with scientifically new methods of conception that were not available when those statutes were enacted or when those interpretations were issued. . . . [W]e need not, and do not, in this case confront questions of parentage, under those statutes, resulting from such recent scientific innovations as, for example, in vitro fertilization using donated eggs that are then implanted in a woman’s womb . . . implantation into a woman’s womb of a frozen embryo formed by the sperm and egg of strangers to both the woman and her husband . . . or other similar innovations in which a woman who gives birth to a child is not the same woman who produced the egg that was ultimately fertilized by a man’s sperm.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 417–18. Finally, Doe did not involve a claim that an intended parent had gained parental status by virtue of a gestational agreement.

Instead, the primary argument advanced by the plaintiff in Doe was that she had acquired parental status by virtue of the equitable parent doctrine, a claim that we rejected in Doe. Id., 443–44. Doe and the precedents on which it relied cannot be read, therefore, to limit the scope of § 7-48a.

The department also contends that courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that the legislature is the appropriate body to devise new rules for the regulation of gestational agreements. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 730 (Tenn. 2005) (deciding maternity question presented by artificial insemination with donated egg narrowly in recognition that, due to ‘‘far-reaching, profoundly complex, and competing public policy considerations implicated by’’ use of assisted reproductive technology, legislature is appropriate body to craft ‘‘general rule to adjudicate all controversies’’ that arise from its use); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 435 Mass. 285, 293, 756 N.E.2d 1133 (2001) (noting that legislature had not yet enacted comprehensive statutory scheme addressing issues arising from use of assisted reproductive technology and stating that legislature ‘‘is the most suitable forum to deal with the questions involved in this case, and other questions as yet unlitigated, by providing a comprehensive set of laws that deal with the medical, legal, and ethical aspects of these practices’’).

We agree that the legislature is the appropriate body to craft specific rules and procedures governing gestational agreements. That precept does not conflict with our decision today, which interprets § 7-48a in accordance with well established rules of statutory construction.

Our decision is grounded on and guided by the intent of the legislature. Moreover, because we agree with the department that the legislature is the appropriate body to establish specific standards, rules and procedures governing gestational agreements, and because our starting point in this decision is an unchallenged ruling that the instant gestational agreement is valid, we have confined the scope of our holding to valid gestational agreements.

Indeed, this appeal highlights the fact that our existing statutes addressing parentage do not address the public policy concerns raised by modern assisted reproductive technology. The legislature itself has recognized that it has postponed confronting these issues.

In 2007, the legislature amended §§ 45a-771a and 45a- 775; see Public Acts 2007, No. 07-93, §§ 1 and 3; redefining artificial insemination to include the use of an egg donor and providing that egg donors, like sperm donors, have no parental rights. In discussing the amendment, Representative Arthur J. O’Neill observed that this change was ‘‘one small part of what once was a very large [b]ill that the [l]aw [r]evision [c]ommission worked on, probably six or seven years ago, in an effort to try to come up with some comprehensive legislation to deal with a number of issues that are created by the new technology of reproduction that has been developing over the last few years.’’ 50 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 2007 Sess., p. 4438. He further observed that the inclusion of egg donors within the artificial insemination statutes was ‘‘actually one of the easier parts of this subject to deal with and it’s something that’s straightforward and understandable. But there are many other issues that we are probably going to have to confront.

‘‘And I’m gathering, based on this [b]ill before us, that it’s going to be in a piecemeal sort of way that we deal with all of these issues of technological innovation in the area of reproduction and legal issues that crop up that really need to be resolved so that the families are not left in a state of confusion as to what they should do.’’ Id., pp. 4438–39.

Representative O’Neill could not have phrased this issue more precisely—this area of law needs to be clarified so that families are not left in a state of confusion.

Our existing statutory scheme only partially addresses these issues. Parentage, however, is not an issue that should be addressed in a ‘‘piecemeal’’ fashion. As we already have observed in this opinion, our existing statutes provide few answers and raise many questions. It is decidedly not the role of this court to make the public policy determinations necessary to establish the specific rules and procedures governing the validity of gestational agreements or set the standards for valid gestational agreements. The legislature will be required to grapple with numerous questions implicating significant public policy issues—that body, with the ability to hold public hearings and seek out expert assistance, is the appropriate one to make such public policy determinations.

We highlight some of the issues that remain unresolved in our current statutory scheme by looking to the laws of other jurisdictions that have grappled with these public policy issues. In jurisdictions that have addressed the issues raised by the use of assisted reproductive technology,35 it appears that there are three general approaches to the determination of legal parentage.

Those three approaches define parentage based on: (1) the intent of the parties; see, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 93, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874, 114 S. Ct. 206, 126 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.045 (2) (2009); (2) the genetic relatedness of the parties; see, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, supra, 435 Mass. 286–87; Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 64–66, 644 N.E.2d 760 (1994); or (3) giving birth. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 196 App. Div. 2d 7, 9, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994).36

How a state defines parentage is merely the starting point. Additional issues that some states have addressed, for example, include whether to recognize compensated gestational agreements,37 whether to limit the availability to married couples,38 infertile intended parents,39 age limitations,40 what protections to put in place to safeguard the gestational carrier’s right to make decisions regarding healthcare and termination of the pregnancy until the child has been delivered,41 whether to require that the spouse of the gestational carrier either consent or be made a party to the contract,42 what measures to put in place to safeguard the legal rights of the parties,43 who should be required to obtain health insurance coverage,44 whether to require that at least one intended parent contribute genetic material,45 and whether to require mental and physical health evaluations and home studies.46

Further guidance may be provided by article eight of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (act). See Unif. Parentage Act §§ 801 through 809, 9B U.L.A. 299–376 (2001). Among the provisions included in the act are: specific procedural requirements for the hearing to validate the gestational agreement, including a residency requirement; joinder of the spouse of the gestational carrier, if she is married; a required finding by the court that the intended parents meet the standards of suitability applicable to adoptive parents and a finding of voluntariness as to all parties to the gestational agreement; Unif. Parentage Act §§ 802 and 803, 9B U.L.A. 363–64 (2001); procedures upon termination of the gestational agreement; Unif. Parentage Act § 806, 9B U.L.A. 367 (2001); procedures upon the birth of the child, including the issuance of a court order declaring parentage and directing the responsible agency to issue a birth certificate naming the intended parents as parents to the child; Unif. Parentage Act § 807, 9B U.L.A. 368 (2001); the effect of a subsequent marriage of the gestational carrier; Unif. Parentage Act § 808, 9B U.L.A. 368 (2001); and the effect of a nonvalidated gestational agreement. Unif. Parentage Act § 809, 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).

We emphasize that the legislature is the appropriate body to make the public policy determinations implicated by these issues. Because of the uncertainties created by the existing statutory scheme, we respectfully would suggest that the legislature consider doing so.

Particularly important will be a determination of which types of gestational agreements are valid, as that determination will decide who may benefit from the streamlined process to parentage created by § 7-48a. As we have stated previously in this opinion, in the language of § 7-48a, the legislature already implicitly has recognized that at least some gestational agreements are valid. That general recognition of validity has little practical use, however, until the legislature clarifies specifically what requirements must be met in order for a gestational agreement to be valid. For today, we answer only the narrow question presented in this appeal: Upon a court order pursuant to § 7-48a, intended parents who are parties to a valid gestational agreement acquire parental status and are entitled to be named as parents on the replacement birth certificate, without respect to their biological relationship to the children.

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See: http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR299/299cr914.pdf

Outcome: The judgment is affirmed.

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