Date: 06-03-2013

Case Style: Barbara Wyatt v. Rhonda Fletcher

Case Number: 11-41359

Judge: E. Grady Jolly

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on appeal from the Eastern District of Texas (Smith County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: James C Harrington and Wayne Nicholas Krause

Defendant's Attorney: Robert Scott Davis and David R Iglesias

Description: As next-friend of her minor daughter “S.W.”, Barbara Wyatt brought this
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against high school softball coaches Rhonda Fletcher
and Cassandra Newell. Wyatt alleges the coaches disclosed S.W.’s sexual
orientation during a disciplinary meeting with S.W.’s mother, primarily claiming
the disclosure to the mother constituted a Fourteenth Amendment invasion of
S.W.’s privacy. Wyatt also alleged a Fourth Amendment claim based on a
disciplinary confrontation in a locked locker room. On the coaches’ motion for
summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to Fletcher and
Newell on the ground that genuine issues of material fact were disputed. We
disagree and reverse. We hold that there is no clearly established law holding

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No. 11-41359

that a student in a public secondary school has a privacy right under the
Fourteenth Amendment that precludes school officials from discussing with a
parent the student’s private matters, including matters relating to sexual
activity of the student. We further hold that such students have no clearly
established Fourth Amendment right that bars a student-coach confrontation in
a closed and locked room. We thus conclude that these individual defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity that bars the federal claims against them,
and, consequently, we REVERSE and VACATE in part and REMAND for entry
of judgment dismissing the federal claims against these individual defendants.

I.

The first matter we must deal with in this qualified immunity case is the
basis of our jurisdiction. On this interlocutory appeal, we have before us the
district court’s denial of the coaches’ motion for summary judgment asserting the
claim of qualified immunity. Our review is de novo. Flores v. City of Palacios,
381 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2004). Although a denial of a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is not ordinarily immediately appealable, such a denial
based on qualified immunity is a collateral order capable of immediate review.
Brown v. Strain, 663 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2011) (inset quotation marks
omitted). We have jurisdiction over such an order, however, only “to the extent
that the district court’s order turns on an issue of law,” Kovacic v. Villareal, 628
F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010); if it turns on a disputed material fact, we lack
jurisdiction. Thus, if we decide that the district court erred in assessing the
legal significance of the conduct that the district court considered, we then
decide whether the factual disputes are material to deciding the legal issue
presented in the summary judgment. See Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 348
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000).

If there are no such material factual disputes, we can then rule on the claim for
qualified immunity.

2

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Ms. Wyatt (“Wyatt”), in her complaint, has made various claims, but in
this interlocutory appeal, we only have appellate jurisdiction over the federal
claims against the individual defendants Rhonda Fletcher (“Fletcher”) and
Cassandra Newell (“Newell”).1 Wyatt alleged in her complaint that the coaches’
conduct violated her daughter’s constitutional right to privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment and her right to be free from unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. As we will see, to decide the overarching
question of whether the district court erred in denying the coaches qualified
immunity, we ask whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which
Wyatt claims were violated, are “clearly established.” See Jones v. City of
Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 231 (1991)). If they are not, the appellants are entitled to qualified
immunity, and the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the federal
claims was error.2

II.

A.

The dispute arose in the East Texas town of Kilgore. On March 3, 2009,
S.W., a student at Kilgore High School (“KHS”), attended a meeting of the
varsity softball team on which she played. The meeting was held at an offcampus
playing field where practices regularly took place. In her complaint,
Wyatt alleges that, upon S.W.’s arrival at the meeting, S.W.’s softball coaches
Fletcher and Newell dismissed the rest of the team and led S.W. into a nearby
1 We do not reach Wyatt’s claims brought under the Monell doctrine against Kilgore
Independent School District. Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Nor are Wyatt’s claims against Douglas Duke before us, see infra n.9. The only
appellants in this case are Fletcher and Newell. To the extent that Wyatt brings state law
claims against Fletcher and Newell under the Texas Constitution and Texas common law,
those claims are not before us on this appeal.

_________________________

2 We stress that our holdings here are narrow: they address only whether the specific
constitutional rights in this case are clearly established.

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locker room, locked the door, and questioned her about an alleged relationship
with an older young woman named Hillary Nutt (“Nutt”). Wyatt said that the
coaches then yelled at S.W., falsely accused her of spreading rumors regarding
one of the coaches’ sexual orientation,3 and threatened to tell S.W.’s mother that
her daughter was in a sexual relationship with another woman.4 In her
complaint, Wyatt made a further allegation: that, at the locker room meeting,
“Fletcher asked S.W. if she was gay.” In her deposition, however, S.W.’s story
changed: she said definitively that the coaches did not ask, point blank, whether
she was a lesbian. Besides this inconsistency, there is one more worthy of note:
in her complaint, Wyatt states, “At the time of Fletcher and Newell’s
confrontation, S.W. was dating [Nutt].” But in her appellate brief, she says “in
fact, [S.W.] and Hillary [Nutt] hadn’t dated” and “weren’t in a relationship.”
Following the meeting with S.W., the coaches called Wyatt, S.W.’s mother,
and requested they meet.5 The parties’ characterizations of events differ. In her
complaint, Wyatt alleges that Fletcher revealed S.W.’s sexual orientation to her

______________________

3 The record indicates that S.W. has admitted to starting a rumor: in her affidavit, S.W.
said that, on the day in question, she speculated on Newell’s sexual orientation to another
student. Apparently, students began discussing this rumor, notes were passed in class, and
a student brought the matter to the coaches’ attention. Newell and Fletcher then called the
meeting. S.W.also admits to routinely showing up late and using profanity at practice.

4 Wyatt’s central claim is “privacy” in S.W.’s sexual orientation. The undisputed facts,
however, indicate that S.W. talked about her sexual orientation with a close friend in 2007,
admitted she was gay to “five or six” friends the week before the events in question, wore
clothing she describes as “society’s symbol for gay pride,” and “went skipping down the hallway
holding hands” with another girl. Although these facts are in no way dispositive in our
analysis, we note them because they suggest S.W.’s sexual orientation was not a hermetically
sealed secret in the school setting.

5 In the KHS “Parent Involvement Plan,” the school states its position that “the more
[KHS] can communicate with parents, the greater success [it] will have in reaching our
students. [KHS] want[s] parents involved in all aspects of our school from academics to
extracurricular activities.” In its “Parent Involvement Policy,” KHS states its goal is to “strive
to increase parental participation in school and encourage positive interaction between school
and home.”

4

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mother at this second meeting and that Newell then offered Wyatt the contact
information for Nutt. As with the locker room meeting, however, there are
inconsistencies in Wyatt’s story. Wyatt’s allegation in her complaint was that,
at the second meeting, the coaches “outed” her daughter: “Fletcher said [to
Wyatt that] S.W. was a lesbian.” Wyatt apparently withdrew this allegation
when, at her deposition, she testified under oath that Coach Fletcher in fact
never used the word “gay” or “lesbian.” The claim involving the revelation of
S.W.’s sexual orientation has become ever more nuanced over the course of the
briefing on this appeal: Instead of alleging that the coaches divulged, pointblank,
her daughter’s homosexuality, Wyatt’s claim is now that she inferred
S.W.’s sexual orientation from the coaches’ comments.6 In response, the coaches
argue that they were obliged to contact S.W.’s mother because rumors regarding
S.W.’s relationship with Nutt were causing dissension on the team, Nutt was a
potentially dangerous and underage user of illegal drugs and alcohol, and any
possible sexual relationship between Nutt and S.W. was a valid concern. See
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2).7

B.

Wyatt filed three separate grievances with Kilgore Independent School
District (“KISD”) alleging the coaches acted inappropriately by disclosing S.W.’s

_______________________

6 In her deposition, however, Wyatt testified that she had suspected her daughter was
gay prior to the events at issue in this case.

7 Although, for the purposes of summary judgment, we take the evidence in the light
most favorable to Wyatt, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986), we note at the outset of our discussion that the legitimate, disciplinary basis
for the coaches’ decision to notify Wyatt is established by undisputed facts. S.W. concedes that
she broke multiple team rules, lied to Newell and Fletcher, and discussed Newell’s sexuality
at school prior to the coaches’ decision to notify S.W.’s mother. Thus, the alleged “bad motives”
of the coaches, which the dissent discusses in painful repetition, are incriminatingly tinged
by S.W.’s own admissions, which demonstrate her culpability for her conduct of the same sort.

5

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sexual orientation to her mother; all were subsequently dismissed.8 Then, on
December 10, 2010, Wyatt, as next-friend of her minor daughter S.W., filed a
complaint in federal court against KISD, and, in their personal capacities,
against KHS assistant athletic director Douglas Duke,9 Fletcher, and Newell, for
violating S.W.’s federal rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
and state privacy rights under the Texas Constitution. In their answer,
Defendants pleaded the affirmative defense of Texas official immunity for KISD
on the state claims and qualified immunity for Fletcher and Newell on the
federal claims. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, and
the coaches moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

The magistrate judge rejected the defense of qualified immunity and
consequently denied the coaches’ motion for summary judgment. The magistrate
judge cited “multiple unresolved questions of fact.” With regard to Wyatt’s
Fourth Amendment claim of unlawful seizure, the court said “there remains a
genuine material issue of fact as to whether there was an objectively reasonable
basis for the coaches’ actions including factual disputes over what transpired
behind the closed doors of the locker room.” With regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy claim, the magistrate judge held that S.W.’s right
to privacy in her sexual orientation was clearly established, and summary
judgment was premature due to unresolved questions of fact – such as “whether
the Coaches[] disclosed S.W.’s sexual orientation as retaliation for S.W.’s
conduct, whether they disclosed the identity of Ms. Nutt [to Ms. Wyatt] without

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8 In her original grievance filed with KISD officials, however, Wyatt did not allege
Fletcher and Newell had “outed” her daughter but only that the coaches, following the
meetings outlined above, improperly removed S.W. from the softball team and that the athletic
department failed to respond to Wyatt’s queries in a timely fashion. In short, the claims made
by Wyatt have been a constantly moving target.

9 The court later granted Wyatt’s motion to file an amended complaint and voluntarily
dismiss Duke from the case; thus, he is not a party in this app

Outcome:

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