Date: 10-27-2013

Case Style: Oklahoma Oncology, Inc. v. Supriya Koya

Case Number: CJ-2012-4524

Judge: Linda G. Morrissey

Court: District Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney: Rebecca D. Stanglein for Oklahoma Oncology, Inc.

Defendant's Attorney: Steven M. Harris and S. Max Harris

Description: Oklahoma Oncology, Inc. sued Supriya Koya on breach of a promissory note, breach of contract, and interference with economic prospective advantage theories claiming:

1. 001 is and was at all times herein mentioned an Oklahoma corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oklahoma, with its principal place of business in Tulsa County, Oklahoma.

2. Upon information and belief, Koya is a resident of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.

3. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court.

4. In February 2010, Koya accepted $30,000.00 from 001 in exchange for Koya’s agreement to remain employed by 001 for at least sixty (60) months. Koya signed a Promissory Note for such amount, that by its terms, would be forgiven if Koya honored her promise to remain employed by 001 for a period of 60 months, at which time the Promissory Note would be forgiven. A true and correct copy of the April 30, 2010, Promissory Note signed by Koya is attached as Exhibit “A”.

5. On May 29, 2012, Koya submitted a letter of resignation effective after July 31, 2012. On July 5, 2012, Koya notified Kent Butcher, CEO of 001, that Koya had decided to accept employment with another medical practice affiliated with a Tulsa hospital and leave the employment of 001.

6. In light of Koya’s voluntary termination of her employment by 001 before the expiration of sixty (60) months, Koya is obligated to repay the $30,000.00 paid to her by 001 as set forth in the Promissory Note dated April 30, 2010.

7. To date, 001 has received absolutely no payments or reimbursements from Koya pursuant to her obligations in the Promissory Note.

8. 001 is entitled to judgment against Koya in the amount of Thirty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($30,000.00) for the principal sum now due and owing under the Promissory Note, together with interest accrued through July 5, 2012, at the rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum as set forth in the Promissory Note, in the amount of $3,925.38. Interest continues to accrue after July 5, 2012, at the rate of Ten Percent (10%) per annum as set forth in the Promissory Note, at the rate of $8.22 per day, until paid in full.

WHEREFORE, OUT prays for judgment against Koya for the principal sum of $30,000.00, together with (a) interest accrued through July 5, 2012, in the amount of $3,925.38, (b), interest accruing on the principal after July 5, 2012, at the rate of $8.22 per day, (c) all costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, and (d) such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Defendant appeared, answered and counterclaimed as follows:

1 Dr Koya admits the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Petition.

2 Dr Koya admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Petition.

3 Dr Koya admits the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Petition

4. Dr. Koya denies the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Petition. In further response to the allegations stated in paragraph 4 of the Petition, Dr. Koya states:

a. The promissory note on which 001 has brought suit, provides in pertinent part:

“This Note is made, issued and accepted pursuant to that certain Employment Agreement Between Oklahoma Oncology, Inc. and Physician, dated as of February 11, 2010, between Maker and Oklahoma Oncology, Inc.”

According to the promissory note which serves as the sole basis for the suit filed by 001, the promissory note is allegedly part of the employment contract made between 001 and Dr. Koya. For the reasons stated below the promissory note is unenforceable and/or void.

In January 2010 Dr. Koya and 001 began negotiations regarding the terms of an employment contract wherein Dr. Koya would become an employed physician with 001. On February 4, 2010 Kent Butcher, the chief executive officer of 001, sent Dr. Koya a letter outlining proposed terms to be included in a contract along with a draft copy of the contract. Mr. Butcher made clear that the terms of his letter and the employment contract would constitute the agreement of the parties. Exhibit 1 attached to this answer is a true and correct copy of Mr. Butcher’s letter. Exhibit 3 attached to this answer is a true and correct copy of the executed employment contract signed by the parties in February 2010. As explained in greater detail below, 001 is in material breach of its contract with Dr. Koya. The material breach precludes 001 from any recovery in this case. The material breach of contract by 001 entitles Dr. Koya to judgment against 001 on 001’s petition and an award of attorney fees. The material breach of contract by 001 also entitles Dr. Koya to judgment against 001 for damages as explained in Dr. Koya’s counterclaim. b. Included within the terms in Mr. Butcher’s letter (Exhibit 1) was the provision that: (i) Dr. Koya would be informed no less than 6 months prior to the end of the initial term of the employment contract regarding whether 001 would offer Dr. Koya the opportunity to become a stockholder of 001. The initial term of the employment contract (Exhibit 3) ended on July 31, 2012. (ii) Any repayment requirement which Dr. Koya may owe 001 would be excused if Dr. Koya’s termination of employment was due to a material breach of the employment contract by 001. 001 breached the employment contract in multiple material ways as further explained in the answer to this petition. Each such breach described below was a material breach and in the aggregate constitute a material breach.

(i) At least one way in which 001 breached the employment contract was that 001 failed to inform Dr. Koya at least 6 months prior to July 31, 2012 of OOPs intention as to whether Dr. Koya would be offered an opportunity to become a shareholder of 001. (ii) Another way in which 001 breached the employment contract was that 001 terminated Dr. Koya’s employment without cause and in violation of and in breach of the employment contract. This termination by 001 occurred on July 6, 2012. See Exhibit 5, a true and correct copy of a termination of employment letter served on Dr. Koya on July 6, 2012. In the first paragraph of the letter, 001 states that July 6, 2012 is the last day of Dr. Koy&s employment. This premature termination of the employment contract made effective on July 6, 2012 by 001 was a breach of the employment contract. This breach was intentional and designed to accomplish several improper purposes including but not limited to interrupting the medical care that Dr. Koya was providing to her patients so that 001 could obtain control over the medical care of those patients and interfere with Dr. Koy&s prospective economic advantage relative to continued relations with said patients. OOFs motivation was to gain a financial advantage over Dr. Koya to the detriment and harm of Dr. Koya. 001 later acknowledged that it had indeed breached the employment contract and paid Dr. Koya her contractual salary through the end of July 31, 2012. However such payment did not cure the breach of contract and the payment did not fully pay Dr. Koya for all economic injury she had suffered as a result of the breach committed by 001.

(iii) Another way in which 001 breached the employment contract with Dr. Koya, resulted from the premature termination of medical malpractice insurance coverage by 001. Although 001 contractually agreed to maintain medical malpractice insurance coverage for Dr. Koya through July 31, 2012, 00! terminated such coverage on or about July 7, 2012. Exhibit 7 attached to this answer is evidence of 001’s cancellation of medical malpractice insurance on Dr. Koya. Dr. Koya was forced to purchase alternative insurance coverage to replace the coverage 001 had contractually agreed to provide and pay for. 00! later admitted that it had breached the employment contract through the premature termination of insurance coverage and arranged to reimburse Dr. Koya for her expense in purchasing alternative insurance coverage through obtaining a credit on Dr. Koya’s credit card that she used to purchase the alternative insurance coverage. The fact that 001 arranged to cause a credit to be issued on Dr. Koya’s credit card did not cure the breach committed by 001. 001 was merely taking steps to mitigate the damage and injury it had caused Dr. Koya to suffer. Dr. Koya is entitled to, at a minimum, nominal damages for this independent and discrete breach of the employment contract. (iv) Because 001 was a first breaching party of the employment contract, 001 is barred from seeking any relief from 001 and Dr. Koya, pursuant to common law, is excused of any further performance. Under the terms of Mr. Butcher’s letter (Exhibit 1) which was intended to form, at least in part, the terms of the employment contract, and because Dr. Koya’s employment terminated due

to a breach of the employment contract, 001 contractually agreed that Dr. Koya has no repayment duties or obligations. (v) During contract negotiations 001 provided to Dr. Koya a written outline or summary of the terms that were typical for employed physicians at 001. These terms and conditions were to be a part of the contract made between the parties. A true and correct copy of this summary is attached hereto as Exhibit

2. Included within the outline of terms was a provision that Dr. Koya was to receive a bonus for signing a contract with 001. The amount of the “signing bonus” was $30,000. There was no discussion with Dr. Koya regarding any obligation for Dr. Koya to re-pay the $30,000 under any conditions. No repayment of this $30,000 is referenced in the Butcher letter (Exhibit 1), the summary of contract terms (Exhibit 2) or the employment contract (Exhibit 3). The employment contract (Exhibit 3) was signed by 001 and Dr. Koya in February 2010. The employment contract contains rio reference to a signing bonus, however 001’s obligation to pay a signing bonus was a fundamental understanding of the parties based on their verbal discussions prior to the signing of the employment contract and memorialized in the written contract summary provided to Dr. Koya (Exhibit 2). Although the employment contract was signed in February 2010, Dr. Koya did not receive her signing bonus of $30,000 when the contract was signed.

(vi) In April 2010 Dr. Koya contacted 001 and asked that the signing bonus be paid. 001, recognizing its contractual obligation to pay the signing bonus, complied and sent Dr. Koya a check for $30,000 in April 2010 (approximately 4 months before Dr. Koya began providing medical services under the employment contract - which first began on August 1, 2010). Dr. Koya deposited the check and used the proceeds to assist her and her husband to purchase a home in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Never at any time through the point of payment and through the point in time that Dr. Koya began active work for 001 (August 1, 2010) did 001 suggest or advise Dr. Koya that there was any repayment obligation associated with the signing bonus.

(vii) 001 was the drafter of all contract documents by and between 001 and Dr. Koya (i.e. the Butcher letter, the written contract summary of terms and the employment contract). 001 as also the drafter of the promissory note that 001 is suing on. To the extent an of the contract documents and/or promissory note contain any ambiguity or conflict regarding any of their terms, such uncertainty of the meaning of the ontract terms must be construed in favor of Dr. Koya and against 001, in accord •th 15 O.S. § 170.

(viii) 001’s allegation t at Dr. Koya accepted $30,000 from 001 in February 2010 in exchange for Dr Koya’s agreement to remain employed by 001 for at least sixty months is a false allegation and known to be false by 001 at the time it was made/alleged. Dr. Ko a’s employment contract specified two years as an initial term. 001 had no contra tual obligation to employ Dr. Koya beyond 24 months/2 years. Dr. Koya had no contractual obligation to remain employed by 001 beyond 24 months/2 years. e employment contract contains no provisions for five years of employment. T e $30,000 was paid to Dr. Koya as a signing bonus. The $30,000 was only ii ed to a signing bonus and not linked to any other condition or obligation. The signing bonus money ($30,000) was paid to Dr. Koya in April 2010. The promissory note on which 001 relies (see paragraph 4 of the petition) does not provide that Dr. Koya agreed to remain employed with 001 for 60 months. There is no contractual promise contained within the promissory note wherein Dr. Koya agreed to be employed by 001. There is no corresponding contractual promise (no mutuality of obligation) by 001 to employ Dr. Koya for 60 months, nor are there any terms and conditions associated with any such employment (i.e. no provision regarding compensation to Dr. Koya, etc.).

(ix) The promissory note on which 001 relies is unenforceable as it is contrary to the terms of the employment contract, the Butcher letter and the written summary of contract terms. The promissory note expressly references the employment contract signed by the parties in February 2010 but is in conflict with the terms of the employment contract. The conflict created here is entirely the fault of 001. Any conflict of terms between the promissory note and the employment contract must be construed against 001. Even if the promissory note were valid (which it is not) regarding any obligation to repay the $30,000, Dr. Koya fully complied with the contract conditions which exonerated/released any such purported obligation. Dr. Koya, but for 001’s breach of the employment contract by terminating Dr. Koya prematurely, would have remained employed by 001 until the end of July 31, 2012 thus exonerating/releasing any purported repayment obligation. In the alternative, the promissory note must be reformed in order to express the intent of the parties, namely that Dr. Koya and 001 intended Dr. Koya to be contractually bound to be employed by 001 until July 31, 2012, and if Dr. Koya did not voluntarily terminate employment effective prior to the end of July 31, 2012, no repayment obligation would exist. In the alternative, the reference to 60 months in the promissory note was a result of mutual mistake, and the term 60 months must be reformed to say 24 months. Because Dr. Koya would have remained employed by 001 for 24 months, but for the breach of the employment contract by 001, Dr. Koya has no repayment obligation.

(x) In the alternative, 001 terminated the employment of Dr. Koya without cause and without excuse, making it impossible for Dr. Koya to remain with 001 for 60 months. The termination by 001 was a breach of the employment contract.

(xi) In the alternative, 001 used deception as a means to persuade Dr. Koya to sign the promissory note. In approximately January 2011, (nearly one year after the employment contract was signed and 6 months after Dr. Koya began providing medical services under the employment contract (on August 1, 2010) Mr. Butcher approached Dr. Koya on a day in which Dr. Koya was busy providing medical care to patients. Mr. Butcher advised Dr. Koya that he had a “paper” that he had forgotten to provide Dr. Koya in 2010 and needed her to sign the document. Dr. Koya at the time had no reasonable opportunity to review the document and relying upon the supposed good faith and representation of Mr. Butcher, signed the document hastily and without reading it. The document was the promissory note which 001 refers to in paragraph 4 of the petition. Mr. Butcher failed to disclose to Dr. Koya at the time he requested her to sign the document that it contained a repayment provision for the $30,000 signing bonus and that it also contained a “5 year” provision. Had Dr. Koya known the true circumstances, namely that Mr. Butcher was trying to change the terms of the prior written agreements (or in the alternative had inserted the reference to 5 years in error), Dr. Koya would not have signed the promissory note. As a result of the deception practiced by Mr. Butcher (or as a result of a mutual mistake), the promissory note is void and of no force or effect.

(xii) In the alternative, the promissory note is unenforceable because there is no mutuality of obligation. 001 alleges in paragraph 4 of the petition that Dr. Koya accepted the $30,000 “. ..in exchange for Koya’s agreement to remain employed by 001 for at least sixty months...” However the promissory note contains no provision that 001 is obligated to employ Dr. Koya for 60 months. The promissory note also contains no provision that Dr. Koya agreed to be employed by 001 for 60 months. The promissory note contains no provision as to what Dr. Koya’s level/amount of compensation was to be at the end of 24 months (per her employment contract) during the remaining 3 years. Moreover, 001 terminated Dr. Koya prior to any anticipated voluntary termination by Dr. Koya rendering the condition for repayment under the terms of the note impossible. There is no provision in the note which allows 001 to collect on the note if it is 001 that terminated employment. These facts serve to nullify the promissory note and render it unenforceable. (xiii) In the alternative, the promissory note is unenforceable due to the complete absence of consideration. The $30,000 was a signing bonus as described in a written memorandum provided to Dr. Koya by 001 during contract negotiations. The agreement for 001 to pay Dr. Koya a signing bonus was fully performed and concluded in April 2010, i.e. Dr. Koya signed the contract in February 2010 and the signing bonus was paid in April 2010. In approximately January 2011 when Mr. Butcher asked Dr. Koya to sign the promissory note and “back date” the promissory note to April 2010, Dr. Koya had already received the $30,000. The consideration that passed between the parties in 2010 for the $30,000 was Dr. Koya’s signing of the employment contract and agreeing to be employed by 001 for 24 months. Dr. Koya received no “new consideration” in connection with the signing of the note. 001 provided no new consideration associated with the promissory note. The $30,000 was in fact “past consideration” (as that term is defined by decisions of Oklahoma Appellate Courts) which does not support a new note. The past consideration was specifically paid in connection with the signing of the employment contract and not in any way associated with the promissory note. The promissory note fails for want of consideration.

(xiv) In the alternative, any sums which 001 paid or expended including but not limited to the $30,000 signing bonus constitute recruitment expenses. Paragraph 11(C) (pages 10-11 of the employment contract - Exhibit 3) expressly provides that such recruitment expenses are not reimbursable to 001 if Dr. Koya does not voluntarily terminate her employment with 001 prior to the end of the initial 2 year term of employment. Dr. Koya issued a resignation letter to 001 stating that she would remain employed through the end of the 2 year initial term of the employment contract, but would not continue her employment with 001 past the conclusion of the initial 2 year term. Because Dr. Koya did not voluntarily terminate employment during the initial 2 year term, under the terms of the employment contract Dr. Koya is not responsible to repay any sums to 00I.

5. Dr. Koya denies paragraph 5 of the petition for the reason that it contains inaccuracies. The letter of resignation which was delivered to 001 on May 29, 2012 is attached to this answer as Exhibit 4. This document accurately describes the exact wording of the terms of her resignation and its effective date. The resignation letter was provided to 001 in strict accord with paragraph 11(b) of the employment contract (Exhibit 3). On or about July 5, 2012, Dr. Koya did notify Mr. Butcher that Dr. Koya had obtained employment with St. John Health System (or its affiliate St. John Medical Center). Following 001 learning of this information, 001 commenced retaliation against Dr. Koya by terminating her employment and terminating her medical malpractice insurance, in breach of the employment contract. This retaliation commenced with Dr. Koya receiving a written notice of termination of her employment on July 6, 2012 a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 5. As noted above, this letter, termination of employment and termination of medical malpractice insurance was in material breach of the employment contract.

On the same day (July 6, 2012) 001 continued its retaliation against Dr. Koya by commencing a concerted effort to interfere with her medical practice as a physician and interfere with her doctor-patient relationship with her patients, and interfere with her economic prospective advantage associated with her patients and prospective patients.

The retaliation and interference began with 001’s issuance of a false and deceptive letter to Dr. Koya’s patients, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. The letter was intended to create the false impression with Dr. Koy&s patients that Dr. Koya had immediately terminated employment with 001 and thus was not in a position to maintain a continuity of care for her patients. The truth was, that Dr. Koya had not abruptly terminated employment with 001 when she issued and delivered her letter of resignation on May 29, 2012 but rather planned to continue such care while employed by 001 through the end of July 31, 2012. Dr. Koya had secured employment with St. John Health SystemlSt. John Medical Center effective August 1, 2012 and therefore Dr. Koya was in a position to continue the medical care for her patients without interruption (for all patients that elected to continue their care with Dr. Koya).

001 falsely and fraudulently represented to Dr. Koy&s patients in 001’s July 6, 2012 letter (Exhibit 6), that Dr. Koya had informed 001 of her election to terminate employment on July 5, 2012. The truth was that Dr. Koya had informed 001 on May 29, 2012 that she would not continue employment with 001 after July 31, 2012. 001 has admitted this. The 1st sentence of

001’s July 6, 2012 letter to Dr. Koya stated: “We have received your letter of May 29, 2012 terminating your employment agreement of August 1, 2010 with a termination date being effective July 31, 2012. (Exhibit 5.)

The 60 day advance notice provided by Dr. Koya (served on 001 on May 29, 2012) was a requirement under the employment contract. 001’s letter to patients was intended to cast Dr. Koya in a false and unfavorable light, namely falsely suggesting to patients that Dr. Koya had abandoned her patients (virtually all of which were patients receiving cancer treatment) and was no longer in a position to maintain the continuity of their care and therefore must be treated by other physicians affiliated/employed by 001.

001 further falsely and fraudulently represented to patients that 001 was prevented from providing advance notice to patients of Dr. Koya’s anticipated departure because Dr. Koya had only informed 001 of her decision on July 5, 2012. The truth was that Dr. Koya informed 001 of her decision not to continue employment with 001 after July 31, 2012, on May 29, 2012. This allowed at least two months for 001 to provide patients of Dr. Koya with accurate information so that the patients could make reasoned decisions, based on true facts, about their medical care. 001 played on the emotions of patients, their vulnerability and the nature of their illnesses, by manufacturing a false sense of urgency. 001 falsely and fraudulently manufactured a need for patients to suddenly secure medical care from someone other than Dr. Koya, namely other physicians employed by 001.

The plan and scheme orchestrated by 001 against Dr. Koya was intentional, vindictive and malicious. The plan and scheme is fairly summarized as follows: (1) 001 intended to and did create a false sense of urgency among Dr. Koya’s patients by making false representations about Dr. Koya to patients, to influence the patients’ decisions regarding who would provide medical care to the patients. (2) 001 intended to and did render Dr. Koya unable to provide medical care to her patients by terminating her employment prematurely and barring her from continuing to perform her contractual duties at

001 (i.e. medical care for patients) and therefore precluding her from providing her medical duties to her patients. (3) 001 intended to and did create an artificial and contrived interruption in Dr. Koya’s medical practice since 001 knew or had reason to know, that Dr. Koya could not commence work at St. John Medical Center until August 1, 2012 and therefore had no facility within which to see and treat patients. (4) 001 intended and did use these manufactured circumstances to actively solicit patients in order to persuade them to use other physicians employed by 001 rather than continue their care with Dr. Koya. The plan conceived and executed by 001 was willful, intentional, performed with malice and for a profit motive to benefit 001 and harm Dr. Koya. 001 disregarded what was in the best interests of patients many of which had life threatening illnesses. 001 acted in willful disregard of its contractual duties owed Dr. Koya. In the alternative, 001 acted in reckless disregard of the rights of Dr. Koya and her patients. The nature of OOPs conduct renders it liable for punitive damages as prayed for in Dr. Koya’s counterclaim stated below.

6. Dr. Koya denies paragraph 6 of the petition.

7. Dr. Koya denies paragraph 7 of the petition. 001 is not entitled to any payments or reimbursements for the reasons stated above.

8. Dr. Koya denies paragraph 8 of the petition.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

9. 001’s claims are barred under the doctrine of unclean hands.

10. 001’s claims are barred under the doctrines estoppel and/or equitable estoppel.

11. 001’s claims are barred under the doctrines laches, waiver and ratification.

12. 001’s claims are barred under the doctrine of inequitable conduct.

13. 001’s claims are barred under the doctrine of “first breaching party”. (The non- breaching party is relieved of all contractual duties and responsibilities once the first breaching party has breached the contract.)

14. 001’s claims are barred under the terms of the parties contract and the statute of frauds.

15. 001’s claims are barred under the law of mutual mistake.

16. 001’s claims are barred under the terms of the parties’ contract when such contract is properly reformed to reflect the true intent of the parties.

17. 001’s claims are barred for lack of consideration.

18. 001’s claims are barred for lack of mutuality of obligation.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Dr. Koya prays that all claims for relief sought by 001 be denied and that Dr. Koya be awarded judgment against 001 for her reasonable attorney fees and the reasonable costs of litigation. Dr. Koya further prays for reformation of any document associated with her employment contract to make such documents consistent with the intent of the parties and as expressed in her employment contract, namely that the length of employment was specified to be 2 years. Dr. Koya further prays for relief as demanded in her counterclaim stated below, and such other and additional relief to which her evidence at trial supports.


COUNTERCLAIM

Comes now Dr. Koya and for her counterclaims against the plaintiff 001, alleges and states as follows. Dr. Koya, in support of her counterclaims, incorporates by reference all allegations stated above in answer to the petition into each and every claim stated below as if restated therein in their entirety. Dr. Koya further incorporates into each cause of action stated in her counterclaim, all allegations stated in every other claim/cause of action stated below.

CLAIM 1- BREACH OF CONTRACT

19. 001 has breached its contract with Dr. Koya for the reasons expressed and described above and which have been incorporated herein by reference.

20. Dr. Koya has suffered economic injury as a direct result of 001’s breach of contract which has not yet been calculated with certainty but in any event such economic loss and injury suffered by Dr. Koya as a result of 001’s breach of contract, is in excess of the amount required for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code. In the alternative Dr. Koya has suffered an economic loss or injury as a result of OOPs wrongful conduct and breach and is at a minimum entitled to nominal damages on her breach of contract claim.

21. Dr. Koya is entitled to receive an attorney fee award and her reasonable litigation costs in connection with her breach of contract claim against 001. Dr. Koya is entitled to receive a monetary award for all economic injury she has suffered, or in the alternative for nominal damages. CLAIM 2- NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH DR. KOYA’S ECONOMIC

PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGE

22. Dr. Koya had and has a valid business relationship and a valid business expectancy with her patients and prospective patients. This relationship commenced and continued on and after August 1, 2010. Although employed by 001 from August 1, 2010 through July 6, 2012, Dr. Koya had an independent business relationship and business expectancy with her patients, because there existed a doctor patient relationship between her and her patients. 001 is a business corporation and has no patients. There is no “corporation patient” relationship because Oklahoma does not recognize the corporate practice of medicine. 23. 001 had knowledge of the doctor patient relationship that Dr. Koya had developed with her patients since August 1, 2010. 001 had knowledge that Dr. Koya had and has a valid business relationship and a valid business expectancy with her patients and prospective patients. This relationship commenced and continued on and after August 1, 2010. 24. 001 negligently interfered with Dr. Koya’s doctor patient relationship and negligently interfered with Dr. Koya’s business relationship with her patients and Dr. Koya’s business expectancy with her patients and prospective patients. The details associated with this interference are fairly described above which have been incorporated herein by reference.

25. Dr. Koya has suffered economic injury and an economic loss as a direct result and consequence of 001’s negligent interference in an amount which has not yet been calculated with precision but in any event is in excess of the amount required for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

CLAIM 3-INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH DR. KOYA’S ECONOMIC PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGE

26. Dr. Koya had and has a valid business relationship and a valid business expectancy with her patients and prospective patients. This relationship commenced and continued on and after August 1, 2010. Although employed by 001 from August 1, 2010 through July 6, 2012, Dr. Koya had an independent business relationship and business expectancy with her patients, because there existed a doctor/patient relationship. 001 is a business corporation and has no patients. There is no “corporation patient” relationship because Oklahoma does not recognize the corporate practice of medicine.

27. 001 had knowledge of the doctor patient relationship that Dr. Koya had developed with her patients since August 1, 2010. 001 had knowledge that Dr. Koya had and has a valid business relationship, and a valid business expectancy with her patients and prospective patients. This relationship commenced and continued on and after August 1, 2010.

28. 001 intentionally interfered with Dr. Koya’s doctor patient relationship and intentionally interfered with Dr. Koya’s business relationship with her patients and Dr. Koya’s business expectancy with her patients and prospective patients. The details associated with this interference are fairly described above which have been incorporated herein by reference.

29. Dr. Koya has suffered economic injury and an economic loss as a direct result and consequence of 001’s intentional interference in an amount which has not yet been calculated with precision but in any event is in excess of the amount required for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

30. 001’s actions and wrongful conduct were malicious, vindictive and intentional. 001’s actions were calculated to harm Dr. Koya. As a result, 001 is liable to Dr. Koya for punitive damages to the maximum amount allowed by law. 23 Okl.Stat. §9.1

31. In the alternative, 001’s actions and wrongful conduct were in reckless disregard to the rights of Dr. Koya. As a result, 001 is liable to Dr. Koya for punitive damages to the maximum amount allowed by law. 23 Okl.Stat. §9.1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Claim 1 - Dr. Koya prays she be awarded judgment against 001 for the full amount of her economic injury suffered but in no event less than nominal damages, attorney fees and costs of the action and any further relief Dr. Koya proves she is entitled to or for which the Court deems just and equitable

Claim 2 - Dr. Koya prays she be awarded judgment against 001 for the full amount of her economic injury suffered, attorney fees and costs of the action and any further relief Dr. Koya proves she is entitled to or for which the Court deems just and equitable.

Claim 3 - Dr. Koya prays she be awarded judgment against 001 for the full amount of her economic injury suffered, attorney fees, costs of the action and the maximum amount of punitive damages allowed under Oklahoma law and any further relief Dr. Koya proves she is entitled to or for which the Court deems just and equitable.

Outcome: Settled and dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: Editor's Note: It never ceases to amaze me how much money doctors can spend litigating disputes!