Date: 12-24-2013

Case Style: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONALD BROWN

Case Number: SC 18926

Judge: Vertefeuille

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Plaintiff's Attorney: Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state’s attorney,
and Suzanne M. Vieux, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

Defendant's Attorney: Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellee
(defendant).

Description: The dispositive issue in this certified
appeal is whether the ten year maximum allowable
period of special parole1 established by General Statutes
§ 54-125e (c)2 operates as an aggregate limitation on
the total effective sentence of special parole when a
defendant is convicted of, and sentenced for, multiple
offenses. The state appeals, following our grant of its
petition for certification to appeal,3 from the judgment
of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment
of the trial court denying the motion to correct an illegal
sentence filed by the defendant, Ronald Brown. State
v. Brown, 133 Conn. App. 140, 156, 34 A.3d 1007 (2012).
On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court
improperly interpreted § 54-125e (c) as imposing a ten
year maximum on the aggregate sentence of special
parole and, therefore, improperly concluded that the
two consecutive sentences of special parole at issue in
the present case—neither of which exceeded ten years
individually, but together imposed a total effective sentence
of sixteen years of special parole—violated § 54-
125e (c). We agree with the state, and conclude that
the ten year limitation on a period of special parole
provided for in § 54-125e (c) applies per offense, rather
than to the total effective sentence of special parole.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Court.
The record and the Appellate Court opinion reveal
the following undisputed facts and relevant procedural
history. In 2005, the state charged the defendant, under
Docket No. MV-05-0443087S, with reckless driving in
violation of General Statutes § 14-222 for conduct that
occurred on June 12, 2005, and, under Docket No. CR-
05-0109070, with, inter alia, possession of narcotics with
intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277
(a) for conduct that occurred on July 1, 2005. Id., 142–43.
In 2006, the state charged the defendant, under Docket
No. CR-06-0112604, with, inter alia, sale of narcotics in
violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) for conduct
that occurred on March 6, 2006. Id.
Thereafter, the state and the defendant reached a
plea agreement resolving these three cases and, on January
25, 2007, the prosecutor set forth the details of
that agreement before the trial court. Id., 143. Specifically,
the prosecutor stated that, in exchange for his
guilty pleas to the three particular offenses, the defendant
would be sentenced as follows: (1) on the sale of
narcotics charge, under Docket No. CR-06-0112604, to
a mandatory term of incarceration of five years, followed
by a ten year term of special parole; (2) on the
charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell,
under Docket No. CR-05-0109070, to a term of incarceration
of four years, followed by a six year term of special
parole, both sentences to run consecutively; and (3) on
the reckless driving charge, under Docket No. MV-05-
0443087S, to an unconditional discharge. Id. Additionally,
pursuant to the plea agreement, in exchange for
the defendant’s guilty pleas on these three charges, the
state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi as to numerous
other charges pending against the defendant. Id. The
defendant’s counsel thereafter agreed that the state had
accurately set forth the terms of the plea agreement. Id.
Before accepting the plea agreement, the trial court
canvassed the defendant, ensuring that he understood
that he was agreeing to a ‘‘total effective sentence of
nine years to serve, five of which are a mandatory minimum’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) id.; and that
the terms of incarceration would be ‘‘followed by sixteen
years of special parole.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 144. ‘‘Following the canvass, the court
accepted the defendant’s pleas as having been freely,
voluntarily and intelligently made with the effective
assistance of counsel. The court found a factual basis
for the pleas, and a finding of guilty entered on the
three offenses.
‘‘On March 8, 2007, the defendant appeared before
the court for sentencing. As he had at the January 25,
2007 hearing, the prosecutor set forth the terms of the
plea agreement, and the defendant’s attorney stated his
agreement with those terms. The court sentenced the
defendant according to the plea agreement.
‘‘[Thereafter] [o]n September 22, 2009, the defendant,
as a self-represented party, filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence.4 The gist of the motion was that the
court illegally sentenced him to a sixteen year term of
special parole when, in light of the crimes at issue,
the maximum term of special parole authorized was
ten years.
‘‘On July 12, 2010, the sentencing court held a hearing
to consider the motion to correct. The defendant, [then]
represented by counsel, argued that the court lacked
the authority to sentence him to a term of special parole
that exceeded ten years. The defendant argued that
although the court imposed consecutive sentences
under two docket numbers, it was not authorized to
exceed a ten year maximum term of special parole. The
defendant [also] argued that any ambiguity with regard
to the court’s authority to sentence him in the manner
that it did should favor the defendant such that the
court was required to reduce the term of special parole
from sixteen years to ten years. . . . The court denied
the motion to correct . . . .’’ (Footnotes altered.) Id.,
144–45.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant reiterated
his claim that the total effective sentence of
sixteen years of special parole was ‘‘illegal because it
exceeds the ten year maximum period of special parole
authorized by . . . § 54-125e (c).’’ Id., 145.
In a divided opinion, the Appellate Court majority
first concluded that it was ‘‘not clear from a review of
subsection (c) of § 54-125e whether the ten year limit
on the ‘period of special parole’ limits the special parole
portion of the sentence imposed for individual offenses
or whether it limits a defendant’s aggregate sentence
that arises from his conviction of multiple offenses for
which special parole was imposed by the sentencing
court.’’ Id., 150–51. After noting that the language of
§ 54-125e (c) created a distinction between different
classes of offenders by providing an exception to the
ten year limitation on a period of special parole for
certain offenses, the majority concluded that the ‘‘distinction,
based upon the type of offense committed by
the defendant, [did] not clarify the issue’’ of whether
an aggregate sentence of a period of special parole,
imposed after a conviction of multiple offenses, that
exceeds ten years violates § 54-125e (c). Id., 151.
The majority, therefore, looked to § 54-125e (a),5 and
concluded that the language of that subsection
‘‘acknowledges that, in a situation in which a person
has been sentenced for multiple offenses to terms of
incarceration and special parole, a single ‘period of
special parole’ begins after the expiration of the maximum
terms of incarceration have expired.’’ Id., 152. The
majority further stated that ‘‘[t]he ‘period of special
parole’ that commences after the expiration of a person’s
maximum term or terms of incarceration ‘shall
not be less than one year or more than ten years’ for
a person, like the defendant, who has not been convicted
of one of the enumerated exceptions set forth
in subsection (c) for which a longer period of special
parole may be imposed.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.
After rejecting the state’s argument that numerous other
statutory provisions related to criminal sentencing and
probation reflect that a ‘‘ ‘period of special parole’ refers
to the special parole portion of a sentence imposed
for a single applicable offense’’; id., 153; the majority
concluded that the trial court had ‘‘exceeded its sentencing
authority insofar as it sentenced the defendant
to serve sixteen years of special parole. The court [further]
abused its discretion in denying the motion to
correct because it lacked the authority to sentence the
defendant to a term of special parole that exceeded ten
years’’ in the aggregate. Id., 152–53. Accordingly, the
Appellate Court rendered judgment reversing the trial
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct an
illegal sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.
6 Id., 160. This certified appeal followed. See footnote
3 of this opinion.
On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that the two individual sentences
of special parole, neither of which individually
exceeded ten years, together were illegal under § 54-
125e (c). Specifically, the state contends that a review
of related sentencing statutes reveals that a court may
impose a sentence of up to ten years of special parole
for each individual offense, and that such sentences
may run consecutively even if the aggregate sentence
exceeds ten years. In response, the defendant claims
that § 54-125e (c) is unambiguous and is capable of only
one interpretation, namely, that the ten year maximum
applies to the aggregate sentence. The defendant further
contends that the interpretation advanced by the
state would lead to bizarre results, and that, although
a sentencing court has numerous options with which
to fashion a criminal sanction, those options simply do
not include imposing any period of special parole that
exceeds ten years. We agree with the state that the ten
year limitation on a period of special parole set forth
in § 54-125e (c) applies to each offense, rather than
the aggregate term provided by multiple, consecutive
sentences. We, therefore, conclude that the two consecutive
sentences of special parole imposed by the trial
court in the present case, for a total effective sentence
of sixteen years of special parole, were legal because
neither individual sentence exceeded ten years.
Before turning to the state’s claims on appeal, we set
forth the appropriate standard of review. ‘‘[A] claim
that the trial court improperly denied a defendant’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence is [typically]
reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard.
. . . In the present case, however, the defendant’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence raise[d] a question
of statutory construction. Issues of statutory construction
raise questions of law, over which we exercise
plenary review. . . .
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective
is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in
context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 308 Conn. 263, 269–70,
63 A.3d 934 (2013).
We begin, then, with the text of § 54-125e (c), and
observe that the phrase providing that ‘‘[t]he period of
special parole shall be not less than one year or more
than ten years’’ is not modified by any language specifying
whether that ten year limitation applies to a sentence
of special parole imposed for one offense, or
whether it applies to a defendant’s aggregate sentence
of special parole imposed for multiple offenses. We,
like the Appellate Court majority, note that § 54-125e
(c) further provides an exception to the general ten
year limitation on a period of special parole when a
defendant is convicted of certain specified offenses,
namely, risk of injury to a child, certain sexual assaults,
and being a persistent felony offender, none of which
applies to the defendant in the present case. See footnote
2 of this opinion. Contrary to the Appellate Court
majority, however, we conclude that the exception for
specified offenses in § 54-125e (c) suggests that ‘‘[t]he
period of special parole’’ that is subject to the ten year
limitation is related to a conviction for each offense,
rather than an aggregate sentence for multiple offenses.
Indeed, it seems implausible that the legislature would
have intended the first portion of § 54-125e (c) to apply
to all sentences in the aggregate, while recognizing
exceptions to the ten year limitation for specific, individual
offenses within the same sentence of the statute.
Nevertheless, we agree with the Appellate Court majority
that the text of § 54-125e (c) does not, by itself,
clearly reveal the legislature’s intent with respect to
the applicability of the ten year limitation. See State v.
Brown, supra, 133 Conn. App. 150–51.
Therefore, we look to other subsections of § 54-125e
to attempt to ascertain the meaning of ‘‘[t]he period of
special parole’’ in § 54-125e (c). Like Judge Bear in his
well reasoned dissent, we find the language of § 54-
125e (a) instructive in divining the intent of the legislature
with respect to the applicability of the ten year
limitation provided in § 54-125e (c). See State v. Brown,
supra, 133 Conn. App. 163–64 (Bear, J., dissenting).
Section 54-125e (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny
person convicted of a crime . . . who received a definite
sentence of more than two years [of incarceration]
followed by a period of special parole shall, at the
expiration of the maximum term or terms of imprisonment
imposed by the court, be automatically transferred
to the jurisdiction of the chairperson of the Board
of Pardons and Paroles . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In
our view, the terms ‘‘a crime,’’ ‘‘a definite sentence,’’
and ‘‘a period of special parole’’ used in § 54-125e (a)—
all of which are expressed in the singular—indicate that
a period of special parole not to exceed ten years can
be imposed upon any person who is convicted of a
crime. Thus, when an individual is convicted of multiple
offenses, it logically follows that a period of special
parole may be imposed for each offense.
Indeed, ‘‘[a]lthough General Statutes § 1-1 (f) provides
that [w]ords importing the singular number may
extend and be applied to several persons or things, and
words importing the plural number may include the
singular, we have held that because § 1-1 (f) uses the
word may it is clearly directory and not mandatory.
. . . [S]uch statutory expressions are legislative statements
of a general principle of interpretation. . . . The
principle does not require that singular and plural word
forms have interchangeable effect, and discrete applications
are favored except where the contrary intent or
reasonable understanding is affirmatively indicated.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shawhan v. Langley,
249 Conn. 339, 347, 732 A.2d 170 (1999). Viewing
this concept in practice, we have held that the legislature’s
use of both the singular and plural forms of a
term in a statute ‘‘is a strong indication that the use of
the singular was deliberate.’’ Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon,
220 Conn. 30, 36 n.6, 594 A.2d 977 (1991). Similarly, we
have held that when statutory language is framed, as
a whole, in the singular, it suggests that the statute
contemplates the relevant terms in the singular. See
Shawhan v. Langley, supra, 344 (‘‘[t]he language of
the statute [regarding an offer of judgment], which is
framed in the singular, suggests . . . that the statute
contemplates one offer of judgment’’ [emphasis
added]). In this regard, contrary to the defendant’s interpretation,
we do not believe that the legislature would
have used the singular forms of ‘‘a crime’’ and ‘‘a definite
sentence’’ in § 54-125e (a) to encompass both a single
crime and single definite sentence and multiple crimes
and multiple definite sentences, while limiting the singular
form of ‘‘a period of special parole’’ in the same
sentence to exclude multiple periods of special parole.
Furthermore, we disagree with the Appellate Court
majority and the defendant that the phrase ‘‘term or
terms of imprisonment’’ in § 54-125e (a) indicates that
the trial court has the authority to sentence a defendant
to multiple terms of imprisonment, but only a single
term of special parole not to exceed ten years. On the
contrary, we, like the state, read the phrase ‘‘term or
terms of imprisonment’’ simply to indicate the starting
point for any postincarceration period of special parole.
Section 54-125e (a) contemplates the potential for a
defendant to have been convicted of multiple offenses
and sentenced to multiple terms of incarceration. In
that respect, the statute requires that a defendant be
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons
and Paroles only after he has served all of the terms
of incarceration for which he has been sentenced.
Therefore, § 54-125e (a) merely establishes the time at
which an individual will begin serving any term of special
parole to which he has been sentenced, specifically,
only after he has completed any and all periods of
incarceration. The statute does not, as the defendant
contends, indicate that, although the legislature used
the singular terms ‘‘a crime,’’ ‘‘a definite sentence,’’ and
‘‘a period of special parole,’’ it intended the phrase ‘‘a
period of special parole’’ to be read in the singular.
General Statutes § 54-125e (a).
A review of the relationship of § 54-125e (c) to other
criminal and sentencing statutes further supports an
interpretation of § 54-125e (c) as limiting a sentencing
court’s ability to impose a sentence of special parole
to a maximum of ten years for each offense, rather than
in the aggregate. We begin by noting that our sentencing
statutes are structurally organized per offense, and provide
that a separate sentence shall be imposed for each
offense. See General Statutes § 53a-28 (a) (‘‘[e]xcept as
provided in section 17a-6997 and chapter 420b,8 to the
extent that the provisions of said section and chapter
are inconsistent herewith, every person convicted of
an offense shall be sentenced in accordance with this
title’’ [emphasis added; footnotes added]). Section 53a-
28 (b) provides: ‘‘Except as provided in section 53a-
46a, when a person is convicted of an offense, the court
shall impose one of the following sentences: (1) A term
of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence authorized by section
18-65a or 18-73; or (3) a fine; or (4) a term of
imprisonment and a fine; or (5) a term of imprisonment,
with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment
suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court,
and a period of probation or a period of conditional
discharge; or (6) a term of imprisonment, with the execution
of such sentence of imprisonment suspended,
entirely or after a period set by the court, and a fine
and a period of probation or a period of conditional
discharge; or (7) a fine and a sentence authorized by
section 18-65a or 18-73; or (8) a sentence of unconditional
discharge; or (9) a term of imprisonment and a
period of special parole as provided in section 54-125e.’’
(Emphasis added.) Section 53a-28 (b) (9) expressly provides
that one of the sentencing options for conviction
of ‘‘an offense’’ is ‘‘a term of imprisonment and a period
of special parole as provided in section 54-125e.’’
(Emphasis added.) Our general sentencing scheme and
§ 53a-28 (a) and (b), therefore, further support our interpretation
that the limitation on a period of special parole
established by § 54-125e (c) similarly applies per
offense rather than in the aggregate.
Another statute referencing special parole also suggests
that the limitation on a period of special parole
should be read as limited to a single offense. In setting
forth the rules for returning a defendant to the jurisdiction
of the Department of Correction after a special
parole violation, the language of General Statutes § 54-
128 (c) references a single term of special parole in
relation to a single offense for which the person was
convicted. See General Statutes § 54-128 (c) (‘‘[t]he total
length of the term of incarceration [after a person has
been returned to the Department of Correction for a
violation of special parole] and term of special parole
combined shall not exceed the maximum sentence of
incarceration authorized for the offense for which the
person was convicted’’ [emphasis added]). Thus, it
becomes clear that, in all references to special parole,
the legislature has related the conviction of a single
offense to the imposition of a single period of special
parole.
Moreover, our statutes that generally address multiple
convictions and the imposition of multiple sentences
of imprisonment provide the trial court with the
authority to determine whether those sentences should
run concurrently or consecutively. See General Statutes
§ 53a-37 (‘‘[w]hen multiple sentences of imprisonment
are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a
person who is subject to any undischarged term of
imprisonment imposed at a previous time . . . is sentenced
to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence
or sentences imposed by the court shall run either
concurrently or consecutively with respect to each
other and to the undischarged term or terms in such
manner as the court directs at the time of sentence’’).
In the related context of probation, however, the legislature
expressly has deprived the trial court of the authority
to impose sentences of probation consecutively.
General Statutes § 53a-31 (a) provides that ‘‘[m]ultiple
periods [of probation], whether imposed at the same
or different times, shall run concurrently.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Neither § 53a-28 (b) (9), which provides the
trial court with the authority to impose a sentence of
special parole, nor § 54-125e (c), which establishes the
ten year maximum allowable sentence of special parole,
similarly restricts the trial court’s authority to impose
multiple sentences of special parole consecutively,
whether imposed at the same or different times.
It is clear, therefore that, when the legislature intends
to limit the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence
of postincarceration supervision consecutively or concurrently,
it has done so expressly, and its failure to
limit, by express terms, the trial court’s authority in the
context of special parole indicates that the legislature
had no intention to limit the trial court’s sentencing
authority beyond setting a maximum allowable sentence
that the trial court could consider when sentencing
a defendant convicted of an offense.
Our interpretation is further bolstered by the fact
that, contrary to the defendant’s contention, an interpretation
of § 54-125e (c) limiting any aggregate sentence
of special parole to a maximum of ten years, rather than
viewing the statute as imposing a ten year maximum
allowable sentence per offense, would lead to bizarre
and unworkable results. Although interpreting the ten
year limitation to apply to an aggregate sentence may
be workable under the circumstances of the present
case, namely, where the defendant was sentenced on
two separate docket numbers for two separate criminal
incidents at the same sentencing hearing after he had
pleaded guilty to those charges pursuant to an overall
plea agreement, we can see bizarre and unworkable
results under the Appellate Court’s interpretation when
a defendant is convicted of two (or more) separate
offenses at different times.
By way of example, assume that the defendant was
convicted of the two offenses relevant to this case in
2005 and 2006, respectively, rather than pleading guilty
to those offenses together in 2007. Had the defendant
been convicted and sentenced to ten years of special
parole for his 2005 offenses in 2005, under the Appellate
Court majority’s interpretation, it would appear that the
trial court would be unable to exercise its authority
pursuant to § 53a-28 (b) (9) to impose a sentence of
incarceration followed by a period of special parole for
the defendant’s 2006 offenses in 2006.9 We do not
believe that the legislature intended § 54-125e (c) to
leave so many questions unanswered. Nor do we believe
that the legislature intended to deprive the trial court
of its authority to impose a sentence of special parole
under § 53a-28 (b) (9) simply on the basis of the timing
of a defendant’s multiple convictions.
Finally, although the interpretation of § 54-125e advocated
for by the defendant, along with his proposed
remedy of simply shortening his sixteen year total effective
sentence of special parole to ten years, would yield
a favorable result for this defendant, we do not believe
that, as a general matter, construing the statute to limit
the allowable sentence of special parole to no more
than ten years in the aggregate would benefit the criminal
justice system as a whole. Indeed, the defendant
conceded at oral argument before this court that so
construing the statute might well result in the state
being unwilling to negotiate favorable terms for criminal
defendants in plea agreements for multiple crimes,
which could lead to longer terms of incarceration for
some of those defendants. An interpretation of § 54-
125e (c) that would not only allow, but essentially
require, a trial court to consider and impose a longer
term of incarceration even when an individual meets
the qualifications for special parole, is not reasonable.
We do not believe that the legislature intended such a
bizarre result.
After our careful review of the language of § 54-125e
(c), in the context of §§ 54-125e (a), 54-128 (c), 53a-28,
53a-37, and 53a-31 (a), we conclude that the legislature
clearly intended to provide the trial court with the
authority to impose a sentence of up to ten years of
special parole for each offense for which a defendant
is convicted. We further determine that the legislature
has not expressed any intention to prevent a trial court
from imposing such sentences of special parole consecutively
if it deems appropriate, regardless of whether
such consecutive sentences impose a total effective
sentence of more than ten years of special parole.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court
improperly reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 Pursuant to § 54-124a (j) (1)-1 (19) of the Regulations of Connecticut
State Agencies, ‘‘ ‘[s[pecial [p]arole’ means that period of supervision of an
offender ordered by the court to follow a term of imprisonment, subject
to conditions of parole set by the Board [of Pardons and Paroles or its
chairperson], as provided in sections 53a-28 (b) (9) and 54-125e of the
Connecticut General Statutes.’’
2 General Statutes § 54-125e (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The period of
special parole shall be not less than one year or more than ten years, except
that such period may be for more than ten years for a person convicted of
a violation of . . . subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or
section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b or sentenced as
a persistent dangerous felony offender pursuant to subsection (h) of section
53a-40 or as a persistent serious felony offender pursuant to subsection (j)
of section 53a-40.’’
3 We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the
following questions: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to
correct an illegal sentence?’’; and (2) ‘‘If the answer to question one is in the
affirmative, did the Appellate Court properly determine that the appropriate
remedy was to remand the case for resentencing, rather than to vacate the
defendant’s guilty pleas?’’ State v. Brown, 304 Conn. 901, 901–902, 37 A.3d
745 (2012). Because we answer the first question in the negative, we do not
reach the second question.
4 ‘‘The defendant brought the motion pursuant to ‘Practice Book Rule 93-
22,’ a provision that does not exist.’’ State v. Brown, supra, 133 Conn. App.
144 n.2. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court treated the motion as
one properly filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22, which governs motions
to correct an illegal sentence. Id. We, likewise, view the defendant’s motion
as a motion filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. See generally Oliphant
v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761 (2005)
(‘‘[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of
pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties
to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party. . . .
The modern trend . . . is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically,
rather than narrowly and technically. . . . The courts adhere to this rule
to ensure that pro se litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard,
regardless of their lack of legal education and experience . . . .’’ [Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).
5 General Statutes § 54-125e (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person
convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1998, who received
a definite sentence of more than two years followed by a period of special
parole shall, at the expiration of the maximum term or terms of imprisonment
imposed by the court, be automatically transferred to the jurisdiction of the
chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Paroles or, if such person has
previously been released on parole pursuant to subsection (a) of section
54-125a or section 54-131a, remain under the jurisdiction of said chairperson
until the expiration of the period of special parole imposed by the court.
. . .’’
6 In his dissent, Judge Bear disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that
the trial court had improperly denied the defendant’s motion to correct.
State v. Brown, supra, 133 Conn. App. 160. Relying on the language of § 54-
125e (c), when read in context with § 54-125e (a) and General Statutes §§ 54-
128 (c), 53a-28, and 53a-37, Judge Bear concluded that ‘‘the sentencing court
may sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment and special parole for
each crime upon which he or she is convicted, provided [that] each individual
sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence allowed for that offense,
and that the court has the authority to order those sentences to run consecutively,
even if the aggregate term of special parole exceeds ten years.’’ Id.,
165–66 (Bear, J., dissenting). Judge Bear also noted in his dissent that, even
if it were assumed, arguendo that the language of § 54-125e was not plain
and unambiguous, the legislative history of a proposed amendment to that
statute further indicated that the legislature intended the ten year maximum
to apply to each sentence of special parole rather than an aggregate sentence
for multiple convictions. Id., 167–70.
7 General Statutes § 17a-699 (b) provides the trial court with the additional
authority to ‘‘impose a sentence and order [drug or alcohol] treatment . . .
if the court finds that (1) the convicted person was an alcohol-dependent
or drug-dependent person at the time of the crime for which he was convicted,
(2) there was a relationship between the dependency and the crime,
(3) the person presently needs and is likely to benefit from treatment for
the dependency, (4) the person is not ineligible under subsection (a) of this
section [which excludes any person convicted of certain, specified violent
offenses or any person who has been previously ordered to undergo drug
or alcohol treatment from eligibility] and (5) the person meets the criteria
for probation under subsection (c) of section 53a-29.’’ (Emphasis added.)
8 Chapter 420b, General Statutes § 21a-240 et seq., provides the trial court
with the authority to impose specified sentences for certain specified
offenses related to controlled substances.
9 It is also entirely unclear what result the Appellate Court majority’s
interpretation would yield should a defendant be convicted of a second
offense after he has begun to serve, or already has completed serving, a
sentence of special parole imposed for a prior offense. For example, if we
assume that a defendant had served two years of a ten year special parole
sentence for the prior offense, would the trial court in the second case have
the authority to impose a sentence of two additional years of special parole?
Or, would the first conviction and sentence of ten years of special parole
preclude a future trial court from ever imposing any new term of special
parole?

Outcome: The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: