Date: 03-13-2014

Case Style: State of Utah v. Luis Miguel Cristobal

Case Number: 2014 UT 55

Judge: Christiansen

Court: The Utah Court of Appeals on appeal from the Fourth District Court, Provo Department

Plaintiff's Attorney: Sean D. Reyes and Andrew F. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Defendant's Attorney: Margaret P. Lindsay and Douglas J. Thompson, Attorneys for Appellant

Description: ¶1 Defendant Luis Miguel Cristobal appeals his first degree
felony aggravated robbery conviction. Defendant argues that the
trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. We
affirm.
State v. Cristobal
2. “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict
and recite them accordingly.” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶ 2, 84
P.3d 1183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
20120309-CA 2 2014 UT App 55
¶2 Defendant’s conviction stems from his role in the robbery of
a Springville convenience store in November 2010.2 During trial,
Defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s
case. Defendant argued that the State’s evidence did not create “a
sufficient nexus under the law” connecting Defendant to the
commission of the robbery. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(p) (“At the
conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any
information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense
charged therein or any lesser included offense.”). After briefly
reviewing the evidence, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion.
The jury subsequently convicted Defendant, and the court
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life.
Defendant timely appeals.
¶3 In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we “will
uphold the trial court’s decision if, upon reviewing the evidence
and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we
conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶ 29, 84 P.3d 1183
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (“When a motion for a
directed verdict is made at the close of the State’s case, the trial
court should dismiss the charge if the State did not establish a
prima facie case against the defendant by producing believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, “[i]f there is any
evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which tends to show
guilt of the crime charged or any of its degrees, it is the trial court’s
State v. Cristobal
20120309-CA 3 2014 UT App 55
duty to submit the case to the jury.” Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶ 33
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
¶4 We note that when a “prosecution is built upon
circumstantial evidence, the government depends upon inferences
to carry its burden . . . [and] probative inferences must be more
than speculation and conjecture.” United States v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628,
632 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
accord State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 1096. Thus,
where there is an absence of direct evidence supporting each
element of the crime charged, a jury’s guilty verdict must be based
upon reasonable inferences. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 10. A
reasonable inference is a conclusion that can be drawn from the
evidence and is based on logic and reasonable human experience.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993); see also Cristobal,
2010 UT App 228, ¶ 16 (“‘The line between a reasonable inference
that may permissibly be drawn by a jury from basic facts in
evidence and an impermissible speculation . . . is drawn by the laws
of logic. If there is an experience of logical probability that an
ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical fact, then
the jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because
there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the
proven facts.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sunward Corp. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987))). Additionally,
“a reasonable inference arises when the facts can reasonably be
interpreted to support a conclusion that one possibility is more
probable than another.” Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 16.
¶5 Here, we determine that the State submitted believable and
sufficient evidence, even if circumstantial, on each element of the
crime of aggravated robbery for the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant participated in the robbery.
Relevant to this case, Utah law provides that a “person commits
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he . . .
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.” Utah Code Ann.
State v. Cristobal
3. Under Utah law, a person commits robbery if
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or
attempts to take personal property in the possession
of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, by means of force or fear, and with
a purpose or intent to deprive the person
permanently or temporarily of the personal property;
or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force
or fear of immediate force against another in the
course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (LexisNexis 2012). Also, Utah law
defines the term “dangerous weapon” as
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if:
(i) the actor’s use or apparent intended use of
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally
or in any other manner that he is in control of such
an item.
Id. § 76-1-601(5).
20120309-CA 4 2014 UT App 55
§ 76-6-302(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 3 The store clerk who was
working the night of the robbery testified that two men, both
wearing masks, entered the store, threatened the clerk with a knife,
and instructed the clerk to open the cash register and give them the
money. The clerk’s testimony was confirmed by the detective who
investigated the crime scene and who viewed surveillance video of
the robbery. Based on this evidence, it is undisputed that a robbery
occurred and that a dangerous weapon was used in its commission.
Thus, the principal issue at trial was who committed the robbery.
State v. Cristobal
20120309-CA 5 2014 UT App 55
¶6 According to the detective, the surveillance video showed
one of the robbers look at his hand and then bring it to his mouth
shortly after he threatened the clerk with the knife. The detective
testified that it appeared the robber was trying to remove blood
from his finger. From this, the jury could have reasonably inferred
that the robber cut himself while handling the knife. The apparent
attempt by the robber to stop the bleeding from his finger led the
Detective to search for blood evidence in the store. Both the
detective and another officer testified that they found two blood
spatters inside the store and one spatter outside the store. The
evidence revealed that the location of the blood spatters was
consistent with where the robbers stood during the robbery and the
direction in which the robbers fled after exiting the store. From this,
the jury could have reasonably inferred that the robber’s blood
dripped on the store floor during the robbery and then again
outside the store as the robbers fled the scene. This inference is
further strengthened by the clerk’s testimony that he had mopped
the store floor with a machine about a half hour before the robbery,
and by the detective’s testimony that at least one of the spatters
“had a redder tint to it” and was not “as dark as the other two,”
which left the detective with the “impression it was fresher, but not
completely dry.” Finally, the State presented DNA evidence that
conclusively linked the three blood spatter samples found in the
store and outside to Defendant.
¶7 All of the inferences that the jury would have been required
to draw in this case to reach a conviction were based on logic and
reasonable human experience. See Workman, 852 P.2d at 985.
Because these inferences “support a conclusion that one possibility
is more probable than another,”—i.e., that Defendant as opposed
to somebody else committed the aggravated robbery—the
inferences are reasonable and not speculative. See Cristobal, 2010 UT
App 228, ¶ 16. This is not a case in which the evidence and
inferences derived therefrom support two equally-plausible
conclusions. See id. Thus, we agree with the State’s assertion that it
“presented competent evidence covering every step in the logical
chain.” We also agree with Defendant’s notable concession that
State v. Cristobal
20120309-CA 6 2014 UT App 55
“the direct evidence (blood matching [Defendant’s] DNA at the
scene, the mopping of the floors, the robber putting his hand to his
mouth) can lead to the inference that the blood came from the
robber and the robber was [Defendant].” Therefore, “upon
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably
drawn from it,” we conclude that some evidence exists from which
a reasonable jury could find that the elements of aggravated
robbery—and Defendant’s participation in that robbery—“had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Montoya, 2004 UT 5,
¶ 29 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict.

Outcome: See above

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