Date: 06-30-2015

Case Style: Barbara J. Fuller v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., et al

Case Number: 14-13789

Judge: Per Curiam

Court: United States Court of Appeals on the Eleventh Circuit on appeal from the Northern District of Georgia (Fulton County)

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: The plaintiffs in these two cases appeal from several orders and a judgment
entered in the district court concerning their claims that the defendants breached
their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. This Court has previously considered the
dismissal of Barbara J. Fuller’s claims, see Fuller v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 744
F.3d 685 (11th Cir. 2014), but this is the first time that Selethia Pruitt’s case has
been presented to us.
While these appeals were pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Tibble v. Edison International, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015). In Tibble, the
Supreme Court determined that, under trust law, which illuminates the contours of
an ERISA fiduciary’s duties, “a fiduciary normally has a continuing duty of some
kind to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones.” 135 S. Ct. at 1828-29.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can effectively allege that a
defendant breached its duty of prudence under ERISA “by failing to properly
monitor investments and remove imprudent ones[,] . . . [and] so long as the alleged
breach of the continuing duty occurred within six years of suit, the claim is
timely.” Id. at 1829.
The parties, in their supplemental discussions of Tibble before this Court,
agree with each other that these cases should be remanded to the district court for
further proceedings, in light of Tibble. We agree with the parties. The Supreme
Court’s Tibble decision essentially abrogates that part of the prior panel’s decision
in Fuller’s case concerning the application of ERISA’s six-year statute of
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limitations. Tibble similarly undermines the district court’s dismissal of Pruitt’s
claims as barred by the six-year limitation. In light of Tibble and the parties’
supplemental notices and agreement that remand is appropriate, we no longer feel
that oral argument is necessary in these cases.
1
We therefore VACATE the
judgment and dismissal in Pruitt’s case and remand to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion and Tibble. Similarly, we VACATE the
district court’s denial of Fuller’s motion under Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and remand for further proceedings.2
The plaintiffs also ask that we assign this case to a new district judge on
remand because, they contend, the judge “has made up her mind that it is not
feasible to try [this] case, and that she would rule against Plaintiffs at every stage
to prevent the case from going forward.” Upon consideration, we do not believe
that reassignment is warranted here.
While reassigning a case to a different district judge falls within our
authority, we have described that course of action as a “severe remedy.” See
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Remillong, 55 F.3d 572, 577 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The propriety
1 See 11th Cir. R. 34-3(f) (“When an appeal is assigned to an oral argument panel, the
oral argument panel . . . may by unanimous vote determine that the appeal will be decided by the
panel without oral argument, or transfer the appeal to the non-argument calendar.”)
2 We note that procedurally, of course, Tibble does not overturn our prior panel’s
affirmance of the judgment in Fuller’s case. By remanding Fuller’s case, we are merely
returning jurisdiction to the district court for consideration of any post-judgment motions Fuller
wishes to make. We offer no opinion on the proper resolution of any such motions.
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of doing so is informed by three factors: “(1) whether the original judge would
have difficulty putting his previous views and findings aside; (2) whether
reassignment is appropriate to preserve the appearance of justice; (3) whether
reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to the gains
realized from reassignment.” Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1373 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs offer argument on the first and third factors
only.
We disagree that the judge’s ruminations on the potential quality of Pruitt’s
trial evidence suggest that she would improperly disregard or misweigh that
evidence. Further, the fact that the district judge ruled against the appellants
previously is of little impact; otherwise, every reversed case would have to be
reassigned on remand. And as the defendants point out, the fact that the judge was
able to reconsider and set aside her reasoning from Fuller’s case when adjudicating
Pruitt’s suggests that she would not have a problem setting aside her previous
views. Finally, although the case is still at the pleadings stage, the district judge
has been assigned to Fuller’s case for over four years and to Pruitt’s for nearly
three. She has expended significant effort on the not-so-simple issues of ERISA’s
fiduciary duties. Because we can discern very little, if any, benefit from
reassignment, the “waste and duplication” of a reassignment outweighs any gains.
Accordingly, the request for reassignment on remand is denied.
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Outcome: VACATED AND REMANDED.

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